







Published by the IEEE Computer Society
10662 Los Vaqueros Circle  
P.O. Box 3014   
Los Alamitos, CA 90720-1314
IEEE Computer Society Order Number P3023























Formal Methods in 





in Computer Aided Design 
FMCAD 2007 
November 11–14, 2007 
Austin, Texas, USA 
Los Alamitos, California 
Washington •       Tokyo
Copyright © 2007 by The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. 
All rights reserved. 
Copyright and Reprint Permissions: Abstracting is permitted with credit to the source. Libraries may photocopy 
beyond the limits of US copyright law, for private use of patrons, those articles in this volume that carry a code at 
the bottom of the first page, provided that the per-copy fee indicated in the code is paid through the Copyright 
Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA  01923. 
Other copying, reprint, or republication requests should be addressed to: IEEE Copyrights Manager, IEEE Service 
Center, 445 Hoes Lane, P.O. Box 133, Piscataway, NJ 08855-1331. 
The papers in this book comprise the proceedings of the meeting mentioned on the cover and title page. They reflect 
the authors’ opinions and, in the interests of timely dissemination, are published as presented and without change. 
Their inclusion in this publication does not necessarily constitute endorsement by the editors, the IEEE Computer 
Society, or the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.
IEEE Computer Society Order Number P3023 
ISBN 0-7695-3023-0 
ISBN 978-0-7695-3023-9 
Library of Congress Number 2007935533 
Additional copies may be ordered from:
IEEE Computer Society IEEE Service Center IEEE Computer Society 
Customer Service Center 445 Hoes Lane Asia/Pacific Office 
10662 Los Vaqueros Circle P.O. Box 1331 Watanabe Bldg., 1-4-2 
P.O. Box 3014 Piscataway, NJ 08855-1331 Minami-Aoyama
Los Alamitos, CA 90720-1314 Tel: + 1 732 981 0060 Minato-ku, Tokyo 107-0062 
Tel: + 1 800 272 6657 Fax: + 1 732 981 9667 JAPAN
Fax: + 1 714 821 4641 http://shop.ieee.org/store/ Tel:  + 81 3 3408 3118 
http://computer.org/cspress
csbooks@computer.org
customer-service@ieee.org Fax: + 81 3 3408 3553 
tokyo.ofc@computer.org
Individual paper REPRINTS may be ordered at: <reprints@computer.org>
Editorial production by Lisa O’Conner 
Cover art production by Joe Daigle/Studio Productions 
Printed in the United States of America by Applied Digital Imaging 
Conference Publishing Services 
http://www.computer.org/proceedings/
Table of Contents 
FMCAD 2007 






Exploiting Resolution Proofs to Speed Up LTL Vacuity Detection for BMC.................................................. 3 
 Jocelyn Simmonds, Jessica Davies, Arie Gurfinkel, and Marsha Chechik 
Improved Design Debugging using Maximum Satisfiability ........................................................................ 13
 Sean Safarpour, Mark Liffiton, Hratch Mangassarian, Andreas Veneris, and Karem Sakallah 
Industrial Strength SAT-based Alignability Algorithm for Hardware Equivalence Verification ..................... 20 
 Daher Kaiss, Marcelo Skaba, Ziyad Hanna, and Zurab Khasidashvili 
Boosting Verification by Automatic Tuning of Decision Procedures ............................................................ 27 
 Frank Hutter, Domagoj Babic, Holger Hoos, and Alan Hu 
High-Level System Analysis 
Verifying Correctness of Transactional Memories ....................................................................................... 37 
 Ariel Cohen, John O'Leary, Amir Pnueli, Mark Tuttle, and Lenore Zuck 
Algorithmic Analysis of Piecewise FIFO Systems ....................................................................................... 45 
 Naghmeh Ghafari, Arie Gurfinkel, Nils Klarlund, and Richard Trefler 
Transaction Based Modeling and Verification of Hardware Protocol Implementations................................. 53 
 Xiaofang Chen, Steven German, and Ganesh Gopalakrishnan 
Automating Hazard Checking in Transaction-Level Microarchitecture Models............................................ 62 
 Yogesh Mahajan and Sharad Malik 
vv
Abstraction-Based Methods 
Computing Abstractions by integrating BDDs and SMT ............................................................................. 69
 Roberto Cavada, Alessandro Cimatti, Anders Franzen, Kalyanasundaram Krishnamani, Marco Roveri, 
 and R.K. Shyamasundar 
Induction in CEGAR for Detecting Counterexamples................................................................................. 77 
 Chao Wang, Aarti Gupta, and Franjo Ivancic 
Lifting Propositional Interpolants to the Word-Level .................................................................................. 85 
 Daniel Kroening and Georg Weissenbacher 
Software Analysis Methods 
Global Optimization of Compositional Systems ......................................................................................... 93 
 Fadi Zaraket, John Pape, Adnan Aziz, Margarida Jacome, and Sarfraz Khurshid 
Cross-Entropy Based Testing ....................................................................................................................101 
 Hana Chockler, Benny Godlin, Eitan Farchi, and Sergey Novikov 
Symbolic Trajectory Evaluation 
Automatic Abstraction Refinement for Generalized Symbolic Trajectory Evaluation ..................................111 
 Yan Chen, Yujing He, Fei Xie, and Jin Yang 
A Logic for GSTE ....................................................................................................................................119 
 Edward Smith 
Automatic Abstraction in Symbolic Trajectory Evaluation.........................................................................127 
 Sara Adams, Magnus Bjork, Tom Melham, and Carl-Johan Seger 
Specification Theory 
A Coverage Analysis for Safety Property Lists ...........................................................................................139 
 Koen Claessen 
What triggers a behavior?..........................................................................................................................146 
 Orna Kupferman and Yoad Lustig 
Two-Dimensional Regular Expressions for Compositional Bus Protocols ...................................................154 
 Kathi Fisler 
A Quantitative Completeness Analysis for Property-Sets............................................................................158 
 Martin Oberkönig, Martin Schickel, and Hans Eveking 
vivi
Industrial-Strength Verification  
Automated Extraction of Inductive Invariants to Aid Model Checking.......................................................165 
 Michael Case, Alan Mishchenko and Robert Brayton 
Checking Safety by Inductive Generalization of Counterexamples to Induction ..........................................173 
 Aaron Bradley and Zohar Manna 
Fast Minimum Register Retiming Via Binary Maximum-Flow...................................................................181 
 Aaron Hurst, Alan Mishchenko, and Robert Brayton 
Formal Verification of Partial Good Self-Test Fencing Structures ...............................................................188
 Adrian Seigler, Gary Van Huben, and Hari Mony 
Case study: Integrating FV and DV within the Verification of Intel® Core(TM) Microprocessor .................192 
 Alon Flaisher, Alon Gluska, and Eli Singerman 
Reasoning about Physical Systems 
Circuit-Level Verification of a High-Speed Toggle .....................................................................................199 
 Chao Yan and Mark R. Greenstreet 
Combining Symbolic Simulation and Interval Arithmetic for the Verification of AMS Designs ...................207 
 Mohamed Zaki, Ghiath Al Sammane, Sofiene Tahar, and Guy Bois 
Analyzing Gene Relationships for Down Syndrome with Labeled Transitions Graphs................................216 
 Neha Rungta, Hyrum Carroll, Eric Mercer, Randall Roper, Mark Clement, and Quinn Snell 
Advanced Theorem-Proving Applications 
A Formal Model of Clock Domain Crossing and Automated Verification  
of Time-Triggered Hardware.....................................................................................................................223 
 Julien Schmaltz 
Modeling Time-Triggered Protocols and Verifying their Real-Time Schedules ............................................231 
 Lee Pike 
A Mechanized Refinement Framework for Analysis of Custom Memories .................................................239 




This volume contains the proceedings of the International Conference on Formal Methods in Computer-Aided 
Design (FMCAD07), held in Austin, Texas, USA on November 11-14, 2007. FMCAD 2007 is the seventh in a 
series of conferences on the theory and applications of formal methods in hardware and system verification. 
FMCAD provides a leading forum to researchers and practitioners in academia and industry for presenting 
and discussing groundbreaking methods, technologies, theoretical results, and tools for reasoning formally 
about computing systems. FMCAD covers formal aspects of computer-aided system design including 
verification, specification, synthesis, and testing. In the past, FMCAD was held in the United States on even 
years and its sister conference, Correct Hardware Design and Verification Methods (CHARME), was held in 
Europe on odd years. Recently, these two conferences decided to merge to form an annual conference with a 
unified international community. As a result, FMCAD has become a yearly conference. 
FMCAD 2007 received 65 regular paper submissions (of 80 submitted abstracts) and 17 short paper 
submissions. Each paper was reviewed by at least four Program Committee members, with the assistance of 
external sub-reviewers. The Program Committee finally accepted a total of 23 regular papers and 8 short 
papers. In addition to the technical papers, the conference program included a pre-conference day of invited 
tutorials, two invited talks, and two panel sessions. The invited tutorials were: 
— Robert Brayton (UC Berkeley), “The Synergy between Logic Synthesis and Equivalence Checking” 
— Randal E. Bryant (CMU), “Modeling Data in Formal Verification: Bits, Bit Vectors, or Words” 
— Niklas Eén (Cadence), “Practical SAT” 
— Farid Najm (U Toronto), “Power Management for VLSI Circuits and the Need for High-Level Power 
Modeling and Design Exploration” 
The invited talks were:  
— Wolfgang Kunz (U Kaiserslautern), “Formal Verification of Systems-on-Chip — Industrial 
Experiences and Scientific Perspectives” 
— Eli Singerman (Intel), “Verification of Embedded Software in Industrial Microprocessors” 
The first panel was entitled “Formal Verification: A Business Perspective” and was moderated by Aarti Gupta 
(NEC). It included presentations by a variety of EDA and semiconductor companies, including Cadence, 
Jasper Design Automation, Mentor Graphics, and Synopsys. The second panel was entitled “FMCAD2027: 
Will the ‘FM’ Have a Real Impact on the ‘CAD’?” and was moderated by William Joyner (SRC). It included 
presentations by Robert Jones (Intel), Andreas Kuehlmann (Cadence), and Carl Pixley (Synopsys). 
We would like to acknowledge the support of our generous sponsors: FMCAD Inc., the IEEE Council on 
Electronic Design Automation (CEDA), Cadence, Freescale Semiconductor Inc., IBM Corporation, Intel 
Corporation, Jasper Design Automation, Mentor Graphics, NEC Labs America, and Synopsys. We also 
would like to thank our Panel Chairs: William Joyner (SRC) and Aarti Gupta (NEC); our Tutorials Chair: 
Natasha Sharygina (U Lugano); our Publicity Chair: Alper Sen (Freescale); our Webmasters: Sandip Ray 
(UT) and Hari Mony (IBM); and our Local Arrangement Chair: Andy Martin (IBM). We additionally thank 
Andrei Voronkov for assistance with the EasyChair system, and Igor Markov for assistance in using the 
Duplication Detection (DUDE) system. We acknowledge the Program Committee and their sub-referees for 
their diligent efforts in reviewing these papers. We finally would like to thank the FMCAD Steering 
Committee for their guidance. 
The FMCAD Chairs, 
Jason Baumgartner (IBM) 




Jason Baumgartner, IBM Corporation, USA
Mary Sheeran, Chalmers University of Technology, Sweden 
Benchmarks 
Panagiotis Manolios, Georgia Institute of Technology, USA
Local Arrangements  
Andy Martin, IBM Corporation, USA 
Panels 
Aarti Gupta, NEC Laboratories America, USA
William Joyner, Semiconductor Research Corporation, USA
Publicity 
Alper Sen, Freescale Semiconductor Inc., USA 
Tutorials 
Natasha Sharygina, University of Lugano, Switzerland 
Webmasters 
Hari Mony, IBM Corporation, USA
Sandip Ray, University of Texas, USA   
ix
Program Committee 
Mark Aagaard, University of Waterloo, Canada
Jason Baumgartner, IBM Corporation, USA
Armin Biere, Johannes Kepler University, Austria 
Per Bjesse, Synopsys, USA 
Dominique Borrione, Grenoble University, France 
Gianpiero Cabodi, Politecnico di Torino, Italy
Alessandro Cimatti, ITC-irst, Trento, Italy 
Koen Claessen, Chalmers University of Technology, Sweden 
Cindy Eisner, IBM Haifa Research Laboratory, Israel 
Steven German, IBM Research Division, USA
Ganesh Gopalakrishnan, University of Utah, USA
Aarti Gupta, NEC Laboratories America, USA
Alan J. Hu, University of British Columbia, Canada
Warren Hunt, University of Texas, USA 
Steven Johnson, Indiana University, USA
Robert Jones, Intel Corp., USA
Daniel Kroening, ETH Zurich, Switzerland
Andreas Kuehlmann, Cadence Laboratories, USA 
Wolfgang Kunz, University of Kaiserslautern, Germany
Jeremy Levitt, Mentor Graphics, USA
Panagiotis Manolios, Georgia Institute of Technology, USA
Andy Martin, IBM Research Division, USA
Tom Melham, Oxford University, UK
Alan Mishchenko, University of California at Berkeley, USA
Ken McMillan, Cadence Labs, USA
John O’Leary, Intel Corp., USA
Wolfgang Paul, Saarland University, Germany
Carl Pixley, Synopsys, USA
Natasha Sharygina, University of Lugano, Switzerland
Mary Sheeran, Chalmers University of Technology, Sweden 
Anna Slobodova, Intel Corp., USA













































































































Exploiting Resolution Proofs to Speed Up LTL
Vacuity Detection for BMC
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Abstract—When model-checking reports that a property holds
on a model, vacuity detection increases user confidence in this
result by checking that the property is satisfied in the intended
way. While vacuity detection is effective, it is a relatively expensive
technique requiring many additional model-checking runs. We
address the problem of efficient vacuity detection for Bounded
Model Checking (BMC) of LTL properties, presenting three par-
tial vacuity detection methods based on the efficient analysis of the
resolution proof produced by a successful BMC run. In particular,
we define a characteristic of resolution proofs – peripherality – and
prove that if a variable is a source of vacuity, then there exists a
resolution proof in which this variable is peripheral. Our vacuity
detection tool, VaqTree, uses these methods to detect vacuous
variables, decreasing the total number of model-checking runs
required to detect all sources of vacuity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Model-checking [1] is a widely-used automated technique
for verification of both hardware and software artifacts that
checks whether a temporal logic property is satisfied by a finite-
state model of the artifact. If the model does not satisfy the
property, a counterexample, which can aid in debugging, is
produced. If the model does satisfy the property, no information
about why it does so is provided by the model-checker alone.
A positive answer without any additional information can be
misleading, since a property may be satisfied in a way that
was not intended. For instance, a property “every request is
eventually acknowledged” is satisfied in an environment that
never generates requests.
Vacuity detection [2]–[5] is an automatic sanity check that
can be applied after a positive model-checking run in order to
gain confidence that the model and the property capture the
desired behaviours. Informally, a property is said to be vacuous
if it has a subformula which is not relevant to its satisfaction,
or if the property itself is a tautology. Conversely, a property is
satisfied non-vacuously if every part of the formula is important
– even a slight change to the formula affects its satisfaction.
In this paper, we focus on vacuity detection for SAT-based
Bounded Model Checking (BMC). Given a BMC problem with
a particular bound, we wish to determine if the property holds
vacuously on the model up to this bound. In this context, a naive
method for detecting vacuity is to replace subformulas of the
temporal logic property with unconstrained boolean variables
and run BMC for each such substitution. If the property with
some substitution still holds on the model, the property is
vacuous. This naive approach is expensive, since in the worst
case it requires as many model-checking runs as there are
subformulas in the property. Our goal is to reduce the number
of model-checking runs required to detect vacuity. We do
this by detecting some vacuity through novel and inexpensive
techniques reported in this paper, and complete the method by
running the naive algorithm on the remaining atomic subfor-
mulas. The key to our technique is that SAT-based BMC can
automatically provide useful information (a resolution proof)
beyond a decision whether the property holds on the model; we
exploit such proofs for partial vacuity detection.
In SAT-based BMC, the property and the behavior of the
model are encoded in a propositional theory, such that the
theory is satisfiable if and only if the formula does not hold.
When the property does hold, a DPLL-based SAT solver can
produce a resolution proof that derives false from a subset of
the clauses in the theory called the UNSAT core. Intuitively,
the resolution proof provides an explanation why the property
is not falsified by the model, and the UNSAT core determines
the relevant parts of the model and the property [6].
In this paper, we develop three methods of increasing pre-
cision (irrelevance, local irrelevance and peripherality) to an-
alyze the resolution proof to achieve partial vacuity detec-
tion. These algorithms are used by our vacuity detection tool,
VaqTree, in order to reduce the number of model-checking runs
required to find all sources of vacuity, thus reducing execution
times. Irrelevance and local irrelevance detect vacuity based
on which variables appear in the UNSAT core, and in which
locations. However, as these methods only examine the UNSAT
core, their precision is limited. The peripherality algorithm
examines the structure of the resolution proof, identifying as
vacuous those variables that are not necessary or central to the
derivation of false. This method is as precise as can be achieved
through analyzing a single resolution proof, and its running
time is linear in the size of the resolution proof and the number
of variables in the property. Our experience shows that local
irrelevance is the ideal candidate for replacing naive vacuity.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec. II
presents some required background, followed, in Sec. III by
our definition of vacuity, the naive algorithm for LTL vacuity
detection using BMC, and an overview of work in the vacuity
detection field. Sec. IV presents the three algorithms that detect
vacuity by analyzing a resolution proof. Our experimental
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results are presented in Sec. V. We conclude with a summary,
additional related work, and suggestions for future work in
Sec. VI.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we review bounded model-checking and
resolution proofs.
A. Bounded Model-Checking
Bounded model-checking (BMC) [7] is a method for deter-
mining whether a linear temporal logic (LTL) formula ϕ holds
on a finite state system represented by a Kripke structure K up
to a finite number of steps. An instance of a BMC problem,
denoted by BMCk(K, ϕ), is whether K |=k ϕ, where |=k is
the k-depth satisfaction relation. An informal description of
LTL formulas, Kripke structures and BMC is given in [8], and
detailed definitions can be found in [1], [7].
To determine whether K |=k ϕ, the problem is converted
to a propositional formula Φ (see [7], [9], [10]) which is
satisfiable if and only if there exists a length-k counterexample
to K |=k ϕ. Φ is then given to a SAT solver which decides its
satisfiability. The propositional encoding represents the behav-
ior ofK up to k steps with a path constraint CLK , and encodes
all counterexamples to ϕ of length k in an error constraint
CLe. Therefore, if the theory CLK ∪ CLe is satisfiable, there
is a path through K which obeys the transition relation and
falsifies ϕ. The value of each variable v of K at each time step
is represented using new boolean variables vi (0 ≤ i ≤ k),
called timed variables.
The transition relation can be represented symbolically by
a propositional formula over the variables V and primed vari-
ables V ′ (which represent the variables in the next state). For
example, in the model in Fig. 1(a), the transition relation is
represented by the formula R = (p ∧ ¬q ∧ ¬p′ ∧ q′) ∨ (¬p ∧
q ∧ ¬p′ ∧ q′). The path constraint is obtained by substituting
the timed variables Vi for V in R, and replacing V
′ by the
timed variables for the next step, Vi+1. This is repeated for
each 0 ≤ i < k, and the resulting propositional formulas are
conjoined along with a formula representing the initial state [7].
In Fig. 1(a), if k = 1,
CLK = (p0 ∧ ¬q0) ∧ ((p0 ∧ ¬q0 ∧ ¬p1 ∧ q1)
∨(¬p0 ∧ q0 ∧ ¬p1 ∧ q1))
CLe is encoded according to a recursive procedure which re-
moves the temporal and logical operators from the property [7],
e.g., the algorithm encodes ϕ = Gp, where p is a propositional
variable, expanded up to k = 2, by the formula ¬p0∨¬p1∨¬p2.
After the boolean formulas for the path and error constraints
are calculated, they are converted to Conjunctive Normal Form
(CNF) before being passed to a SAT solver. If the solver reports
that CLK ∪ CLe is unsatisfiable, it means that there is no
length-k counterexample to ϕ; otherwise, a satisfying assign-
ment is returned. When a DPLL-based SAT solver processes
an unsatisfiable theory, a resolution derivation of false (or the
empty clause) is implicitly constructed [11], [12]. This resolu-
tion proof is used to verify that false can indeed be derived from
CLK ∪ CLe [13].
B. Resolution Proofs
Resolution is an inference rule that is applied to proposi-
tional clauses to produce logical consequences. A clause is
a disjunction of boolean variables and their negations. For
example, (v1 ∨ ¬v2 ∨ v5) is a clause stating that at least
one of v1,¬v2 or v5 must be true. The resolution rule takes
two clauses, where one contains a variable v and the other –
its negation ¬v, and produces a clause containing the union
of the two clauses minus v and ¬v. For example, resolving
(v1∨¬v2∨v5) and (v2∨v6) produces the resolvent (v1∨v5∨v6).
A resolution proof Π is a directed acyclic graph whose nodes
are labeled by propositional clauses. Π represents a tree of
resolutions between the clauses labeling its nodes. Its roots are
the nodes with no parents; otherwise, all nodes have exactly
two parents. The nodes with no children are called the leaves.
For example, the roots of resolution proof Π in Fig. 1(b) are
Roots(Π) = {(¬r0), (r0∨p0), (¬p0∨q0), (¬p0∨¬q0), (p0)},
and the leaf of Π is the empty clause,i.e., Leaf (Π) = false.
Given a non-root node labeled by the clause c, and the la-
bels of its parents, c1 and c2, c is the resolvent since it has
been produced by resolving c1 and c2 on some variable v.
A resolution proof Π is a proof of unsatisfiability of a set of
clauses A if and only if all roots of Π belong to A, and one
of the leaves of Π is the empty clause. For example, Fig. 1(b)
shows a resolution proof of the unsatisfiability of Roots(Π). If
a propositional theory in CNF is unsatisfiable, an UNSAT core
is an unsatisfiable subset of its clauses.
Given two disjoint sets of clauses A and B, a variable v is
said to be local to A if and only if v appears in A but does
not appear in B, and v is said to be global if it appears in both
A and B. In Fig. 1(b), if Roots(Π) = A ∪ B, where A =
{(¬r0), (r0 ∨ p0), (¬p0 ∨ q0)} and B = {(¬p0 ∨ ¬q0), (p0)},
then r0 is local to A, and the rest are global.
III. DEFINING VACUITY
This paper uses the following definition of vacuity.
Definition 1 Let K be a Kripke structure, ϕ be a formula
satisfied by K (i.e., K |= ϕ), and p be a variable. Then, ϕ
is p-vacuous in K iff ϕ[p ← x] is satisfied by K, where x is a
variable not occurring inK or in ϕ.
We use ϕ[p ← x] to indicate that all occurrences of p in ϕ
are replaced by x.
Similarily, it is possible to define vacuity in the BMC setting.
Definition 2 Let K be a Kripke structure, ϕ be a formula s.t.
K |=k ϕ, and p be a variable. ϕ is k-step p-vacuous iff K |=k
ϕ[p← x], where x is a variable not occurring inK or in ϕ.
If ϕ is k-step p-vacuous, we call p a k-step vacuous variable.
A property ϕ is k-step vacuous if and only if ϕ contains a k-step
vacuous variable. Therefore, our techniques aim to find the k-
step vacuous variables of ϕ. The qualifier “k-step” is omitted in
the remainder of the paper but should be understood implicitly
in the BMC context.
In the remainder of the paper, we avoid referring to k-vacuity,
focusing instead on those variables p that are used to prove that
a property is k-vacuous. When we say that a property ϕ is p-











(p0) (¬p0, q1) (x1,¬q1) (¬x1)
q1 ¬q1
()
Fig. 1. (a) A Kripke structure; (b) A resolution proof for EXAMPLE 2; (c) A resolution proof for EXAMPLE 1.
such that K |=k ϕ[p ← x], where x is a new unconstrained
variable of K.
Def. 1 suggests a sound and complete algorithm for vacuity
detection: for each propositional variable p in ϕ, run BMC on
ϕ[p ← x], where x is a variable that does not appear in K and
ϕ. If K |=k ϕ[p ← x] for some p, then ϕ is k-step vacuous.
We refer to this algorithm as naive. Its drawback is that it may
require as many model-checking runs as there are propositional
variables in ϕ. Defs. 1 and 2 can be generalized to vacuity in
arbitrary (not necessarily atomic) subformulas. This follows
from the fact that a subformula is vacuous iff it is mutually
vacuous in all of its atomic propositions [14, Th. 9], and that
the definitions can be easily extended to mutual vacuity. For
example, if ϕ contains subformula θ = p ∧ q, and p and q are
mutually vacuous, then we can deduce that θ is vacuous as well.
We now review some of the alternative definitions of vacuity
and their algorithms. The first attempt to formulate and auto-
mate vacuity detection is due to Beer et al. [2]. They consider a
property ϕ to be vacuous if ϕ contains a subformula ψ such that
replacing ψ by any other formula does not affect the satisfaction
of ϕ. Applying this definition directly would require an infinite
number of subformula replacements, precluding a practical im-
plementation. However, Beer et al. show that to detect vacuity
w.r.t. a single occurrence of a subformula ψ in w-ACTL, it is
sufficient to replace ψ with only true and false. This was later
extended to CTL* by Kupferman and Vardi [3]. Purandare and
Somenzi [4] showed how to speed up subformula vacuity by
analyzing the parse tree of a CTL property.
Armoni et al. [5] generalized the above syntactic defini-
tion of vacuity by introducing universal quantification, i.e.,
∀x · ϕ[ψ ← x]. Based on the domain of x, three notions of
vacuity are obtained, the most robust of which being trace
vacuity. Gurfinkel and Chechik [15] extended Armoni’s def-
inition of vacuity to CTL*, thus uniformly capturing CTL
and LTL. Armoni et al. also analyzed the syntactic structure
of the property in order to avoid checking the operands of
subformulas that are known to be vacuous. Such optimizations
complement our techniques, which focus on detecting vacuous
atomic subformulas.
Namjoshi [16] defines a somewhat different notion of vacu-
ity, also based on a proof derived from a successful model
checking run. According to Namjoshi, a property should only
be considered vacuous if every proof of why it holds on the
model exhibits vacuity. This definition of vacuity coincides with
the definition of [5], [15] for a subset of LTL. Our methods
efficiently examine proofs derived from model-checking runs,
but are able to detect vacuity as defined by [2], [5], [15], [17].
Finally, we cannot empirically compare our techniques, since
no experimental results are provided in [16].
Our definition of vacuity is syntactic, and in this respect, it
is similar to the original definition of Beer et al. [2]. However,
Def. 1 is stronger, and is equivalent to the semantic definition
of Armoni et al. [5], as shown by Gurfinkel and Chechik [15].
IV. EXPLOITING RESOLUTION PROOFS
In Sec. III, we discussed the existence of a sound and com-
plete vacuity detection algorithm for BMC, which requires as
many model-checking runs as there are propositional variables
in the property being checked. We propose a new vacuity
detection strategy: first detect partial vacuity using inexpensive
techniques and then complete the analysis using extra model-
checking runs. Since we are interested in replacing expensive
model-checking runs by inexpensive partial vacuity detection
methods, we limit ourselves to considering the output of the
original model-checking run on BMCk(K, ϕ), i.e.,CLK ∪CLe.
This run provides us with a single resolution proof to analyze,
but in general, there may be many ways to derive the empty
clause from different subsets of BMCk(K, ϕ). Any method that
only examines one of these derivations is inherently incom-
plete, in the sense that a property may be p-vacuous but there
is no way of determining this based on a given resolution
proof. For example, consider a model that is composed of
two completely disjoint sub-models, running in parallel, i.e.,
K = K1 ‖ K2. Suppose that K1 satisfies Gp, K2 satisfies
Gq, and that both do so non-vacuously. Then the property
ϕ = Gp ∨ Gq holds on K p-vacuously and q-vacuously.
However, one of the possible resolution proofs showing that ϕ
holds proves that Gp holds non-vacuously on K1. Thus, it is
impossible to determine that ϕ is vacuous in p from this proof.
Any method based on examining only one resolution proof
cannot prove the absence of vacuity, since another resolution
proof, showing the property to be vacuous, might exist.
In this section, we introduce three algorithms of increasing
precision for partial vacuity detection, based on examining
the UNSAT core (irrelevance and local irrelevance) and the
resolution proof produced by BMC (peripherality).
A. Examining UNSAT cores
Given a resolution proof that BMCk(K, ϕ) is unsatisfiable,
we can sometimes cheaply determine that the similar theory
BMCk(K, ϕ[p← x]) is also unsatisfiable, and therefore, that
the property is p-vacuous. In this section, we consider how to
determine that BMCk(K, ϕ[p← x]) is unsatisfiable given that
BMCk(K, ϕ) is unsatisfiable, using only an UNSAT core.
1) Irrelevance: Intuitively, any variable that does not appear
in the UNSAT core does not contribute to the reason why ϕ
holds on K, so it can be considered irrelevant.
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Definition 3 LetK be a model, and ϕ an LTL formula. Assume
thatΠ is an UNSAT core of BMCk(K, ϕ) witnessing thatK |=k
ϕ. Then, p is irrelevant with respect to BMCk(K, ϕ) and Π iff pi
does not appear in Π for any time instance i.
If a variable is irrelevant, it is also vacuous, as shown by the
following theorem. The proofs of this and other theorems are
given in Appendix A.
Theorem 1 If p is irrelevant with respect to BMCk(K, ϕ) and
Π, then ϕ is k-step p-vacuous.
Def. 3 provides an algorithm to detect some vacuous vari-
ables. However, a variable can appear in the UNSAT core and
still be vacuous, as demonstrated by the following example.
EXAMPLE 1. Consider a Kripke structure K with variables p
and q given by the constraints Init = p ∧ q, R = p ⇒ q′,
which mean that the initial state is labeled by {p, q}, and the
transition relation is expressed by the propositional formula
p⇒ q′ over unprimed and primed variables. Let ϕ = X(p∨ q)
be the property to check. ϕ is p-vacuous since it is satis-
fied simply because q is true in any successor of the initial
state. The CNF encoding of the one-step BMC problem is
CLK = {(p0 ∧ q0), (p0 ⇒ q1)} = {(p0), (q0), (¬p0, q1)},
CLe = {(¬p1), (p1,¬q1)}. In this case, the unique minimal
UNSAT core contains all of the clauses of the problem except
for (q0). Thus, all pi appear in the UNSAT core, and p cannot
be determined vacuous using irrelevance. 
This example shows that even if we are to look at every
UNSAT core of a BMC problem, irrelevance is still unable to
detect existing vacuity.
2) Local Irrelevance: Variables which do not appear in the
UNSAT core are vacuous. The converse is not true: vacuous
variables may also appear in the UNSAT core. Intuitively, these
variables are not the central reason why ϕ holds on K. For
example, the clauses of CLK may resolve against each other,
representing some simplification and unification of parts of the
model, before resolutions with CLe clauses are performed. If a
variable is resolved upon using only the CLK clauses or only
the CLe clauses, it is potentially vacuous. By looking at the
UNSAT core, it is possible to anticipate whether a variable will
not be involved in resolutions betweenCLK andCLe using the
following definition.
Definition 4 LetK be a model, and ϕ an LTL formula. Assume
that Π is an UNSAT core of BMCk(K, ϕ) witnessing K |=k ϕ.
Then, p is locally irrelevant with respect to BMCk(K, ϕ) and Π
iff for each time instance i, either pi does not appear in Π or pi
is local to either CLe ∩Π or CLK ∩Π.
In Example 1, p is locally irrelevant since p1 only occurs
in the clauses of U taken from CLe, while p0 only appears
in U within CLK clauses. Moreover, the UNSAT core
of the original problem can be converted to an UNSAT
core of the new theory, thus proving that p is vacuous.
Specifically, U = {(p0), (¬p0, q1), (¬p1), (p1,¬q1)} is the
UNSAT core of the original problem, so substituting
x for p in the clauses of U that came from CLe gives
U ′ = {(p0), (¬p0, q1), (¬x1), (x1,¬q1)}. This is a subset of
BMC1(K, ϕ[p← x]) = {(p0), (q0), (¬p0, q1), (¬x1), (x1,¬q1)},
so it is a candidate for the new UNSAT core. The substitution
may have prevented the resolutions necessary to derive the
empty clause. However, Fig. 1(c) shows a proof that U ′ is also
unsatisfiable. In this case, it was possible to substitute xi for
pi in the clauses coming from CLe in the original UNSAT
core and create an UNSAT core for BMCk(K, ϕ[p← x]). In
fact, this observation applies to all cases of local irrelevance by
Theorem 2. Therefore, Def. 4 specifies an algorithm to detect
some vacuous variables.
Theorem 2 If p is locally irrelevant with respect to
BMCk(K, ϕ) and Π, then ϕ is k-step p-vacuous.
Unfortunately, if a variable p is not locally irrelevant in an
UNSAT core, the formula can still be p-vacuous, as shown by
the following example.
EXAMPLE 2. Consider a Kripke structure with atomic propo-
sitions r, p and q whose initial state is given by the constraint:
Init = ¬r ∧ p ∧ q. The formula ϕ = ¬p ∨ q is p-vacuous in
the initial state. Let us assume that the zero-step BMC problem
is encoded in CNF as follows:
CLK = (¬r0)(r0 ∨ p0)(¬p0 ∨ q0)
CLe = (p0)(¬p0 ∨ ¬q0)
There are several resolution proofs that can establish unsatis-
fiability of CLK ∪ CLe; one such proof is shown in Fig. 1(b).
In none of the proofs is p locally irrelevant with respect to CLe
and CLK . 
The problem with local irrelevance is that it is impossible to
tell if a variable is going to be used in a resolution joining CLK
and CLe clauses based on the UNSAT core alone.
B. Peripherality
In Sec. IV-A, two vacuity detection methods based on ex-
amining the variables in the UNSAT core were found to fall
short of completeness. It was seen that even if every possible
resolution proof could be analyzed, irrelevance and local irrele-
vance still might fail to detect existing vacuity. Here, we extend
the analysis to the resolution proof’s structure. The resulting
peripherality algorithm is superior, since it guarantees vacuity
will be found if all possible resolution proofs are considered.
The limitations of detecting vacuity based only on the UN-
SAT core were demonstrated in Example 2. By examining the
resolution proof in Fig. 1(b), we see that although p0 appears
both in CLK clauses and in CLe clauses, it is always resolved
“locally”. That is, if we resolve two clauses c1 = (..., pi, ...)
and c2 = (...,¬pi, ...), pi and ¬pi must have been preserved
from their original source in some set of root clauses. If all the
originating root clauses belong to CLK or all belong to CLe,
then pi is being resolved on locally. In this case, we can replace
pi in either set of clauses without affecting their unsatisfiability.
For example, in Fig. 1(b), p0 can be replaced in CLe by a new
unconstrained variable x0. This intuition is formalized below.
Given a resolution proof Π, a variable l, and a clause c, we
denote by S(l, c) the set of all root clauses that have contributed
the variable l to c. S(l, c) is defined recursively as shown in
Fig. 3. A root clause cr is an element of S(l, c) if it contains
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L(c) : clause c, variable p → {‘∅’, ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘AB’}





‘∅’ if p 6∈ c
‘A’ if p ∈ c ∧ c ∈ A
‘B’ if p ∈ c ∧ c ∈ B
• else if c is a clause resulting from resolving c1 and c2 on variable v, i.e., c = ∃v · c1 ∧ c2, then









‘∅’ if L(c1) = L(c2) = ‘∅’
‘A’ if ∃i, j · L(ci) = ‘A’ ∧ L(cj) ⊆ {‘A’, ‘∅’}
‘B’ if ∃i, j · L(ci) = ‘B’ ∧ L(cj) ⊆ {‘B’, ‘∅’}
‘AB’ otherwise
– else if v = p, then
L(c) =
{
‘∅’ if L(c1) = L(c2)
‘AB’ otherwise









∅ if l 6∈ c
c if c ∈ Roots(Π) ∧ l ∈ c
S(l, c1) ∪ S(l, c2) if c1 and c2 are parents
of c ∧ l ∈ c
Fig. 3. Definition of S(l, c).
a variable l and there exists a path from cr to c that does not
contain a resolution on l. We can now define peripherality of
variables, which captures the conditions when a global variable
may not be central to the reason why ϕ holds on K.
Definition 5 Let A and B be disjoint sets of clauses such that
C = A ∪B is unsatisfiable, and Π be a resolution proof estab-
lishing unsatisfiability of C. Then a variable l is peripheral with
respect to A and B iff for every resolution on l between clauses
c1 and c2, S(l, c1) ∪ S(l, c2) ⊆ A or S(l, c1) ∪ S(l, c2) ⊆ B.
Within the BMC setting, we have the following definition:
Definition 6 Let K be a model, ϕ be an LTL formula,
BMCk(K, ϕ) be a CNF encoding of a BMC problem for K |=k
ϕ, and Π be a proof of unsatisfiability of BMCk(K, ϕ). p is
peripheral in ϕ iff for each time instance i, pi is peripheral in Π
with respect to CLe and CLK .
If a variable is peripheral, it is vacuous by Theorem 3.
Theorem 3 LetΠ be a proof of unsatisfiability of BMCk(K, ϕ).
If a variable p of ϕ is peripheral in Π, then ϕ is k-step p-
vacuous.
In Fig. 1(b), although p is not locally irrelevant in ϕ, it is
peripheral, and therefore ϕ is p-vacuous. This also demon-
strates that peripherality is a strictly stronger notion than local
irrelevance. Theorem 4 shows that under our constraints this is
the strongest result that we can hope to establish.
Theorem 4 Assume ϕ is k-step p-vacuous in K. Then, there
exists a resolution proof Π of unsatisfiability of BMCk(K, ϕ)
such that p is peripheral in Π.
This is one of the main contributions of this paper: if a
variable appears in all proofs, but is detected as peripheral in at
least one of these proofs, it is vacuous. Conversely, if a variable
appears in all proofs but is not peripheral in any of them, it is
definitively not vacuous.
Peripherality of a variable can be detected by traversing the
resolution proof from the roots to the leaf, keeping track of the
source of the variable in each clause. If Π is a resolution proof
whose root clauses are divided into two disjoint sets, A ∪ B,
then the labeling function L is defined recursively as shown
in Fig. 2, where c is used to represent a clause. This labeling
function defines an algorithm for detecting peripherality.
A CNF variable v is peripheral iff the label of the empty
clause is not ‘AB’. Thus, to detect whether a formula ϕ is p-
vacuous, we need to check that all CNF variables pi corre-
sponding to p (see Sec. II) are peripheral. This can be done
by applying the labeling function described in Fig. 2 with
A = CLK , and B = CLe for each pi (for details, see [8]).
It is also possible to simultaneously keep track of the labels for
all CNF variables so that only a single pass through Π is needed.
The time complexity of the peripherality algorithm is linear in
the size of the resolution proof.
Theorem 5 For a resolution proof Π that BMCk(K, ϕ) is un-
satisfiable, determining which variables of ϕ are peripheral can
be done in time linear in the size of Π.
In this section, we defined three methods of detecting vacuity
based on examining the UNSAT core and the resolution proof
produced by BMC. Our evaluation of these algorithms w.r.t.
precision and execution times can be found in Sec. V.
V. PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE
The techniques reported in this paper have been implemented
in a tool called VaqTree (see [8] for a description of this tool).
The inputs to VaqTree are a model (encoded using the language
of NuSMV [10]) and an LTL property. The tool returns the
vacuity status of each variable in the property. Vacuity detec-
tion in VaqTree proceeds in two phases: a “partial pass” that
applies one of our methods, and a “model-checking pass” that
completes the analysis using additional model-checking runs.
We have run VaqTree on two benchmark suites. To evaluate
the overall performance of the tool and the effectiveness of our
partial vacuity detection methods, we have created a benchmark
suite SA using various models and properties from the NUSMV
distribution. To evaluate the scalability of the tool to industrial
models, we have created a benchmark suite SB from the mod-
els in the IBM Formal Verification Benchmarks Library [18].
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These models came with rather simple properties (one temporal
operator), and (as expected from an industrial benchmark) did
not exhibit a high degree of vacuity. Thus, we used this suite to
measure the “worst-case” behavior of the tool, i.e., the amount
of overhead incurred by our methods when no vacuity is found.
In the benchmarks, each test case consists of a model M , a
property ϕ, and a bound k such thatM |=k ϕ. Note that finding
an appropriate bound k is orthogonal to k-vacuity detection,
which explains why our evaluation does not consider the time
needed to find k. The experiments were performed on a Linux
machine with a 2.8GHz P4 CPU, and 1GB of RAM, with
up to 700MB of RAM available to each process. Currently,
VaqTree is limited to proofs with up to 2.5 million resolutions.
In SA, this corresponds to a test case from the asynchronous
abp4 model (roughly 30 boolean variables, with k = 19). A
sample of our experimental data is available in Appendix B,
and the full results – in [19]. Below, we discuss results obtained
with each benchmark individually.
A. Results obtained with SA
This benchmark suite consists of 5 models: abp4,
msi wtrans, pci, and prod-cell from the NUSMV distribution
(107 properties) and toyFGS04 from [20] (14 properties). On
average, the properties in the suite have 2 temporal operators
(from the set G, F, U and X), with a maximum of 4 operators,
and include both liveness and safety. 99 of the properties exhibit
vacuity, and 22 do not.
Scatter plots in Fig. 4 compare the execution times of
VaqTree (parametrized with irrelevance, local irrelevance, and
peripherality), with naive detection for this benchmark. Execu-
tion times for naive detection include CNF theory generation
and satisfiability testing for each variable of the property. Ex-
ecution times for VaqTree include the time for the partial pass
and the subsequent model-checking pass. Each point in the plot
represents a single test case. The X-axis represents the time
(in seconds) taken by naive detection. The Y-axis represents
the time (in seconds) taken by VaqTree when parameterized
by each of our methods. Points below the diagonal indicate
where VaqTree was faster than naive detection; points near the
diagonal indicate cases where the partial pass found a small
percentage of the vacuous variables.
Fig. 5 shows that on SA, VaqTree with irrelevance finds
the fewest vacuous variables among our partial methods, as
expected from the discussion in Section IV. Although Fig. 4(b)
and (c) look similar, the numbers (see Appendix B and [19])
show that local irrelevance is faster than peripherality in 96%
of the cases. This is consistent with the additional work pe-
ripherality must perform to analyze the proof tree. A detailed
comparison of local irrelevance and naive detection shows that
VaqTree with local irrelevance was faster or comparable to
naive detection in 95% of the test cases. VaqTree with local
irrelevance was faster than naive detection in 70 (58%) of the
test cases, out of which 30 cases were twice as fast, and 20 cases
were faster by an order of magnitude. In the remaining 51 cases,
local irrelevance was at most 3% slower in 86% of these cases.
There are 10 cases where VaqTree with peripherality took
much longer than naive detection. All of these cases are from
the abp4 model, and while they have the largest resolution
proofs of the benchmark suite (between 300,000 and 2M
clauses), other 300,000-clause test cases did not yield poor
performance. We conjecture that the poor performance is due to
a low clause/variable ratio [21] which favours naive detection
in cases where vacuity is not present. Intuitively, a low ratio
indicates that the SAT instance is underconstrained, and so a
solution (if it exists) can be found quickly. On the other hand,
finding a proof of unsatisfiability in a model with few con-
straints can be more difficult. Naive detection on a non-vacuous
property requires solving satisfiable SAT instances, since re-
placing variables falsifies the property. However, peripherality
on a non-vacuous property requires time linear in the size of
the resolution proof obtained from the original model-checking
run. If all of these SAT instances have a low clause/variable
ratio, naive detection can be much faster than peripherality.
This situation was only observed on the abp4 model, with
clause/variable ratio of 1.5-1.8 – significantly lower than any
other test case with large proofs and without vacuity.
We now turn to measuring the effectiveness of our meth-
ods, using the number of vacuous variables found during the
partial pass as a metric (see the scatter plots in Fig. 5). This
number indicates how many additional model-checking runs
are needed to complete vacuity detection. Since our partial
methods can be ordered by increasing precision, Fig. 5(a)
compares irrelevance and local irrelevance, Fig. 5(b) – local
irrelevance and peripherality, and Fig. 5(c) – peripherality and
naive detection. Each point in the plot represents a set of test
cases – a larger point means a larger set. The axes show the
number of vacuous variables detected by each method. Points
below the diagonal indicate where the X-axis method detects
more vacuous variables than the Y-axis method. The plots show
that local irrelevance is clearly more effective than irrelevance.
Contrary to our expectations, peripherality performed exactly
as local irrelevance in all but 5 cases. Thus, local irrelevance
appears to be more cost-effective. Fig. 5(c) shows that our
techniques are effective when compared with naive detection:
peripherality reduced the number of extra model-checking runs
by 40% in 54 out of 99 cases that exhibited vacuity.
B. Results obtained with SB
This benchmark suite consists of 13 models from the IBM
Formal Verification Benchmarks Library [22] (18 properties).
The properties have a single temporal operator (G or F), and
include both safety and liveness. 12 of the properties exhibit
vacuity, and 6 do not. evaluate the scalability of VaqTree to
industrial models, we must first bound such that M |=k ϕ. For
this benchmark, we picked depth k = 20, which is in line with
the bounds used for analyzing these models in [22, Sec. 2]. At
this depth, only 13 models from the benchmark were suitable
for our experiments. We report on the experiments below. At
this k, some of the models where too large to analyze using
VaqTree, and some of the properties did not hold. This is why
we only report data for 13 models from this benchmark.
Table I, which includes full results for SB, shows that proof

































































































































































































































































































































































































Fig. 6. SB: Comparison of execution times. Where applicable, all times include times for both the partial and model-checking passes.
ingly, these are in the same range as proof sizes for SA. This
could be explained by the fact that even though these models
are more complex, properties are simpler.
Scatter plots in Fig. 6 compare the execution times of
VaqTree parametrized with local irrelevance and peripherality,
with naive detection for this benchmark. Execution times are
measured as described in Section V-A, and the graphs are
interpreted in the same way as those in Fig. 4. Since SB had
low vacuity, we did not expect our techniques to find it without
the help of naive detection. However, graphs in Fig. 6 show
that our techniques do in fact detect vacuity, as indicated by the
points that appear below the diagonal. Both local irrelevance
and peripherality detect the same amount of vacuity in SB, but
local irrelevance is slightly faster than peripherality.
Surprisingly, peripherality introduces a low overhead in this
benchmark – points over the diagonal are near it, unlike what
we see in Fig. 4. To explain this behavior, we hypothesized that
in non-vacuous cases with low clause/variable ratios and large
proofs, peripherality is much slower than naive detection. In
SB, we found that 15 of the test cases have a clause/variable
ratio between 2.62-3.66, much higher than the ratios encoun-
tered in SA. The remaining three cases had ratios in the same
range as the abp04 model. However, two of these produce
trivial proofs, and the last one exhibits vacuity. These results
empirically support our hypothesis.
C. Conclusions
In summary, we observed that local irrelevance performs best
out of our proposed partial methods, finding most vacuity in
the least amount of time. In 95% of both benchmark suites,
we found VaqTree with local irrelevance to be at most 3%
slower, and usually much faster, than the naive detection. In
several tests of the SA benchmark, peripherality was notice-
ably slower than naive detection. On the industrial benchmark
SB, the overhead produced by peripherality was negligible.
Interestingly, this suggests that peripherality may be a viable
alternative to local irrelevance on industrial models. We plan
to investigate this further in the future. Thus, we believe that
both local irrelevance and peripherality can be used to replace
naive detection. We plan to enhance our methods by developing
a heuristic based on the clause/variable ratio and proof size
that indicates when naive detection should be applied instead.
Finally, VaqTree outputs the vacuity results for each timed
variable pi as a byproduct of its partial pass. This information
gives an explanation of non-vacuity, indicating which time
steps have been important for deciding whether a given variable
was vacuous, thus facilitating debugging.
VI. SUMMARY AND RELATED WORK
In this paper, we showed how to exploit the UNSAT core
and resolution proof produced by a successful run of BMC for
vacuity detection. We introduced three vacuity detection meth-
ods that can be applied with little overhead after one model-
checking run in order to quickly identify vacuous variables and
reduce the number of additional model-checking runs required.
Two of these methods, irrelevance and local irrelevance, exploit
the UNSAT core, and the third, peripherality, is based on
analyzing the resolution proof. We built a tool VaqTree, which
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is based on these methods, and showed that it is effective for
speeding up vacuity detection.
Related work on vacuity detection has been described in
Section III. Additionally, our work is related to research in
declarative modeling. In particular, our use of the UNSAT core
to detect vacuity was inspired by [23], which addresses the
problem of identifying overconstraint in declarative models.
While similar in spirit to vacuity detection in model checking,
declarative models have no explicit transition relation; instead,
transitions are expressed with constraints [24], [25]. An over-
constraint occurs when the model satisfies a safety property
because all violations of the formula have been accidentally
ruled out by the declared constraints. In order to detect such
overconstraints, [23] introduces the idea of core extraction:
declarative models are reduced to SAT instances, from which
an UNSAT core can be extracted if the property holds. If a
constraint’s clauses do not appear in the UNSAT core, the
constraint is called irrelevant, and is a source of overconstraint
(similar to Def. 3). The cone-of-influence technique [1] is also
similar to Def. 3. However, as both of these techniques are
model-based, neither can be used to detect vacuity.
Our experiments show that local irrelevance and periphera-
lity can detect more vacuous variables than irrelevance. There-
fore, detecting overconstraint in declarative models may also
benefit from methods that analyze the structure of the resolution
proof. In the future, we propose to investigate how a notion
equivalent to peripherality can be defined in the declarative
setting. Another goal of future work is to increase the power of
resolution proof-based vacuity detection methods. In this paper,
we restricted ourselves to using results of only one BMC run,
and to methods with linear time complexity in the size of the
resolution proof or better. However, it is possible that the most
optimal trade-off between speed and effectiveness of vacuity
detection algorithms lies in the domain of multiple resolution
proofs, where we can find the minimal UNSAT core [26] or
reduce the resolution proof using interpolation [27].
McMillan [6] uses interpolation to prove that a particular
bound is sufficient to imply the unbounded satisfaction of a
BMC problem. We intend to combine our techniques with
this algorithm in order to prove that bounded vacuity for the
correct k implies that the property also holds vacuously in the
unbounded case.
Interpolation can also be used to detect vacuity. Given two
sets of clauses, A and B, such that A ∪ B is unsatisfiable, an
interpolant C is a set of clauses whose variables appear in both
A and B, such that B ∪ C is unsatisfiable and A ⇒ C [28].
Intuitively, if C is minimal, then C is the reason why A ∪ B
is unsatisfiable. This intuition suggests that if an interpolant of
CLK and CLe could be found, then all variables not appearing
in it could be considered vacuous. However, we did not include
this technique in our empirical evaluation, as our interpolant
generator was comparatively slower.
Another means of speeding vacuity detection for BMC is
to iteratively check the k-step vacuity of each variable starting
with k = 0. Since K 2k1 ϕ[p ← x] implies K 2k2 ϕ[p ← x]
for all k2 > k1, if a variable is proven non-vacuous at some
step k, then it can be omitted from subsequent checks of higher
k. This method is orthogonal to our techniques, and the vacuity
detection at each step could be carried out by VaqTree.
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APPENDIX
A. Proofs of Theorems
Proofs of selected theorems are given. Additional proofs can
be found in [8, Appendix A2].
Theorem 2 If p is locally irrelevant with respect to
BMCk(K, ϕ) and Π, then ϕ is k-step p-vacuous.
Proof: Let BMCk(K, ϕ) = CLK ∪ CLe and U be the
UNSAT core of Π. Assume that p is locally irrelevant in
BMCk(K, ϕ). So for all pi, either pi does not appear in U , or
pi is local to CLe ∩ U = Ue or to CLK ∩ U = UK by Def. 4.
Let Ue′ be Ue with each occurence of pi replaced by xi. Since
each pi that has been replaced is local to Ue, and UK ∪Ue = U
is unsatisfiable, then UK ∪ Ue′ is also unsatisfiable. Since
Ue′ ⊆ CLe[p ← x], the set of clauses CLK ∪ CLe[p ← x]
is unsatisfiable as well. Therefore, K |=k ϕ[p← x] holds, so ϕ
is p-vacuous.
Theorem 3 LetΠ be a proof of unsatisfiability of BMCk(K, ϕ).
If a variable p of ϕ is peripheral in Π, then ϕ is k-step p-
vacuous.
Proof: Let BMCk(K, ϕ) = CLK ∪ CLe and U be the
UNSAT core of Π. Assume that p is peripheral in BMCk(K, ϕ).
Let Ue′ be the result of replacing each pi with xi in CLe ∩ U .
Then (CLK ∩ U) ∪ Ue′ is still unsatisfiable, since every
resolution on xi must be local to CLe∩U , and every resolution
on pi must be local toCLK∩U by the peripherality of pi. Since
Ue′ ⊆ CLe[p ← x], CLK ∪ CLe[p ← x] is unsatisfiable as
well. Therefore, K |=k ϕ[p← x], and ϕ is p-vacuous.
Theorem 4 Assume ϕ is k-step p-vacuous in K. Then, there
exists a resolution proof Π of unsatisfiability of BMCk(K, ϕ)
such that p is peripheral in Π.
Proof: Assume that ϕ is p-vacuous. Then, the BMC
problem BMCk(K, ϕ[p← x]) = CLK ∪ CLe[p ← x] is
unsatisfiable, and there exists a resolution proof Π establishing
this. We must show that this proof can be transformed to a proof
of unsatisfiability of BMCk(K, ϕ) = CLK∪CLe in which each
pi is peripheral with respect to CLK and CLe.
If Π does not contain a clause that has both pi and xi for some
i, then for Π′ obtained from Π by replacing each occurrence
of xi by pi, (a) Π
′ is a well-formed resolution proof, and (b)
Roots(Π′) ⊆ CLK ∪ CLe. That is, Π
′ is a resolution proof
establishing that BMCk(K, ϕ) is unsatisfiable.
We now show how such a proof can be constructed from an
arbitrary proof Π of unsatisfiability of BMCk(K, ϕ[p← x]). Let
UK = Roots(Π) ∩ CLK , and CLe′ = CLe[p ← x]. Then, if
pi occurs in any clause of UK , it is local to UK . Let L be the
set of all local variables of UK , C = ∃L · UK be a formula
resulting from existentially eliminating these local variables,
and CNF(C) be the CNF encoding of C. For any i, pi does not
appear in C. Furthermore, the set of clauses CNF(C)∪CLe′ is
unsatisfiable. Thus, there exists a resolution proof Π′ establish-
ing this such that Roots(Π′) ⊆ CLe′ ∪CNF(C). Finally, since
UK ⇒ C, for each clause c ∈ C there exists
a resolution proof Πc such that Leaf (Πc) = c and
Roots(Πc) ⊆ UK . By combining the proofs {Πc | c ∈
CNF(C)} and Π′, we obtain a proof of unsatisfiability of
UK ∪ CLe′ that does not contain a clause with variables xi
and pi.
B. Experiments
Table I shows detailed results of our experiments. In this
table, column “Benchmark” indicates the benchmark the test
case belongs to; “Test case” is the case’s unique identifier
inside the benchmark, “Model” is the SMV model tested; “#
var. in M” is the number of variables in the model; “k” is
the number of steps used to run BMC; “op. in ϕ” shows the
property operators (e.g., 2G means that two G operators appear
in the property); “# var. in ϕ” is the number of atomic variables
present in the property; “# vac. vars.” is the number of vacuous
variables; and “# resol. in Π” is the number of resolutions in the
resolution proof. The next three columns report the time needed
for model-checking: “Gen. CNF” is the time NuSMV took to
generate the corresponding CNF theory; “Test SAT” and “Gen.
Π” are the time MiniSat took to test satisfiability and generate
the corresponding resolution proof respectively; and “Total” is
the sum of the previous three columns.
For the naive method, we report the total times for the CNF
theory generation (“Gen. CNF”) and for satisfiability testing
(“Test SAT”). One CNF theory is produced per each atomic
variable. For irrelevance, local irrelevance and peripherality, we
report how many vacuous variables were found by the partial
pass (“# vac. vars. found”), how long VaqTree took to do
the corresponding analysis (“Anal.”) and how much time was
needed to do the completeing pass (“Extra runs”).
For example, test case 8 analyzes a five-variable, two tem-
poral operator (G,U) property of the pci model (which has
40 variables). Only three of these variables are vacuous. The
resolution proof generated when k = 13 has 4,283 resolutions.
This property was checked in 5.59 seconds. Naive vacuity de-
tection required five model-checking runs, taking 25.85 seconds
to generate the corresponding CNF theories and 2.89 seconds
to test their satisfiability, requiring a total of 28.74 seconds.
Irrelevance took 0.27 seconds to find two of the vacuous
variables during the partial pass. It then took 17.60 seconds
to carry out the completing pass, so the total time required by
irrelevance to find all three vacuous variables is 17.87 seconds.
Local irrelevance took 0.28 seconds to analyze the resolution
proof, finding the same two vacuous variables as irrelevance.
Thus, it also takes 17.60 seconds to run the completing pass,
so the total time required by local irrelevance is 17.88 seconds.
Finally, peripherality took 0.47 seconds to execute the partial
pass and found the same two vacuous variables; it also required
17.60 seconds to run the completing pass, taking a total of 18.07
seconds to produce complete results for test case 8.
VaqTree, the complete experimental results and some test
cases are available at [19].
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TABLE I: Statistics for vacuity detection experiments on NuSMV distribution and other examples.
Bench-Test Model (M ) # var. k op. # var.# vac. # resol. Model Checking Naive Irrelevance Local Irrelevance (LI) Peripherality (P)
mark case inM in ϕ in ϕ vars. inΠ Gen. Test Gen. Total Gen. Test Total #
vac.
Anal. Extra Total #
vac.
Anal. Extra Total #
vac.
Anal. Extra Total
CNF (s)SAT (s)Π (s) (s) CNF (s)SAT (s) (s) vars. (s)runs (s) (s) vars. (s)runs (s) (s) vars. (s)runs (s) (s)
found found found
SA 1 pci 40 13 G,U 4 1 19792 4.69 0.23 5.9 10.82 20.66 2.77 23.43 0 0.34 23.43 23.77 0 0.34 23.43 23.77 0 0.81 23.43 24.24
SA 2 pci 40 13 G,U 4 3 1649 5.13 0.14 5.64 10.91 11.75 1.30 13.05 3 0.26 0 0.26 3 0.26 0 0.26 3 0.37 0 0.37
SA 3 pci 40 13 G,U 4 3 1649 5.09 0.13 5.32 10.54 12.03 2.14 14.17 3 0.26 0 0.26 3 0.25 0 0.25 3 0.37 0 0.37
SA 4 pci 40 13 G,U 3 1 7725 4.80 0.18 5.65 10.63 12.68 1.73 14.41 0 0.29 14.41 14.7 0 0.29 14.41 14.70 0 0.50 14.41 14.91
SA 5 pci 40 13 G,U 3 1 7555 4.76 0.18 5.55 10.49 12.36 1.56 13.92 0 0.28 13.92 14.20 0 0.28 13.92 14.20 0 0.50 13.92 14.42
SA 6 pci 40 13 G,U 4 3 1705 4.66 0.12 5.68 10.46 11.66 1.19 12.85 3 0.25 0 0.25 3 0.26 0 0.26 3 0.39 0 0.39
SA 7 pci 40 13 G,U 4 3 1705 4.67 0.14 5.42 10.23 11.68 1.40 13.08 3 0.25 0 0.25 3 0.26 0 0.26 3 0.37 0 0.37
SA 8 pci 40 13 G,U 5 3 4283 4.95 0.22 5.59 10.76 25.85 2.89 28.74 2 0.27 17.60 17.87 2 0.28 17.60 17.88 2 0.47 17.60 18.07
SA 66 prod-cell 39 10 G,F 6 6 5275 0.88 0.04 1.25 2.17 5.55 0.18 5.73 6 0.28 0 0.28 6 0.28 0 0.28 6 0.49 0 0.49
SA 67 prod-cell 39 10 G,F 5 5 5320 1.02 0.04 1.41 2.47 4.81 0.16 4.97 5 0.28 0 0.28 5 0.29 0 0.29 5 0.47 0 0.47
SA 68 prod-cell 39 10 G,F 4 4 3798 0.91 0.03 1.27 2.21 3.57 0.12 3.69 2 0.27 1.86 2.13 2 0.27 1.86 2.13 2 0.43 1.86 2.29
SA 69 prod-cell 39 10 G,F 8 8 2764 0.99 0.03 1.26 2.28 7.52 0.23 7.75 1 0.26 6.78 7.04 1 0.26 6.78 7.04 1 0.42 6.78 7.2
SA 70 prod-cell 39 10 G,F 5 5 5232 1.20 0.04 1.33 2.57 4.63 0.15 4.78 1 0.28 3.82 4.10 2 0.28 2.86 3.14 2 0.48 2.86 3.34
SA 71 prod-cell 39 10 G,F 4 4 4068 1.35 0.03 1.27 2.65 3.87 0.10 3.97 2 0.27 2.16 2.43 3 0.27 0.95 1.22 3 0.44 0.95 1.39
SA 72 prod-cell 39 10 G,F 4 4 2756 0.96 0.03 1.27 2.26 3.64 0.13 3.77 1 0.26 2.82 3.08 1 0.26 2.82 3.08 1 0.40 2.82 3.22
SA 73 prod-cell 39 10 G,F 6 6 4425 0.84 0.04 1.30 2.18 5.47 0.19 5.66 2 0.28 3.74 4.02 2 0.28 3.74 4.02 2 0.46 3.74 4.2
SA 74 prod-cell 39 10 G,F 5 5 3802 0.92 0.04 1.28 2.24 4.55 0.17 4.72 4 0.27 1.01 1.28 4 0.28 1.01 1.29 4 0.43 1.01 1.44
SA 75 prod-cell 39 10 G,F 5 5 2802 0.91 0.03 1.44 2.38 4.53 0.14 4.67 2 0.26 2.80 3.06 2 0.26 2.80 3.06 2 0.41 2.80 3.21
SA 76 prod-cell 39 10 G,F 8 8 3732 1.16 0.03 1.36 2.55 7.72 0.21 7.93 5 0.28 2.96 3.24 6 0.27 1.98 2.25 6 0.46 1.98 2.44
SA 77 prod-cell 39 10 G,F 9 9 3010 1.50 0.03 1.28 2.81 8.93 0.22 9.15 6 0.27 3.12 3.39 7 0.27 1.94 2.21 7 0.45 1.94 2.39
SA 78 prod-cell 39 10 G,F 5 5 2585 0.86 0.03 1.25 2.14 4.98 0.14 5.12 2 0.26 2.93 3.19 2 0.26 2.93 3.19 2 0.40 2.93 3.33
SA 79 prod-cell 39 10 G,F 5 5 2556 1.06 0.03 1.30 2.39 4.70 0.12 4.82 2 0.26 2.98 3.24 2 0.26 2.98 3.24 2 0.40 2.98 3.38
SA 80 prod-cell 39 10 G,F 4 4 5317 1.26 0.04 1.27 2.57 3.53 0.12 3.65 4 0.29 0 0.29 4 0.29 0 0.29 4 0.46 0 0.46
SA 81 prod-cell 39 102G,2F 10 10 2497 3.15 0.06 1.29 4.5 9.68 0.27 9.95 3 0.26 6.97 7.23 4 0.26 4.94 5.20 4 0.42 4.94 5.36
SA 82 prod-cell 39 10 G,F 8 8 2348 0.88 0.033 1.25 2.16 7.52 0.22 7.74 3 0.27 4.84 5.11 3 0.26 4.84 5.10 3 0.41 4.84 5.25
SA 83 abp4 13 19 G,F 1 0 1289374 2.79 10.7334.14 47.66 2.93 1.79 4.72 0 5.51 4.72 10.23 0 5.72 4.72 10.44 0 98.62 4.72103.34
SA 84 abp4 13 19 G,F 3 2 1050234 3.14 6.4529.43 39.02 8.43 20.76 29.19 0 5.07 29.19 34.26 0 5.22 29.19 34.41 0 67.54 29.19 96.73
SA 85 abp4 13 19 G,F 3 2 2246095 2.99 19.0349.63 71.65 8.81 26.43 35.24 0 8.23 33.78 42.01 0 8.22 33.78 42 0 412.30 33.78446.08
SA 86 abp4 13 19 G,2F 2 0 795705 3.07 5.0421.28 29.39 5.54 6.29 11.83 0 2.69 25.64 28.33 0 2.71 25.64 28.35 0 37.21 25.64 62.85
SA 93 toyFGS04 151 18 F 6 6 297 18.88 0.26 5.27 24.41 114.78 0.76115.54 3 0.23 57.39 57.62 3 0.22 57.39 57.61 3 0.29 57.39 57.68
SA 94 toyFGS04 151 18 F 12 12 308 19.13 0.16 5.28 24.57 224.79 1.40226.19 6 0.26 132.43132.69 6 0.26 132.43132.69 6 0.33 132.43132.76
SA 95 toyFGS04 151 18 F 6 0 318 18.35 0.15 5.17 23.67 126.28 32.03158.31 0 0.22 158.31158.53 0 0.22 158.31158.53 0 0.29 158.31158.60
SA 96 toyFGS04 151 18 F 4 0 308 18.57 0.14 5.45 24.16 75.18 22.26 97.44 0 0.22 97.44 97.66 0 0.22 97.44 97.66 0 0.27 97.44 97.71
SA 97 toyFGS04 151 18 G 4 0 8072 14.14 0.21 3.3 17.65 57.91 10.60 68.51 0 0.33 68.51 68.84 0 0.33 68.51 68.84 0 0.60 68.51 69.11
SA 98 toyFGS04 151 18 G 6 0 7985 14.47 0.21 3.63 18.31 88.94 11.48100.42 0 0.34 100.42100.76 0 0.34 100.42100.76 0 0.68 100.42101.10
SA 99 toyFGS04 151 18 F 6 6 293 19.80 0.15 5.61 25.56 111.91 0.66112.57 2 0.21 75.08 75.29 2 0.22 75.08 75.30 2 0.27 75.08 75.35
SA 107 msi wtrans 30 40 G 5 3 66 21.85 0.20 8.39 30.44 120.15 65.70185.85 3 0.21 112.59112.80 3 0.20 112.59112.79 3 0.24 112.59112.83
SA 108 msi wtrans 30 40 F 5 4 66 23.53 0.20 9.15 32.88 120.16 73.28193.44 3 0.2 120.30120.50 3 0.21 120.30120.51 3 0.25 120.30120.55
SA 109 msi wtrans 30 40 F 6 4 66 21.56 0.21 8.46 30.23 156.61 93.23249.84 4 0.21 0 0.21 4 0.21 0 0.21 4 0.24 0 0.24
SB 1 IBM FV 2002 03 111 20 G 8 8 7480 4.54 0.09 3.8 8.43 36.21 0.67 36.88 7 0.35 4.67 5.02 7 0.35 4.67 5.02 7 0.74 4.67 5.41
SB 2 IBM FV 2002 04 223 20 G 4 3 45065 7.62 0.92 5.71 14.25 29.66 3.83 33.49 0 0.59 33.49 34.08 0 0.59 33.49 34.08 0 1.67 33.49 35.16
SB 3 IBM FV 2002 05 310 20 G 2 1 32776 11.82 0.6210.02 22.46 22.97 1.31 24.28 1 0.44 12.21 12.65 1 0.44 12.21 12.65 1 1.02 12.21 13.23
SB 4 IBM FV 2002 09 233 20 F 9 9 2 8.96 0.17 0 9.13 81.02 1.22 82.24 9 0.17 0 0.17 9 0.17 0 0.17 9 0.17 0 0.17
SB 5 IBM FV 2002 10 224 20 G 3 2 78523 54.23 8.4546.09108.77 165.88 93.22 259.1 0 0.7 259.1 259.8 0 0.7 259.1 259.8 0 2.33 259.1261.43
SB 6 IBM FV 2002 10 224 20 G 4 3 177536 53.3 30.2156.61140.12 219.74 199.25418.99 0 1.12 418.99420.11 0 1.12 418.99420.11 0 5.8 418.99424.79
SB 7 IBM FV 2002 10 224 20 G 4 4 9119 53.97 0.9740.84 95.78 218.45 211.21429.66 3 0.32 112.58 112.9 3 0.32 112.58 112.9 3 0.61 112.58113.19
SB 8 IBM FV 2002 10 224 20 G 2 0 155775 54.99 9.2246.75110.96 108.76 165.1273.86 0 0.99 273.86274.85 0 0.99 273.86274.85 0 3.7 273.86277.56
SB 9 IBM FV 2002 10 224 20 G 2 1 197053 54.96 65.4379.32199.71 110.2 103.82214.02 0 1.09 214.02215.11 0 1.12 214.02215.14 0 4.5 214.02218.52
SB 10 IBM FV 2002 17 1 1584 20 G 2 0 96085 38.58 1.1514.23 53.96 75.78 2.35 78.13 0 1.07 78.13 79.2 0 1.08 78.13 79.21 0 2.47 78.13 80.6
SB 11 IBM FV 2002 17 2 1583 20 G 1 0 77553 38.5 0.8613.68 53.04 38.82 1.35 40.17 0 0.88 40.17 41.05 0 0.88 40.17 41.05 0 1.74 40.17 41.91
SB 12 IBM FV 2002 17 2 1583 20 G 2 1 73790 38.47 0.823.98 63.25 77.01 1.77 78.78 0 0.89 78.78 79.67 0 0.89 78.78 79.67 0 1.98 78.78 80.76
SB 13 IBM FV 2002 19 121 20 G 1 0 35769 9.56 6.4913.31 29.36 9.65 5.52 15.17 0 0.39 15.17 15.56 0 0.4 15.17 15.57 0 0.83 15.17 16
SB 14 IBM FV 2002 21 79 20 G 1 0 25508 8.8 5.6111.98 26.39 8.68 7.61 16.29 0 0.37 16.29 16.66 0 0.37 16.29 16.66 0 0.71 16.29 17
SB 15 IBM FV 2002 22 104 20 G 1 0 53300 14.58 7.7417.84 40.16 14.78 24.42 39.2 0 0.53 39.2 39.73 0 0.53 39.2 39.73 0 1.2 39.2 40.4
SB 16 IBM FV 2002 23 103 20 G 8 8 7618 14.52 0.6911.29 26.5 115.68 2.36118.04 1 0.36 103.01103.37 2 0.35 88.41 88.76 2 0.74 88.41 89.15
SB 17 IBM FV 2002 27 43 20 G 8 6 431223 3.09 4.5415.98 23.61 24.43 25.01 49.44 0 1.77 49.44 51.21 0 1.78 49.44 51.22 0 24.5 49.44 73.94
SB 18 IBM FV 2002 31 2 227 20 G 17 17 2 9.81 0.19 0 10 168.2 2.57170.77 17 0.19 0 0.19 17 0.19 0 0.19 17 0.19 0 0.19
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Abstract— In today’s SoC design cycles, debugging is one of
the most time consuming manual tasks. CAD solutions strive
to reduce the inefficiency of debugging by identifying error
sources in designs automatically. Unfortunately, the capacity and
performance of such automated techniques must be consider-
ably extended for industrial applicability. This work aims to
improve the performance of current state-of-the-art debugging
techniques, thus making them more practical. More specifically,
this work proposes a novel design debugging formulation based
on maximum satisfiability (max-sat) and approximate max-sat.
The developed technique can quickly discard many potential
error sources in designs, thus drastically reducing the size of the
problem passed to an existing debugger. The max-sat formulation
is used as a pre-processing step to construct a highly optimized
debugging framework. Empirical results demonstrate the effec-
tiveness of the proposed framework as run-time improvements
of orders of magnitude are consistently realized over a state-of-
the-art debugger.
I. INTRODUCTION
Functional verification tasks dominate the effort of con-
temporary VLSI and SoC design cycles. A major step of
functional verification is design debugging, which determines
the root cause of failed verification tasks such as simulation
or equivalence checking. For example, when a simulation
run fails because a design’s behavior is inconsistent with its
specification, debugging identifies the components responsible
for the discrepancy.
Hardware debugging is overwhelmingly performed manu-
ally in the industry today. Designers and verification engineers
must analyze the failed verification instances, the design and
the specification to realize which design components or blocks
are the root cause of the failure. Due to the “guess-and-check”
nature of the problem, this task is accepted as one of the most
time-consuming processes of the VLSI and SoC design cycles.
As design complexities nearly double with every generation, so
does the daunting debugging effort. Clearly, automated debug-
ging solutions are needed to increase a designer’s debugging
and verification efficiency.
Automated debugging is a computationally intensive prob-
lem since its complexity increases dramatically with the size
of the design, the length of the error traces and with the
number of errors present in the design. There is a rich
history of debugging techniques and algorithms developed
over the last decades which seek to tackle this problem [1],
[2], [6]. Although efficient for relatively small design blocks
and particular design types, these solutions have not been
extended to industrial problems. More recently, several debug-
ging techniques based on formal techniques such as Boolean
Satisfiability (SAT) [10] and Quantified Boolean Formula
(QBF) [5] have demonstrated great promise and encouraged
further research in formal techniques for debugging. Despite
these successes, the capacity and performance of both tra-
ditional and newer debugging techniques must be greatly
improved to make debugging practical for industrial problems.
This work proposes a novel framework with the aim of
greatly reducing the run-time of state-of-the-art debuggers.
This technique presents the first maximum satisfiability (max-
sat) formulation for design debugging. The formulation is
constructed using the constraints corresponding to the erro-
neous design, the input stimulus, and the expected correct
response. The formulation is unsatisfiable, since the incorrect
design cannot produce the correct response, and it can only
be satisfied if some of the constraints are removed. An all-
solution max-sat solver can iteratively find maximal satisfi-
able subsets of the constraints. The complement of any of
these subsets is a set of constraints whose removal makes
the problem satisfiable. These constraints will be shown to
correspond directly to the erroneous gates or components in
the design. The proposed max-sat technique is developed for
combinational and sequential circuits as well as for problems
with single or multiple input stimuli and expected responses.
The proposed technique is an alternative approach to
hardware debugging which can be easily enhanced to over-
approximate solutions. The over-approximation allows for a
trade-off between the tool’s performance and the resolution of
the solutions. More specifically, approximation can reduce the
problem complexity and thus require less run-time at the cost
of finding larger, less precise solutions. Although not exact,
this approach can be employed as a pre-processing step that
filters solutions for a second stage exact debugger. The second
debugger benefits from having fewer suspect error sources
which translates into faster run-times. The combined two-step
debugging framework reduces the complexity of both stages,
resulting in an efficient debugging solution.
A suite of experiments on combinational and sequential
circuits for single and multiple vectors are conducted to
demonstrate the benefit of the proposed framework. On aver-
age, the over-approximation technique quickly eliminates 92%
of the suspects. The second stage debugger uses the filtered
suspects to find the exact error sources in a fraction of the time
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it would take otherwise. Overall, performance improvements
of 200 times or two orders of magnitude over a state-of-the-art
debugger are observed consistently.
In the next section, background is provided on the max-
sat approach used as well as on design debugging. Sec. III
presents the proposed max-sat approach for combinational
circuits and Sec. IV extends this for sequential circuits and
for multiple vectors. Sec. V present the over-approximation
technique and the overall framework developed for opti-
mal performance, respectively. Experiments are presented in
Sec. VI followed by the conclusion in Sec. VII.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Maximum Satisfiability
The algorithm from [8] is used to solve a generalization of
the max-sat problem. While max-sat is concerned with finding
a satisfiable set of clauses with maximum cardinality, this can
be generalized to find Maximal Satisfiable Subsets (MSSes).
An MSS is a satisfiable subset of a formula’s clauses that is
maximal in the sense that adding any one of the remaining
clauses would make it UNSAT. Any max-sat solution is of
course an MSS, but MSSes can be different (smaller) sizes as
well. In this work, the complements of MSSes, sets of clauses
whose removal makes the instance satisfiable, are of interest.
Just as an MSS is maximal, its complement is minimal, and
we refer to such a set as a Minimal Correction Set (MCS).
This work makes use of two following techniques developed
as extensions to the algorithm from [8]:
• Finding all MCSes up to size k
• Grouping clauses to produce ”approximate” MCSes
Finding all MCSes up to size k is performed by the
algorithm AllMCSes from [8], which was developed as the
first phase of an approach for finding all Minimal Unsatisfiable
Subsets (MUSes). This procedure solves consecutive optimiza-
tion problems, finding MCSes in order of increasing size
(equivalent to finding their complementary MSSes in order
of decreasing size). MCSes are returned as they are found,
and execution can be stopped when a size limit is reached.
The second ability, of grouping clauses, depends on the
way the algorithm uses clause-selector variables. Every clause
Ci is augmented with a new variable yi, producing C ′i =
(yi + Ci) = (yi → Ci). When yi is assigned TRUE, the
original clause Ci must be satisfied, while when yi is FALSE,
C ′i is satisfied, essentially disabling the original clause. This
gives a standard SAT solver the ability to enable and disable
constraints implicitly within the normal backtracking search.
By assigning the same y variable to multiple clauses, a set
of clauses can be treated as a single higher-level constraint
(the conjunction of all clauses given the same y variable) that
can be enabled and disabled at once. Using this approach,
each MCS is a minimal set of groups of constraints whose
removal makes the instance satisfiable. This leads to an over-
approximation of an MCS of the original clauses, because
extra clauses will be included in groups even though they may
not be necessary. The benefit of the over-approximation is that
it can greatly increase the performance of the algorithm as the
search space is reduced exponentially.
This work uses the MCS techniques outlined above for
debugging. Although not precise in the general case, the
term max-sat is used throughout to refer collectively to the
techniques above for simplicity.
B. Automated Design Debugging
The problems of design debugging and fault diagnosis,
which occur at different stages of the VLSI design cycle,
have strong similarities. The latter occurs when a fabricated
chip fails during the testing phase due to the presence of
manufacturing defects [10], while design debugging occurs at
the early stages of the design cycle, when the implemented
design does not meet its functional specifications. In this
paper the terminology and assumptions are those of design
debugging, however, the proposed techniques can apply to
fault diagnosis as well.
The input of the design debugging problem is an erroneous
circuit C, a set of input stimuli I for which the design fails
verification, and the corresponding correct output responses O.
The components I and O, also called input/output vectors, can
be obtained from simulation-based verification tools or formal
tools such as equivalence checkers and model checkers.
An error source at the circuit-level exhibits an erroneous
response at the primary outputs for at least one of the provided
vectors. In this paper, a model-free diagnosis strategy is
used, which can “detect” any type of gate/module error. The
error cardinality Ng is the maximum number of simultaneous
error sources the debugger assumes exist in the circuit. The
complexity of design debugging increases exponentially with
the error cardinality [11]. A design debugging tool must return
all possible solutions, i.e. all potential error tuples up to the
size of the error cardinality.
Traditionally, methods based on simulation, path-tracing
and binary decision diagrams have been used to tackle the
design debugging problem [1], [2], [6]. Recently, SAT-based
strategies [10] have been proven to be effective as their
performance increases with that of the underlying SAT solvers.
This approach formulates the design debugging problem by
constructing circuit constraints, translating it to a Boolean
formula in Conjunctive Normal Form (CNF), and giving it
to an all-solution SAT solver. Note that deriving a CNF
from a circuit is a simple linear time algorithm as there is
a one-to-one correspondence between circuit gates and CNF
formulas. Table I shows five basic gates along with their CNF
representations.
Gate CNF
y = NOT(x) (x + y) · (x + y)
y = AND(x1, x2, . . . , xn)
(x1 + y) · (x2 + y) · . . . · (xn + y)·
(x1 + x2 + · · · + xn + y)
y = OR(x1, x2, . . . , xn)
(x1 + y) · (x2 + y) · . . . · (xn + y)·
(x1 + x2 + · · · + xn + y)
y = XOR(x1, x2)
(x1 + x2 + y) · (x1 + x2 + y)·
(x1 + x2 + y) · (x1 + x2 + y)
y = MUX(s, x1, x2)
(x1 + y + s) · (x1 + y + s)·
(x2 + y + s) · (x2 + y + s)
TABLE I
GATE TO CNF TRANSLATION
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III. DEBUGGING COMBINATIONAL CIRCUITS WITH
MAX-SAT
Given an erroneous circuit C, an input stimulus I , and the
corresponding correct output response O a CNF formula can
be produced as follows.
Φ = I ·O · CNF(C)
This CNF problem is naturally unsatisfiable because the er-
roneous circuit cannot produce the correct output response
under the given input vector. Since the inconsistency between
a circuit’s actual and correct response is due to some gate-level
error sources, the unsatisfiability of the problem is due to the
clauses derived from these error sources. In other words, the
clauses that are at conflict in the CNF correspond to the circuit-
level error sources from which they are derived. Therefore, the
circuit-level errors can be identified by finding the CNF-level
error clauses.
The max-sat approach in Sec. II-A can identify Maximal
Satisfiable Subsets (MSSes) whose complements are Minimal
Correction Sets (MCSes). These MCSes represent sets of
clauses whose removal from the CNF make the problem
satisfiable. In the formula Φ constructed using the constraints
I , O, and CNF(C), the MCSes map directly to error clauses.
Once the error clauses are identified through MCSes, the gate-
level suspects are found by mapping each clause to the gate





















Fig. 1. Correct and erroneous circuit
For example, consider the correct and erroneous circuit in
Fig. 1 (a) and (b) where gate A is mistakenly implemented as
an AND gate instead of an OR gate. Under the input stimulus
{a = 0, b = 1, d = 1} the circuit has a response of {e = 0}
instead of the correct response of {e = 1}. The corresponding
erroneous CNF for the circuit and the input/output vectors are
shown below.
(a) · (b) · (d) · (e)
(a+ c) · (b+ c) · (a+ b+ c)
(c+ e) · (d+ e) · (c+ d+ e).
Here, the max-sat approach described in Sec. II-A can return
the MCS (a + c) as a solution because removing this clause
from the CNF makes the formula satisfiable. Notice that this
clause is derived from the erroneous gate A.
The above example illustrates how the removal of an error
clause can help identify the error source. Further analysis of
the example demonstrates that there are other clauses such
as (c + e) whose removal can satisfy the problem. Indeed,
more than one error clause may exist in a given problem
corresponding to the many potential error sources at the gate-
level. These are more commonly known as equivalent errors
or faults in the diagnosis literature [1]. Note that the removal
of the clause (a) also satisfies the problem, however since this
constraint is not part of the circuit component of the CNF (i.e.
C), it is not considered as an error clause.
For the debugging technique to be complete, all equivalent
errors must be found. Each of these is known as a suspect
error source because it may fix the problem such that erroneous
circuit produces the correct response for the given input vector.
As a result, the AllMCSes algorithm of Sec. II-A is used
to find all error clauses and consequently all gate-level error
suspects.
A. Error Clause Cardinality
Since the solution space for the AllMCSes algorithm is
exponential, an explicit limit for the maximum cardinality
of the MCSes is advised to prevent memory explosion. In
practice, this limit, called the error clause cardinality, must
be relatively small due to memory and performance considera-
tions. The error clause cardinality determines the completeness
and efficiency of the proposed technique.
Since this work is primarily concerned with gate-level
debugging the limit used must correspond with the gate-level
cardinality of conventional debuggers. In Sec. II the error
cardinality Ng is defined as the maximum gate tuples that
may be responsible for the erroneous behavior. At the level
of the CNF encoding, the error clause cardinality Nc must
be set to a value such that all the gate-level errors at Ng
can be found using the proposed max-sat approach. Thus
completeness in this context is with respect to the gate-level
debuggers such as [5]. The following theorem proves that the
proposed approach is complete for a given value of Ng .
Theorem: The algorithm AllMCSes called on the problem
Φ = I · O · CNF(C) with a limit of Nc is complete if Nc
is equal to [the maximum number of clauses derived for any
single gate in the CNF] ×Ng .
Proof: Proof by contradiction. Suppose there is a gate-level
error not identified by the proposed approach using the error
cardinality limit Nc. Since AllMCSes iteratively finds sets of
clauses with cardinality 1 up to Nc, the gate-level error must be
caused by more than Nc clauses. However, Nc is equal to the
maximum number of clauses derived from any one gate times
Ng , so the error must be caused by more than Ng gate-level
sources. Therefore the error is not found using conventional
debuggers with Ng either. 
In many circuit-based SAT problems, the circuit is first con-
verted to a 2-input AND-INVERTER graph and then translated
into CNF [4], [7]. In such a CNF formula, the maximum
number of clauses from any gate is 3, thus Nc = 3×Ng . Using
this value for Nc results in finding all the solutions found using
conventional debuggers with Ng . In CNF formulas derived
from arbitrary circuits where the number of clauses generated
can greatly vary from one gate to another, the proposed max-
sat debugging technique may return more solutions than the
gate-level debugger for a given Ng . As discussed further
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in Sec. V this scenario does not pose a problem under the
proposed framework.
B. Error Group Cardinality
The previous section presented a limit for the error clause
cardinality to guarantee completeness for the proposed ap-
proach. Although complete, increasing the error clause cardi-
nality is not always desired as the complexity of the debugging
problem is exponentially related to the error cardinality. Here,
the grouping ability described in Sec. II-A is used to reduce the
complexity of the problem while maintaining completeness.
Grouping all clauses derived from the same gate together
allows the max-sat solver to “enable” or “disable” all of those
clauses simultaneously. In effect, this gives the solver the
ability to treat each gate as a single high-level constraint,
leading to solutions (MCSes) found directly in terms of the
gates. Under this problem restriction, the error clause-group
cardinality, Ncg required to find gate-level errors can be
effectively Ng .
Theorem: By grouping all clauses derived from the same
gate together, the proposed technique is complete if the error
clause-group cardinality Ncg = Ng .
Proof: Since each group has a one-to-one correspondence
with a circuit gate, when a group is found as part of an MCS,
all clauses corresponding to the original gate are “disabled”
by the AllMCSes algorithm. Thus every solution found by
AllMCSes maps to a set of the original gates. Hence, lim-
iting the group cardinality is equivalent to limiting the gate
cardinality. 
Re-visiting the example of Fig. 1, grouping the clauses of
gate A together with the clause-selector variable yA and the
clauses of gate B together with the clauses-selector variable
yB , results in the following CNF.
(a) · (b) · (d) · (e)
(a+ c+ yA) · (b+ c+ yA) · (a+ b+ c+ yA)
(c+ e+ yB) · (d+ e+ yB) · (c+ d+ e+ yB).
IV. EXTENSION TO SEQUENTIAL CIRCUITS AND
MULTIPLE VECTORS
Debugging sequential circuits is similar to that of combina-
tional circuits except that their behavior must be modeled for a
finite number of clock cycles. These clock cycles are necessary
to excite and observe the errors. A popular approach for
modeling sequential circuits is to use the time-frame expansion
technique or the Iterative Logic Array (ILA) representation.
These techniques replicate a circuit’s transition relation, called
a time-frame, and connect the current-state and the next-
state of adjacent time-frames together. In effect, the sequential
circuit is transformed into an “unfolded” combinational circuit
that can be debugged like any other combinational circuit.
Since the complexity of debugging increases exponentially
with the number of error sources, debuggers must be careful
not to consider the “replicated” gates across time-frames as
unique error sources. For example, a single gate-level error in
an ILA with 3 time-frames may appear to have 3 distinct error
locations, however, replacing the functionality of a single gate
in the original sequential circuit will fix the problem in all
time-frames.
The proposed max-sat debugging technique can be extended
to handle sequential designs efficiently. First, the sequential
circuit is converted to an ILA and then translated into CNF.
Similar to the previous formulation the CNF is then con-
strained with input stimulus and output response, I and O
resulting in
Φ = I ·O · CNF(ILA(C)).
The second step is to account for the replication due to the
ILA by grouping all clauses derived from the same gate but
from any time-frame. As a result, clauses from a particular
gate will be “enabled” and “disabled” at once irrespective of

























































Fig. 2. Erroneous sequential circuit and its ILA representation
For example consider the erroneous sequential circuit shown
in Fig. 2(a) and its ILA in Fig. 2(b). Here, the gate A has
been erroneously implemented as an AND gate instead of an
OR gate. As a result, the output of A in the first and second
time-frames should be 1 instead of 0. Note that the input
stimulus and correct response are also shown in Fig. 2(b). The
corresponding CNF for the constrained ILA is shown below.
(a1) · (b1) · (d1) · (e1)
(a1 + c1) · (b1 + c1) · (a1 + b1 + c1)
(a1 + e1) · (d1 + e1) · (a1 + d1 + e1)
(c1 + a2) · (c1 + a2)
(b2) · (d2) · (e2)
(a2 + c2) · (b2 + c2) · (a2 + b2 + c2)
(a2 + e2) · (d2 + e2) · (a2 + d2 + e2)
(c2 + a3) · (c2 + a3)
(b3) · (d3) · (e3)
(a3 + c3) · (b3 + c3) · (a3 + b3 + c3)
(a3 + e3) · (d3 + e3) · (a3 + d3 + e3)
In the above example, the clauses corresponding to gate A in
both time frames 1 and 2 are responsible for the discrepancy
between the actual and correct response. Specifically, these
are (b1 + c1) and (b2 + c2). However, by grouping all clauses
derived from gate A together and those from gate B together,
irrespective of the time-frames, the single group solution is
returned. Below is the modified CNF based on grouping
clauses from gate A (B) together with the clause-selector
variable yA (yB).
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(a1) · (b1) · (d1) · (e1)
(a1 + c1 + yA) · (b
1 + c1 + yA) · (a1 + b1 + c
1 + yA)
(a1 + e1 + yB) · (d
1 + e1 + yB) · (a1 + d1 + e
1 + yB)
(c1 + a2) · (c1 + a2)
(b2) · (d2) · (e2)
(a2 + c2 + yA) · (b
2 + c2 + yA) · (a2 + b2 + c
2 + yA)
(a2 + e2 + yB) · (d
2 + e2 + yB) · (a2 + d2 + e
2 + yB)
(c2 + a3) · (c2 + a3)
(b3) · (d3) · (e3)
(a3 + c3 + yA) · (b
3 + c3 + yA) · (a3 + b3 + c
3 + yA)
(a3 + e3 + yB) · (d
3 + e3 + yB) · (a3 + d3 + e
3 + yB)
For debugging problems with multiple vectors, I =
{I1, I2, ...}, O = {O1, O2, ...}, the union of the CNF problems
for each vector results in a single constraint system. In other
words the CNF corresponding to the circuit, C is again repli-
cated for each vector. Similar to the approach for sequential
circuit, all clauses derived from the same gate, regardless of
which replica of C they occur in, must be grouped together
and treated as a single error source. It should be noted that
the groupings for multiple vectors and sequential circuits is in
addition to the gate groupings discussed in Sec. III.
V. DEBUGGING WITH APPROXIMATE MAX-SAT
In practice, debugging via an exact max-sat formulation
may not be practical, as the number of groups and clauses
under consideration can be quite high thus resulting in a “hard”
max-sat problem. The proposed max-sat strategy can be easily
modified to perform an over-approximation instead of finding
exact solutions. The benefit of the over-approximation is that
the speed and resolution trade-off can be adjusted for the
problem: reducing the resolution or granularity of the solutions
found yields decreased run-time.
The over-approximation is achieved by grouping clauses
together as described in Sec. II-A and finding the MCSes
in terms of the groups. Note that the groupings discussed
here are in addition to those presented in Sec. III and IV.
Different grouping strategies can be easily formulated ranging
from random groupings to those based on a circuit’s topology
or structure. Similarly, groups can differ in cardinality from
a single clause to thousands of clauses. For instance, a set
of clauses can be grouped together if they are in the same
fanout-free cone which is similar to the dominator debugging
technique introduced in [10]. Another example is grouping
based on a high-level modules derived from RTL similar to
the technique of [3]. Intuitively, generating groups based on
the circuit’s structure or modularity may be advantageous
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Fig. 4. Max-sat debugging framework
Grouping clauses may increase the effect of error masking,
in which some error sources may not be detected as they are
masked by others [3]. This also occurs in traditional diagnosis
techniques when error-free models are used. For instance,
consider the gates shown in Fig. 1 and a pair of errors on
gates A and B. In this scenario, the single model-free error,
A, masks the pair solution of A and B.
Similar scenarios can occur when grouping clauses together,
especially if the groups are made arbitrarily. For instance,
consider the CNF illustrated in Fig. 3 where some clauses are
grouped in A and other are grouped in B. Further consider a
pair of error clauses illustrated by the “X”. Here, the single
solution identifying group A masks the pair solution A and B.
It should be emphasized that error masking is not unique to the
proposed technique as it occurs in gate-level and hierarchical
debugging as well [3].
A. Efficient Max-sat Framework
This section presents a performance optimized debugging
framework using the discussed max-sat technique. The com-
plexity of conventional debugging techniques such as SAT-
based tools depend to a large extent on the number of
suspects that must be considered. In the past, divide and
conquer schemes based on the problem hierarchy have proven
beneficial [3]. Here, the approximate max-sat approach can
be used as a filter to remove the majority of the suspects by
quickly finding over-approximate solutions. Subsequently, any
exact debugging approach can be used and will benefit greatly
by not having to consider all the original suspects during its
analysis.
Any type of grouping can be used; however, in the remain-
der, clauses are grouped in sets of size G according to their
corresponding circuit-level topology. Every group contains G
clauses (except for one group that contains the remainder of
the clauses in the CNF) from gates in close proximity to one
another. For sequential circuits and multiple vectors, the group
size is G× [the total number of replications] as described in
Sec. IV. Fig. 4 illustrates the flow of the proposed framework
where the suspects are first filtered by the max-sat engine and
then processed by the exact debugger. The optimal value of
G, found experimentally, determines how the debugging effort
is divided between the two stages.
VI. EXPERIMENTS
The proposed framework is implemented in C++ using
the max-sat algorithm (AllMCSes) in [8] and the SAT-based
debugging engine in [5] as a second stage debugger. Six com-
binational and ten sequential circuits from ISCAS85, ISCAS89
and ITC99 benchmarks as well as OpenCores.org [9] are used
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Circuit and debugging info Debug Max-sat20+debug
name
# # # # error time max-sat debug total time X
improv.gates vecs repl. locs (sec) # grps # suspects % susp red time (sec) time (sec) (sec)
mot-comb1 2, 162 1 1 4 4.79 3 49 97.73% 0.03 0.05 0.08 59.88
mot-comb2 5, 487 1 1 13 54.50 13 178 96.76% 0.13 0.24 0.37 147.30
mot-comb3 11, 268 1 1 16 357.67 14 189 98.32% 0.27 0.47 0.74 483.34
c6288 3, 466 1 1 75 67.96 48 536 84.54% 0.45 1.23 1.68 40.45
c7552 2, 644 1 1 248 25.66 74 789 70.16% 0.11 3.11 3.22 7.97
c5315 1, 884 1 1 11 4.83 7 99 94.75% 0.04 0.07 0.11 43.91
rsdecoder 12, 041 1 2 11 572.68 7 126 98.95% 0.67 0.65 1.32 433.85
spi 2, 012 1 21 19 80.54 12 194 90.36% 1.15 2.99 4.14 19.45
erp 2, 449 1 3 13 36.09 11 179 92.69% 0.20 0.25 0.45 80.20
ac97 15, 599 1 6 4 [TO] 3 58 99.63% 2.22 1.45 3.67 > 980.93
reactimer 265 1 512 7 51.81 6 89 66.42% 47.58 6.15 53.73 0.96
divider 5, 248 1 15 4 1, 160.39 3 52 99.01% 14.58 1.32 15.90 72.98
b14 5, 695 1 22 45 1, 377.86 36 627 88.99% 11.17 50.75 61.92 22.25
b15 8, 938 1 13 32 [TO] 40 645 92.78% 96.99 65.82 162.81 > 22.11
s15850 10, 481 1 2 19 747.36 12 183 98.25% 0.53 0.71 1.24 602.71
s38584 21, 006 1 14 58 [TO] 34 566 97.31% 28.02 36.00 64.02 > 56.23
rsdecoder 12, 041 4 8 11 [TO] 7 126 98.95% 2.88 2.01 4.89 > 736.20
spi 2, 012 4 81 4 264.07 6 107 94.68% 4.95 4.39 9.34 28.27
erp 2, 449 4 12 4 73.71 5 101 95.88% 0.82 0.52 1.34 55.01
ac97 15, 599 4 23 4 [TO] 3 58 99.63% 9.95 5.05 15.00 > 240.00
reactimer 265 4 1, 745 6 172.30 6 89 66.42% 2, 845.80 21.48 2, 867.28 0.06
divider 5, 248 4 71 4 [TO] 3 52 99.01% 54.74 5.44 60.18 > 59.82
b14 10, 114 4 1, 216 − [MO] − − − [MO] − − −
b15 8, 938 4 62 − [TO] − − − [TO] − − −
s15850 10, 481 4 8 19 [TO] 12 183 98.25% 2.21 3.64 5.85 > 615.38
s38584 21, 006 4 178 35 [MO] 20 365 98.26% 626.45 376.62 1,003.07 > 3.59
Fig. 5. Max-sat+debug versus standalone debugger
to construct several design debugging problems. The erroneous
circuits are obtained by manually changing the functionality of
a single gate at random. The failing test vectors are generated
by running pseudo-random simulations until an erroneous
response is observed. Experiments are conducted using both
single and four failing test vectors. The performance of the
proposed framework utilizing the max-sat pre-processing is
compared against the efficiency of the SAT-based debugging
engine in [5] without pre-processing. In all experiments, the
size of the clause group error cardinality Ncg is set to one
to find the single error sources. In addition to the groups
created for the over-approximation, clauses are also grouped
together based on the circuit replicas as discussed in Sec. IV.
Experiments are conducted on a Pentium IV 2.8 GHz Linux
platform with a 1GB memory limit and 3600 seconds time-out.
In order to determine the effectiveness of the overall debug-
ging framework of Sec. V-A as a function of the group size G,
experiments are conducted on several representative circuits.
Fig. 6 (a) and (b) shows two such experiments, using circuit
c6288 and mot-comb3, where three curves representing the
run-times of the over-approximate max-sat stage, the exact
debugging stage, and the combined run-times are presented
for several group sizes. The run-time of max-sat increases
abruptly as the group size becomes very small, and it reaches
a maximum when the exact method is used (single-clause
groups). However, as the group size increases, the run-time of
the second stage debugger increases as it must consider many
more suspects due to the over-approximation. The combined
curve shows the total run-time of the overall framework is
minimized with group sizes of roughly 10 to 20 clauses.
In the remaining, “max-sat20+debug” refers to the proposed
framework with a grouping size of G = 20. For sequential
designs and multiple vectors the actual number of clauses per
group is 20 times the number of circuit replicas. Figure 5
compares max-sat20+debug to the standalone debugger of [5].
Rows 1 − 6 report experiments with combinational circuits
given a single failing test vector, and 7− 16 (17− 26) report
experiments with sequential circuits given one (four) failing
test vector(s). The first four columns contain the circuit’s
name, its size in gates, the number of test vectors used,
and the total number of circuit replicas needed. The fifth
column (# error locs) gives the total number of potential error
locations that could explain the faulty behavior of the circuit
(the complete set). These are the locations expected to be
returned by both approaches when available. The sixth column
gives the run-time of the standalone debugger. An entry of
[TO] denotes a time-out, and [MO] denotes a memory-out.
The remaining columns present the results of our proposed
framework. The first four (# grps, # suspects, % susp red,
and time (sec)) report the number of groups (of 20× # repl.








































































Fig. 7. max-sat20+debug versus debug
clauses) returned by the AllMCSes algorithm in any MCS;
the number of suspect variables identified by those groups,
each corresponding to a potential gate-level error source; the
percent reduction in the number of suspect gates; and the
run-time of this first stage. The true benefit of the proposed
technique is evident when considering the number of suspects
that are filtered by the first stage with relatively small run-time.
For instance consider the circuit ac97 with a single vector.
The approximation technique rules out 99.64% of the suspects
in just 2.22 seconds. On average, the number of suspects is
reduced by over 92%.
The run-time in seconds of the second stage debugger using
the suspects of the first stage is shown in column debug time
(sec). Finally, the total time (sec) column shows the combined
run-time of the proposed framework. This number is compared
with the run-time of the standalone debugger in column six to
get the improvements shown in the final column (X improv.).
These results demonstrate the overwhelming advantage of
the proposed method over the standalone debugging engine
as the run-times are reduced by an average of 200 times.
For combinational circuits, the number of solved instances
is increased from 16 to 24 out of 26, a 50% improvement,
and for sequential circuits with one (four) test vector(s), the
number of solved instances is increased from 7 (3) to 10 (8),
a 43% (167%) improvement.
Fig. 7 plots the number of solved instances as a function
of run-time on a logarithmic scale for max-sat20+debug and
standalone debug. It can be seen that max-sat20+debug out-
performs the standalone approach by roughly two orders of
magnitude across all problems. Fig. 8 plots the total run-time
of max-sat20+debug for each instance against the correspond-
ing run-time of standalone debugger on a logarithmic scale.
Clearly, most points lie above the 45o line which indicate
the better performance of the proposed framework. Points
on the upper border indicate the instances solved by max-
sat20+debug but unsolved by the standalone approach. The
single point where the proposed framework fares essentially
worse is caused by the large run-time of the first stage. Such
cases can be addressed by increasing the group size G, thus




































Fig. 8. max-sat20+debug versus debug
VII. CONCLUSION
This work presents an efficient two stage debugging frame-
work which uses a novel max-sat problem formulation. First,
it is shown that the debugging problem can be solved exactly
with a max-sat formulation. The approach is extended for
sequential circuits and for problems with multiple vectors. An
over-approximation technique is developed to take advantage
of the strengths of the max-sat techniques. This technique
considers groups of clauses together and can thus make
decisions based on the groups instead of the individual clauses.
The over-approximation technique is used as a pre-processing
step that filters the majority of suspects and reduces the
problem complexity drastically for any debugger used in the
second stage. Experiments demonstrate overwhelming run-
time improvements of two orders of magnitude on average.
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Abstract
Automatic synchronization (or reset) of sequential syn-
chronous circuits is considered one of the most challenging
tasks in the domain of formal sequential equivalence verifi-
cation of hardware designs. Earlier attempts were based on
Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs) or classical reachability
analysis, which by nature suffer from capacity limitations.
A previous attempt to attack this problem using non-BDD
based techniques was essentially a collection of heuristics
aimed at toggling of the latches, and it is not guaranteed
that a synchronization sequence will be computed if it ex-
ists.
In this paper we present a novel approach for comput-
ing reset sequences (and reset states) in order to perform
sequential hardware equivalence verification between cir-
cuit models. This approach is based on the dual-rail mod-
eling of circuits and utilizes efficient SAT-based engines
for Bounded Model Checking (BMC). It is implemented in
Intel’s sequential verification tool, Seqver, and has been
proven to be highly successful in proving the equivalence of
complex industrial designs. The synchronization method de-
scribed in this paper can be used in many other CAD appli-
cations, including formal property verification, automatic
test generation, and power estimation.
1. Introduction
In this work, we are concerned with Formal Equiva-
lence Verification (FEV) of hardware designs. The goal is
to verify ”functional equivalence” between the specifica-
tion (e.g., RTL) and the implementation (e.g., schematics)
circuit models.
Most of the current generation FEV tools are limited by
the requirement that the RTL be state matching with the
schematics. That is, there must be a one-to-one correspon-
dence between the state elements of the two compared de-
signs. Therefore, a propositional tautology-checking proce-
dure (e.g., a BDD [3] or SAT [12]-based solver), can be
employed to decide functional equivalence. This form of
equivalence verification is known as combinational equiv-
alence verification, as opposed to sequential equivalence
where propositional decision procedures do not suffice and
one needs other techniques to perform equivalence verifica-
tion.
Combinational equivalence verification forces the de-
signers to write detailed RTL in order to meet the state
matching requirement. The low level of abstraction in the
RTL model has a negative impact on the quality of the RTL
[17]. Sequential equivalence verification comes to enable
higher abstraction level of the RTL, and to reduce the ef-
fort of mapping of sequential elements during FEV.
While many algorithms and tools for several forms of
sequential equivalence verification for circuits have existed
for more than a decade [28, 2, 32, 36, 15, 19, 20], the
industry has started to move towards full-scale sequential
equivalence verification only recently [21, 26, 17, 22, 27].
The dominating concepts for sequential equivalence used in
the industry all center around alignability equivalence [28].
Alignability equivalence verification can be performed in a
compositional manner, where the equivalence of the com-
pared circuits is derived from the equivalence of their cor-
responding sub-circuits [21, 22, 27]. Therefore, in this work
we focus on alignability verification (or more precisely, on
strong alignability [17] verification) of sub-circuits, possi-
bly constrained with input properties, and do not discuss
the compositionality related topics any further.
Both the BDD-based and SAT-based model checking al-
gorithms require a set of initial states [10, 11, 37, 6, 7, 25, 1,
35]. However, in practice, an initial (or reset) state of a hard-
ware design is not always available. In such cases, an auto-
mated technique for computing a reset state for hardware
model checking would be an advantage. For alignability
equivalence verification, both BDD-based and SAT-based
methods have been proposed in the literature [28, 33, 21,
17, 27]. In some of the BDD-based methods [28, 27], com-
putation of reset states of (sub-)circuits is not necessary,
while in the SAT-based (strong) alignability verification
method one first tries to synchronize the compared (sub-
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)circuits and then to compare the reset states for state equiv-
alence [33, 21, 17]. The experimental data reported in the
above works show that the SAT-based methods scale far bet-
ter than the BDD-based methods; thus the importance of
efficient SAT-based synchronization techniques is evident.
Computation of initializing or reset sequences is a difficult
problem [30, 33, 8, 29, 24, 18, 9]. Most of the previous al-
gorithms are BDD-based. In [33], a SAT-based method for
computing reset states is proposed. That method is essen-
tially a set of heuristics aimed at toggling the latch con-
trol signals, as well as toggling some of the inputs and out-
puts. Toggling these signals is achieved by creating condi-
tions (rather, invariant or safety properties) whose counter-
examples can serve as input-vector sequences that guaran-
tee that latch control signals will be asserted and input val-
ues will be propagated through the latches, and that some
”important” inputs and outputs will toggle. As a result,
there is a ”good chance” that latches will be initialized. A
Bounded Model Checking (BMC [1]) engine was used to
generate the counter-examples, as for many sub-circuits the
BDDs are not enough even to build the model-checking in-
stances (the next-state functions and initial state relation).
The four-stage initialization algorithm in [33] is not
sound in the presence of constraints on (sub-)circuit in-
puts and internal constraints, due to the unrestricted, ran-
dom simulation at the first stage of initialization and ”par-
tial satisfaction of constraints” in the second stage. More-
over, this method is incomplete in that there is no guaran-
tee (even theoretically) that an initial state or a reset state
will be computed if one exists.
In this work we enhance the approach taken in [33] and
present the first sound and complete SAT-based technique
for computing a reset state. Unlike [33], we use the dual-
rail modeling of circuits [4, 5], which allows us to more
conveniently and precisely formulate the invariant proper-
ties whose counter-examples serve as (parts of the) synchro-
nizing sequences that we are computing. We use the self-
alignability ideas from [33] as a complementary method
to 3-valued based initialization, and describe a hybrid au-
tomatic synchronization algorithm which is more efficient
than the self-alignability technique alone and also succeeds
in the cases where the 3-valued initialization alone fails.
This paper is organized as follows: In the next section
we recall some basic definitions used in this work. In Sec-
tion 3, we describe the dual-rail modeling of the circuits.
Section 4 describes our algorithm for computing synchro-
nization sequences and performing strong alignability ver-
ification. Experimental results are discussed in Section 5.
Conclusions appear in Section 6.
2. Preliminaries
A circuit design is modeled at the gate level in terms of
combinational elements and storage elements. For simplic-
ity, we assume that a storage element is a device that trans-
fers its input to its output when a clock signal is high, and
holds the output value when the clock signal is low. A state
s of a circuit C is any one of the 2n assignments of boolean
values to the n storage elements of C.
Without restricting generality, we assume that any circuit
C has exactly one output, o, and a set of n storage elements
L1 · · ·Ln. C1 and C2 denote the specification and imple-
mentation circuits with outputs o1 and o2, respectively. C1
and C2 have the same set of inputs (dummy inputs can be
added, if necessary). C⇔ denotes the combined circuit of
C1 and C2 – the product machine [13] with shared inputs
and o = o1 ⇔ o2 as the output.
We consider ternary modeling of circuit node values.
The values can be one of the two binary values – T or F,
or an undefined value – ⊥ (elsewhere also denoted by X).
Given a binary input vector sequence π, n(C, s, π) denotes
the value of node n of a circuit C after 3-valued simula-
tion of C with π, starting at state s. Similarly, C(s, π) de-
notes the (ternary) state into which π brings C, from state s.
The unknown state of C is the state in which all the storage
elements have the undefined value X. A binary state of a cir-
cuit C is a state in which all the state elements have binary
values.
2.1. Alignability theory
Alignability equivalence [28] is a widely used concept of
hardware equivalence verification. Its introduction was mo-
tivated by the fact that a power-up state of a hardware de-
sign cannot be predicted or controlled, therefore the design
must be brought into a smaller set of states where the de-
sign is supposed to work correctly.
In this section we recall concepts related to alignability
equivalence.
Definition 2.1 An initializing sequence of C is a sequence
of binary inputs which, when applied to the unknown state
X of C, brings C into a binary state.
Definition 2.2 State (s1, s2) of the combined circuit C⇔ is
an equivalent state (denoted by s1  s2) if for any input
sequence π, o1(C1, s1, π) = o2(C2, s2, π). States s1 and s2
are then called equivalent states of C1 and C2.
Definition 2.3 ([28])
1. A binary input sequence π is an aligning sequence for
a combined state (s1, s2) of C⇔ if it brings C⇔ from
state (s1, s2) into an equivalent state.
2. Circuits C1 and C2 are alignable, written C1∼=alnC2,
if every state of C⇔ has an aligning sequence.
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It is shown in [28] that C1∼=alnC2 iff there is a sequence,
called a universal aligning sequence, that aligns any state
of C⇔. When the two circuits coincide C1 = C2 = C, then
following [33] we will speak of the self-alignability of C.
Note that C is self-alignable iff it is weakly synchronizable,
as defined in [31]:
Definition 2.4 A weak synchronizing sequence (ws-
sequence for short) of a circuit C is an input vector
sequence that brings C from any binary state to a sub-
set of states S, called ws-states of C, such that all states of
S are equivalent.
Theorem 2.5 (Alignment Theorem [28]) Circuits C1 and
C2 are alignable if and only if each circuit is weakly syn-
chronizable and there is an equivalent pair s1  s2 of states
inC1 andC2. The concatenation of ws-sequences ofC1 and
C2 is a ws-sequence for both of them and it weakly synchro-
nizes C1 and C2 into equivalent ws-states (when C1 and C2
are alignable).
We now recall a more restrictive version of alignability,
called strong-alignability [17].
Definition 2.6 [23] A reset or synchronizing sequence πr
brings C from any binary state to a same state sr, called a
reset or synchronizing state.
Note that the set of ws-states and the set of synchroniz-
ing states are closed under state transition. Every synchro-
nizing sequence is also a weakly synchronizing sequence.
Therefore one can define strong-alignability as:
Definition 2.7 [17] Circuits C1 and C2 are strongly
alignable (denoted by C1∼=salnC2) if each circuit is syn-
chronizable and there is an equivalent pair (s1, s2) of
states in C1 and C2.
The concatenation of synchronizing sequences ofC1 and
C2 is a synchronizing sequence for both of them and it syn-
chronizes C1 and C2 into equivalent states (when C1 and
C2 are strongly alignable).
Strong alignability equivalence can be expressed in the
following manner. Let circuit C⇔ with an output o be the
product of two circuits C1 and C2, and assume that S is the
set of states of C⇔; then:
C1∼=salnC2 ⇔ ∃π.∀s ∈ S.
(
sr = C⇔(s, π) ∧
∀γ.o(C⇔, sr, γ) = T
)
(1)
The strong alignability verification of two (sub-)circuits
is done in two stages: (1) Compute a sequence which guar-
antees that when applied to a circuit C⇔, it brings it to the
same state. (2) Perform equivalence verification from the
state(s) of the first stage. If the verification passes, then the
models are declared (strongly) alignable.
The reasons for choosing strong alignability instead of
the regular alignability for performing equivalence verifica-
tion are driven by practical considerations. Assume that the
second stage fails with a counter example. This failure can
stem from two possible causes: (1) there is no sequence that
aligns the two (sub-)circuits, or (2) this is a real counter ex-
ample that needs to be debugged. Since it is not practical
to require designers to debug counter examples which later
on are root caused to a problematic initialization, we de-
cided to work with strong alignability concept. For more
methodological discussions concerning the usage of strong
alignability, we refer the reader to [17].
3. Dual-rail modeling of hardware designs
In this section, we demonstrate on simple examples how
Bounded Model checking (BMC) problems for hardware
designs can be encoded using dual-rail modeling [4].
A circuitC is usually represented by a collection of next-
state functions (NSFs) of the latches, by initial-state con-
straints on the latches, and by output functions. A NSF is
a function of current and next-state values of inputs and
latches. For example, consider the circuit C illustrated in
Figure 1. It consists of four inputs a, b, c and clk, one latch,
l, and the output of the circuit o. As usual, we denote the
next-state version of a variable v by v′. So the function
of the output o is l ∨ c , while the NSF of the latch l is
(clk′ ∧ a′ ∧ b′) ∨ (¬clk′ ∧ l). Available convenient repre-
sentations for next state functions can be BDDs or boolean
expressions. The latter is a simple data structure for rep-
resenting propositional logic formula. We adopted boolean
expressions in our work since uniqueness of BDDs is not
needed.
Modeling of sequential logic is done using a com-
pact representation of infinite variable sequences. For a sig-
nal v, an infinite sequence of propositional variables
{v0, v1, v2, · · ·} represents symbolically its sequential be-
havior. This allows one to reduce sequential verification
problems to propositional satisfiability. The sequence rep-
resentations can be unrolled to a desired depth k, producing
k propositional variables {v0, v1, · · · vk−1}, which repre-
sent all the possible first k values of the signal v. This rep-
resentation is suitable not only for modeling sequential
behavior of inputs, but also for internal combinational sig-
nals, storage elements, and outputs. For example, for a
given output o in Figure 1, the sequential behavior is repre-
sented by a disjunction of the sequences representing l and
c. Similarly, we can define the behavior of any storage ele-
ment by using NSFs.
Dual-rail modeling of circuits was introduced in [4, 5] to
enable a more precise modeling of circuit operation, and to
enable representation of all ternary values with BDDs via








Figure 1: Example of latch and output functions
critical as our SAT solver is based on binary values (T,F)
while our algorithm needs ternary values (T,F,⊥). We re-
fer to [34, 16] for more information on dual-rail symbolic
simulation.
Each ternary value v is encoded as a pair of binary val-
ues (vh, vl), called the high and the low values. To avoid any
confusion, we use Fdr, Tdr, and ⊥dr to denote the dual-rail
encoding of T,F and ⊥, respectively. And vdr = (vh, vl)
will denote the dual-rail encoding of a ternary variable v.
The undefined value ⊥dr is encoded as a pair ⊥dr = (T,T).
The truth constants are encoded by Tdr = (T,F) and
Fdr = (F,T). The pair 
dr = (F,F) encodes a contami-
nated or over-specified value.
In order to model sequential logic in dual-rail, it is
enough to have dual-rail rules for the combinational oper-
ators and the next state variable operator, denoted by ′. The
the dual-rail rules are as follows: Let xdr = (xh, xl) and
ydr = (yh, yl) be dual-rail encoding of ternary variables x
and y. Then
• (xh, xl) ∧ (yh, yl) = (xh ∧ yh, xl ∨ yl) ;
• (xh, xl) ∨ (yh, yl) = (xh ∨ yh, xl ∧ yl) ;
• ¬(xh, xl) = (xl, xh) ;
• (xh, xl)′ = (x′h, x′l).
Example 3.1 Let us compute xdr⊕Tdr (⊕ stands for XOR)
xdr ⊕ Tdr = ((xh, xl) ∧ ¬(T,F)) ∨ (¬(xh, xl) ∧ (T,F))
= ((xh, xl) ∧ (F,T)) ∨ ((xl, xh) ∧ (T,F))
= (xh ∧ F, xl ∨ T) ∨ (xl ∧ T, xh ∨ F)
= (F,T) ∨ (xl, xh)
= (F ∨ xl,T ∧ xh)
= (xl, xh)
= ¬xdr
Below we omit the superscript dr in dual-rail formulas.
To ensure that the inputs are always binary in a sequen-
tial instance, one needs to add, for any input variable i, a
constraint ih = ¬il. This guarantees that we do not intro-
duce (F,F) values in the instance. Further, if (F,F) val-
ues are not introduced in constraints or in the properties,
the NSFs cannot introduce them either (because the above
four operations cannot result in an (F,F) value if the argu-
ments are not over-constrained). Thus, for example, over-
constrained values should not appear in a satisfying assign-
ment found by a SAT-solver. An appearance of (F,F) in
a satisfying assignment indicates a bug, which is why we
do not add a constraint to the instance forbidding over-
constrained values on all variables.
A dual-rail NSF is a pair of NSFs of the high and low
values. For example, the NSF of the latch in Figure 1 is
represented in the dual rail encoding as follows: l′h =
(clk′h∧a′h∧b′h)∨(¬clk′h∧lh) = (clk′h∧a′h∧b′h)∨(clk′l∧lh)
and l′l = (clk
′
l ∨ a′l ∨ b′l) ∧ (clk′h ∨ ll).
4. Performing strong alignability verification
Given two circuits (C1, C2) (specification and imple-
mentation circuits), SAT-based strong alignability verifica-
tion is performed in two stages: (1) compute the reset se-
quence for both circuits (which by itself produces the reset
states) and (2) perform SAT-based state-equivalence veri-
fication from the computed reset states. In both stages we
assume that the two circuits are modeled in one dual-rail
model-checking instance as described in Section 3, and that
the instance includes the constraints of the two circuits but
not the property to be model-checked. The properties will
be defined separately depending on the stages of the veri-
fication. Since the concatenation of reset sequences for C1
and for C2 is a reset sequence for both of them, for simplic-
ity we will describe an algorithm for computing a reset state
for one given circuit C.
4.1. The basic algorithm for computing a reset
state
Assume a circuit C with exactly one output, o, with n in-
puts i1, · · · , in, and m storage elements L = {L1 · · ·Lm}.
We will denote the value of a variable v (input, storage ele-
ment or output) at time-frame k in the unrolled instance by
v[k]. Computing a reset state consists of two stages: (a) ini-
tialization and (b) self-alignability.
(a) Initialization
In this stage, we try to find an initializing sequence γ1
for the circuit C. If this stage succeeds then there is no
need to do the self-alignability stage, and we can pro-
ceed directly to the verification stage.
Recall the definition of an initializing sequence and
the unknown state in Section 2. Every initializing se-
quence is a synchronizing sequence but the inverse
is not true. This is true due to the monotonicity of
the symbolic simulator, as any binary values resulting
when simulating patterns containing X’s would also re-
sult when the X’s are replaced by any combination of
0’s and 1’s. [5]. An initializing sequence assumes the
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Figure 2: Performing self alignability
unknown state as the starting state (all the storage ele-
ments are initialized with the X value). Therefore, for
every storage element L modeled by (Lh, Ll) in the
dual-rail modeling, we add to the model-checking in-
stance initial-state constraints stating that Lh[0] = T
and Ll[0] = T, which means that we are initializing
the state element L with X = (T,T). We are left with
adding to the instance a property such that, if falsified




(Lh[k] = ¬Ll[k]) (2)
That is, if the counter-example is applied to the circuit
C at the starting state X, all the latches will receive bi-
nary dual-rail values at the end of the simulation.
To check whether or not the property is falsifiable,
one needs to choose a sufficiently large k (the diam-
eter of C) or use other SAT-based methods for full
proofs, like the induction method [35] (since BDD-
based model checking methods do not scale). In prac-
tice, however, SAT-based full-proof methods are com-
putationally expensive compared to the regular BMC
and we do not use them as a default. Instead, we chose
a reasonably large bound k according to a heuristic and
apply BMC till that bound. Furthermore, we modify
the above property so that even if full initialization of
C in k time steps is not possible, the BMC engine re-
ports a counter-example that initializes a ”large num-
ber” of latches. We then move to the self-alignability
stage of our synchronization algorithm.
(b) Self-alignability
This stage attempts to complete the process of stage (a)
by finding a synchronizing sequence γ1γ2 for the cir-
cuit C. The computation is done iteratively: each new
input sequence πi is concatenated to the sequence al-
ready computed. We start from the state which was
obtained after the initialization stage, so that part of
the storage elements are not initialized yet. Assume
that after applying the sequence γ1 of the initialization
stage, out of the m storage elements in C, we have
m′ storage elements which are not initialized (have
(T,T) value). Intuitively, the algorithm iteratively tries
to enumerate possible values for the m′ uninitialized
storage elements. The algorithm works as follows:
1. Set i = 1.
2. Replicate circuit C and produce new circuit Crep
in a way that the non-initialized m′ storage el-
ement set in C (call it L′ ⊆ L) has a differ-
ent corresponding encoding set in Crep (call it
L′rep). That is, for every storage element L =
(Lh, Ll) in C, produce a storage element Lrep =
(Lreph , L
rep
l ) in C
rep. Our target now is to find
a synchronizing sequence for the combined cir-
cuit built from C and its copy Crep.
3. Let sinit be the ternary state ofC at the end of the
initialization stage (the latches in L′ have X val-
ues in sinit). Assume that s and s′ are states of
C and Crep such that the latches initialized dur-
ing the initialization stage have the same concrete
values as in sinit, and the remaining latches have
binary dual-rail values. Furthermore, we add the
following constraint to the model checking in-
stance to state that s and s′ are different states:
∨
L=(Lh,Ll)∈L′
(Lh[0] = ¬Lreph [0]) (3)
In addition, initial-state constraints defining the
values of the initialized latches in s and s′ are
added to the instance.
4. Find a binary sequence πi such that when ap-
plied toC andCrep starting from s and s′, the re-
sult is the same binary state (See Figure 2). This
is achieved by adding to the instance a property
that, if falsifiable at time-frame k, the counter-















5. If the property is not falsifiable till a bound k,
then either the circuit is not synchronizable, or
we did not choose a sufficiently large bound. We
usually choose a large bound, so most probably
the reason for the failure at this stage is due to the
fact that the circuit is not synchronizable. The al-
gorithm aborts with failure in this situation.
6. Otherwise, check whether there are two binary
states of C, Crep such that the latches that are
initialized after the initialization stages have the
same values as in sinit, and when applying the
sequence π1 · · ·πi to both of them, the result is
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two different binary states, si and s′i. This is done
by adding a property that, if falsifiable at bound




(Lh[k] = ¬Lreph [k])∨
(Ll[k] = ¬Lrepl [k])
)
(5)
and by restricting the behavior of the inputs of
the circuit to comply with π1 · · ·πi.
7. If such states don’t exist, then C is synchroniz-
able and the sequence γ1π1 · · ·πi is a synchro-
nizing sequence for it.
8. Otherwise, go to step 4 with s := si, s′ := s′i
(s.t. si = C(⊥, γ1π1 · · ·πi) and s′i =
Crep(⊥, γ1π1 · · ·πi)) and with i := i+ 1.
The algorithm is sound in the sense that if a sequence
is found, it is guaranteed to be a synchronizing se-
quence. This is due to the iterative process which
looks for new states that are not yet joined (i.e., trans-
fered into the same state) by the already computed
sequence. Furthermore, by the same argument, we
can conclude that if in the last item of stage (b) of
the algorithm we define si = C(ssym, γ1π1 · · ·πi)
and s′i = Crep(ssym, γ1π1 · · ·πi) (rather than si =
C(⊥, γ1π1 · · ·πi) and s′i = Crep(⊥, γ1π1 · · ·πi)),
where ssym is a symbolic binary representation of a
state in C, the algorithm becomes complete in the
sense that if C is synchronizable, the algorithm will
build a synchronizing sequence. When this algorithm
was applied to real designs, the number of iterations
was surprisingly small (most of the time 1 or 2 and al-
ways less than 10), which makes the algorithm very
practical. This is partly due to the fact that many of the
storage elements are already initialized during the ini-
tialization stage.
This hybrid system of combining initialization with self-
alignability is indeed the breakthrough of our method,
since initialization alone is insufficient and running
self-alignability alone is not practical due to the large num-
ber iterations needed.
4.2. Performing strong alignability verification
Once the reset states of C1 and C2 are computed, we
mainly use the induction-based algorithms [35] to check
that the two reset states are state-equivalent. The induc-
tion based algorithms perform reasonably well when a full
proof is sought. The instance should contain the NSFs, the
initial-state constraints describing the reset states obtained
during stage (1), the constraints, and a property stating that
o⇔ = T.
Table 1: Single Outputs
Ckt Inps Latches Result #Self Synch. Verify
(sec.) (sec.)
o1 2283 40 EQUAL 2 300.5 617.1
o2 396 884 EQUAL 0 2.2 40.9
o3 111 133 EQUAL 0 0.3 10.5
o4 969 112 EQUAL 0 2.4 9.6
o5 96 132 EQUAL 1 1.3 8.7
o6 277 873 EQUAL 0 1.6 2.9
o7 381 402 EQUAL 2 0.1 0.8
o8 398 984 EQUAL 0 2.4 0.2
o9 275 748 EQUAL 0 0.8 0.1
o10 23 72 Not Init. 2 0.9 0
Table 2: Total Run Times
Ckt Gates Latches Outs Inps CPU(sec.)
C1 362604 12693 389 397 4700
C2 423070 23913 349 302 5722
C3 157110 22080 572 578 2478
5. Results
The algorithms described are implemented in Intel’s Se-
quential EQuivalence VERifier, Seqver) [17]. Seqver is be-
ing used to verify the next generation of Intel’s processors,
and has found many bugs. Tables 1 and 2 contain data about
the size of the problems that were verified and the run time
it took the tool to verify them. The run time was measured
on a 2.4GHz Linux machine with 2GB memory. Table 1
illustrates the performance of the algorithm running on a
single output. Note that for some of the outputs, initializa-
tion was not enough and we had to perform self-alignability
(#self is the number of self-alignability iterations). The run
time results show the run time for the synchronization and
the verification stages. The number of iterations in the self-
alignability stage is 1-2 on the average. Table 2 illustrates
total run time for Seqver on representative circuits. To the
best of our knowledge, no previous work has reported a tool
that is able to perform (compositional) alignability verifica-
tion on such large (sub-)circuits, and in such a short time,
for circuits without predefined reset states.
6. Summary
We have gaven a description of a SAT-based algorithm
for performing efficient alignability equivalence verifica-
tion. This algorithm outperforms previous BDD based al-
gorithms (which suffer from capacity limitations), and com-
pletes previous SAT-based attempts.
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Abstract—Parameterized heuristics abound in computer aided
design and verification, and manual tuning of the respective
parameters is difficult and time-consuming. Very recent results
from the artificial intelligence (AI) community suggest that this
tuning process can be automated, and that doing so can lead to
significant performance improvements; furthermore, automated
parameter optimization can provide valuable guidance during
the development of heuristic algorithms. In this paper, we
study how such an AI approach can improve a state-of-the-
art SAT solver for large, real-world bounded model-checking
and software verification instances. The resulting, automatically-
derived parameter settings yielded runtimes on average 4.5 times
faster on bounded model checking instances and 500 times
faster on software verification problems than extensive hand-
tuning of the decision procedure. Furthermore, the availability
of automatic tuning influenced the design of the solver, and
the automatically-derived parameter settings provided a deeper
insight into the properties of problem instances.
Index Terms—Decision Procedures, Boolean Satisfiability,
Search Parameter Optimization
I. INTRODUCTION
The problems encountered in automated formal verification
are typically hard. As with other computationally difficult
problems, the key to practical solutions lies in the use of
heuristic techniques. In the context of verification, decision
procedures, which might be embodied as a BDD [1] package, a
Boolean satisfiability (SAT) solver (e.g., [2]), or an automated
theorem prover based on the Nelson-Oppen framework [3], all
make use of various heuristics that have a crucial impact on
their performance.
A high-performance decision procedure typically uses mul-
tiple heuristics that interact in complex ways. Some examples
from the SAT-solving world include decision variable and
phase selection, clause deletion, next watched literal selection,
and initial variable ordering heuristics (e.g., [4], [5], [6]).
The behavior and performance of these heuristics is typically
controlled by parameters, and the complex effects and interac-
tions between these parameters render their tuning extremely
challenging.
During the typical development process of a heuristic solver,
certain heuristic choices and parameter settings are tested in-
crementally, typically using a modest collection of benchmark
instances that are of particular interest to the developer. Many
choices and parameter settings thus made are “locked in”
during early stages of the process, and typically, only few
parameters are exposed to the users of the finished solver. In
many cases, these users never change the default settings of
the exposed parameters or manually tune them in a manner
similar to that used earlier by the developer.
Not surprisingly, this manual configuration and tuning ap-
proach typically fails to realize the full performance potential
of a heuristic solver. In this paper, we present an alternative
approach based on automated parameter optimization methods
and demonstrate its benefits, which include substantial perfor-
mance improvements, valuable guidance to the algorithm de-
signer, and new insights into specific types of (SAT-encoded)
verification problems.
Specifically, we explain how PARAMILS, a recent param-
eter optimization tool developed by Hutter et al. [7], was
used during the development of SPEAR, a high-performance
modular arithmetic decision procedure and SAT solver, which
was developed in support of the CALYSTO static checker [8].
Although the performance of an early, manually-tuned version
of SPEAR was comparable to that of a state-of-the-art SAT
solver (MiniSAT 2.0 [9]), the use of PARAMILS ultimately
lead to speedups between a factor of 4.5 and a factor of
500 due to the optimization of the search parameters. The
use of PARAMILS also influenced the design of SPEAR and
gave us some important insights about differences between
(SAT-encoded) hardware and software verification problems;
for example, we found that the software verification instances
generated by the CALYSTO static checker required more
aggressive use of SPEAR’s restart mechanism than the bounded
model checking hardware verification benchmarks we studied.
While the results of our case study are interesting in their
own right, it should be noted that our overall approach and
the specific parameter optimization tool used in this study are
very general and can be applied to any parameterized heuristic
algorithm; the performance criterion that is automatically
optimized can be runtime, precision, latency, or any other
computable scalar metric.
II. RELATED WORK
There are almost no publications on automated parameter
optimization for decision procedures for formal verification.
Seshia [10] explored using support vector machine (SVM)
classification to choose between two encodings of difference
logic into Boolean SAT. The learned classifier was able
to choose the better encoding in most instances he tested,
resulting in a hybrid encoding that mostly dominated the two
pure encodings. The only other work we are aware of is
unpublished, ad hoc work in industry.
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There is, however, a fair amount of previous work on opti-
mizing SAT solvers for particular applications. For example,
Shtrichman [11] considered the influence of variable and phase
decision heuristics (especially static ordering), restriction of
the set of variables for case splitting, and symmetric replication
of conflict clauses on solving bounded model checking (BMC)
problems. He evaluated seven strategies on the Grasp SAT
solver, and found that static ordering does perform fairly well,
although no parameter combination was a clear winner. Later,
Shacham and Zarpas [12] showed that Shtrichman’s conclu-
sions do not apply to zChaff’s less greedy VSIDS heuristic on
their set of benchmarks, claiming that Shtrichman’s conclu-
sions were either benchmark- or engine-dependent. Shacham
and Zarpas evaluated four different decision strategies on IBM
BMC instances, and found that static ordering performs worse
than VSIDS-based strategies. Lu at al. [13] exploited signal
correlations to design a number of ATPG-specific techniques
for SAT solving. Their technique showed roughly an order of
magnitude improvement on a small set of ATPG benchmarks.
The automated parameter optimization tool used in our
study has been recently introduced by Hutter et al. [7];
however, that work was more focused on theoretical properties
of the algorithm and did not consider an application to a state-
of-the-art solver for real-world problems. That work and the
study presented here complement each other and also address
two different communities. Very broadly, automated parameter
optimization can be seen as as a stochastic optimization
problem that can be solved using a range of generic and
specific methods [14], [15], [16]. However, these are either
limited to algorithms with continuous parameters or algorithms
with a small number of discrete parameters.
III. ALGORITHM DEVELOPMENT AND MANUAL TUNING
The core of SPEAR is a DPLL-style [17] SAT solver,
but with several novelties. For example, SPEAR features an
elaborate clause prefetching mechanism that improves memory
locality. To improve the prediction rate of the prefetching
mechanism, Boolean constraint propagation (BCP) and con-
flict analysis have been redesigned to be more predictable.
SPEAR also features novel heuristics for decision making,
phase selection, clause deletion, and variable and clause
elimination. In addition, SPEAR has several enhancements for
software verification, such as support for modular arithmetic
constraints [18], incrementality to enable structural abstrac-
tion/refinement [8], and a technique for identifying context-
insensitive invariants to speed up solving multiple queries
that share common structure [19]. Given all of these features,
extensions, and heuristics, many components of SPEAR are
parameterized, including the choice of heuristics, as well
as enabling (or disabling) of various features: e.g., pure-
literal rule, randomization, clause deletion, and literal sorting
in freshly learned clauses. Thus, the optimization of these
parameters is a challenging task.
After the first version of SPEAR was written and its
correctness thoroughly tested, its developer, Domagoj Babić,
spent one week on manual performance optimization, which
involved: (i) optimization of the implementation, resulting in
a speedup by roughly a constant factor, with no effects on
the search parameters, and (ii) manual optimization of roughly
twenty search parameters, most of which were hard-coded and
scattered around the code at the time.
The manual parameter optimization was a slow and tedious
process done in the following manner: the SPEAR developer
collected several medium-sized benchmark instances which it
could solve in at most 1000 seconds and attempted to come up
with a parameter configuration that would result in a minimum
total runtime on this set. The benchmark set was very limited
and included several medium-sized BMC and some small soft-
ware verification (SWV) instances generated by the CALYSTO
static checker [8].1 Such a small set of test instances facilitates
fast development cycles and experimentation, but has many
disadvantages.
Quickly it became clear that implementation optimization
gave more consistent speedups than parameter optimization.
Even on such a small set of benchmarks, the variations due
to different parameter settings were huge. We even found one
case (Alloy analyzer [20] instance handshake.als.3) where the
difference of floating point rounding errors between Intel’s
non-standard 80-bit and IEEE 64-bit precision resulted in an
extremely large difference in the runtimes on the same pro-
cessor. The same instance was solved in 0.34 sec with 80-bit
precision and timed out after 6000 sec with 64-bit precision.
The difference in rounding initially caused minor differences
in variable activities, which are used to compute the dynamic
decision ordering. Those minor differences quickly diverged,
pushing the solver into two completely different parts of search
space. Since most parameters influence the decision heuristics
in some way, the solver might be equally sensitive to parameter
changes.2
Given the costly and tedious nature of the process, no further
manual parameter optimization was performed after finding a
configuration that seemed to work well on the chosen test set.
To assess the performance of this manually tuned version
of SPEAR, we ran it against MiniSAT 2.0 [9], the winner
of the industrial category of the 2005 SAT Competition and
of the 2006 SAT Race. In this experiment, we used two
instance sets introduced in detail later in Sec. V: bounded
model checking (BMC) and software verification (SWV). As
can be seen from the runtime correlation plots shown in
Figure 1, both solvers perform quite similarly for bounded
model checking and easy software verification instances. For
difficult software verification instances, however, MiniSAT
clearly performs better. This seems to be the effect of focusing
the manual tuning on a small number of easy instances.
For most decision procedures, the process of finding default
(or hard-coded) parameter settings resembles the manual tun-
ing described above. Furthermore, most users of these tools
1Small instances were selected because CALYSTO tends to occasionally
generate very hard instances that would not be solved within a reasonable
amount of time.
2This emphasizes the need to find parameter settings that lead to more




























































































Fig. 1. MiniSAT 2.0 vs. SPEAR using its original, manually tuned default parameter settings. (a) The two solvers perform comparably on bounded model
checking instances, with average runtimes of 298 seconds (MiniSAT) vs. 341 seconds (SPEAR) for the instances solved by both algorithms. (b) Performance
on easy and medium software verification instances is comparable, but MiniSAT scales better for harder instances. The average runtimes for instances solved
by both algorithms are 30 seconds (MiniSAT) and 787 seconds (SPEAR).
do not change these settings, and when they do, they typically
apply the same manual approach.
IV. PARAMETER OPTIMIZATION BY LOCAL SEARCH
The tool we chose to use for automatically optimizing
parameter settings in SPEAR has recently been developed in
the Artificial Intelligence community [7]; in the following, we
briefly introduce the underlying PARAMILS algorithm (further
details and some theoretical background can be found in the
paper by Hutter et al. [7]).
PARAMILS is motivated by the following manual parameter
tuning technique often used by algorithm developers:
• Start with some parameter configuration
• Iteratively, modify one algorithm parameter at a time,
keeping the modification if performance on a given
benchmark set improves and undoing it otherwise.
• Terminate when no single parameter modification yields
an improvement, or when the best configuration found so
far is considered “good enough”.
Notice that this is essentially a simple hill-climbing local
search process, and as such it will typically terminate in a
locally, but not globally optimal parameter configuration, in
which changing any single parameter value will not achieve
any performance improvement. However, since parameters of
heuristic algorithms are typically not independent, changing
two or more parameter values at the same time may still
improve performance.
The problem of local optima is ubiquitous in local search,
and many approaches have been developed to effectively
deal with them; one of these approaches is Iterated Lo-
cal Search (ILS) [21], [22], which provides the basis for
PARAMILS. ILS essentially alternates a subsidiary local
search procedure (such as simple hill-climbing) with a per-
turbation phase, which lets the search escape from a local
minimum. Additionally, an acceptance criterion is used to
decide whether to continue the search from the most recently
discovered local minimum or from some earlier local min-
imum. More precisely, starting from some initial parameter
configuration, PARAMILS first performs simple hill-climbing
search until a local minimum c is reached, and then it cycles
through the following phases:
1) apply perturbation (in the form of multiple random
parameter changes);
2) perform simple hill-climbing search until a new local
minimum c′ is reached;
3) accept the better of the two configurations c and c′ as
the starting point of the next cycle.
PARAMILS thus performs a biased random walk over lo-
cally optimal parameter configurations. To determine the better
of two configurations, it can use arbitrary scalar performance
metrics, including expected runtime, expected solution quality
(for optimization algorithms), or any other statistic on the
performance of the algorithm to be tuned when applied to
instances from a given benchmark set. This benchmark set is
called the training set, in contrast to the test sets we used later
for evaluating the final parameter configurations obtained from
PARAMILS (as is customary in the empirical evaluation of
machine learning algorithms, training and test sets are strictly
disjoint).
Clearly, the choice of the training set has important con-
sequences for the performance of PARAMILS. Ideally, a
homogenous training set would be chosen, i.e., one in which
the impact of parameter settings on the performance of the
algorithm to be tuned (here, SPEAR) is similar for all in-
stances in the set. In that case, it would be sufficient and
‘safe’ to evaluate and compare parameter configurations by
running the solver on a small number of instances. In practice,
however, ‘interesting’ instance sets may not be homogenous,
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and therefore larger training sets may be required to achieve
a reasonably unbiased evaluation of parameter configurations.
BASICILS(N ) is a simple version of PARAMILS that uses
a training set of N instances, where the choice of N has
a major impact on the efficacy of the tuning process. For
small N , there is a risk of over-fitting, i.e., good parameter
configurations determined for the corresponding small sets
may be overly specific to the training set and not work well
for any other problem instances. For large N , however, the
evaluation of each parameter configuration becomes costly,
which can severely limit the number of search steps that can
be practically performed by PARAMILS (and hence reduce
the quality of the final parameter configuration returned by
the tuning algorithm).
FOCUSEDILS is a more advanced version of PARAMILS. It
adaptively chooses the number of training instances to use for
each parameter setting: while poor settings can be discarded
after a few algorithm runs, promising ones are evaluated on
more instances. This mechanism avoids over-fitting to the
instances in the training set. (For details, see [7].) In tuning
SPEAR, we initially used BASICILS(300) and later employed
the more advanced FOCUSEDILS.
V. AUTOMATED PARAMETER OPTIMIZATION
We performed two sets of experiments: automated tuning
of SPEAR on a general set of instances for the 2007 SAT
competition and application-specific tuning for two real-world
benchmark sets.
A. Benchmark Sets and Experimental Setup
We employed two sets of problems of immense practical
importance: hardware bounded model checking and software
verification. Specifically, our set of BMC instances consists of
754 IBM BMC instances created by Zarpas [23], and our SVW
benchmark set is comprised of 604 verification conditions
generated by the CALYSTO static checker [8].
Both instance sets, BMC and SWV, were split 50:50 into
disjoint training and test sets. Only the training sets were used
for tuning, and all results in this paper are for the test sets.
All reported experiments were carried out on a cluster of 55
dual 3.2GHz Intel Xeon PCs with 2MB cache and 2GB RAM,
running OpenSuSE Linux 10.1. Reported times are CPU times
per single CPU. Runs are terminated after 10 CPU hours or
when they run out of memory and start swapping; we count
both of these conditions as time-outs.
B. Search Parameters
The availability of automatic parameter tuning encouraged
us to parameterize many aspects of SPEAR. The first automat-
ically tuned version exposed only a few important parameters,
such as restart frequencies and variable priority increments.
The results of automated tuning of those first versions of
SPEAR prompted its developer to expose more and more
search parameters, up to the point where not only every single
hard-coded parameter was exposed, but also a number of new
parameter-dependent features were incorporated. This process
not only significantly improved SPEAR’s performance, but also
has driven the development of SPEAR itself.
The resulting version of SPEAR used for the experiments
reported in the following has 26 parameters:
• 7 types of heuristics (with the number of different heuris-
tics available shown in parentheses):
– Variable decision heuristics (20)
– Heuristics for sorting learned clauses (20)
– Heuristics for sorting original clauses (20)
– Resolution ordering heuristics (20)
– Phase selection heuristics (7)
– Clause deletion heuristics (3)
– Resolution heuristics (3)
• 12 double-precision floating point parameters, including
variable and clause decay, restart increment, variable and
clause activity increment, percentage of random variable
and phase decisions, heating/cooling factors for the per-
centage of random choices, etc.
• 4 integer parameters which mostly control restarts and
variable/clause elimination.
• 3 Boolean parameters which enable/disable simple opti-
mizations such as the pure literal rule.
For each of SPEAR’s floating point and integer parameters
we chose lower and upper bounds on reasonable values and
considered a number of values spread uniformly across the
respective interval. This number ranges from three to eight,
depending on our intuition about importance of the parameter.
The total number of possible combinations after this discretiza-
tion is 3.78×1018. By exploiting some dependencies between
parameters, we reduced the number of configurations that we
consider in this paper to 8.34 × 1017.
C. SAT Competition Tuning
The first round of automatic parameter optimization was
done in the context of preparing a version of SPEAR for
submission to the 2007 SAT Competition. The first two authors
used this as a case study in parameter optimization for real-
world problem domains: the SPEAR developer provided an
executable of SPEAR and information about its parameters
as well as approximate ranges of reasonable values for each
of them; the default parameter configuration, however, was
not revealed. The goal of this study was to see whether
the performance achieved with automatic methods could rival
the performance achieved by the manually engineered default
parameters.
Since the optimization objective was to achieve good perfor-
mance on the industrial benchmarks of the 2007 SAT Compe-
tition (which were not disclosed before the solver submission
deadline), we used a collection of instances from previous
competitions for tuning: 176 industrial instances from the 2005
SAT Competition, 200 instances from the 2006 SAT Race, as
well as 30 SWV instances generated by the CALYSTO static
checker. A subset of 300 randomly selected instances was used
for training, and the remaining 106 test instances provided an
unbiased performance estimate of SPEAR’s performance with
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the tuned parameter configuration. Since the SAT competition
rules reward per-instance performance relative to other solvers,
the optimization objective used in this phase was geometric
mean speedup over SPEAR with the (manually optimized)
default parameter settings.
We ran a single run of BASICILS(300) for three days on
the 300 designated training instances, and used the parameter
configuration with the best training set performance found
within that time; we refer to this parameter configuration as
Satcomp. During tuning, we took the risk of setting a low
cutoff time of 10 seconds for each single algorithm run in order
to save time. This bore the possibility of over-tuning the solver
for good performance on short runs but poor performance
on longer runs, and we expected that parameter configuration
Satcomp may be too aggressive and might perform poorly
on harder instances.
However, our experimental results indicate that the opposite
is the case, namely that SPEAR’s performance scales better
with the Satcomp parameter settings than with the default
settings. The fact that these results contradicted the intuition of
the algorithm’s developer illustrates clearly the limitations of
even an expert’s ability to comprehend the complex interplay
between the many parameters of a sophisticated heuristic
algorithm such as SPEAR.
On the 106 test instances used to assess the result of
our SAT competition tuning, Satcomp achieved a geometric
mean speedup of 21% over SPEAR’s default parameter settings
and showed much better scaling with instance hardness. Fig-
ure 2 demonstrates that this speedup carries over to both our
verification benchmark sets: Satcomp performs better than
the SPEAR default on BMC (with an average speedup factor of
about two) and clearly dominates it for SWV (with an average
speedup factor of about 78).
D. Application-specific Tuning
While general tuning on a mixed set of instances as per-
formed for the 2007 SAT Competition resulted in a solver with
strong overall performance, in practice, one often mostly cares
about excellent performance on a specific type of instances,
such as BMC or SWV. For this reason we performed a second
set of experiments — tuning SPEAR for these two specific
sets of problems. Since users typically care most about an
algorithm’s total runtime, we used average (arithmetic mean)
runtime as our optimization objective in this tuning phase.
For both sets, during training we chose a cutoff of 300
seconds, which according to SPEAR’s internal book-keeping
mechanisms turned out to be sufficient for exercising all
techniques implemented in the solver. In order to speed up
the optimization, in the case of BMC we removed 95 hard
instances from the training set that could not be solved by
SPEAR with its default parameter configuration within one
hour, leaving 287 instances for training.
We performed parameter optimization by running 10 paral-
lel copies of FOCUSEDILS on a cluster, for three days in the
case of SWV and for two days for BMC. For each instance set,
we picked the parameter configuration with the best training
performance after that time.
Figure 3 demonstrates that these application-specific pa-
rameter configurations perform even better than the optimized
settings for the SAT competition, Satcomp. SPEAR’s perfor-
mance is boosted for both application domains, by an average
factor of over 2 for BMC and over 20 for SWV; the scaling
behavior also clearly improves, especially for SWV.
Figure 4 shows the total effect of automatic tuning by
comparing the performance of SPEAR with the (manually
optimized) default settings against that achieved when using
the parameter configurations tuned parameters for the BMC
and SWV benchmark sets. For both sets, the scaling behavior
of the tuned version is much better and on average, large
speedups are achieved — by a factor of 4.5 for BMC and
500 for SWC. SPEAR with the default settings even times out
on four SWV instances after 10 000 seconds, while the tuned
version solves every single instance in less than 20 seconds.
Figure 5 summarizes the performance of MiniSAT 2.0
(which we used as a baseline) and SPEAR with parameter
settings default, Satcomp, and specifically tuned for BMC
and SWV. Notice that the versions of SPEAR specifically tuned
for BMC and SWV also clearly outperform MiniSAT: for
BMC, SPEAR solves two additional instances and is faster by a
factor of three on average; for SWV, the speedup factor is over
100. For both benchmark sets, scatter plots (not shown here)
also reveal much better scaling behavior of the specifically
tuned versions of SPEAR.
VI. DISCUSSION
Automated parameter tuning provided us with new insights
into properties of the benchmark instances used in our study
and influenced the design of SPEAR. These insights arise from
considering characteristic differences between the optimized
parameter configurations for the BMC and SVW instances.
Although we have limited knowledge about the high-level
features of the IBM BMC instances, we made some interesting
observations. The best decision heuristic that we found for
these instances picks variables with higher activity, and ties
are resolved by choosing the one with a smaller product of
positive and negative occurrences. We also found that the IBM
BMC instances favor less aggressive restarts than the SVW
instances, implying that the decision heuristic tends to find
better variable orderings. The best phase selection heuristic
we found for BMC instances aggressively picks the phase so
as to minimize the number of watched clauses that need to
be traversed in order to find the next watched literal. This
heuristic minimizes the number of clauses that BCP needs
to analyze, and its effectiveness on this hard set of instances
did not surprise us. Finally, we observed that a small amount
of randomness helps performance — roughly 5% of phase
and variable decisions were done randomly before the first
restart. The most effective strategy scales down the percentage
of random decisions by a factor of 0.7 at each restart (which






































































































Fig. 2. Improvements by automated parameter optimization on a mix of industrial instances: SPEAR with the original default parameter configuration vs.
SPEAR with configuration Satcomp. (a) Even though a few instances can be solved faster with the SPEAR default, parameter configuration Satcomp is
considerably faster on average (mean runtime 341 vs. 223 seconds). Note that speedups are larger than they may appear in the log-log plot: for the bulk of
the instances Satcomp is about twice as fast. (b) Satcomp improves much on the scaling behavior of the SPEAR default, which fails to solve four instances

































































































Fig. 3. Improvements by automated parameter optimization on specific instance distributions: SPEAR with configuration Satcomp vs. SPEAR with parameters
optimized for the specific applications BMC and SWV. Results are on independent test sets disjoint from the instances used for parameter optimization. (a)
The parameter configuration tuned for set BMC solved four instances for which configuration Satcomp timed out after 10 000 seconds. For the remaining
instances, mean runtimes are 223 seconds (Satcomp) and 96 seconds (specific tuning for BMC), a speedup by more than a factor of two. (b) Both parameter
settings solved all 302 instances, mean runtimes are 36 seconds (Satcomp) and 1.5 seconds (tuned for SWV), a speedup factor of 24.
Since we are intimately familiar with the CALYSTO static
checker, we are able to provide a deeper analysis for the
software verification instances. CALYSTO performs aggres-
sive common subexpression elimination, virtually eliminating
all symmetries. It also propagates all constants. CALYSTO
queries correspond to path- and context-sensitive verification
conditions, which have deep and rich Boolean structure, with
many expensive operations (like division and multiplication)
sprinkled around. The queries can be represented at a high
level as single-rooted acyclic graphs. Experimental results (see
[8]) suggest that the probability of infeasibility of a single path
starting from the root of the formula is proportional to the
length of the path — the longer the path, the more likely it is
that it is infeasible. This can be exploited by a SAT solver by
focusing the search on the expressions that are closer to the
root of the tree.
SWV instances prefer an activity-based heuristic that re-
solves ties by picking the variable with a larger product of
occurrences. This heuristic might seem too aggressive, but
helps the solver to focus on the most frequently used common
subexpressions. It seems that a relatively small number of


































































































Fig. 4. Overall improvements achieved by automatic tuning: SPEAR with its manually engineered default parameter configuration vs. the optimized versions
for sets BMC and SWV. Results are on test sets disjoint from the instances used for parameter optimization. (a) The default timed out on 90 instances after
10 000 seconds, while the tuned configuration solved four additional instances. For the instances that the default solved, mean runtimes are 341 seconds
(default) and 75 seconds (tuned), a speedup factor of 4.5. (b) The default timed out on four instances after 10 000 seconds, the tuned configuration solved
all instances in less then 20 seconds. For the instances that the default solved, mean runtimes are 787 seconds (default) and 1.35 seconds (tuned), a speedup
factor of over 500.
Solver
Bounded model checking Software verification
#(solved) runtime for solved #(solved) runtime for solved
MiniSAT 2.0 289/377 360.9 302/302 161.3
SPEAR original 287/377 340.8 298/302 787.1
SPEAR general tuned 287/377 223.4 302/302 35.9
SPEAR specific tuned 291/377 113.7 302/302 1.5
Fig. 5. Summary of Results. For each solver and instance set, #(solved) denotes the number of instances solved within a CPU time of 10 hours, and the
runtimes are the arithmetic mean runtimes for the instances solved by that solver. (Geometric means were not meaningful here, as all solvers solved a number
of easy instances in “0 seconds”; arithmetic means better reflect practical user experience as well.) If an algorithm solves more instances, the shown average
runtimes include more, and typically harder, instances. Note that the averages in this table differ from the runtimes given in the captions of Figures 1-4,
because averages are taken with respect to different instance sets: for each solver, this table takes averages over all instances solved by that solver, whereas
the figure captions state averages over the instances solved by both solvers compared in the respective figure.
tion condition, and this heuristic quickly narrows the search
down to such expressions. The SWV instances favored very
aggressive restarts (first after only 50 conflicts), which in
combination with our experimental results shows that most
such instances can be solved quickly if the right order of
variables is found. A simple phase selection heuristic (always
assign FALSE first) seems to work well for SWV, and also
produces more natural bug traces (small values of variables in
the satisfying assignments). The SWV instances correspond to
NULL-pointer dereferencing checks, and this phase selection
heuristic attempts to propagate NULL values first (all FALSE),
which explains its effectiveness. SWV instances prefer no
randomness at all, which is probably the result of joint
development of CALYSTO and SPEAR as a highly optimized
tool chain for software verification.
The use of automated parameter optimization also influ-
enced the design of SPEAR in various ways. An early ver-
sion of SPEAR featured a nascent implementation of clause
and variable elimination. Prior to using automated tuning,
these mechanisms did not consistently improve performance,
and therefore, considering the complexity of finalizing their
implementation, the SPEAR developer considered removing
them. However, these elimination techniques turned out to be
effective after parameter tuning found good heuristic settings
to regulate the elimination process. Another feature that was
considered for removal was the pure literal rule, which ended
up being useful for BMC instances (but not for SWV).
Similarly, manual optimization gave inconclusive results about
randomness, but automated optimization found that a small
amount of randomness actually does help SPEAR in solving
BMC (but not SWV) instances.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we have demonstrated that by using a general
parameter optimization method, PARAMILS, which is based
on the idea of iterated local search in parameter configu-
ration space, major performance improvements of a high-
performance SAT solver, SPEAR, can be achieved. We believe
that the resulting optimized version of SPEAR represents a
considerable improvement in the state of the art of solving
33
decision problems from hardware and software verification
using SAT-solvers. Tuning SPEAR on a general set of industrial
instances from previous SAT competitions already resulted in
large improvements when compared to SPEAR’s manually op-
timized default parameter setting. The greatest improvements,
however, were achieved when tuning was performed on a
specific, relatively homogenous class of problem instances.
Average runtimes were reduced by a factor of 4.5 for bounded
model checking instances and a factor of over 500 for software
verification instances (see Figure 4). It is worth noting that
prior to applying our automated tuning approach, considerable
time had been invested by its author to manually tune SPEAR.
This indicates that automated parameter optimization can be
considerably more effective than manual tuning, and that the
use of automated tuning procedures such as PARAMILS not
only frees the algorithm designer (and user) from the typically
tedious and time-consuming manual tuning task, but also helps
to better exploit the full performance potential of a highly
parameterized heuristic solver.
Not too surprisingly, our experimental results suggest that
optimized search parameters are benchmark-dependent —
which highlights the advantages of automated parameter tun-
ing over the conventional manual approach. Furthermore, pa-
rameter tuning is obviously engine-dependent, due to complex
interactions between various mechanisms implemented in a
typical decision procedure.
We also illustrated how the use of automated parameter
optimization provided guidance in the development of SPEAR
and in particular encouraged its developer to expose a large
number of parameters that could then be optimized. We are
convinced that similar benefits will arise when applying our
general approach in the development of other heuristic algo-
rithms. Finally, comparing specifically optimized parameter
configurations, we gained some insights into which compo-
nents of SPEAR were particularly effective on the hardware
and software verification instances considered here.
In future work, we intend to further explore the role of
local search and machine learning strategies that support
algorithm design and engineering tasks. We believe that the
tuning procedure can be further improved, for example, by
combining ideas from our current local-search-based approach
with concepts from racing procedures, or by incorporating
techniques from experimental design. We also see significant
potential in instance-specific tuning methods, which use ma-
chine learning techniques to find good parameter settings for a
given problem instance [24], and in reactive tuning strategies,
which adapt parameter settings while a solver is running
(utilizing information gathered while trying to solve the given
instance) [25]. Finally, considering that many other design
and engineering tasks involve heuristic algorithms, we are
convinced that the use of automated algorithm configuration
and parameter optimization procedures can lead to similarly
substantial performance improvements as demonstrated here
and hope to collect further evidence for this claim in the near
future.
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Abstract—We show how to verify the correctness of transactional
memory implementations with a model checker. We show how to
specify transactional memory in terms of the admissible interchange
of transaction operations, and give proof rules for showing that an
implementation satisfies this specification. This notion of an admissible
interchange is a key to our ability to use a model checker, and lets us
capture the various notions of transaction conflict as characterized by
Scott. We demonstrate our work using the TLC model checker to verify
several well-known implementations described abstractly in the TLA+
specification language.
Index Terms—Verification, transactional memory, model checking,
HTM, STM, TLA+, TLC.
I. INTRODUCTION
The most important development in processor architecture in the
last decade has been the shift from single-threaded, single-core
processors to multi-threaded, multi-core processors. Taking advantage
of these new processors, however, requires rewriting our applications
as multi-threaded programs, and multi-threaded programs are hard
to write, especially when several threads need to access the same
data. Conventional approaches employ locks to regulate access to
shared data, but locks are subtle and hard to use correctly. Some
well-known problems with locks are priority inversion, which can
occur when a low priority thread holds a lock needed by a higher
priority thread; and deadlock, which can occur when several threads
attempt to acquire the same set of locks in a different order.
Transactional memory [1] is a programming abstraction intended
to simplify the synchronization of conflicting memory accesses (by
concurrent threads) without the headaches associated with locks. A
transaction is a sequence of memory operations that appears to be
performed atomically with respect to other memory operations. The
idea is that if a concurrent program is written so that each access
to a shared data structure is encapsulated within a transaction, then
all reads and writes to the data structure will appear to occur in
isolation in some sequential order, and the established theory of
database serializability will help us reason about the correctness
of such programs. Early hardware implementations of transactional
memory were limited to relatively small transactions, but recent
software implementations (sometimes depending on limited hardware
support) have managed to remove this restriction.
Larus and Rajwar [2] survey nearly 40 implementations of trans-
actional memory in their comprehensive book on the subject, which
differ in many dimensions. An implementation may employ eager
version control (or direct update) in which a transaction modifies an
object in place and restores the object to its original value upon abort,
or may employ lazy version control (or deferred update) in which a
transaction modifies a private copy of the object and overwrites the
object with this private copy upon commit. An implementation may
support weak atomicity or strong atomicity depending on whether
the implementation guarantees transactional semantics only to object
references within transactions or to all object references (even those
outside of transactions). Different implementations may use very
different approaches to detecting conflicts among transactions such
This research was supported in part by SRC grant 2004-TJ-1256 and ONR
grant N00014-99-1-0131.
as lazy or eager invalidation, and support many different progress
conditions in the presence of contention such as wait freedom, lock
freedom, or obstruction freedom.
Scott [3] wrote a widely-cited paper that was the first to charac-
terize transactional memory in a way that captured and clarified the
many semantic distinctions among the most popular implementations.
His approach was to begin with classical notions of transactional
histories and sequential specifications, and to introduce two important
notions. The first was a conflict function which specifies when two
transactions cannot both succeed (a safety condition). The second
was an arbitration function which specifies which of two transactions
must fail (a liveness condition). Scott’s work went a long way
toward making sense of transactional memory semantics, but his work
was purely semantic and did not immediately facilitate mechanical
verification of implementations.
In this paper, we present an abstract model for specifying trans-
actional memory semantics inspired by Scott’s original work, and a
proof rule for verifying that an implementation satisfies a transac-
tional memory specification. The premisses of our proof rule can be
checked with a model checker, and we demonstrate the method by
modeling three well-known transactional memory implementations
in TLA+ and proving their correctness with the model checker TLC.
The essential contribution of this paper that enables mechanical
checking is the notion of an admissible interchange used to model
the approaches to conflict detection and resolution characterized by
Scott in his paper. The work we report here is preliminary, but we
hope it will form the basis for analysis of well-known issues like
privatization and granular lost update in addition to implementation
correctness, and for analysis of the interaction between hardware and
software support for transactional memory.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We begin with
preliminary definitions related to transactions and transaction se-
quences in Section II, and we define an admissible interchange
in Section III. This definition is the key to our ability to model
check transactional memory implementations, and we show how
Scott’s transaction conflict classes can be characterized in terms of
admissible interchanges. We give our specification of a transactional
memory and what it means for an implementation to be correct in
Section IV, and we give proof rules for verifying implementation
correctness in Section V. We sketch the correctness proofs for several
implementations of transactional memory in Section VI, and show
how to use a model checker to verify their correctness in Section VII.
Finally, in Section VIII, we end with some conclusions and open
problems.
II. TRANSACTIONAL SEQUENCES
Assume n clients that direct transactional requests to a
memory system, denoted by memory. The requests that can be issued
by client i are:
• i – An open transaction request.
• Ri(x) – A read request from address x ∈ N.
• Wi(y, v) – A request to write the value v ∈ N to address y ∈ N.
• i – A close transaction request.
The memory provides a response for each request. For requests
that are rejected (e.g., a i request while client i has a pending
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transaction) the memory returns an error flag. For requests that are
accepted, and do not require a special response (e.g., i when
there is no pending i transaction), the memory responds with some
acknowledgment. For accepted requests that require a response the
memory provides a return value. For Ri(x), it is a natural number
indicating the value of the memory at location x. For i, the memory
responds with “commit” or “abort,” according to its decision on
whether the transaction should be committed or aborted.
Let Ei : {i, Ri(x, u),Wi(x, v),i,  i} be the set of
observable events associated with client i, where  i represents
the closing of a transaction that has been aborted (while i
represents the closing of a transaction that has been committed).
We consider as observable only requests that are accepted, and we
include the memory’s response for Ri(x) and i requests (rather
than the requests themselves). In this paper we also mandate that
the order in which the memory issues its commit responses (and
therefore the order of observable i events) uniquely determines the
order of committed transactions. Let E be the set of all observable
events over all clients, i.e., E =
⋃n
i=1 Ei.
Note that we have defined Ri(x) to be the request corresponding
to the response Ri(x, u), and that we are abusing notation by writing
i, Wi(y, v), i to denote both a request and a corresponding
response when the meaning is clear from context. We will also denote
responses Ri(x, u) and Wi(x, v) by Ri and Wi when the exact
values of the parameters are unimportant or are clear from context.
Let σ : e0, e1, . . . , ek be a finite sequence of observable E-events.
The sequence σ is called a well-formed transactional sequence (TS
for short) if the following conditions hold:
1) For every client i, let σ|i be the sequence obtained by projecting
σ onto Ei. Then σ|i satisfies the regular expression T ∗i , where
Ti is the regular expression i (Ri+Wi)∗(i +  i). For each
occurrence of Ti in σ|i, we refer to the first and last elements
as matching. The notion of matching is lifted to σ itself, where
i and i (or  i) are matching if they are matching in σ|i;
2) The sequence σ is locally read-write consistent: i.e, for any
subsequence Wi(x, v)ηRi(x, u) in σ, where η contains no
event of the form i,  i, or Wi(x,w), we have u = v.
We denote by T the set of all well-formed transactional sequences,
and by pref (T ) the set of prefixes of such sequences.
Notice that the requirement of local read-write consistency can
be enforced by each client locally. To build on this observation, we
assume that, within a single transaction, there is no Ri(x) following a
Wi(x), and there are no two reads or two writes to the same address.
As a result, we can assume that the sequence of events constituting
a single i-transaction has the form
i Ri(x1, u1) · · ·Ri(xr, ur)Wi(y1, v1)· · ·Wi(yw, vw){i,  i}
where the addresses in each of the sequences x1, . . . , xr and
y1, . . . , yw are pairwise distinct. With this assumption, the require-
ment of local read-write consistency is always (vacuously) satisfied.
The TS σ is called atomic if:
1) It satisfies the regular expression (T1 + · · · + Tn)∗. That is,
there is no overlap between any two transactions.
2) The sequence σ is globally read-write consistent: for any
subsequence Wi(x, v)ηRj(x, u) in σ, where η contains i but
contains no event Wk(x, ·) followed by an event k, it is the
case that u = v.
III. INTERCHANGING EVENTS
When is a TS σ a correct behavior of a transactional memory
implementation? It is natural to say that σ is correct if it can be
transformed into an atomic TS by first removing from it all events
that belong to aborted transactions, then freely interchanging adjacent
events that belong to committed transactions. This correctness crite-
rion is known as serializability. Since we require that the order of
i events determines the order of committed transactions, we choose
to disallow the interchange of  events. This narrower criterion is
known as strict serializability, and we will further refine it throughout
the rest of this section.
Strict serializability, by itself, is far from a satisfactory correctness
criterion for TM implementations. Let us say that transactions Ti
and Tj overlap when i precedes j and j precedes i, and
suppose we wish to specify a class of implementations that forbid two
overlapping transactions to both commit. Strict serializability is much
too generous a specification, as many strictly serializable transactional
sequences contain overlapping transactions. Scott [3] introduced
conflicts to describe the TS’s characteristic of different classes of
implementations (in Scott’s terminology, our hypothetical class of
implementations avoids overlap conflicts). We will describe conflicts
by restricting which events can be exchanged during serialization.
To specify the class of implementations that forbid overlapping
transactions, for example, we will add the restriction that adjacent
 and  events cannot be interchanged during serialization: thus no
TS with overlapping events will be strictly serializable.
Before introducing our notion of admissible interchanges, we
briefly describe Scott’s six classes of conflicts. For a TS σ, let ≺σ
denote the precedence relation of events in σ, meaning that ei ≺σ ej
if ei occurs before ej in σ. We omit the σ subscript when its identity
is clear from the context.
1) A TS σ has an overlap conflict if for some transactions Ti and
Tj , we have i≺j and j≺i.
2) A TS σ has a writer overlap conflict if two transactions overlap
and one performs a write before the other terminates, i.e., for
some Ti and Tj , we have i≺Wj ≺i or Wj ≺i≺j .
3) A TS has a lazy invalidation conflict if commitment of one
transaction may invalidate a read of the other, i.e., if for some
transaction Ti and Tj and some memory address x, we have
Ri(x),Wj(x) ≺j≺i.
4) A TS has an eager W-R conflict if it has a lazy invalidation
conflict, or if for some transactions Ti and Tj and some
memory address x, we have Wi(x) ≺ Rj(x) ≺i.
5) A TS has a mixed invalidation conflict if it has a lazy invali-
dation conflict, or if for some transaction Ti and Tj , and some
memory address x, we have Ri(x) ≺Wi(x),Wj(x) ≺i,j .
6) A TS has an eager invalidation conflict if it has an eager W-R
conflict, or if for some transaction Ti and Tj and some memory
address x, we have Ri(x) ≺Wj(x) ≺i.
Let c be some conflict (e.g., “write overlap”). We denote by Fc
the resolving predicate describing the interchanges that may resolve
a c-conflict. For a pair of events 〈ei, ej〉 that belong to transactions
Ti and Tj (where i = j), we denote by 〈ei, ej〉 |= Fc the fact that
Fc implies that the interchange 〈ei, ej〉 may resolve a c-conflict. In
Fig. 1 we define |= Fc for each of Scott’s conflicts c and every pair
〈ei, ej〉. In the full version of this paper we describe the language
used to define the F ’s.
Given a conflict c and the resolving predicate Fc that corresponds
to it, a TS σ is said to be serializable with respect to Fc if it
can be transformed into an atomic TS by a sequence of admissible
interchanges (that do not satisfy Fc). Note that this definition is not
equivalent to Scott’s definition of c which, in some cases, may imply
interchanges that are not admissible (that is, that satisfy Fc).
The sequence σ̃ is called the purified version of TS σ if σ̃ is
obtained by removing from σ all aborted transactions, i.e., removing
the opening and closing events for such a transaction and all the read-
write events by the same client that occurred between the opening and38
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Conflict (c) 〈ei, ej〉 |= Fc if:
Overlap (o) ei =i ∧ej =j
Writer Overlap (wo) ∃x, u.(ei =i ∧ej = Wj(x, u) ∨ ei = Wi(x, u) ∧ ej ∈ {j ,j})
Lazy Invalidation (li) ∃x, u, v.(Wj(x, u) ∈ Tj ∧ ei = Ri(x, v) ∧ ej =j)
Eager W-R (ewr) Fli ∨ (∃x, u, v.ei = Wi(x, u) ∧ ej = Rj(x, v))
Mixed Invalidation (mi) Fli ∨ ∃x, u, v.(ei = Ri(x) ∧ ej = Wj(x) ∧ ei ≺Wi(x, u) ≺j ∧ej ≺i ∨
ei = Wj(x, u) ∧ ej =j ∧Ri(x, u) ≺Wi(x))
Eager Invalidation (ei) Fewr ∨ ∃x, u, v.(ei = Ri(x, u) ∧ ej = Wj(x, v) ∧ ej ≺i ∨ ei = Wi(x, u) ∧ ej =j ∧Rj(x, v) ≺ ei)
Fig. 1. Conflicts and Their Corresponding Predicates
closing events. When we specify the correctness of a transactional
memory implementation, only the purified versions of the implemen-
tation’s transaction sequences will have to be serializable.
IV. TM: SPECIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION
Let F be a resolving predicate which we fix for the remainder of
this section. We now describe SpecF – a specification of transactional
memory that generates all TSs serializable with respect to F and a
definition of a correct implementation of SpecF .
The specification SpecF can be formally presented as an FDS (fair
transition system, see Appendix). It uses the following data structures:
• spec mem : N 	→ N — A persistent memory, represented as an
array of naturals. For simplicity, we represent it as an infinite
array. Initially, for every i ≥ 0, spec mem[i] = 0;
• q : queue of E ∪ ⋃ni=1{mark i} — A queue of pending
events, initially empty;
• spec out: scalar in E⊥ = E ∪ {⊥} — an output variable
recording responses to clients, initially ⊥;
• doomed : array [1..n] of booleans — An array recording
which transactions are doomed to be aborted. Initially
doomed [i] = F for every i.
Let
tr : i Ri(x1, u1), . . . , Ri(xr, ur),Wi(y1, v1), . . . ,Wi(yw, vw) i
be a transaction. We say that tr is consistent with spec mem if, for
each j ∈ [1..r], spec mem[xj ] = uj . The update of spec mem by tr
is defined to be the memory spec mem′ such that, for each j ∈ [1..w],
spec mem′[yj ] = vj and, for all k ∈ {y1, . . . , yw}, spec mem′[k] =
spec mem[k].
Intuitively, the stream of spec out’s is the sequence of observable
events. Pending transactions are partitioned to two categories. Active
transactions, whose events are maintained in q in the order they are
in spec out, and doomed transactions, that must be aborted, indicated
by doomed [i] = T. When a transaction is doomed, all its events are
removed from q, and subsequent events are echoes by spec out but
nowhere stored. When a pending transaction is committed, aborted,
or doomed, all its events (which may be none if the transaction
is doomed) are removed from q, and subsequent events are stored
nowhere and it is marked as “undoomed.” A transaction Ti is doomed
if doomed [i] = T; Ti is active if q has some Ei-event; Ti is inactive
if its neither active nor doomed.
For every active transaction Ti, we allow the queue q to include
a special symbol, mark i. The symbol mark i is added to the queue
when a Ti issues a close request, and some tests are done to determine
whether it can safely close. If the test is successful, spec out is set
to i, otherwise, it is set to  i, and then mark i as well as all the
Ei-events are removed from the queue. We say that q is marked
(unmarked) if it has some (no) mark i symbol.
Transaction a1–a5 are applicable only when q is unmarked. Note
that a4 and a5 do not set spec out to a value. For such cases we
assume that spec out is set to ⊥.
a1. For some i ∈ [1..n], if Ti is inactive, write i to spec out and
append it to the end of the queue q.
a2. For some i ∈ [1..n], and x, u ∈ N, if Ti is active or doomed,
write Wi(x, u) to spec out. If Ti is active, then Wi(x, u) is
appended to the end of the queue q.
a3. For some i ∈ [1..n], and x, u ∈ N, if Ti is active or doomed,
write Ri(x, u) to spec out. If Ti is active, then Ri(x, u) is
appended to q. Moreover, in this case we also require that the
events of Ti are locally consistent.
a4. For some i ∈ [1..n] such that Ti is active, remove all of events
in Ei from the queue q and set doomed [i] to T.
a5 For some i ∈ [1..n] such that Ti is active, add mark i to the
end of q.
Transition a6–a8 deal with commits and aborts. It is a7 that
determines whether a transaction marked for commit can indeed
commit.
a6. For some i ∈ [1..n] such that Ti is active or doomed, write  i
to spec out, and remove all of Ei- and mark i-events from the
queue q, and set doomed [i] to F.
a7. For some i ∈ [1..n] such that Ti is active, if Ti is consistent with
spec out, all of its events appear consecutively in the front of q,
and mark i is in q, then write i to spec out, update spec mem
according to Ti, and remove all Ei- and mark i-events from the
queue.
a8. Interchange the order of two contiguous events ei, ej in q
belonging to different transactions Ti and Tj , respectively, if
mark j is in q, and 〈ei, ej〉 |= F . We treat mark j as if it is a
j and assume a hypothetical i appended at the end of q.
a9. An idling transition which does not modify spec mem, q or
doomed .
Note that the updates of the queue in a4, a6, and a7 are not standard
queue operations.
The specification has n associated justice requirements, namely,
for every i = 1, . . . , n:
there are infinitely many states in which q|i is empty.
A sequence σ over E∗ is compatible with SpecF if σ can be
obtained by the sequence of spec out which SpecF outputs, once
all the ⊥’s are removed. We then have:
Claim 1: For every sequence σ over E, σ is compatible with
SpecF iff σ is serializable with respect to F .
An implementation TM : (read, close) of a transactional memory
consists of a pair of functions
read : pref (T ) × [1..n] × N → N and
close : pref (T ) × [1..n] → {commit, abort}
For a prefix σ of a TS, read(σ, i, x) is the response (value) of the
memory to an accepted Ri(x) request immediately following σ, and
close(σ, i) is the response (commit or abort) of the memory to a i
request immediately following σ.
A TS σ ∈ T is said to be compatible with the memory TM if:39
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1) For every prefix ηRi(x, u) of σ, read(η, i, x) = u.
2) For every prefix η i of σ, close(η, i) = commit .
3) For every prefix η  i of σ, close(η, i) = abort .
An implementation TM : (read, close) is a correct implementation
of a transactional memory with respect to F if every TS compatible
with TM is also compatible with SpecF .
V. VERIFYING IMPLEMENTATION CORRECTNESS
In this section we present proof rules for verifying that an imple-
mentation satisfies the specification Spec. The approach is an adapted
version of the rule presented in [4].
To apply the underlying theory, we assume that both the implemen-
tation and the specifications are represented as a fair discrete system
(FDS) of the form D : 〈V,O,Θ, ρ,J , C〉. We refer the reader to
the appendix for additional details about this presentation of reactive
systems.
In the current application, we prefer to adopt an event-based view
of reactive systems, by which the observed behavior of a system is
a (potentially infinite) set of events. Technically, this implies that the
set of observable variables consists of a single variable O, to which
we refer as the output variable. It is also required that the domain
of O always includes the value ⊥, implying no observable event. In
our case, the domain of the output variable is E⊥ = E ∪ {⊥}.
Let η : e0, e1, . . . be an infinite sequence of E⊥-values. The E⊥-
sequence η̃ is called a stuttering variant of the sequence η if it can be
obtained by removing or inserting finite strings of the form ⊥, . . . ,⊥
at (potentially infinitely many) different positions within η.
Let σ : s0, s1, . . . be a computation of FDS D. The observation
corresponding to σ is the E⊥ sequence s0[O], s1[O], . . . obtained by
listing the values of the output variable O in each of the states. We
denote by Obs(D) the set of all observations of system D.
Let DC and DA be two systems, to which we refer as the concrete
and abstract systems, respectively. We say that system DA abstracts
system DC (equivalently DC refines DA ), denoted DC  DA if, for
every observation η ∈ Obs(DC ), there exists η̃ ∈ Obs(DA), such
that η̃ is a stuttering variant of η. In other words, modulo stuttering,
Obs(DC ) is a subset of Obs(DA).
A. A Verification Rule Based on Abstraction Mapping
Based on the abstraction mapping of [5], we present in Fig. 2
a proof rule that reduces the abstraction problem into a ver-
ification problem. There, we assume two comparable FDS’s, a
concrete DC : 〈VC ,OC ,ΘC , ρC ,JC , CC 〉 and an abstract DA :
〈VA ,OA ,ΘA , ρA ,JA , CA〉, and we wish to establish that DC  DA .
Without loss of generality, we assume that VC ∩ VA = ∅, and that
there exists a 1-1 correspondence between the concrete observables
OC and the abstract observables OA .
The method assumes the identification of an abstraction mapping
α : (VA = Eα(VC )) which assigns to each abstract variable X ∈ VA
an expression EαX over the concrete variables VC . For an abstract
assertion ϕ, we denote by ϕ[α] the assertion obtained by replacing
each abstract variable X ∈ VA by its concrete expression EαX . We
say that the abstract state S is an α-image of the concrete state s,
written S = α(s), if the values of Eα in s equal the values of the
variables VA in S.
Premise A1 of the rule states that if s is a concrete initial state,
then S = α(s) is an initial abstract state.
Premise A2 states that if concrete state s2 is a ρC -successor of
concrete state s1, then the abstract state S2 = α(s2) is a ρA -
successor of S1 = α(s1). The box ( ) is the (linear time) temporal
operator for “from here onwards.” Together, A1 and A2 guarantee
that, for every run s0, s1, . . . of DC there exists a run S0, S1, . . .
of DA , such that Sj = α(sj) for every j ≥ 0. Premise A3
states that the observables of the concrete state s and its α-image
S = α(s) are equal. Premises A4 and A5 ensure that the abstract
fairness requirements (justice and compassion, respectively) hold in
any abstract state sequence which is a (point-wise) α-image of a
concrete computation. Here, is the (linear time) temporal operator
for “eventually,” thus, means “infinitely often.” It follows that
every α-image of a concrete computation σ obtained by applications
of premises A1 and A2 is an abstract computation whose observables
match the observables of σ. This leads to the following claim:
Claim 2: If the premises of rule ABS-MAP are valid for some
choice of α, then DA is an abstraction of DC .
B. A Rule Based on an Abstraction Relation
It is not always possible to relate abstract to concrete states by
a functional correspondence which maps each concrete state to a
unique abstract state. In many cases, we cannot find an abstraction
mapping, but can identify an abstraction relation R(VC , VA) (which
induces a relation R(s, S)).
In Fig. 3, we present proof rule ABS-REL which only assume an
abstraction relation between the concrete and abstract states.
Premise R2 of the rule allows a single concrete transition to be
emulated by a sequence of abstract transitions. This is done via the
transitive closure ρ+
A
which is defined as follows:
Let S0, S1, . . . , Sk, k > 0, be a sequence of abstract states, such
that 〈Si, Si+1〉 |= ρA for every i ∈ [0..k−1], and for some  ∈ [1..k],
for every i ∈ [1..k], if i =  then Si[O] = ⊥. Then 〈S0, ˜Sk〉 |= ρ+A ,
where ˜Sk = Sk[O := S[O]] is obtained from Sk by assigning
the variable O (the single output variable) the value that it has in
state S. This definition allows to perform first some “setting up”
transitions that have no externally observable events, followed by a
transition that produces a non-trivial observable value, followed by a
finite number of “clean-up” transitions. The observable effect of the
composite transition is taken to be the observable output of the only
observable transition in the sequence.
Premise R1 of the rule states that for every initial concrete state
s, it is possible to find an initial abstract state S |= ΘA , such that
〈s, S〉 |= R.
Premise R2 states that for every pair of concrete states, s1 and s2,
such that s2 is a ρC -successor of s1, and an abstract state S1 which
is a R-related to s1, it is possible to find an abstract state S2 such
that S2 is R-related to s2 and is also a ρ+A -successor of S1. Together,
R1 and R2 guarantee that, for every run s0, s1, . . . of DC there exists
a run S0, . . . , Si1 , . . . , Si2 , . . . , of DA , such that for every j ≥ 0,
Sij is R-related to sj and all abstract states Sk, for ij < k < ij+1,
have no observable variables. Premise R3 states that if abstract state
S is R-related to the concrete state s, then the two states agree on
the values of their observables. Premises R4 and R5 ensure that the
abstract fairness requirements (justice and compassion, respectively)
hold in any abstract state sequence which is a (point-wise) R-related
to a concrete computation. It follows that every sequence of abstract
states which is R-related to a concrete computation σ and is obtained
by applications of premises R1 and R2 is an abstract computation
whose observables match the observables of σ. This leads to the
following claim:
Claim 3: If the premises of rule ABS-REL are valid for some
choice of R, then DA is an abstraction of DC .
VI. TRANSACTIONAL MEMORY IMPLEMENTATIONS
We now demonstrate how our proof rules can be used to
verify three popular transactional memory implementations. Larus
and Rajwar [2] classify transactional memory implementations in40
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A1. ΘC → ΘA [α]
A2. DC |= (ρC → ρA [α][α′])
A3. DC |= (OC = OA [α])
A4. DC |= J [α], for every J ∈ JA
A5. DC |= p[α] → q[α], for every (p, q) ∈ CA
DC  DA
Fig. 2. Rule ABS-MAP.
R1. ΘC → ∃VA : R ∧ ΘA
R2. DC |= (R ∧ ρC → ∃V ′A : R′ ∧ ρ+A )
R3. DC |= (R → OC = OA )
R4. DC |= (∀VA : R → J), for every J ∈ JA
R5. DC |= (∃VA : R ∧ p) → (∀VA : R → q), for every (p, q) ∈ CA
DC  DA
Fig. 3. Rule ABS-REL.
terms of several properties. We focus on two of these properties,
conflict detection and version control, both of which can be either
“eager” or “lazy,” depending when conflicts are detected and when the
memory is updated. Since one cannot have eager version management
with lazy conflict detection, there are three possibilities left. We give
a detail description of the proof of the lazy conflict detection and
lazy version control, and sketch the remaining two.
A. Lazy Conflict Detection, Lazy Version Control
Denote this class by ll. A representative of this class is TCC [6],
and we give a simple implementation from this class that we refer
to as TM1.
The implementation uses the following data structures:
• imp mem : N → N — A persistent memory. Initially,
imp mem[j] = 0 for all j ∈ N;
• trans : array[1..n] of list of E — An array of lists. For each
i ∈ [1..n], trans[i] is a sequence over Ei that lists the events
of the currently pending transaction of client i, if such exists.
Initially, every trans[i] is empty;
• imp out: scalar in E⊥ = E ∪ {⊥} — an output variable
recording responses to clients, initially ⊥.
The implementation reacts to possible requests by the clients. It
accepts a request of i (“open transaction”), and rejects any other
request if trans[i] is empty. An accepted Ri(x) request is responded
by u, where u is such that Wi(x, u) is the last Wi(x) event in trans[i],
or, if no such event exists, by imp mem[x]; Upon an accepted i
request, TM1 checks whether the transaction trans[i] is consistent
with imp mem. If it is, TM1 returns to Client i a “commit”, updates
imp mem according to trans[i], and resets trans[i] to be empty. If
trans[i] is not consistent with imp mem, TM1 returns an “abort,” and
resets trans[i] to empty.
Finally, the events corresponding to accepted requests are written
to imp out, which is set to ⊥ with steps that don’t produce a response.
Each of these events (with the exception of  and  ), is appended
to the appropriate trans[i].
The specification, described in Section IV, specifies not only the
behavior of the Transactional Memory but also the combined behavior
of the memory when coupled with a typical clients module. A generic
clients module, Clients(n), may, at any step, issue the next request
for client i, i ∈ [1..n], provided the sequence of Ei-events issued so
far (including the current one) forms a prefix of a well-formed TS.
The justice requirement of Clients(n) is that eventually, every open
transaction must be closed by issuing a i-request.
Combining modules TM1 and Clients(n) we obtain the complete
implementation, defined by:
Imp1 : TM1 ‖| Clients(n)
where ‖| denote the synchronous composition operator defined in
the appendix. We interpret this composition in a way that combines
several of the actions of each of the modules into a single transition.
The possible actions of Imp1 are the following:
t1. Set imp out = trans[i] =i if trans[i] = Λ;
t2. Set imp out to Ri(x, u) and append it to trans[i] if trans[i] is
non-empty, and the last Wi(x) event in it is Wi(x, u), or if
trans[i] contains no Wi(x) event and u = imp mem[x];
t3. Set imp out to Wi(y, v) and append Wi(y, v) to the end of
trans[i] if trans[i] is non-empty;
t4. Set imp out to i, update imp mem according to trans[i], and
reset trans[i] to empty if trans[i] is non-empty and consistent
with imp mem;
t5. Set imp out to  i and set trans[i] to empty if trans[i] is non-
empty and is inconsistent with imp mem;
t6. Set imp out to ⊥ and leave all other variables unchanged.
Since Clients(n)’s justice requires every transaction to eventually
issue a  request, and since t4 and t5 guarantee that each  request
empties the corresponding trans[i], it follows that module Imp1 has a
justice requirement: for each i = 1, . . . , n, trans[i] is empty infinitely
many times.
We now sketch a proof, using Rule ABS-REL, that Imp1  Spec.
The application of rule ABS-REL requires the identification of a
relation R which holds between concrete and abstract states. We use
the relation R defined by:





The relation R stipulates equality between spec out and imp out – the
output of the implementation, and between spec mem and imp mem,
and that, for each i ∈ [1..n], the projection of q on the set of events
pertinent to Client i equals trans[i].
To simplify the proof, we assume (see the end of Section II) that
all transactions have the form
i Ri(x1, u1) · · ·Ri(xr, ur)Wi(y1, v1) · · ·Wi(yw, vw){i,  i}41
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It is not difficult to see that premise R1 of rule ABS-REL holds, since
the two initial conditions are given by
ΘC : imp out = ⊥ ∧ imp mem = λi.0 ∧
∧n
i=1(trans[i] = Λ)
ΘA : spec out = ⊥ ∧ spec mem = λi.0 ∧ q = Λ
and the relation R guarantees equality between the relevant variables.
The R-conjunct spec out = imp out guarantees the validity of
premise R3.
We will now examine the validity of premise R2. This can be done
by considering each of the concrete transitions t1, . . . , t6.
t1. Transition t1 appends the event i to an empty trans[i] and
outputs it to imp out. This can be emulated by an instance of
abstract transition a1 which output i to spec out and places
this event at the end of q. It can be checked that this joint action
preserves the relation R, in particular, the relevant conjunct
∧n
j=1(q|j = trans[j]).
t2. Transition t2 appends to trans[i] (and outputs) the event Ri(x, u)
where, due to the simplifying assumption, u = imp mem[x].
This can be matched by another instance of abstract transition
a3.
t3. Transition t3 appends to trans[i] (and outputs) the event
Wi(y, v), which is matched by an instance of abstract transition
a2.
t4. Transition t4 closes and commits the current transaction con-
tained in trans[i] while outputting the event i. This is possible
if the transaction pending in trans[i] is consistent with imp mem.
The transition also updates imp mem according to trans[i], and
then clears trans[i].
The emulation of this transition begins by the instance of
a5 which appends mark i to q, followed by a sequence of
applications of abstract transition a8 which attempts to move
all the elements of trans[i] to the front of the queue q, where
F is the trivial predicate F (thus, allowing any interchange).
If successful, we apply abstract transition a7 which confirms
that trans[i] is consistent with spec mem (must be true due
to the R-conjunct spec mem = imp mem), updates spec mem
according to trans[i] (thus making it again equal to imp mem),




t5. Transition t5 closes and aborts the transaction pending in trans[i]
while outputting the event  i. This is possible only if the
transaction pending in trans[i] is inconsistent with imp mem.
The transition also clears trans[i].
The transition t5 is matched with the abstract transition a6 which
outputs the event  i and removes from q all elements of the
aborted transition trans[i]. Note that Spec does not require an
aborted transaction to be “uncommitable,” thus, we don’t have
to (though we can) ensure that Spec cannot commit trans[i].
t6. The idling concrete transition t6 may be emulated by the idling
abstract transition a9.
It remains to verify premise R4. This premise requires showing that
any concrete computation visits infinitely many times states satisfying
∀VA : R → JA , where Ji : q|i = Λ, characterizes the set of abstract
states in which the queue contains no Ei event. Since R requires that
q|i = trans[i], we obtain that Premise R4 is valid.
Premise R5 is vacuously valid since Spec has no compassion
requirements.
Note that ABS-MAP does not suffice to construct step t4, where the
power of ABS-REL is demonstrated. We obtained a similar proof for
a bounded instantiation using TLC, however, there Spec is defined as
performing “meta-steps,” without which TLC, that uses an ABS-MAP-
like rule, cannot construct the relations ABS-REL does.
B. Eager Conflict Detection, Lazy Version Control
Denote this class by el. A representative of el is LTM of [7].
Its definition of “conflict” is slightly stronger than “eager invalida-
tion” by having writes to the same object as a conflict, thus, its
forbidden interchange set consists of Fei and all pairs of the form
(Wi(x),Wj(x)). In case of a conflict, the transaction that requests
the second “offensive” memory access is aborted.
The main difference between el and the prior implementation TM1
is the conflict detection: upon receiving a Ri(x) such that Wj(x) is
in some open transaction, or a Wi(x, v) such that Wj(x) or Rj(x)
is in some open transaction, the transaction of client i is aborted.
The system performs two steps – the first returns the result of the
operation, and the second aborts the transaction. Thus, an abort is
not only a possible response to a non-close transaction request, but
every transaction that requests to be closed is committed. For our
higher level description of this implementation, we add a new variable
toabort ∈ [0..n], that holds the id of the client whose transaction is
to be aborted (0 indicates no such client exists).
The combination of an el memory and Clients(n) is the module
Iel whose possible actions are:
t1. If toabort = i > 0, then set imp out to  i, empty trans[i],
and set toabort to 0;
Else, do one of the following:
t2. Set imp out = trans[i] =i if trans[i] is empty;
t3. Set imp out to R(x, u), and append it to trans[i], if
trans[i] = Λ, u = imp mem[x] or Wi(x) ∈ trans[i] and the
most recent such event is Wi(x, u), and for every j = i,
W (x) ∈ trans[j], ;
t4. Set imp out to R(x, imp mem[u]), append it to trans[i], and
set toabort to i if trans[i] = Λ, and for some j = i, or
Wj(x) ∈ trans[j];
t5. Set imp out to Wi(x, v) and append it to trans[i], if
trans[i] = Λ and for every j = i, W (x), R(x) ∈ trans[j];
t6. Set imp out to Wi(x, v), append it to trans[i], and set
toabort to i, if trans[i] = Λ and for some j = i, Rj(x) or
Wj(x) ∈ trans[j];
t7. Set imp out to i, update imp mem according to trans[i]
and reset trans[i] to Λ, if trans[i] is not empty;
t8. Set imp out to ⊥ and leave all other variables unchanged;
Module Iel has a justice requirement for each i = 1, . . . , n, requiring
that trans[i] = Λ infinitely many times.
To prove that Iel satisfies the specifications of Section IV, we
use the same R used to verify TM1, with respect to the admissible
interchange associated with el.
STM of [8] is also an el implementation. There, clients must first
obtain write locks on all memory locations they are likely to access
in a transaction (the locks are requested in increasing order, to avoid
deadlocks), which are released when the transaction completes. The
locking mechanism can be accomplished by adding to each memory
location an “owner” in the range [0..n] indicating which client
currently has a write-lock on it, and refining Iel to accommodate
the needs of STM.
C. Eager Conflict, Eager Version Control
Denote this class by ee. A representative of ee is LogTM of [9].
Its definition of “conflict” and their resolution are exactly like those
of el. Being eager-version, however, ee protocols update the memory
upon a write. If later it is necessary to abort the transaction, then
the memory is rolled back to its previous value. Since the protocol
does not allow for more than one overlapping write, there is no need
to record any information but the previous value of W ’s in pending42
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transactions. To thus add a set committed ⊆ n× N × N where n is
a client id. committed stores, for every memory address x that was
written by a currently pending transaction, the previous value written
to it (by a committed transaction). Initially, committed = ∅.
The combined implementation of ee memory and Clients(n) is the
module Iee whose possible actions are similar to that of Iel, but for
t1, t5 and t7, that are now:
t1. If toabort = i > 0, then
1) set imp out to  i;
2) for every (i, x, v) ∈ committed , set imp mem[x] to v
and remove (i, x, v) from committed ; set trans[i] =
Λ and toabort = 0;
t5. Set imp out to Wi(x, v), append it to trans[i], add
(i, x, imp mem[x]) to committed , and set imp mem[x] to
v, if trans[i] = Λ, and for every j = i, W (x), R(x) ∈
trans[j];
t7. Set imp out to i, reset trans[i] to Λ and remove from
committed every (i, x, v), if trans[i] is not empty;
Module Iee has the same justice requirement as its predecessors.
To prove that Iee satisfies the specifications of Section IV, we
cannot use the same R used to verify TM1; rather, we look at the
“rolled back” version of memory values, which can be determined by
committed . Formally, for each memory address x ∈ N, we define




v for some j,
(j, x, v) ∈ committed
imp mem[x] otherwise
For the memory imp mem, rolled back(imp mem) is imp mem
where every entry is replaced by its rollback entry. Then the relation
RSTM is defined by:
RSTM : spec out = imp out ∧ ∧ni=1(q|i = trans[i]) ∧
spec mem = rolled back(imp mem)
VII. VERIFICATION WITH TLC
We verified the correctness of all implementations above by the
explicit-state model checker TLC, the input of which are TLA+
programs. See [10] for a thorough discussion of TLC and TLA+.
Based on the similarity between TLC and the FDS model, we verified
that all the implementations above indeed implement our trivial
specification of Section IV.
To verify that an implementation correctly implements its specifi-
cation, one has to provide TLA+ modules for both specification and
implementation, and a mapping associating each of the specification’s
variables with an expression over the implementation’s variables.
With these, TLC verifies that the mapping is a refinement mapping
satisfying the premises of Rule ABS-MAP. (In fact, the rule TLC
uses is somewhat different, but suffices for our needs.) Since TLC
can handle only finite-state systems, all parameters – memory size,
number of clients, bound on pending transactions, etc. – have to be
bounded.
A. Specification Module
The specification module is constructed from two submodules,
Spec and Driver. Submodule Spec is the core of the specification and
is uniform for all TM specifications. It is essentially the specification
module of Section IV. Driver defines features that are unique to each
transactional memory by means of a resolving predicate F . Driver
can only restrict the next state relation and cannot introduce new
transitions that are not defined in Section IV.
B. Implementation Module
All implementations include a module Imp that consists of a
synchronous composition of the memory and the clients, such that
every request by a client is immediately responded by the memory.
Since TLC requires that every Spec variable has a matching
expression over Imp variables, we added a new variable to Imp,
history q, which is a queue over E⊥ that contains all events of
pending transactions. New events are appended to history q, and
the events of a transaction that is closed (committed or aborted) are
removed from it.
C. Refinement mapping
The implementation module includes a mapping between Spec’s
variables, spec mem, q, spec out, and doomed , to expressions over
Imp’s variables. In all but our last example the refinement mapping
is trivial: spec mem = imp mem, q = history q, spec out =
imp out, and doomed [i] = F for all i. In the last exam-
ple, spec mem = rolled back(imp mem) replaces spec mem =
imp mem. TLC (automatically) verifies that the proposed mapping
is a refinement mapping. Success means that, for the bounded
instantiation taken, Imp implements its specification Spec, i.e., that
every Imp implements some Spec run, and that every fair Imp
computation maps into a fair Spec computation. In the first case,
failure is indicated by a finite execution path leading from an initial
state into a state in which the mapping is falsified. In the second
case, failure is indicated by a finite execution path leading from an
initial state to a loop in which the implementation meets all fairness
requirements, and the associated specification does not.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we developed a formal specification of transactional
memory correctness and a methodology for verifying transactional
memory implementations based on model checking. We demonstrated
our approach on three transactional memory implementations drawn
from the literature. While our models capture the important algo-
rithmic aspects of those implementations, they are still quite a bit
more abstract than “real” implementations in the form of C++ or
Java libraries, say. The most obvious next step is to formally analyze
more detailed models of implementations.
Practical transactional memory implementations must deal with
memory accesses that occur outside of transactions. Such non-
transactional accesses give rise to anomalies like the privatization
problem [11], in which a thread can observe inconsistencies in what
should be its own private copy of some shared data; and the granular
lost update problem [12], in which the transactional implementation
manages memory at a coarser granularity than changes made by
nontransactional updates, leading to nontransactional updates being
lost. It would be interesting to extend our formal specification and
verification framework to account for non-transactional accesses and
give precise and abstract characterizations of the privatization and
GLU problems.
There are also a number of open questions concerning the program-
mer’s view of transactions, and we want to extend our framework to
reason about them, too. For example,
• What happens when transactions contain other transactions?
Two kinds of transaction nesting have been proposed: in closed
nesting the nested transactions are “flattened” into one top-
level transaction whose effects are invisible until commit time,
while in open nesting the effects of nested transactions may
be visible before commit. In open nesting the requirement for
serializability is relaxed, and it would be interesting to extend
our specification to account for this.43
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• What are the properties of various linguistic constructs for pro-
gramming with transactions? This is an active area of research
in the programming languages community (see [13] for one
example).
Finally, we would like to harness the power of new verification
technology like satisfiability modulo theories (SMT) that has already
shown so much potential for software verification. Interesting ques-
tions are whether SMT and other software verification technology
gives us additional leverage for efficient reasoning about transactional
memory, and whether there are theories and decision procedures
specific to transactional memory that we could add to the SMT
arsenal.
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APPENDIX
Fair Discrete Systems and Their Computations As a computational
model for reactive systems we take the model of fair discrete systems
(FDS) [14], which is a slight variation on the model of fair transition
system [15]. Under this model, a system D : 〈V,O,Θ, ρ,J , C〉
consists of the following components:
• V — A set of system variables. A state of D provides a type-
consistent interpretation of the variables V . For a state s and a
system variable v ∈ V , we denote by s[v] the value assigned to
v by the state s. Let Σ denote the set of all states over V .
• O ⊆ V — A subset of observable variables. These are the
variables which can be externally observed.
• Θ — The initial condition: An assertion (state formula) charac-
terizing the initial states.
• ρ(V, V ′) — The transition relation: An assertion, relating the
values V of the variables in state s ∈ Σ to the values V ′ in
an D-successor state s′ ∈ Σ. We assume that every state has a
ρ-successor.
• J — A set of justice (weak fairness) requirements (assertions);
A computation must include infinitely many states satisfying
each of the justice requirements.
• C — A set of compassion (strong fairness) requirements: Each
compassion requirement is a pair 〈p, q〉 of state assertions; A
computation should include either only finitely many p-states,
or infinitely many q-states.
For an assertion ψ, we say that s ∈ Σ is a ψ-state if s |= ψ.
A run of an FDS D is a possibly infinite sequence of states σ :
s0, s1, . . . satisfying the requirements:
• Initiality — s0 is initial, i.e., s0 |= Θ.
• Consecution — For each  = 0, 1, . . ., the state s+1 is an D-
successor of s. That is, 〈s, s+1〉 |= ρ(V, V ′) where, for each
v ∈ V , we interpret v as s[v] and v′ as s+1[v].
A computation of D is an infinite run that satisfies
• Justice — for every J ∈ J , σ contains infinitely many
occurrences of J-states.
• Compassion – for every 〈p, q〉 ∈ C, either σ contains only
finitely many occurrences of p-states, or σ contains infinitely
many occurrences of q-states.
A synchronous parallel composition of systems D1 and D2,
denoted by D1‖|D2, is specified by the FDS
D : 〈V1 ∪ V2,O1 ∪ O2,Θ1 ∧ Θ2, ρ1 ∧ ρ2,J1 ∪ J2, C1 ∪ C2〉
To guarantee that the composition doesn’t cause any computation
of the composed system to be lost, we further require that for every
i = 1, 2, each Di-computation is some computation of D when
projected onto Vi.
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Abstract—Systems consisting of several components that com-
municate via unbounded perfect FIFO channels (i.e. FIFO
systems) arise naturally in modeling distributed systems. Despite
well-known difficulties in analyzing such systems, they are of
significant interest as they can describe a wide range of com-
munication protocols. Previous work has shown that piecewise
languages play an important role in the study of FIFO systems.
In this paper, we present two algorithms for computing the
set of reachable states of a FIFO system composed of piecewise
components. The problem of computing the set of reachable states
of such a system is closely related to calculating the set of all
possible channel contents, i.e. the limit language. We present new
algorithms for calculating the limit language of a system with
a single communication channel and a class of multi-channel
system in which messages are not passed around in cycles through
different channels. We show that the worst case complexity of our
algorithms for single-channel and important subclasses of multi-
channel systems is exponential in the size of the initial content
of the channels.
I. INTRODUCTION
Concurrent systems consisting of a set of finite state ma-
chines that communicate via unbounded First-In First-Out
(FIFO) channels are a common model of computation for
describing distributed protocols such as IP-telecommunication
protocols, interacting web services, and System on Chip (SoC)
architectures (e.g., [9], [5], [1], [18], [10], [6], [20]). Even
though all physically constructible systems have finite size
channels, their size is often an implementation parameter that
is typically left unspecified. Thus, modeling with unbounded
channels is often more appropriate.
While unboundedness of communication channels provides
a useful modeling abstraction, it complicates the analysis.
Brand and Zafiropulo [9] showed that a single unbounded
channel is already sufficient to simulate the tape of a Turing
machine. Hence, verification of any non-trivial property, such
as reachability, is undecidable. Despite these results, a substan-
tial effort has gone into identifying subclasses of FIFO systems
for which the verification problem is decidable (e.g., [1], [2],
[3], [4], [5], [7], [8], [10], [16], [18]).
In this paper, we study the class of piecewise FIFO systems.
These systems can be used for modeling distributed protocols
such as IP-telecommunication protocols and interacting web
services [16], [13]. A piecewise FIFO system is composed of
components whose behaviors can be expressed by piecewise
languages. Intuitively, a language is piecewise if it is accepted
by a non-deterministic finite state automaton whose only non-
trivial strongly connected components are states with self-
loops. Formally, a piecewise language is a union of sets of
strings, where each set is given by a regular expression of
the form M∗0 a0M
∗
1 · · ·an−1M
∗
n, where each Mi is a subset
of the alphabet Σ and each ai is an element of Σ. In [16],
[13], verification problems for piecewise FIFO systems were
described and shown to be decidable.
Although piecewise languages may look restrictive, they can
be used to express descriptions of IP-telephony features [16],
[13] and seem amenable to describing composite web services
specified in Business Process Execution Language (BPEL)
[14]. For example, [13] studied the behavior of the telephony
features in BoxOS which is the next generation telecommu-
nication service over IP developed at AT&T Research [6],
[15]. Essentially an active call is represented by a graph of
telephony features (referred to as boxes) while communication
between neighboring boxes is handled via unbounded perfect
FIFO channels. At a sufficient level of abstraction, boxes may
all be viewed as finite state transducers. It is required that
the communication between different boxes follow a certain
pattern. Thus, all of the feature boxes implement a commu-
nication template that consists of three phases (cf. [6]): setup
phase, transparent phase, and teardown phase. Interestingly,
as shown in [16], [13], this communication template can be
expressed by piecewise languages.
It is crucial to be able to reason about safety and deadlock
properties of BoxOS implementations with multiple features,
somethings that the techniques in [6] fell short to address.
It has been shown in [6], [16], [13] how aspects of BoxOS
can be modeled as a piecewise FIFO system. In this paper, our
main contribution is the algorithms for reachability analysis of
piecewise FIFO systems. Analysis that was either not possible
with previous approaches or for which the cost of the previous
approaches was unknown.
The ability to calculate all possible channel contents that
may arise from an initial state, i.e. the limit language, plays a
central role for automated verification of non-trivial properties
of FIFO systems. This problem is undecidable in general.
Moreover, the limit language is not necessarily regular, even
if the initial language is [10], and even when the limit
language is known to be regular, determining it may still be
undecidable [10]. Recently, in [16] it has been shown that
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for the piecewise FIFO systems, the limit language is regular
even when conditional actions are considered. However, the
construction of the limit language may not always be effective.
We present two new algorithms for computing the limit
language: one for single-channel systems, and another for
multi-channel systems with acyclic communication graphs. In
both algorithms, we use automata to represent and manipulate
the set of possible channel configurations. We also discuss the
complexity of these algorithms.
The algorithm for single-channel systems requires that
components be piecewise, and applies to any regular initial
channel content. We show that the worst case complexity of the
algorithm is at most exponential in the size of the automaton
that represents the language of the initial channel content.
The algorithm for the multi-channel systems requires that
both the components and the initial contents of the channels
be piecewise, and that the communication graph be acyclic.
A communication graph is a graph with channels as vertices
and conditional actions as edges indicating which channels
are connected by these actions. For ease of presentation, we
develop the algorithm incrementally by restricting the topology
of the communication graphs to star, tree, inverted tree, and
directed acyclic graph (DAG) topologies. We study the worst
case complexity of the algorithm for each topology. We show
that for the star and tree topologies the worst case complexity
of the algorithm is exponential in the size of the automaton that
represents the language of the initial content of the channel in
the origin of the star and the root of the tree, respectively.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. An overview
of piecewise languages and their properties is given in Sec. II,
and is followed by a description of the system model in
Sec. III. The algorithm for single-channel systems is presented
in Sec. IV, and the one for multi-channel systems in Sec. V.
We review related work in Sec. VI, and conclude in Sec. VII.
II. REGULAR AND PIECEWISE LANGUAGES
Let Σ be a finite alphabet and ǫ the empty string. A regular
expression (RE) over Σ is defined by the following grammar
r ::= a ∈ Σ | r · r | r + r | r∗. The language L(r) denoted
by an RE is defined in the usual way and we sometimes just
write r to mean L(r). In a further abuse of notation, we often
regard a set M ⊆ Σ ∪ {ǫ} as an RE, namely the sum of
elements in M .
Definition 1 (Piecewise Languages) [16], [8] A language is
simply piecewise if it can be expressed by an RE of the form
M∗0 a0 · · ·an−1M
∗
n, where each Mi ⊆ Σ and ai ∈ Σ∪ {ǫ}. A
piecewise language is a finite (possibly empty) union of simply
piecewise languages.
For example, (a + b)∗c is simply piecewise, where M0 =
{a, b} and a0 = c, but (ab)
∗c is not piecewise.
Definition 2 (FSA) A finite state automaton (FSA) A is a
tuple (Σ, Q, q0, δ, F ), where Σ is a finite alphabet; Q is a
finite set of states; q0 ∈ Q is the initial state; δ : Q×Σ → 2Q
is the transition relation; and F ⊆ Q is a set of accepting (or
final) states. When F is omitted, it is assumed that F = Q.
For a ∈ Σ we write δ(q, a, q′) to mean that q′ ∈ δ(q, a).
Given q ∈ Q, and w ∈ Σ∗, δ(q, w) is defined as usual:
δ(q, ǫ) , {q}, and δ(q, wa) , {p | ∃r ∈ δ(q, w), p ∈
δ(r, a)}. We say that a word w is accepted by A iff (δ(q0, w)∩
F ) 6= ∅. The language of A is defined as L(A) = {w ∈ Σ∗ |
δ(q0, w) ∩ F 6= ∅}. We define the size of an FSA A as usual:
|A| , |Q| + |δ|.
We often use RE notation with automata. For example, A1 ·
A2 stands for concatenation of two automata, A1 + A2 for an
automaton with language L(A1)∪L(A2), and (A1 matches a·
W ) is true iff L(A1) = L(a · W ).
Definition 3 (PO-FSA) A partially ordered automaton (PO-
FSA) is a tuple (A,), where A = (Σ, Q, q0, δ, F ) is an
automaton, and ⊆ Q × Q is a partial order on states such
that q′ ∈ δ(q, a) implies that q  q′.
Proposition 1 [16] A language is piecewise iff it is recognized
by a PO-FSA.
Proposition 2 (cf. [16], [8]) Piecewise languages are closed
under finite unions (+), finite intersections (∩), concatenation
(·), shuffle (||), projections (defined by letter-to-letter map-
pings), and inverse homomorphisms, but not under comple-
mentation and substitutions.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we review the definition of FIFO systems
and the reachability problem for them.
Action Languages and Semantics. A channel over an alpha-
bet Σ is a FIFO queue whose contents is given by a word
w ∈ Σ∗. We define two types of channel actions: read a,
denoted by ?a, and write a, denoted by !a, that stand for
reading and writing a letter a from/to a channel, respectively.
We use f : w to denote the application of an action f to a
word w. For example, ?a : abb = bb and !a : bb = bba.
Let Σrw , {?, !} × Σ denote read/write(rw)-alphabet over
Σ. For a set of channels C = {c1, . . . , ck} this alphabet
is extended as follows: Σrw(C) , [1..k] × Σrw. Thus, an
action 4?a corresponds to reading a from channel c4, and 6!b
corresponds to writing b to channel c6. In the sequel, we drop
C from the notation when it is clear from the context. We




A channel configuration for a system with k channels is
a k-tuple w ∈ (Σ∗)k. We use 〈w1, . . . , wk〉 to denote a
tuple, where wi is the content of channel i. In single-channel
systems, a configuration is just the content of the single
channel. We use bold fonts to differentiate between channel
configurations in multi-channel and single-channel systems.
Let w[i] denote the content of channel i in w and w[i 7→ y]
denote a channel configuration obtained from w by replacing
the content of channel i with y.
In the single-channel case, for X ⊆ Σ∗rw and W ⊆ Σ
∗,
we use X : W to denote the result of applying a sequence of
actions from X to a word in W . This is called the concrete
semantics of actions and is defined as follows:
Definition 4 (Concrete Semantics) Let W ⊆ Σ∗ be a set of
words over Σ, and X an action language, then X : W is
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defined as follows:
?a : W , {u | a · u ∈ W} !a : W , {w · a | w ∈ W}
{x · y} : W , y : (x : W ) X : W ,
[
x∈X
(x : W )
For example, ({?a!b , ?a!c} : a) = {b , c}.
Def. 4 is extended to a k-channel system as follows. Given
w ∈ (Σ∗)k and an action language X , then X : w for a single
action is defined as shown below,
i?a : w , w[i 7→ (?a : w[i])] i!a : w , w[i 7→ (!a : w[i])]
and is extended to words identically to Def. 4.
We write ?a →!b for a conditional action that means “b is
written only if a is read first”. In other words, ?a →!b is an
abbreviation for a sequence of simple actions: ?a!b. Given an
action alphabet Σrw(C) over a set of channels C, we define
a conditional action alphabet Σrwc(C) that treats conditional
actions as letters:
Σrwc(C) , Σrw(C) ∪ ((C × {?} × Σ) · (C × {!} × Σ))
For a set of actions Act ⊆ Σrwc(C), a communication graph
of Act, CG(Act), is a digraph (C, E), with an edge (i, j) ∈ E
iff there are a and b in Σ such that i?a → j!b is in Act.
Definition 5 (FIFO System) A FIFO system is a tuple
S = (Σ, C, Q, q0, δ), where Σ is a finite alphabet; C =
{c1, . . . , ck} is a finite set of channels; Q is a finite set of
control locations; q0 ∈ Q is the initial control location; and
δ ⊆ Q × Σrwc × Q is a set of transition rules.
Note that in Def. 5, a FIFO system is defined with respect to a
conditional action alphabet Σrwc. A global state of S is a pair
(q,w) where q is a state in Q and w is a channel configuration.
The transition relation ∆ of S is a set of triples of the form
((q,w), op, (q′,w′)), where op ∈ Σrwc, (q, op, q
′) ∈ δ, and
w
′ ∈ (op : w).
A FIFO system S is piecewise if there exists a partial order
 on Q such that q′ ∈ δ(q, op) implies that q  q′.
FIFO Reachability Problem. We are interested in the reach-
ability problem: given a FIFO system S and a set of initial
configurations I, what is the set of all reachable global states?
This problem can be reduced to computing the semantics
(Def. 4) of a regular action language. That is, let S =
(Σ, C, Q, q0, δ), q ∈ Q some control location, and I a set
of initial configurations. Define a finite automaton Aq =
(Σrwc, Q, q
0, δ, {q}) where q is the only accepting state. Then,
the set of all reachable configurations of S at control location
q is (L(Aq) : I).
Finally, computing the semantics of a regular action lan-
guage is itself reducible to the limit language problem: given
a regular language of actions La and a regular language of
channel content W, compute the language of (L∗a : W). In
the particular case of piecewise FIFO systems, La is further
restricted to subsets of Σrwc. This is the problem we study in
the rest of the paper.
1: Aut SINGLELIMIT (Aut AI, Set Act)
2: R := ǫ, F := AI
3: while L(F) * L(R) do
4: R := R + F
5: F := FULL(F, Act)
6: end while
7: return PARTIAL(R, Act)
Fig. 1. The SINGLELIMIT algorithm.
IV. ANALYSIS OF SINGLE-CHANNEL PIECEWISE SYSTEMS
In this section, we focus on the analysis of a single-
channel piecewise FIFO system. We present an algorithm
for calculating the limit language, show its correctness, and
discuss its worst case complexity.
Fig. 1 shows the algorithm SINGLELIMIT for calculating the
limit language. The inputs to the algorithm are an automaton
AI representing a set of initial single-channel configurations
I ⊆ Σ∗, and a set Act ⊆ Σrwc of actions; the output is an
automaton representing the limit language (Act∗ : I).
The algorithm has two phases. In the first phase, called
FULL, the algorithm iteratively computes all configurations
reachable by (i) reading the current channel content com-
pletely, and (ii) writing the result of conditional and other
write actions. Let Act ⊆ Σrwc be partitioned into uncon-
ditional write actions Actw = {!a |!a ∈ Act}, and the
rest Actr = Act \ Actw. In each iteration, if W is the set
of currently reachable configurations, the algorithm computes
W ′ = FULL(W, Act) such that
W
′ = {w | ∃u ∈ W, w ∈ (Act|u|r : u)} || (Act
∗
w : ǫ)
Note that FULL misses some reachable configurations. For
example, let Act , {?a →!c, ?b →!d, !e} and I , ab.
Then, FULL results in L(e∗ce∗de∗) and misses reachable
configurations in L(be∗ce∗). This is fixed in the second phase,
called PARTIAL. Let W be a set of reachable configurations,
the result of PARTIAL is a set W ′ such that
W
′ = {w | ∃u, v, z, (v · u ∈ W )∧
(u · z = w) ∧ (z ∈ FULL({v}, Act))}
These two phases are implemented using automata as de-
scribed below.
FULL Phase. As inputs, FULL(A, Act) takes an automaton
A = (Σ, Q, δ, q0, F ), and a set of actions Act. As output, it
constructs an automaton A′ = (Σ, Q, δ′, q0, F ), where δ′ is
defined as follows:
δ
′(q, i, q′) ⇔
`








i = c ∧ q = q′ ∧ ∃(!c) ∈ Act
´
Intuitively, the first rule of δ′ corresponds to unconditional
reads (replacing by ǫ transitions), the second – to renaming the
labels of the transitions according to the conditional actions,
and the third – to unconditional writes.
PARTIAL Phase. Let A = (Σ, Q, q0, δ, F ) be an automa-
ton and s be a state in Q. We construct two automata:
A1 = (Σ, Q, q
0, δ, {s}) and A2 = (Σ, Q, {s}, δ, F ). Let
A′1 be the automaton constructed by applying FULL to A1,
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Fig. 2. Communication topologies: (a) star, (b) tree, (c) inverted tree, (d), (e) DAGs.
i.e., A′1 = FULL(A1, Act). Then, the language of A2 · A
′
1
contains a word u · z iff (i) there exists a word v such
that v · u is accepted by A via a run passing through the
state s, and (ii) z ∈ FULL({v}, Act). We call this operation





The algorithm in Fig. 1 always terminates. Given an automa-
ton A, FULL produces an automaton with the same number
of states as A. Thus, the set {FULLi(A, Act)}i is finite, and
the algorithm always reaches a fixpoint.
Theorem 1 Let AI be an automaton representing a set of con-
figurations, Act be a set of actions, and AL be the automaton
returned by SINGLELIMIT(AI , Act). Then, L(AL) = (Act
∗ :
L(AI)).
Complexity Analysis. Let h = |AI | denote the size of AI –
the automaton representing the set of initial configurations. As
discussed above, FULL(AI , Act) produces an automaton with
the same number of states as AI by relabeling the transitions
of AI . In the worst case, each transition can be updated
at most |Σ| times. Thus, the worst case complexity of the
SINGLELIMIT algorithm is |Σ|h.
Theorem 2 Let AI be an automaton over a finite alphabet
Σ representing a set of single-channel configurations, and
h = |AI |. Then, in the worst case, the running time of the
SINGLELIMIT algorithm is O(|Σ|h).
V. ANALYSIS OF MULTI-CHANNEL PIECEWISE SYSTEMS
In this section, we focus on the limit language problem for
a set of actions, Act, on a k-channel system with an acyclic
communication graph, CG(Act). For ease of presentation, we
develop the algorithm for the DAG topology incrementally by
restricting CG(Act) to star, tree, inverted tree, and eventually
DAG topologies. We show correctness of each algorithm and
discuss its complexity.
Throughout, we assume that all actions are conditionals.
This is not a significant limitation since: (i) unconditional reads
can be modeled by conditionals that write to dummy channels,
and (ii) unconditional writes can be handled easily, but are
ignored for presentational convenience. The algorithms are
based on automata, and operate on piecewise configurations. A
piecewise (k-channel) configuration u is a tuple 〈A1, . . . , Ak〉,
where each Ai is a PO-FSA over Σ. A piecewise configuration
u = 〈A1, . . . , Ak〉 represents a set of channel configurations
L(A1) × · · · × L(Ak), which is denoted by L(u). The size
of u is the sum of the sizes of all of the automata in it. L is




L(u). Note that L(U) can be seen as a
piecewise recognizable relation.
For notational convenience, in the examples we use tuples of
regular expressions instead of PO-FSA to represent piecewise
configurations. For example, u = 〈a∗b, (c + d)∗e〉 represents
a piecewise configuration where u[1] is an automaton repre-
senting a∗b, and u[2] is an automaton representing (c + d)∗e.
In pseudo-code, we use Conf for the type of piecewise con-
figurations, and notation X with [i] = y to mean X [i 7→ y].
A. Star Topology
A set of actions Act has a star topology iff there exists a
unique channel o, the origin, s.t. for every action i?a → j!b in
Act, i = o and j 6= o, i.e., CG(Act) is a star (see Fig. 2(a)).
In the sequel, we assume that channel 1 is the origin channel.
Let u be a piecewise channel configuration. The algorithm
DOREAD, shown in Fig. 4, computes the limit (Act∗ : L(u)).
The use of the argument idx is explained in Sec. V-D.
DOREAD is driven by the automaton u[1] representing the
content of channel 1. For example, if u[1] = M∗1 a1M
∗
2 a2 then
the algorithm first computes all reachable configurations w
whose channel 1 content, w[1], is in L(M∗1 a1M
∗
2 a2), then all
configurations with w[1] in L(M∗2 a2), then all configurations
with w[1] being ǫ. Each iteration of the algorithm is done using
functions SATURATE and STEP. For our running example, in
the first iteration, SATURATE computes all reachable configu-
rations with w[1] in L(M∗1 a1M
∗
2 a2) and STEP computes all
configurations with w[1] in L(M∗2 a2), etc.
SATURATE. Let u be a piecewise configuration, where u[1]
matches M∗ · Z , i.e., u[1] is a PO-FSA with a single initial
state q0 and some self-loops on q0. Note that, u represents a
set of configurations with an arbitrary number of letters from
M at the head of channel 1. The SATURATE phase computes a
set of configurations that are reachable by reading an arbitrary
number of these letters. Formally, SATURATE(u, 1) defines
a piecewise configuration u′ such that L(u′) is {w | w ∈
(Act∗ : L(u)) ∧ (w[1] ∈ L(u[1]))}. It corresponds to a




u[1] if i = 1
u[i] · (Act : M)∗ otherwise.
STEP. Let u be a piecewise channel configuration, where u[1]
matches (a0 + · · · + an) · Z , i.e, u[1] is a PO-FSA with a
single initial state with no self-loops. Here, u represents a set
of configurations whose channel 1 content starts with a letter
in {a0, . . . , an}. The STEP phase computes all configurations
that are reachable by reading exactly one letter from channel
1. Formally, STEP(u, 1) defines a set U′ of piecewise configu-
rations such that L(U′) = {w | w ∈ (Act∗ : L(u))∧ (w[1] ∈




(1?a → i!b) : L(u)
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1: Conf SATURATE(Conf u, Channel ch, int idx)
2: let (Q, q0, δ, F ) = u[ch], M = {a | (q0, a, q0) ∈ δ}
3: forall i ∈ ([1..k] \ {ch}) do
4:
let M ′ = {b | (ch?a → i!b) ∈ Act ∧ a ∈ M∧
(∀j < ch, idx(j, b) = idx(j, a)) ∧ idx(ch, b) = idx}
5: u′[i] := (u[i] · (M ′)∗)
6: return u′
7: Set〈Conf〉 STEP(Conf u, Channel ch, int idx)
8: U′ := ∅
9: let (Q, q0, δ, F ) = u[ch], M = {a ∈ Σ | ∃q′, (q0, a, q′) ∈ δ ∧ q′ 6= q0}
10: forall a ∈ M ∧ i ∈ {j | ∃b, (ch?a → j!b) ∈ Act} do
11:
M ′ = {b | (ch?a → i!b) ∈ Act∧
(∀j < ch, idx(j, b) = idx(j, a)) ∧ idx(ch, b) = idx}
12: u
′[ch] := (Q, δ(q0, a) \ {q0}, δ, F )
13: u′[i] := u[i] · M ′
14: U′ := U′ ∪ {u′}
15: return U′
Fig. 3. STEP and SATURATE algorithms.
1: global List readWL
2: global List writeWL
3: List DOREAD(Conf u, Channel ch)
4: doReadRec(u, ch, 0, true)
5: return writeWL
6: proc doReadRec(Conf u, Channel ch, int idx, bool na)
7: if u[ch] matches (U1 + ... + Un) then
8: for i ∈ [1..n] do doReadRec(u with [ch] :=Ui, ch, idx, na)
9: else if u[ch] matchesM∗ · W then
10: u := SATURATE(u, ch, idx)
11: writeWL = writeWL∪ {u}
12: u := (u with [ch] := W )
13: doReadRec(u, ch, idx + 1, false)
14: else if na ∧ (u[ch] matches ǫ) then
15: writeWL := writeWL∪ {u}
16: else if u[ch] matches a · W then
17: if na then writeWL := writeWL∪ {u}
18: U := STEP(u, ch, idx)
19: forall u′ ∈ U do doReadRec(u′, ch, idx+ 1, true)
20: end if
Fig. 4. DOREAD algorithm for star topology and its supporting routines.
Detailed implementations of SATURATE and STEP for a set of
actions Act on k channels are shown in Fig. 3.
Theorem 3 Let u be a piecewise channel configuration, Act
an action set with star topology and origin o, and U′ the set
returned by DOREAD(u, o). Then, L(U′) = (Act∗ : L(u)).
Complexity Analysis. For a piecewise configuration u, the
depth of the recursion of DOREAD is bounded by h = |u[o]|
for the origin o. Inside each call, SATURATE takes constant
time and returns a single configuration; however, STEP may
return a set of configurations. In a k-channel system, the size
of this set is bounded by k − 1. For example, for Act ,
{1?a → 2!b, 1?a → 3!b} and initial piecewise configuration
〈a, ǫ, ǫ〉, STEP returns two piecewise configurations 〈ǫ, b, ǫ〉
and 〈ǫ, ǫ, b〉. Thus, the complexity of the DOREAD algorithm
is bounded by the number of internal nodes of a (k − 1)-
ary tree of height h. There are h such nodes for k = 2, and
((k − 1)(h+1) − 1)/(k − 2) for k > 2.
Theorem 4 Let u be a piecewise channel configuration, Act
a set of actions with star topology on k channels with origin
o, and h = |u[o]|. Then, in the worst case, the running time
of DOREAD(u, o) is O(max(kh, h)).
1: List TREELIMIT ( )
2: for ch = 0 to k do
3: writeWL := ∅
4: forall u ∈ readWL do doRead(u, ch)
5: readWL := writeWL
6: return readWL
Fig. 5. The TREELIMIT algorithm.
1: Conf MERGES(Conf u, Channel ch);
2: Conf doWrite(Conf conf, Channel ch)
3: return MERGES(u, ch)
4: List MULTILIMIT ( )
5: for ch = 0 to k do
6: writeWL := ∅
7: forall u ∈ readWL do doRead(u, ch)
8: if ch + 1 < k then
9: forall u ∈ writeWL do
10: readWL := readWL∪ {doWrite(u, ch + 1)}
11: return readWL
Fig. 6. MULTILIMIT algorithm and its supporting routines.
B. Tree Topology
A set of actions Act has a tree (or, more generally, a forest)
topology iff for all actions i?a → j!b and i′?a′ → j′!b′ in Act,
j = j′ ⇒ i = i′. That is, CG(Act) is a tree (e.g. Fig. 2(b)).
The DOREAD algorithm for the star topology is not ap-
plicable to the tree topology since it assumes that all reads
come from a single channel. However, an action set with
the tree topology can be partitioned such that each partition
has a star topology. Formally, for a set of actions Act, let
Acti denote all the actions that read from channel i. Then,
{Acti} partitions Act and each Acti has a star topology with
origin i. For example, consider the CG in Fig. 2(b): here,
Act1 = {1? → 2!, 1? → 3!, 1? → 4!}, Act2 = {2? → 5!},
and Act3 = {3? → 6!, 3? → 7!}.
This way, DOREAD can be used to compute Act∗i : L(u) for
any channel i and a piecewise configuration u. Furthermore, it
can be applied iteratively to compute sequential composition
of the partitions of Act. For example, computation of (Act∗1 ·
Act∗2) : L(u) is done by using DOREAD to first compute U
′
s.t. L(U′) = (Act∗1 : L(u)), and using it again to compute
(Act∗2 : L(U
′)). In the following, we show how to extend this
to the computation of the full limit language.
The graph CG(Act) is acyclic and, therefore, induces a
partial order  on channels (vertices of the graph). For
channels i and j, i  j iff there exists a path from i to j
in CG(Act). Intuitively, channel i is less than channel j if
the final content of j depends on the initial content of i. We
say that channel j depends on channel i if i  j, and that i
and j are interdependent if either i  j or j  i. W.l.o.g., we
assume that the partial order  is extended to a total order
and that the channels are numbered such that i  j iff i ≤ j.
For example, channel 3 depends on channels 1 and 2, and 2
depends only on 1. The ordering and renaming of the channels
can be done in time linear in the size of the CG.
If Act has a tree topology, every channel in CG(Act) has
at most one immediate predecessor. Thus, for every sequence
x ∈ Act∗, there exists a sequence y such that: (i) y has the
same actions as x, (ii) all reads of y are ordered, i.e., y ∈
Act∗1 · Act
∗
2 · · · · , and (iii) if (x : w) 6= ∅ for some w, then
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(y : w) = (x : w). For example, for Act in Fig. 2(b), and
x = 1? → 2! 1? → 3! 2? → 5! 1? → 4! 3? → 6!, an equivalent
sequence y is












Theorem 5 Let Act be an action set on k channels s.t.
CG(Act) is a tree, and w a channel configuration. Then,
((Act∗ : w) 6= ∅) ⇒ ((Act∗ : w) = ((Act∗1 · · · · · Act
∗
k) : w))
Theorem 5 leads to an obvious algorithm for computing the
limit language in the tree topology: (i) establish a total order on
channels based on the CG, and (ii) use this order to iteratively
apply DOREAD to each partition Acti. We call this algorithm
TREELIMIT (see Fig. 5). Since TREELIMIT proceeds through
a finite total order of channels it always terminates.
Theorem 6 Let u be a piecewise configuration,Act an action
set with tree topology, and U′ the set of configurations
returned by TREELIMIT. Then, L(U′) = (Act∗ : L(u)).
Complexity Analysis. W.l.o.g., we assume that CG(Act) is
an N -ary tree with M internal nodes and that the initial
content of all the channels except the root is empty. Let u
be a piecewise configuration, and h = |u|. By Theorem 4,
computation of Act∗i : L(u) produces at most max(N
h, h)
piecewise configurations, each of size at most h. TREELIMIT
applies computation Act∗i : L(u), M times, which produces
at most max(Nh×M , hM ) configurations.
Theorem 7 Let u be a piecewise configuration, Act a set
of actions with a tree topology of degree N and M internal
nodes, and h = |u[1]|. In the worst case, the running time of
TREELIMIT is O(max(Nh×M , hM )).
C. Inverted Tree Topology
A set of actions Act has an inverted tree topology iff for
all conditional actions i?a → j!b and i′?a′ → j′!b′ in Act,
i = i′ ⇒ j = j′. That is, CG(Act) is an inverted tree (e.g.,
see Fig. 2(c)).
In the inverted tree topology, a channel may depend on
several pairwise independent channels. Therefore, Theorem 5
is no longer applicable. For example, let Act , {1?a →
3!a, 2?b → 3!b}, and w , 〈aa, bb, ǫ〉 be a configuration.
The partial order on the channels induced by CG(Act)
is {1  3, 2  3}, with two obvious linearizations. A
configuration 〈ǫ, ǫ, abab〉 is reachable from w, but does not
belong to neither ((1?a → 3!a)∗(2?b → 3!b)∗) : w, nor
((2?b → 3!b)∗(1?a → 3!a)∗) : w, which contradicts the
theorem.
For simplicity of presentation, we assume that there is a
unique channel, referred to as l, that has multiple dependen-
cies, like channel 3 in the above example. That means l is
the only channel whose node in CG(Act) has an in-degree
greater than or equal to 2. In this case, it is possible to (i)
replace channel l with new channels, called shadows of l, and
turn Act into a tree topology, (ii) solve the new limit problem
using TREELIMIT, and (iii) combine the contents of shadow
channels together. This is further explained below.
We define a function ADDS that introduces shadow channels
for l by redirecting each conditional that reads from i and
writes to l to write to a newly created shadow channel l̂i.
Formally,
ADDS(i?a → j!b, l) ,
{
i?a → l̂i!b if j = l
i?a → j!b otherwise.
ADDS breaks dependencies between channels. Let ̂Act =
ADDS(Act, l). If CG(Act) is an inverted tree, then CG(̂Act)
is a tree. We use S(l) to denote the shadows of l.
Let w be a configuration, and ŵ be its extension to shadow
channels. That is, ŵ[i] = w[i] if i 6∈ S(l), and ŵ[i] = ǫ
otherwise. The sets (Act∗ : w) and ((̂Act)∗ : ŵ) are closely
related. Let t ∈ (x : w) be a configuration reachable from
w by a sequence x ∈ Act∗, and t̂ ∈ (ADDS(x, l) : ŵ) be a
configuration reachable from ŵ, where ADDS is extended to
sequences in an obvious way. ADDS only augments actions
that write to l. Thus, t[i] = t̂[i] for any i that is different from
l or its shadow channels S(l). By adding shadow channels for
l, all the writes on l are redirected to its shadows and t̂[l] is the
initial content of l, hence, it is a prefix of t[l]. Each shadow
channel l̂i keeps track of what was read from channel i and
written to l, hence, t̂[l̂i] is a subsequence of t[l].
In order to formalize the relation between (Act∗ : w)
and ((̂Act)∗ : ŵ), we define a function MERGES. Given a
configuration over shadow channels, MERGES produces all
corresponding configurations without shadows. Formally,
t ∈ MERGES(t̂, l) ⇔ (∀i 6= l ∧ i 6∈ S(l), t[i] = t̂[i])∧
(t[l] ∈ L(t̂[l] · ||j∈S(l){t̂[j]})
Theorem 8 Let Act, ̂Act, w, ŵ, and l be as above. Then,
t ∈ (Act∗ : w) ⇔ ∃t̂ ∈ ((̂Act)∗ : ŵ), t ∈ MERGES(t̂, l)
Both Theorem 8 and MERGES are easily lifted to piecewise
configurations s.t. if u is a piecewise configuration, then
MERGES(u, l) defines a piecewise configuration as well. This
follows from the fact that piecewise languages are closed under
concatenation and shuffle (see Prop. 2).
The explained procedure can be extended to an arbitrary
inverted tree. The correctness follows by induction on the
number of channels. The final algorithm MULTILIMIT is
shown in Fig. 6. The algorithm assumes that shadow channels
are introduced where they are needed. It traverses the channels
according to the partial order induced by the CG, applying read
and write phases. The read phase is the same as in the star
and tree topologies (done by DOREAD). The write phase uses
MERGES to merge the content of all the shadows of a channel
before applying a read phase to it.
Theorem 9 Let u be a piecewise configuration,Act an action
set with inverted tree topology, andU the set of configurations
returned by MULTILIMIT. Then, L(U) = (Act∗ : L(u)).
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D. DAG Topology
In this section, we present an algorithm for computing the
set of reachable configurations for a set of actions whose CG is
an arbitrary directed acyclic graph (DAG) (e.g. see Fig. 2(d-e)).
This subsumes the algorithms from the previous sections for
star, tree, and inverted tree topologies.
What makes the DAG topology different from the inverted
tree is that immediate predecessors (in the  partial order on
the CG) of a channel may be interdependent. For example,
consider Act , {1?a → 3!a, 1?b → 2!b, 2?b → 3!b} whose
CG is shown in Fig. 2(d). Channel 3 has channels 1 and 2 as its
immediate predecessors, and channel 2 depends on channel 1.
This extra layer of dependence precludes the possibility of
breaking the topology by simply introducing shadow channels.
For our running example, consider the computation of
reachable configurations starting from 〈a∗b∗, ǫ, ǫ〉. We can
replace channel 3 with two shadow channels to obtain ̂Act =
{1?a → 3̂1!a, 1?b → 2!b, 2?b → 3̂2!b}. By applying
TREELIMIT to the resulting tree topology, we obtain two
piecewise configurations {〈a∗b∗, ǫ, a∗, ǫ〉, 〈b∗, b∗, a∗, b∗〉}. If
we then proceed by merging the contents of the shadows
of channel 3, as in the inverted tree topology, we obtain
{〈a∗b∗, ǫ, a∗〉, 〈b∗, b∗, (a+b)∗〉}. The second piecewise config-
uration includes configurations in which the content of channel
3 is in b+a+. These configurations are infeasible since a came
before b in channel 1 in any initial configuration and this order
must be preserved when the content is copied to channel 3.
To solve this problem, we extend MULTILIMIT algorithm
by modifying the shuffle used by MERGES (see Sec. V-C)
to respect the dependencies between the predecessors of the
channel whose shadows are merged. This requires (i) keeping
track of the relative positions of each letter in a channel as
it is copied between channels, and (ii) restricting the shuffle
based on the history of positions of each letter.
For a system with k channels, each letter is associated with
a k-tuple of indices from IDXk, where IDX , [−1..∞).
Intuitively, jth index of a letter a indicates the relative position
of a when it was in channel j, with −1 meaning that a
was never in that channel. Let idx(i, a) be a function that
extracts the ith index of a. For example, idx(2, a) = 4 means
that a was at some point at position 4 in channel 2, and
idx(3, a) = −1 means that a was never in channel 3. We
use ch(a) to denote the latest channel that a was in. Formally,
ch(a) , max{i | idx(i, a) 6= −1}.
To keep track of the indices, several parts of the
MULTILIMIT are modified. DOREAD (see Fig. 4) is extended
to accept as an argument the ch-index of a letter at the head
of the current channel ch, and increment it at each recursive
call (lines 15 and 24). SATURATE and STEP (see Fig. 3)
are extended to propagate and assign indices as well (lines 4
and 11).
The interdependence of the channels implies the following
constraint on the content of every channel in every reachable
configuration. Let w be a word describing a content of channel
l. Let a and b be letters at positions p and q in w, respectively.
Assume that i is the last channel a was in, and that i precedes
the last channel that b was in, i.e., i = ch(a) < ch(b).
Furthermore, assume that a preceded b in channel i, i.e.,
idx(i, a) < idx(i, b). Then a has to precede b in w, i.e., p < q,
since a had to be read from channel i (and placed in w) before
b could be read.
We denote the set of all words that satisfy the above
condition by WO. Formally, it is the set of all words w in
(Σ × IDXk)∗ that satisfy
∀p, q, (a = w(p) ∧ b = w(q) ∧ i = ch(a) ∧
ch(a) < ch(b) ∧ idx(i, a) < idx(i, b)) ⇒ p < q
where w(p) denotes the letter at position p of w.
For our running example, the word ba in channel 3 does
not belong to WO: the last channel of a is 1 which precedes 2
– the last channel of b, and a preceded b in channel 1, thus,
it must also precede b in channel 3.
The set WO defines a piecewise language, and is recogniz-
able by a PO-FSA.
Theorem 10 The language WO is piecewise.
In order to restrict MERGES to only include words that
satisfy WO, we replace it with a function MERGEDAGS
defined as follows. Let t̂ be a configuration reachable
from an initial configuration extended with shadow channels,
and l a non-shadow channel. Then, MERGEDAGS(t̂, l) ,
MERGES(t̂, l)∩WO. Since WO is piecewise (by Theorem 10)
and piecewise languages are closed under intersection (by
Prop. 2), MERGEDAGS defines a piecewise configuration.
With this change, MULTILIMIT algorithm computes the
exact set of reachable configurations.
Theorem 11 Let u be a piecewise configuration, Act a set
of actions with DAG topology and U′ a set of configurations
returned by MULTILIMIT algorithm, where MERGES is re-
placed by MERGEDAGS. Then L(U′) = (Act∗ : L(u)).
VI. RELATED WORK
FIFO systems play key roles in description and analysis
of distributed systems. It is well-known that most non-trivial
verification problems for FIFO systems are undecidable [9].
However, a substantial effort has gone into analysis of these
systems. In general, two main approaches have been followed
for the analysis of FIFO systems. The first approach, and
the one taken in this paper, is to identify practically useful
subclasses of FIFO systems with decidable properties (e.g.,
[18], [11], [19], [16]). The second approach is to look for
efficient semi-algorithms that scale to realistic examples, but
do not guarantee to always terminate (e.g., [4], [5], [12]).
Although this approach may look promising, in many cases
finding a good bound between scalability and termination is
very challenging.
The two approaches may be combined, as illustrated in the
analysis of lossy channel systems in which channels may lose
messages. In these systems, the problem of reachability of a
given state is decidable [2], [10], [1]; however, calculating
the set of all reachable states is impossible. The systems
51
considered in this paper are not lossy; all channels are perfect,
i.e., they do not lose any message.
Pachl [18] proves that if the set of reachable channel
configurations (the limit language) is recognizable then it is
decidable to check for reachability of any given state. It was
later shown in [10] that even though the reachability set might
be recognizable, determining it may still be undecidable.
Boigelot et al. [4], [5], [3] describe a data structure, QDD,
for representing sets of queue contents, and a QDD-based
semi-algorithm to compute a set of reachable states. The termi-
nation of this algorithm depends on handling iterations of arbi-
trary sequences of actions. This is equivalent to limit languages
in our terminology. In [4], automata-theoretic algorithms are
given to calculate f : L and f∗ : L for a single read, write,
or conditional action f . Boigelot’s Ph.D. thesis [3] and [5]
extend that to action sequences that preserve recognizability of
channel contents. The key difference between [4], [5] and our
work is that we concentrate on iteration of multiple conditional
actions. Such sequences are harder to handle since in general
they do not preserve recognizability of channel contents [16].
The problems of recognizability of limit languages and
decidability of their computation for piecewise FIFO systems
were first studied in [16]. Although the paper presents de-
cidability results, it only sketches the algorithms and does
not analyze their complexity. For the single-channel case,
our new algorithm is simpler. It avoids the use of recurrence
arguments on set-theoretic operators on alphabets. Rather, we
bound the iterative construction through a direct use of the
union operation on simpler versions of the original automata
than the one presented in [16]. For the multi-channel case,
we provide new explicit algorithms. Our concept of indexing
allows dependencies between inputs on different channels to
be added and tracked in the transducer-like treatment of the
DAG topology.
An approach for model-checking piecewise FIFO systems
was studied in [13]. That work presents a procedure for
calculating an abridged model of a FIFO system, which
when successful, constructs such a model by computing an
abstraction of the reachable channel contents. It is shown
in [13] that abridged models preserve path properties expressed
by a restricted class of Büchi automata. In contrast, the work
presented in this paper focuses on calculating the exact limit
languages and applies to reachability/safety properties only.
VII. CONCLUSION
FIFO systems are a common model of computation for
distributed protocols. We have studied the reachability problem
for a class of FIFO systems composed of piecewise compo-
nents. Since it is well-known that this problem is reducible to
computing the limit language of a regular language of actions,
we concentrate exclusively on the limit language problem.
We consider single-channel and multi-channel FIFO sys-
tems separately. For the single-channel case, we present a new
automata-theoretic algorithm for calculating the limit language
starting with an arbitrary regular initial content. We show that
the worst case complexity of our algorithm is exponential
in the size of the automaton representing the initial channel
content. A prototype of the algorithm was implemented using
the Automaton package [17].
For multi-channel systems, we present an automata-
theoretic algorithm for computing the limit language subject
to the following conditions: (i) the initial language is
piecewise, and (ii) the communication graph of actions is
acyclic. For the star and the tree topology, we show that the
complexity of our algorithm is exponential in the size of the
automaton representing the initial channel configuration. In
the cases of inverted tree and DAG topologies the complexity
of the algorithms remains an open problem.
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Abstract— Modeling hardware through atomic guard/action
transitions with interleaving semantics is popular, owing to the
conceptual clarity of modeling and verifying the high level
behavior of hardware. In mapping such specifications into hard-
ware, designers often decompose each specification transition into
sequences of implementation transitions taking one clock cycle
each. Some implementation transitions realizing a specification
transition overlap. The implementation transitions realizing dif-
ferent specification transitions can also overlap.
We present a formal theory of refinement, showing how a
collection of such implementation transitions can be shown to
realize a specification. We present a modular refinement verifi-
cation approach by developing abstraction and assume-guarantee
principles that allow implementation transitions realizing a single
specification transition to be situated in sufficiently general
environments. Illustrated on a non-trivial VHDL cache coherence
engine, our work may allow designers to design high performance
controllers without being constrained by fixed automated synthe-
sis scripts, and still conduct modular verification.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the growing complexity of the internal organization of
modern processors and other digital systems, it is important
to develop notations, verification methodologies and tools that
ensure correctness as well as high performance of the overall
design, and allow designers to make design choices. To put
things into sharper focus, consider the design of a modern
high performance cache coherence protocol as an example.
A designer initially conceptualizes the design in terms of
atomic transitions that fire under certain conditions, and move
request/response packets between various directories, caches,
and processor cores. Accumulated experience, starting from
Yang et al’s early work on UltraSparc-1 [1] to more modern
ones [2]–[4], shows that designs captured at this level of
abstraction (specification level) in languages such as Murphi
[5] and TLA+ [6] supporting guard/action style rules can be
model checked to eliminate virtually all high level concurrency
bugs. It is also widely known that the atomic transitions used
at the specification level are implemented in hardware over
multiple clock cycles (a transaction in our terminology), with
one or more implementation steps happening in each clock
cycle of the transaction. In addition, while the specification
level models the desired computation according to the inter-
leaving model where only one specification transition fires at a
time, the implementation level often starts a second transaction
before the first transaction has finished, again to maximize
overlapped computation, pipelining, and to take advantage of
internal buffers and split transaction buses. In today’s design
contexts, designers are seriously under-equipped concerning
This work is supported in part by SRC Contract 2005-TJ-1318.
(i) notations that allow them to specify the designs of such
aggressively optimized implementations, (ii) theories for for-
mally relating such implementations against specifications,
and (iii) compositional methods for verifying implementations
against specifications that have already been verified at the
interleaving model level for global properties.
This paper makes a contribution in all these areas, surveying
available solutions and contrasting our solutions against them,
and reporting a complete case study in which a VHDL level
cache coherence protocol engine is compositionally shown
to implement a high level Murphi specification. Our overall
approach is as follows. We employ an extended form of
Murphi to model and verify specifications at the level of inter-
leaving transitions for global properties (e.g., coherence) using
model checking. We employ HMurphi (Hardware Murphi)
to represent implementations. Hardware Murphi extends the
Murphi language of Dill et al [5] into a hardware description
language. S. German and G. Janssen defined Hardware Murphi
and implemented a translator, called muv, from Hardware
Murphi into synthesizable VHDL [7], [8]. Using the generated
VHDL, we can apply symbolic model checking to either the
interleaving specification or the implementation. HMurphi has
the following features. First, it supports signals with modes in,
out, and internal, and signal assignments. Second, in HMurphi,
updates to variables within a rule are immediate, while writes
become visible to all the other rules in the next step –
thus modeling hardware at the level of clock cycles. Third,
HMurphi follows the concurrent execution semantics (to be



















Fig. 1. The workflow of our approach
Given a coherence checked specification and an HMurphi
implementation model (Figure 1), the theory described in
this paper allows refinement between the implementation and
the specification to be checked as assertions generated and
embedded within a product model between the specifica-
tion and implementation models. The product model can be
checked (monolithically) using a VHDL model checker, or
decomposed into a collection of abstract models, to perform
a compositional proof of refinement. We have also designed
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a VHDL version of the German cache coherence protocol
[8], [9] – a widely used benchmark protocol in this area, and
applied our verification methodology. Our experimental results
are encouraging, and also suggest future research areas.
A. Related Work
Direct modeling using finite-state machines expressed in
VHDL/Verilog is unsuitable for representing, manipulating,
and optimizing the control logic at the implementation level of
concurrent transactions described above. Mellergaard et al [10]
presented an approach to model and verify (using theorem
proving) digital systems using Synchronized Transitions [11].
There was no attempt to model implementations separately,
nor to verify correspondence. However, synchronized transi-
tions, and similar notations including Unity [12], term rewrit-
ing systems [13], Murphi, TLA+, and Bluespec [14] reveal the
wide adoption of the guard/action notation among designers.
Bluespec [13], [15], [16] is probably the most closely
related work to our overall project. Both approaches view the
specification in terms of interleaved executions. The Bluespec
compiler automatically synthesizes the specification into a
RTL model, automatic scheduling the implementation actions
according to pre-defined synthesis recipes.
However, such automatic synthesis methods may not meet
performance goals. They may also not give designers enough
flexibility in handling pre-existing interfaces such as embedded
split-transaction buses or packet routing networks around
which implementations are designed. By allowing designers
to express implementation details in terms of transactions and
supporting the verification of refinement, our approach is better
suited to existing industrial design flows.
Our notion of transactions is related to Park’s approach
to aggregation of distributed actions [17]. Park’s work uses
theorem proving while we develop a compositional approach
using model checking. Also, our work is directed towards ver-
ifying hardware implementations, while Park verifies abstract
protocols.
Our compositional verification approach relies on input
variable generalization and assume-guarantee reasoning. Many
previous approaches to assume-guarantee reasoning have been
developed for both software and hardware contexts, for ex-
ample, [18], [19]. Although we verify hardware, our model
is related to models of concurrent software with interfering
operations.
In our approach to abstraction, variables of the model can
be abstracted to different degrees at different points in time.
At some steps, a variable can be abstracted by input variables,
while at other steps, the variable may not be abstracted. This
selective abstraction approach has some resemblances with
how the degree of input weakenings can be controlled in STE
based verification (e.g., as in [20, Page 25]); however, virtually
all details are different.
A goal of our research is to develop methods for checking
refinement that are computationally efficient and also reduce
the manual burden of specifying and verifying the mapping
between the implementation and the specification. To reduce
the manual effort, we develop a theory of refinement checking
that incorporates the notion of multi-cycle transactions and
their mappings onto interleaving specifications. The kind of
refinement checking we perform can be formulated in other
theories, but we believe that in many cases the necessary
mappings and reasoning will be simpler in our theory.
B. Overview of the paper
(Reading suggestion: this section, then Sections VII and
VIII, then II onwards.) Section II discusses notational prelim-
inaries. We define transitions and their read and write sets of
variables. A transition in the implementation is a single clock
cycle operation, while a transaction is a multi-cycle operation.
Implementation transactions are viewed as sets of transitions,
with each set helping implement a specification transition.
Section III discusses the notion of a correct implementation
of a specification.
Section IV discusses monolithic model checking by defining
a product model between the specification and implementation
models. The cross product model has pre- and postcondition
on transitions to check that the implementation correctly
implements the specification.
Section V discusses compositional model checking where a
collection of abstract models are created through read-variable
generalization and assume-guarantee reasoning.
Section VI discusses our heuristics to implement composi-
tional model checking.
II. SOME PRELIMINARIES
A. States, Transitions, Models
Let V be a set of variables and D be a set of values which
are both non-empty. A state s is a function from variables
to values, s : V → D. For state s, variable v, and value
α ∈ D, s[v ← α] denotes the state that is the same as s
except s[v ← α](v) = α. Let S be the set of states. For a
state s and a set of variables X , s | X denotes the restriction
of s to the variables in X .
A transition t consists of a guard g and an action a, where
g is a predicate on states, and a is a function a : S → S. We
write g a to denote the transition with guard g and action
a.
We can also form the action of a transition by composing
two or more functions. If a, b : S → S, then g a; b denotes
the transition g λs.b(a(s)).
We associate with each transition t = (g a) two sets of
variables called the read and write sets of t, R(t), W (t) respec-
tively. The write set of t is the set of variables whose value can
be changed by the transition in some state, W (g a) = {v |
∃s ∈ S : g(s) ∧ a(s)(v) 6= s(v)}. The read set of a transition
is the set of variables that can affect either the enabling of the
guard, or the value written to one of the variables in the write
set, R(g a) is
{v | ∃s ∈ S, ∃α ∈ D : (g(s) 6≡ g(s[v ← α])) ∨
(a(s) 6= a(s[v ← α]))}
We say t reads v if v ∈ R(t); t writes v if v ∈W (t).
A model has the form (V, I, T, A), where V is a set of
variables, I is a set of initial states over V , T is a set of
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transitions, and A is a set of assertions (state formulas over
V ) which can be empty.
B. Executions
We consider two notions of execution for models. An
interleaving execution of a model is based on steps in which
a single enabled transition fires. For a transition t = (g a),
we write s t−→ s′ to denote that g(s) holds and s′ = a(s). An
interleaving execution of (V, I, T, A) is a sequence of states
s0, s1, . . ., such that s0 ∈ I and for all i ≥ 0, there is a
transition ti ∈ T such that si
ti−→ si+1.
We now introduce the concurrent executions of a model.
First we define the concurrent firing of a set of transitions.
If t1 = (g1 a1), t2 = (g2 a2) are two transitions with
W (t1)∩W (t2) = ∅, we write s
{t1,t2}
−→ s′ to denote that g1(s)
and g2(s) hold, and s′ = (a1(s) |W (t1))∪ (a2(s) |W (t2))∪
(s | V −W (t1)−W (t2)). In the preceeding, we form the
function s′ by taking the union of restricted functions. We
define the notion of the concurrent firing of a set E consisting
of more than two transitions similarly, and write it as s E−→ s′.
The idea of a concurrent execution of a model is that all
of the enabled transitions fire at each step. However, we have
to deal with the problem of write conflicts between different
transitions. This is because if two transitions ti, tj are both
enabled at s, and they both write a variable v, then the value
of v cannot be defined at the next state. For a state s such that
two transitions t1, t2 are enabled, with W (t1) ∩W (t2) 6= ∅,
we say there is a write-write conflict at s. When a write-write
conflict occurs at s, for the ease of exposition, we will define
execution to simply stay at s (we can also define this as an
error). Thus, a concurrent execution of a model (V, I, T, A)
is a sequence of states s0, s1, . . ., such that s0 ∈ I and for
all i ≥ 0, si
Ei−→ si+1. Here, Ei is the set of all transitions
(maximal set) enabled at state si if there is no write-write
conflict at si, i.e. si
Ei−→ si+1. Otherwise, si = si+1.
Now we define labelled executions. Given an execution
Se = s0, s1, . . . of a model, a labelled execution of Se is
a sequence: s0
E0−→ s1
E1−→ . . .. If Se is an interleaving
execution, then for each i ≥ 0, Ei is a transition with
si
Ei−→ si+1. Otherwise, Ei is a set of transitions (defined, as
above, to be maximal set) such that si
Ei−→ si+1, or si = si+1.
In executions we may write t for the singleton set of transitions
{t} if the context makes the intended usage clear.
C. Annotations
A transition may be annotated by associating formulas
for pre- and post-conditions with the transition. We write
g {P}a{Q} to denote the annotation of a transition g a
with precondition P and postcondition Q. The formulas P , Q
are formulas over the variables of the model. We can omit
{P} or {Q} in the cases when it is equivalent to {true}. For
an execution S = s0
E0−→ s1
E1−→ . . ., we say that S satisfies
the annotation g {P}a{Q}, if whenever si
Ei−→ si+1 and
Ei contains (if S is a concurrent execution) or is (if S is an
interleaving execution) the transition g a, then P (si) and
Q(si+1) both hold. The intuition is that if a transition fires in
an execution, then both the precondition and the postcondition
must hold. An annotated model is one which has one or more
annotated transitions.
Let M = (V, I, T, A) be a model and p be a formula. For an
execution (either interleaving or concurrent) Se = s0, s1, . . . of
M , we say Se satisfies p if p(si) holds for every i ≥ 0. If M is
a model in which only interleaving executions are considered,
we say M satisfies p if every interleaving execution of the
model satisfies p. We denote this by M |= p. Similarly,
we define M |= p for a model M where only concurrent
executions are considered. For an annotated transition t of M ,
we also write M |= t to denote that every execution of M
satisfies t. Finally, if M satisfies all the assertions of A and
its set of annotations then |= M holds.
D. Transactions
We are interested in showing the correspondence between
implementation and specification models, where the imple-
mentation may take many steps to accomplish the work of
one step in the specification. To help define the correspondence
between an implementation and specification, we introduce the
notion of a transaction.
The purpose of a transaction is to collect the implementation
transitions that correspond to a single transition of the spec-
ification. Each transaction has a unique state variable called
the alive variable. In an initial state of the model, all of the
alive variables for transactions are set to false. At this state,
no transitions in a transaction are enabled until a transition
called the trigger of the transaction is fired. If the transaction
takes multiple steps to finish, then the alive variable is set to
true. Once the guard of the trigger transition is enabled, other
transitions in the transaction can fire. The other transitions
can continue to fire until a closing transition resets the alive
variable to false. Such a closing transition is assumed to always
exist, and it could be the same as the trigger.
We now describe transactions more precisely. A transaction
is a set of transitions, formed as follows. Let t = (g a)
be a transition, and T be a possibly empty set of transitions.
Then transaction[t; T ] is the following set of transitions:
{(g ∧ ¬alive) (a; alive ← MultiCycle)}
⋃
∪(gi ai)∈T {(gi ∧ (g ∨ alive)) ai}
In the above formula, alive is the alive variable unique to this
transaction, and t is the trigger transition. The first half of the
formula says that the trigger transition fires when its guard g is
true and the alive variable is false. Firing the trigger transition
updates the state by the action a. The function MultiCycle
is true in a state if the transaction will take more than one
cycle. The alive variable is set to true if the transaction takes
multiple steps.
A transition in T fires when its guard gi is true and either
(i) the alive variable is false and the trigger guard is true,
or (ii) the alive variable is true. That is, transitions in T are
permitted to fire on the same step as the trigger transition.
As said earlier, transactions provide a way of organizing
the transitions that realize the operations by the hardware
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into mutually exclusive sets of transitions. However, note that
during execution, the execution semantics are defined in terms
of the concurrent executions generated by ∪iUi where Ui
is a transaction. This means that transitions from different
transactions can fire concurrently.
In the sequel, we study read-write relations between con-
current transactions in a way that is analogous to concurrency
and variable access in threaded programs. We define the read
and write sets of a transaction Ui to be R(Ui) = ∪t∈UiR(t),
W (Ui) = ∪t∈UiW (t), respectively.
E. Implementation Model
We define an implementation model, or low-level model, to
be a model ML = (VL, IL, TL, AL), where TL is the union of
a set of transactions, TL = ∪iUi, and the transactions Ui are
pairwise disjoint sets of transitions. This is the structure that
we will assume for implementations.
We say that a variable v is active in state s in an implemen-
tation model, if there is a transaction U with v ∈W (U), and
the alive variable for U is true in s. For a state s, let active(s)
be the set of all variables active in s, and inactive(s) be the
set of model variables not in active(s).
III. CORRECT IMPLEMENTATION
We consider three kinds of variables in the implementation
model and discuss how each kind of variable corresponds to
the specification. An interface variable must match the specifi-
cation model at all times. A transactional variable must match
the specification model except when the variable is active. The
specification for a transactional variable is comparable to a
resource invariant in a shared variable program with critical
sections [21]. The similarity is that a transactional variable
in our theory and a shared variable used in critical sections
[21] both have a specified value when the variable is not
being updated. Finally, the implementation can have additional
variables that are not present in the specification and are not
constrained.
Let MH = (VH , IH , TH , AH) be a model and ML =
(VL, IL, TL, AL) be an implementation model over variables
VH , VL respectively, where VH ⊆ VL. Let VI ⊆ VH be
the set of interface variables and VT ⊆ VH be the set of
transactional variables. We say that ML implements MH with
interface variables VI and transactional variables VT if for
every concurrent execution l0, l1, . . . , of ML, there exists an
interleaving execution h0, h1, . . . , of MH , and an increasing
sequence of natural numbers n0 < n1 < . . . such that for all
i ≥ 0,
(li | VI = hni |VI)
∧ (li | (VT ∩ inactive(li)) = hni | (VT ∩ inactive(li))).
In this definition, step i of the implementation is matched in
the specification at step ni, and variables in VI plus those in
VH that are inactive must have the same value in both models.
If ML implements MH , then whenever ML reaches a cleanly
halted state with no transactions in progress, all of the variables
in VI and VT must be in a state reachable in the specification
MH .
This definition can be augmented with additional invariant
assertions to express stronger properties. For example, one
invariant could be that ni is the number of transactions in
ML which have completed at li. Another example could be
that for all the transitions which are fired between hni and
hni+1 , their write sets are disjoint.
Proposition 1. Suppose MH is a model and ML is an
implementation model such that ML implements MH with
VI and VT . If MH |= P , for an invariance property P ,
then ML |= inactivep ⇒ P , where inactiveP is a formula
that asserts that all the transactional variables in vars(P ) are
inactive. The formula inactiveP can be expressed using the
alive variables of transactions.
IV. MONOLITHIC MODEL CHECKING
The refinement of the specification model MH by the
implementation model ML can be checked in a straight-
forward way by constructing a monolithic checking model,
called MMC . MMC defines all the possible executions of
the implementation, and for each execution, asserts that the
states reached by the implementation can also be reached
through specification transitions. In effect, MMC executes a
cross product construction. In Section V, we describe a com-
positional checking method that allows much of the checking
to be performed on smaller models.
Let MH = (VH , IH , TH , AH) be a specification model and
ML = (VL, IL, TL, AL) be an implementation model, where
VH ⊆ VL. Let V ′H be a fresh set of variables, with one new
variable corresponding to each variable in VH . For a set of
variables V , V ′ is the result of replacing all variables from
VH in V with the corresponding primed variable. That is, for
V ⊆ VL, V ′ = {v′ | v ∈ V ∩VH}∪ (V −VH). For V ⊆ VL−
VH , V
′ = V . In addition, priming of expressions is defined
to be the priming of the free variables of the expression.
We define the monolithic model as follows, MMC = (VL ∪
V ′H , IMC , TMC , AMC). The variables VL will be updated ac-
cording to the implementation model ML, while the variables
V ′H will be updated according to the specification model MH .
We will check that for each initial state of the implementa-
tion, there exists an intial state of the specification that matches
on the variables in VH , that is, (IL | VH) ⊆ IH . Then we
define the initial states of MMC to be IMC = {sL ∪ (sL |
VH)
′ : sL ∈ IL}. Thus, for each initial state sL of ML, we
start MMC in the state consisting of sL and a primed copy of
the the state sL over the variables in V ′H .
Our method is based on showing that for each transaction
Ui, there is corresponding transition ui in the specification
such that Ui implements ui. We call ui the specification
transition of Ui, written spec(Ui).
We assume the specification always contains a stuttering
transition of the form true id , where for all states s,
id(s) = s. For a transaction Ui that only writes to variables
in VL − VH , we can assign the specification transition to be
the stuttering transition.
We check refinement by finding for each transaction Ui
a transition ci in Ui that acts as a commit transition in the
sense that whenever ci fires, the specification transition ui is
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enabled on the primed variables. This allows the model MMC
to fire the specification transition ui on the primed variables
whenever ci fires.
The transitions of MMC are defined as follows. For
each transaction Ui, let the commit transition ci be
cguard i cact i. To build the cross product model, we re-
place ci with a transition that executes ci on the unprimed
variables while executing spec(Ui) on the primed variables.






has the same guard as the commit transition, and uses a
precondition annotation to check that the guard of the speci-
fication transaction is enabled on the primed variables. When
this transition fires, it executes the action sact i on the primed
variables and executes cact i on the unprimed variables. For
each transaction Ui of MMC , we call the precondition sguard i
in the above formula the specification enableness condition of
Ui.












To check the implementation relation, we define assertions
in MMC . We check the interface variables by defining the
invariant assertions of MMC to be AMC = {v = v′ | v ∈
VI}. These assertions check that the implementation always
matches the specification on interface variables.
For transactional variables, we check the implementation re-
lation as follows. Consider a transaction Ui and a transactional
variable v. If v is written by either Ui or the specification
transition spec(Ui), then we assert that v = v′ holds at the
end of the transaction. We implement these checks by adding
a postcondition annotation of the form
{¬alive i ⇒ vars i = vars
′
i}],
to each transition of transaction Ui. In this formula, alive i is
the alive variable of Ui and vars i is defined to be the vector of
all variables written by either a transition of Ui or written by
spec(Ui). Attaching this postcondition to each transition t of
Ui has the following meaning: if the transaction Ui completes
on a given step of the execution of MMC , then alive i will
be false in the following state. The postcondition asserts that
vars i must equal vars ′i in this state. These assertions check
the necessary conditions for the transactional variables.
Checking Correct Implementation: Let Smc =
mc0, mc1, . . . , be an execution of MMC . If all the
specification enableness conditions are satisfied in this
execution, one or more specification transitions can fire
at each mci. It follows that mc0 | V ′H , mc1 | V ′H , . . . ,
is a concurrent execution of the specification. For
i ≥ 0, let hi = mci | V ′H . Also, let Sh be the labelled
concurrent execution h0
E0−→ h1
E1−→ . . . , where for i ≥ 0,
Ei = {ui,1, . . . , ui,ni} is the set of specification transitions
that fire simultaneously at state hi in the projected execution
Sh.
We would like to know when the concurrent execution of
the specification transitions in Sh can be converted into an
interleaving execution. First, there cannot be a write-write
conflict in Ei, for any i. Second, for each i, the concurrent
firing of the transitions in Ei must be equivalent to some
sequential firing order. For any two transitions t1, t2, say t1
must preceed t2, written t1 ≺ t2, if R(t1) ∩ W (t2) 6= ∅.
For each set Ei, define ≺∗i to be the transitive closure of
the ≺ relation on the transitions in Ei. If the relation ≺∗i is
irreflexive, then there is a sequential firing of the transitions
in Ei that updates the state from hi to hi+1. If the relation ≺∗i
is irreflexive for all i, we say serializability holds for MMC .
The following theorem states the necessary conditions for
checking the implementation relation.
Theorem 1. Suppose MMC is the monolithic model for
implementation ML and specification MH . If (i) (IL | VH) ⊆
IH , (ii) no write-write conflicts exist at any state of MMC ,
(iii) serializability holds for MMC , (iv) W (spec(Ui)) ⊆
W (Ui) holds for each transaction Ui in ML, and (v) |= MMC ,
then ML implements MH with interface variables VI and
transactional variables VT .
V. COMPOSITIONAL MODEL CHECKING
This section presents results that allow one to reason ef-
ficiently about a model by checking properties of a set of
smaller, more abstract models. There are two basic ideas:
abstraction and assume-gurantee reasoning.
Consider the problem of making an abstract model that
conserves correctness of the annotations on a transition t in a
model M . We would like to remove as many transitions from
the model as possible, while maintaining the property that if
the annotations hold in the abstract model, they hold in the
full model.
To form an abstraction, we analyze the sources that supply
values for variables that are read by a transition. To make
a model more abstract, we can convert some sources into
free input variables and remove certain transitions from the
model. We will develop a condition that ensures that input
sources for a transition in an abstract model are at least as
general as the sources in the full model. One distinctive feature
of our approach is that we allow abstractions in which a
variable is abstracted to an input variable in some transitions,
but the original variable is retained in other transitions. This
approach allows us to control the level of detail contained in
an abstract model. We use this control of abstraction to reason
compositionally about transactions.
To form abstract models, we introduce input variables, and
models with input variables. A model with input variables
has the form M = (V, Ṽ , I, T, A), where V is the set of
state variables and Ṽ is the set of input variables. For each
variable v in V , there are two corresponding input variables,
ṽ and ṽn. The variable ṽ is used to provide an unconstrained
input on the current state. The variable ṽn is used in annotated
transitions, to provide an unconstrained input for postcondition
annotations, which are evaluated in the “next” state of the
model.
Semantically, a model with input variables is similar to a
model without inputs. The states of the model map V ∪ Ṽ to
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values. Transitions can read but not write the input variables.
The action function of a transition defines the next state of the
ordinary state variables in V only. The next-state relation for
input variables is unconstrained: an input variable can take on
any value in the next state of a computation.
Without loss of generality, we can assume that all models
have input variables, since a model that does not mention input
variables can be represented as a model with input variables.
A. Abstraction
Let t = (g a) be a transition of a model M . We define
a read variant of t as the result of replacing reads of zero
or more variables in R(t) with their corresponding input
variables. (Formal definition in Appendix.) We write t̃ for read
variant of t. A transition t is a read variant of itself in the case
that no variables are renamed. If T is a set of transitions, then
we define variants(T ) to be the set of all read variants of
transitions in T .
We now discuss our approach to abstraction in more detail.
Let M = (V, Ṽ , I, T, A) be a model. We are interested in
models built from a subset of variants(T ) that contains no
more than one read variant of any transition in T . Let us
call such a set consistent. Intuitively, a model containing a
consistent set of read variants of T can execute the behavior
of M on a subset of the variables, without introducing two
transitions that generate write-write conflicts at all states.
We want to define a syntactic condition that says when a
set of read variants is capable of executing all behaviors of
the full model over a subset of the state variables. Let T̃ be
a set of read variants of transitions in T . Consider t ∈ T , t̃
which is a read variant of t, and a variable v that is read by
t̃. We say that the read of v in t̃ is sufficiently general with
respect to M if one of the following holds:
1) v is an input variable, or
2) T̃ contains a read variant of every transition in T that
writes to v, or
3) There is a transition s ∈ T that writes v, s̃ ∈ T̃ , and
in every concurrent execution of M , whenever t fires, s
fires on the previous step.
We say that T̃ is sufficiently general with respect to M if
every read of every variable in T̃ is sufficiently general with
respect to M .
Our abstract models overapproximate an original model
by reading the values of a combination of state and input
variables. In order to compare executions of abstract models
to the original models, we define the effective input state of a
model with input variables at a given state. When a transition
reads the value of an input variable ṽ, the effective input
state assigns the same value to the original variable v. Let
M = (V, Ṽ , I, T, A) be a model and s be a state of M . The
effective input state of a transition t at a state s, eff (t, s), is
defined for v ∈ R(t):
1) If t reads the state variable v, then eff (t, s)(v) = s(v).
2) If t reads the input variable ṽ, then eff (t, s)(v) = s(ṽ).
The effective read states of a transition t in a model M are
defined by Eff (t, M) =
{eff (t, s) | s is a reachable state of M and t is enabled at s}.
The following proposition describes how a model M ′ contain-
ing a sufficiently general subset of read variants of transitions
of a model M can overapproximate the behavior of M .
Proposition 2. Let M = (V, Ṽ , I, T, A) and let T ′ be a subset
of T . Let M ′ = (V, Ṽ , I ′, T̃ , A′) be a model where I ⊆ I ′, and
T̃ contains a read variant of each transition in T ′. Suppose T̃ is
sufficiently general with respect to M . Then for all transitions
t ∈ T ′ Eff (t, M) ⊆ Eff (t̃, M ′).
The notions of read variant and sufficiently general ab-
straction extend readily to models with annotations. A read
variant of an annotated transition g {P}a{Q} is formed by
consistently replacing read variables v with the corresponding
same-state input variables ṽ in g, P and a, and replacing
variables v in Q with the corresponding next-state variables
ṽn.
Consider an annotated model M and a set T̃ of read variants
of transitions in M . A variable instance v in the precondition
of an annotated transition is sufficiently general with respect
to M under the same conditions that apply for a read instance
in a guard or action. A variable instance v in a postcondition
of a transition t̃ is sufficiently general if one of the following
holds:
1) v is a next-state input variable.
2) T̃ contains a read variant of every transition of M that
writes to v.
3) t̃ writes to v.
4) There is a transition s of M that writes to v, s̃ ∈ T̃ ,
and in every concurrent execution of M , if t fires then
s fires on the same step.
As before, we say that T̃ is sufficiently general with respect to
M if every read of every variable in T̃ is sufficiently general
with respect to M .
Proposition 3. Let M = (V, Ṽ , I, T, A) and M ′ =
(V, Ṽ , I ′, T̃ , A′) be models where I ⊆ I ′, and T̃ is a subset
of variants(T ) that is sufficiently general with respect to M .
Let t be an annotated transition in T and t̃ be a read variant
in T̃ . Then M ′ |= t̃ implies M |= t.
B. Assume-Guarantee Reasoning
In the previous section, we developed a set of sufficient
conditions under which the annotations of a transition can
be checked in an abstract model. Assume-guarantee reasoning
involving the input variables of an abstract model can reduce
the size of the models that need to be checked below the size
that is needed when abstraction is used alone.
If P (Ṽ ) is a satisfiable formula over the input variables in
Ṽ and Q(V ) is an invariance property over the state variables
V , then define M ; P (Ṽ ) |= Q(V ) to be true if Q(V ) holds
on all reachable states of the model M , provided the input
variables are contrained at each step to satisfy P (Ṽ ).
In its simplest form, assume-guarantee reasoning is a form
of induction involving the input variables. Suppose M =
(V, ∅, I, T, A) is a model, and M ′ = (V, Ṽ , I ′, T̃ , A′) is a
model with input variables, where T̃ contains a read variant of
every transition in T , and I ⊆ I ′. Then the following scheme
is valid. Note that any update of the variables V from the input
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variables Ṽ requires at least one time step for a transition to
fire.
M ′; P (Ṽ ) |= P (V )
M |= P (V )
The actual form of assume-guarantee reasoning that we use
can be stated as follows. Suppose M = (V, ∅, I, T, ∅) is a
model, and M1 = (V, Ṽ , I1, T1, ∅), and M2 = (V, Ṽ , I2, T2, ∅)
are models with input variables where T1 and T2 are subsets
of variants(T ) that are both sufficiently general with respect
to M . We require that for each transition t in M , either M1
or M2 contains a read variant of t. Also suppose the initial
states of M1, M2 both contain the initial states of M . These
conditions assure that M1 and M2 are abstractions of M that
preserve the correctness of annotations on transitions in M .
We can use compositional assume-guarantee reasoning as
follows. Let P (X) be a formula over a set of state variables
X ⊆ V . Suppose that every transition in M that writes to a
variable in X is annotated with the postcondition P (X). Then
we can use the following scheme, which checks that P (X) or
a read variant is true in the initial state and whenever one of
the variables in X is written. The scheme assumes P (X̃) is
always true over the input variables, where X̃ is the result
of replacing each variable in X with the corresponding input
variable.
I1 |= P (X) M1; P (X̃) |= T1
I2 |= P (X) M2; P (X̃) |= T2
M |= T
As noted in the next section, in some cases the actual
annotations to be checked can be simplified. For instance it
may be the case that M consists of two transactions that can be
shown to never overlap, and M1 and M2, respectively, contain
read variants of these two transactions. In this case, only the
final value produced by each transaction can be read by the
other transaction. It is not necessary to annotate the non-final
transitions in this case.
Another case in which the invariant can be simplified is
when no transition in one of the submodels, M1 or M2,
writes to a certain variable. In the next section, detailed im-
plementation rules are described and the rules are specialized
to consider the case of checking models having the form of
the monolithic checking model MMC .
VI. IMPLEMENTATION
Now we describe an implementation of the compositional
approach for the monolithic model MMC .
For each transaction Ui in MMC , we build an abstract model
Mi = (VMC , ṼMC , Ii, Ti, Ai) that contains the correctness
conditions for Ui. In this model, Ti is a set of read variants
of transitions of Ui. For the initial states, Ii is highly uncon-
strained compared with IMC . Ii covers all the states of MMC
at which the trigger transition of Ui fires in MMC . Essentially,
Ii consists of those states where the variables in VH that Ui
reads or writes, match with their correspondents in V ′H .
Now we discuss the variables whose reads are replaced with
input variables in Mi. This is based on how the transaction
Ui can interact with other transactions in MMC .
• First, we consider variables v in VL − VH . If Ui reads v,
another transaction writes v, and these transactions can overlap
in MMC , i.e. one starts before the other is completed, then we
replace each read of v in Mi with the input variable ṽ.
• Second, for variables v in VH , if Ui reads v, another
transaction writes v, and they can overlap in MMC , then we
replace the reads of v with ṽ in Mi. At the same time, if v′ is
in the read set of the specification transition of Ui, then we also
replace the reads of v′ with ṽ′ , and we assume ṽ = ṽ′ holds
at every step of Mi. The reason to make these assumptions is
that, to verify the specification enableness condition and the
postcondition vars i = vars ′i of Ui in Mi, reads of individual
input variables would otherwise be too unconstrained. We will
discuss how these assumptions will be guaranteed in the next.
• Third, for variables v in VH , if Ui writes v, another
transaction reads v′ or writes v, and they can overlap in MMC ,
then we make v = v′ a postcondition of every transition that
writes to v or v′ in Mi. That is, we request that in every
state of Mi, v = v′ holds. This is a guarantee part of assume-
guarantee reasoning. In fact, the postcondition vars i = vars ′i
of Ui in Mi is another part of guarantee.
The above process describes one implementation of how we
can decompose the model checking of MMC into the checks
of the Mi. It is straightforward that this implementation is
just a special case of the abstraction and assume-guarantee
reasoning which are presented in Section V. So all the abstract
models built this way have the following property: if for all
i, Mi; Pi(Ṽ , Ṽ ′) |= Ti holds, then |= MMC holds. Here,
Pi(Ṽ , Ṽ
′) is the set of assumptions which are described in
the second case.
In the above, if the check of some Mi fails due to abstraction
using input variables, we can undo the replacements. In more
detail, we can change every read of an input variable ṽ in
Mi back to reads v. We can then transitively include all
the transactions of MMC that write v, to Mi. All these are
just different heuristics of implementing the compositional
approach.
In order to use the compositional approach, we still need
to deal with write-write conflicts, the serializability condition,
and how to find out if two transactions can overlap in MMC .
Our current approach is to check these properties directly in
MMC . We first statically find out all the potential write-write
conflicts in MMC . We then check whether each pair of trans-
actions with a statically detected potential write-write conflict
can overlap in MMC . If there is no overlap, the potential
conflicts cannot occur. Otherwise, we check the occurrence of
conflicts individually in MMC . The serializability condition
can be checked similarly. Finally, for all the transactions
which don’t involve statically detected write-write conflicts,
we assume they can overlap with each other (clearly this is
sound).
VII. IMPLEMENTATION AND EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Given a specification model MH in Murphi and an imple-
mentation model ML in HMurphi, we first build a monolithic
model MMC . We then use a static analyzer to find out all the
possible shared variables read-write and write-write usages in
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MMC . Following that, we use muv to translate the model into
VHDL. It assumes that each rule once enabled finishes in one
clock cycle. Finally, we use a VHDL verifier, in our case the
IBM RuleBase [22], to check the refinement properties.
A. Benchmark Details
We use the German protocol [9] as the specification of
our benchmark. This protocol is a simple invalidation-based
directory protocol. A cache line can be in one of the states:
invalid, shared and exclusive. Right now, the system models
one address with one home node and one remote node.1
In the model each node contains a memory, a cache and
a directory. To prevent communication deadlocks and allow
non-FIFOed delivery of messages, multiple communication
channels are introduced for each pair of nodes. As a whole,
the specification model has about 500 LOC in Murphi.
The implementation model [8] is much more complex. Each
node contains three controlling units: the local, home and
remote units. It also contains a directory, a cache and a mem-
ory. Different units in one node can function simultaneously.















Fig. 2. Structure of an implementation node
In the implementation model, other than the two nodes,
there also exists one router and six buffer units. The router
is used to transfer messages from source nodes to destination
buffers, and it can select at most one message to transfer
at each cycle. The buffers are used to store messages in
the destination side, before the destination nodes pick the
messages and process them. Altogether, the monolithic model
has about 1500 LOC in HMurphi.
B. Transaction Details
In this benchmark, there are altogether 13 transactions in-
cluding transactionsets. A transactionset is a set of transactions
which only differ in certain parameters. The sequence of how
the transitions within each transaction fire, is fixed in this
example. These sequences fall into five categories, as shown
in the following figure.
The first category represents the cases when a transaction
has only one transition. The second represents the cases when
a transaction has two transitions and they fire concurrently
in one cycle. These two transitions are in different hardware
modules, and they are structually separate. They happen to









Fig. 3. Transition firing sequences of transactions.
fire concurrently in one cycle, so we cannot combine them
into one transition. The rest is similar.
In this example, one transition can be in different transac-
tions. In that case, each instance of the transition has a different
alive variable and a trigger transition associated with it. It is
worthwhile mention that all the transitions within a transaction
do not necessarily need to fire in consecutive cycles. There
could have gaps in between and all our proof rules still work.
For example, in hardware because all the processing units can
be active at the same time, a unit may have to wait several
cycles to access a shared resource.
In our benchmark, different transactions can overlap. For
example, one transaction in the fifth category is that a node
which requested an exclusive copy, receives the copy. The five
transitions in this transaction work as follows: (i) the local
unit copies the replied message from the buffer unit, and sets
the flag of availability for cache unit true; (ii) the cache unit
copies the message, and sets the flag of acknowledgement for
local unit true; (iii) the local unit resets the flag of availability,
and marks the action of requesting an copy as completed;
(iv) the cache unit resets the flag of acknowledgement; (v)
the buffer unit resets the message. Another transaction in the
first category is a node updating its cache line, when it has
an exclusive copy. These two transactions can overlap in a
way such that the second transaction fires immediately after
the second transition of the first transaction. So when the first
transaction is completed, the cache line data is from the second
transaction, not from the replied message. The refinement still
holds in this case, because when both transactions are finished,
the resulting state can be reached in the specification by firing
the two transactions sequentially. Our method shows that the
refinement holds in this case.
C. Experiment Results
For this benchmark, we have successfully verified that the
implementation refines the specification, using both the mono-
lithic and the compositional approaches. All the experiments
were performed on a PC with an Intel Pentium CPU of 3.0GHz
with 2GB memory. Table VII-C shows the experimental results
of the two approaches where the datapath of the cache line is
one bit.
Compositional MC Monolithic MC
Conflict check Abstract models
# of FF 108 89 212
# of gates 5763 2194 8574
MC time 674 163 1036
In this table, “MC” represents model checking, and “# of
FF” and “# of gates” represent the number of flip-flops and
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gates of the boolean circuits, after the models under test were
reduced with the same configurations. The model checking
time is counted in seconds. The cost of the compositional
approach comes from two parts. The first is checking the write-
write conflicts and serializability on the monolithic model,
and the second comes from model checking for each abstract
model. Here, we only show the maximum boolean circuit on
all the abstract models, and the total model checking time on
them. There are altogether 13 abstract models, some of which
are very small. The boolean circuits of the abstract models
range from 18 to 89 flip-flops, 513 to 2194 gates, and the
model checking time ranges from 12 to 52 seconds.
Moreover, for datapath larger than one bit, the monolithic
approach exceeds the 300 flip-flops limit that our academic
version of RuleBase can handle. In contrast, the compositional
approach can handle upto 26-bit of datapath. From the above,
we can see that the compositional approach can enable us to
verify larger models, in which these models may exceed the
capacity of the monolithic approach.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we present a framework for modeling and
verifying transaction based hardware protocol implementa-
tions. While our methodology is being developed with shared
memory subsystems as driving examples, we believe that it
is far more general in scope, and will very likely find other
applications within a multicore design as well.
Our method is currently implemented as a manual form of
abstraction and assume-guarantee reasoning. We plan to mech-
anize our methods as much as possible, to get the most benefit.
It will be important to understand how to effectively combine
our abstraction and assume-guarantee methods with automatic
abstraction algorithms found in current model checkers.
As our future work, we would also like to explore how
to reduce the cost of write-write conflicts and serializability
checks of the compositional approach. We will also try our
approaches on other applications such as pipelined systems,
and with other verification tools.
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Appendix. Defintion of read variant. Let Vt =
{v1, . . . , vn} ⊆ V , n ≥ 0. We define a substitution
function σ, to replace each read of v ∈ Vt in t with the input
variable ṽ:
σ(t, Vt) = (σ(g, Vt) σ(a, Vt))
where
σ(g, Vt) = λs.g(s[v1 ← s(ṽ1)] . . . [vn ← s(ṽn)])
σ(a, Vt) = λs.a(s[v1 ← s(ṽ1)] . . . [vn ← s(ṽn)])
Then σ(t, Vt) is a read variant of t.
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Abstract—Traditional hardware modeling using RTL presents
a time-stationary view of the design state space which can be used
to specify temporal properties for model checking. However, high-
level information in terms of computation being performed on
units of data (transactions) is not directly available. In contrast,
transaction-level microarchitecture models view the computation
as sequences of (data-stationary) transactions. This makes it easy
to specify properties which involve both transaction sequencing
and temporal ordering (e.g. data hazards). In RTL models,
additional book-keeping state must be manually introduced in
order to specify and check these properties. We show here that
a transaction-level microarchitecture model can help automate
checks for such properties via the automated creation of the
book-keeping structures, and illustrate this for a simple pipeline
using SMV. A key challenge in model-checking the transaction-
level microarchitecture is representing the dynamic transaction
state space. We describe an encoding as well as a fixed point
computation for this.
I. INTRODUCTION
Often, the functionality of a hardware design is specified at
the level of computation on units of data (transactions). Con-
sequently, one has to verify that the design satisfies properties
which involve the correctness of individual transactions, as
well as the correctness of interactions between transactions.
However, traditional models such as RTL take a time-
stationary view of the design and do not provide an easy mech-
anism to associate events with the corresponding specification-
level transactions. In contrast, transaction-level microarchitec-
ture (µ-architecture) models (e.g. [1]) make this information
easily accessible for use in properties and formal analysis.
We argue that using a transaction-level µ-architecture model
for design (at a level higher than RTL) makes it easier to
state interesting properties as well as to increase automation of
some common verification tasks and thereby improve produc-
tivity. This paper focuses on the detection of data hazards in
transaction-level µ-architecture models to illustrate this point.
II. TRANSACTION-LEVEL µ-ARCHITECTURE MODELING
A transaction-level µ-architecture model (µ-TLM) separates
the computation on data from the usage of resources. Trans-
actions describe computation on units of data present in a
set of shared state elements. (The shared state includes the
“architected state” of the specification level.)
A transaction type T is described as an FSM where the
states of the FSM may be labeled with a set of resources. (The
example in Fig 1(a) has resource R1 associated with state B.)
All transaction instances of type T can read/write to the shared
state elements. In addition, each transaction instance of type
T has an associated private copy of local state elements LT
(only accessible to that particular transaction instance). While
the shared state elements are persistent across transactions, a
fresh set of transaction local state elements is used by each
transaction instance during its lifetime.
The transaction FSM is constrained as follows regarding
when it can make transitions. A transition to a new state can
be made only after the transaction instance gains possession of
all the resources associated with the new state. The allocation
of resources among transaction instances is done by resource
managers which are modeled as FSMs. Thus, the resource
managers drive the execution of the µ-architecture (Fig 1(b))
while the transactions perform the actual computation on data.
Fig. 1. Example of (a) transaction FSM (b) transaction scheduling
The resource manager FSMs maintain their own state
throughout the execution of the system. The interaction be-
tween transaction instances and resource managers is that the
transactions request resources which may be granted by the
resource managers.
In this methodology, the RTL is synthesized from the µ-
TLM [1] followed by an equivalence check between the
resulting RTL and the µ-TLM.
III. PROPERTIES INVOLVING TRANSACTION INFORMATION
Writing properties that relate data values across the duration
of a transaction or properties that involve data interactions
between multiple transactions is not easy to do for the RTL
because this requires precise knowledge of how the transac-
tions map to the RTL.
In a µ-TLM, it is easy to group related events associated
with individual transaction instances. Additionally, a µ-TLM
has an inherent notion of sequencing/ordering of transactions
during their execution. These two characteristics make it
simpler to state some interesting properties for the model.
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As an example of an interesting property which involves
both transaction ordering and temporal ordering, consider the
property which checks that a design is free of data hazards:
A read-after-write (RAW) hazard is present if there is a write
to a memory location by transaction Ti which occurs later in
time than a read from the same location by some transaction
Tj with i < j. Here the later is a temporal ordering and i < j
is a transaction ordering requirement of the property.
Note that there is no need to manually modify the model in
order to be able to state the property, since the model has
the notion of transactions and their ordering. For an RTL
model, the designer has to know how the specification-level
transactions map to the RTL and manually add additional
state or logic to make this information accessible. This gap in
automation has been a limiting factor in property verification.
Another property which requires read and write events to be
associated with transaction level information involves relating
the µ-architecture level to the specification: A transaction
reads the same inputs and produces the same outputs at
the µ-architecture level as at the specification-level. (This
‘correctness’ check is the subject of current work.)
IV. MODEL CHECKING ISSUES
Even though modeling the µ-architecture as a µ-TLM frees
the designer of the burden of re-introducing transaction level
information into a time-stationary model, it introduces some
new challenges due to the dynamic nature of the state space
of the model as explained below.
For the following discussion, we will consider a design
with a single transaction type T for illustration, but similar
comments also apply in the case of multiple transaction types.
A. State Space of the Model
The overall state of a µ-TLM has two components:
• Persistent state: This consists of the shared state through
which transactions interact and the state of the resource
manager FSMs.
• Transient state: Each transaction instance maintains some
state during its lifetime. The ith instance of a transaction
of type T , i.e. Ti, is associated with the state variables
Qi which consist of two components - the FSM encoding
variables and the local state variables.
The transient state associated with transaction instances
poses a problem for model checking. If each new transaction
uses a fresh set of state variables, this will lead to an
unbounded increase in the number of state variables. An
encoding of the transient state which reuses the state variables
of retired transactions for newer transactions instances might
fail to retain transaction ordering information. Hence, a key
challenge is the representation of the state space of the model
in a form suitable for model checkers via a suitable encoding
which preserves transaction ordering information.
B. Bounding the Number of Transient State Variables
If the most recent transaction instance of type T is Tn, then
the transient state for type T transactions would consist of
the state variables Q1 ∪Q2 ∪ . . . ∪Qn assuming no reuse of
state variables. However, the state of transactions which have
already completed is not required in order to determine the
next state of the system. The persistent state and the state of
the currently active transactions are adequate for this. Suppose
that At is a set containing the instance numbers of only the
active transaction instances at time t (those which have left the
initial state but have not yet finished execution). Then, at time
t, the transient state is represented by the variables
⋃
i∈At Qi.
In practice, the number of concurrently active transactions
|At| will be bounded due to the limited availability of re-
sources in hardware. In some cases, it may be possible to
determine an upper bound on this number based on the
transactions’ usage of resources, or by bounding the lifetime
of transactions. Otherwise, we may assume an upper bound
and then additionally verify that this assumption is correct.
With a bound |At| ≤ k on the number of active transactions,
it becomes possible to fix the number of state variables needed
to represent the transient state of the system at any possible
instant. With a new set of state variables S1, S2, . . . , Sk and
a mapping f t : At → {1, 2, . . . , k} such that Sft(i) = Qi, the
transient state at time t is rewritten as S1 ∪ S2 ∪ . . . ∪ Sk.
C. Preserving Transaction Ordering Information
We can choose the mapping f t to make it easy to determine
the relative ordering of when two transactions started just by
looking at which Si variables are used for their corresponding
state variables, i.e. for i, j ∈ At we can have (i < j) ⇒
(f t(i) < f t(j)). Such a mapping is maintained dynamically
during the execution of the system.
Consider the simple case when at most one new active
transaction instance may be created at any time, with |At| ≤ k.
This is modeled by always having exactly one transaction
instance attempting to leave the start state (become active),
which is always mapped to the state variables Sk+1. The
remaining active transaction instances use the state variables
S1, S2, . . . , S|At| in the order that the transaction instances
were instantiated. Variables S|At|+1 through Sk are set to
a sentinel value representing the end state. The transient
state at time t is S1 ∪ S2 ∪ . . . ∪ Sk+1. Each state update
involves two steps. First, we compute the next state function
of each of the |At| + 1 transaction FSMs, based on their
interactions with the resource managers. Second, we have
another combinational computation which remaps the next
states onto the appropriate state variables Si for the next
time step based on the progress of the current transaction
instances. This remapping happens when some transaction
instance ends, thus freeing up its S variables, or when a
new transaction instance becomes active. Note that such an
arrangement implies that the same transaction instance may
actually use different state variables to represent its state
during its lifetime. The mapping corresponding to the above
is f t where f t(i) = |{j : j ∈ At, j ≤ i}| when i ∈ At and
f t(i) = k + 1 when Ti is attempting to leave the start state.
More than one transaction instance starting at the same time
can be handled by marking out groups of instances which
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become active together, but this is not considered in this paper.
D. State Space Traversal
The reachable state space is explored using a standard
fixpoint computation. (In fixpoint computations which use sets
of states, all the states must be expressed using the same
fixed set of state variables. This was achieved by the dynamic
mapping f t.) Such a computation is valid when the property
being checked depends at most on the relative ordering of
transaction instance numbers (e.g. i < j), and not on the
precise value (e.g. i = 10) or the separation (e.g. i = j + 3)
of the instance numbers.
The choice of the f t described in Sec. IV-C can also be
viewed as a means of breaking the symmetry in the state space.
Consider the following two possibilities At = {4, 5, 6} and
At = {4, 5, 7} where transaction instances T6 and T7 have the
same value of associated state as do the other corresponding
transaction instances T4 and T5. Both of these map to the same
assignment of the state variables S1 ∪ S2 ∪ S3.
V. HAZARD CHECKING
In this section, we illustrate how a µ-TLM with one trans-
action type T (and at most one new active transaction instance
being created per cycle) can be checked for hazards using an
automatable procedure. This illustrates how the transaction-
level information which is easily accessible in the µ-TLM
supports automation of common verification tasks.
Any shared state which is written by T is a potential site
for a read-after-write (RAW), write-after-read (WAR) or write-
after-write (WAW) hazard. We show here how to check for the
RAW hazard. (The WAR and WAW cases are similar.)
A. Checking RAW hazards
Assume that the number of active transactions |At| ≤ k at
all times. Recall from Sec. IV-C that we encode the transient
state using variables S1∪S2∪ . . .∪Sk+1 such that transaction
instance Ti uses the state variables Sft(i) at time t. The
mapping f t ensures that for a pair Ti and Tj of simultaneously
active transaction instances, (i < j) ⇒ (f t(i) < f t(j)).
Initially A0 = {} and f0(1) = k + 1 (the superscript refers
to time). The initial state of the system has S0m = end for
1 ≤ m ≤ k and S0k+1 = start.
Suppose that r is a shared state element written to by trans-
action T . In order to check for a RAW hazard involving r, we
introduce a new state element zr with values 1 ≤ zr ≤ k+ 1.
Initially z0r = k + 1. The value of ztr is always such that Sztr
is used by the most recently started (youngest) transaction
instance to “effectively” have read from r before time t. For
each m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k + 1}, introduce signals writerm and
readerm, where writertm is true iff the transaction instance
corresponding to Sm writes to r at time t, and similarly for
readertm. The state update for z
t
r involves two steps:
1) Identify the youngest transaction instance which has
read from r before or at time t.
Rt = {ztr} ∪ {m : 1 ≤ m ≤ k + 1, readertm is true}
ytr = max(R
t)
2) If that youngest reader (associated with Sytr ) is finishing
execution at time t, then the next younger transaction
instance which is alive at time t+ 1 inherits the role of
the youngest reader. If all younger transaction instances
are finishing execution at t, the readership is inherited
by the possibly new transaction instance associated with
Sk+1 at time t + 1. This is needed since a finished
transaction may be a potential reader for a RAW hazard
whose write has yet to occur.
Et+1 = {f t+1(i) : f t(i) ≥ ytr, Ti alive at t+ 1}
zt+1r = min(E
t+1 ∪ {k + 1})
The absence of RAW hazards is now stated as the assertion
G(∀m, 1 ≤ m ≤ k + 1 : writerm ⇒ yr ≤ m) where G is
the ‘always’ operator of temporal logic. (This is the property
r no RAW .) In addition, we have to verify that the bound
|At| ≤ k is valid. (This is the property enough slots.) The
properties r no RAW and and enough slots together imply
that the model does not suffer from a RAW hazard involving r.
(As a sanity check, we also verify that at most one transaction
instance writes to r at a time - the property r one write.)
Fig. 2. Illustration of RAW hazard check, |At| ≤ 3.
Figure 2 above shows an execution trace for four transaction
instances with two RAW hazards. Reads (Writes) to r are
annotated with a R(W). Each transaction instance is also
annotated with f t(i) over its lifetime. The table on the right
shows the values of ztr and y
t
r for this duration.
B. Automation of the RAW Hazard Check
The steps involved in model checking a µ-TLM model with
a single transaction type T for a RAW hazard are given below.
They can be fully automated.
• Encode the system as described in Sec. IV-C assuming
|At| ≤ k. Start with k = 1 and increment k until the
property enough slots becomes true.
• For each state element r written by T ,
– Introduce the additional state zr and write the equa-
tions for the update of zr as in Sec. V-A
– Verify the properties r no RAW and r one write
using a model checker
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C. Case Study
Consider a simple µ-TLM example with a single transaction
type representing a simple pipeline with 4 stages Read,
Delay1, Write and Delay2. The shared state consists of
a single register file Reg with n registers and each register
Reg[i] is associated with a resource ρi. The local state
maintained with each transaction instance is idx which takes
values in {0, 1, . . . , n− 1}. The transaction instance starts in
stage Read with a non-deterministically chosen value for idx.
The Read stage needs the resource ρidx to read Reg[idx].
Once the resource ρidx is obtained, it is retained by the
transaction instance until it finishes writing to Reg[idx] in
stage Write. The transaction instance does nothing in the
Delay1 and Delay2 stages. Execution ends after the Delay2
stage. We have currently hand-written the SMV input for the
Cadence SMV model checker for this example. With n = 4,
checking for the absence of RAW hazards takes 10 seconds
(k = 1, 2, 3) with the Linux version of Cadence SMV on a
Pentium IV machine with 512 KB cache and 1GB RAM. The
verification time grows rapidly with increasing n as the BDDs
grow larger and the number of potential hazard sites increases.
The example with n = 5 takes 60 seconds to verify. A version
of the pipeline model where the transaction does not retain
ρidx, but requests it separately during the Read and Write
steps, results in counterexamples being found in 1 second for
n = 4, and 3 seconds for n = 5.
VI. RELATED WORK
We are unaware of other work that directly model checks a
µ-TLM model for properties involving transaction ordering.
The work related to model checking concurrent software
(e.g. [2]) has some overlap as it shares some features of
a dynamic state space, due to unbounded stack depth of
recursion.
A lot of work related to checking for data hazards appears
in the domain of processor verification. Here, the problem
of verifying a µ-architecture against a transaction-level (ISA)
specification is well studied. There are many approaches for
this using various correctness criteria (which imply absence of
data hazards) and with varying degrees of automation. None
of these approaches starts with a µ-TLM model, and all these
techniques need to manually make transaction (ISA) informa-
tion accessible in the time-stationary model. The “flushing”
approach [3] requires a way to limit the creation of new trans-
action instances (instructions). Compositional model checking
(e.g. [4]) uses some auxillary variables to define a refinement
map between the architecture level and the RTL. Other related
approaches (e.g. [5]–[8]) similarly require various aspects of
transaction-level input. BlueSpec [9] uses operation-level, as
opposed to a transaction level, modeling. It is unclear how
hazard checking can be automated in that framework.
VII. CONCLUSION
Traditional RTL based hardware verification presents a
time-stationary view of the state space for property specifi-
cation and verification using model checking. We argue that
this makes it difficult to directly state properties involving
transaction information (e.g. properties which involve not just
the temporal ordering of events, but also the relative ordering
of transactions). For this purpose, we advocate the use of a
transaction-level µ-architecture model which describes com-
putation on units of data in terms of individual transactions.
While µ-TLM models make it easier to specify a richer set
of properties, they pose a new challenge for model checking.
Since transactions start and end, the state space seen by the
model checker is dynamic. Our proposed solution to this
encodes this dynamic state space using a fixed number of
state variables while preserving transaction information, and
then determines the fixed-point in the state space traversal.
In the process, we use an assume-guarantee reasoning on the
maximum number of in-flight transactions, and a dynamic
transaction order preserving re-indexing of state variables.
With traditional RTL models, significant human input is
needed to understand and augment the design so as to specify
the hazards using only signals in the RTL design. With a µ-
TLM model, both specifying the properties which check for
hazards and checking them are fully automatable. We show an
implementation of these ideas in SMV for a simple pipeline.
Transaction-level modeling has been pushed as a path to
greater designer productivity due to its higher abstraction level;
in this paper we show that through appropriate augmenting
of model checking algorithms, it can also be made useful
for greater automation in data-level property specification and
verification.
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Computing Predicate Abstractions




















The efficient computation of exact abstractions of a concrete
program for a given set of predicates is key to the efficiency
of Counter-Example Guided Abstraction-Refinement (CEGAR).
Recent work propose the use of DPLL-based SMT solvers,
modified into enumerators. This technique has been successfully
applied in the realm of software, where a control flow graph is
available to direct the exploration. However this approach shows
some limitations when the number of models grows: in fact,
it intrinsically relies on the enumeration of all the implicants,
which basically requires the enumerations of all the disjuncts in
the DNF of the abstraction.
In this paper, we propose a new technique to improve the
construction of abstractions. We complement SMT solvers with
the use of BDDs, which enables us to avoid the model explosion.
Essentially, we exploit the fact that BDDs are a DAG represen-
tations of the space that a DPLL-based enumerator treats as a
tree. A preliminary experimental evaluation shows the potential
of the approach.
I. INTRODUCTION
Abstraction is one of the key techniques to tackle the
state-space explosion problem. Instead of directly searching
the system under analysis (also called the concrete system),
information is disregarded in order to obtain an abstract
system, which is easier to analyze. The analysis of the abstract
system is intended to provide information useful to evaluate
the properties of the concrete system. However, since the
abstraction may throw away important information, the result
of the analysis in the abstract space may not be conclusive,
and additional refinement steps may be in order. A popular
framework is Counter-Example Guided Abstraction Refine-
ment (CEGAR) [1]. CEGAR uses conservative abstractions,
i.e. each trace in the concrete space has a counterpart in
the abstract space. This means that, in the case of invariant
properties, if the analysis in the abstract space reveals no
bugs, then the concrete system is also correct. When an
abstract counterexample is found, concretization is attempted,
i.e. a correspondent counterexample in the concrete system
is searched. If it cannot be found, then the abstract coun-
terexample is deemed spurious, and the reasons for failure to
concretize are analyzed, in order to decide which information
should be added to the abstraction. The CEGAR approach has
seen substantial success in recent years [2]. This technique is
now being used to do compositional verification [3], to verify
device drivers, ANSI-C programs [4], [5], RTL designs written
in Verilog HDL [6], SpecC [7], etc.
An efficient way to obtain a conservative abstraction is
localization reduction, where certain signals are simply re-
placed with inputs. However, the resulting abstraction can be
very coarse, since the correlation between abstracted signals
is completely lost. A more informed approach is predicate
abstraction: the concrete state space is partitioned by a set of
predicates; each predicate is associated with a boolean vari-
able, so that each part of the concrete space corresponds to an
abstract state; the abstract transition relation is defined accord-
ingly. However, the exact computation of the abstract system
given a set of predicates is a potential bottleneck, and [6], [8]
investigate the computation of approximate abstractions. The
downside is that approximating the abstraction may yield more
spurious counterexamples, and result in additional CEGAR
iterations.
The exact computation of abstractions is tackled in [9] by
extending a DPLL-based Satisfiability Modulo Theory (SMT)
solver to work as a model enumerator. This technique has
been successfully applied in the realm of software, where
a control flow graph directs the exploration of the abstract
space, and the emphasis is on the solution of constraints in
the background theory. However, this approach is subject to
the model explosion problem: it has to enumerate enough
implicants to cover the abstraction, and this boils down to
going through the construction of the corresponding DNF.
In this paper, we propose a new technique for the compu-
tation of exact predicate abstractions, that is more efficient in
dealing with the boolean components. Our approach integrates
Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs) [10] and procedures for
Satisfiability Modulo Theory (SMT) [11]. It is based on
the consideration that BDD-based quantification methods are
highly optimized, and can be vastly superior to DPLL-based
enumerators, especially within a certain (reasonable) number
of variables. Our method applies a modified quantification
on (the BDD representing) the boolean abstraction of the
problem, that interacts with an SMT solver in order to ensure
the consistency of the models with respect to the background
theory. The traversal of the BDD recursively computes the
results of quantifications for the subtrees, and combines them.
In addition, the theory constraints that are “activated” on the
current path are sent for consistency checking to an SMT
solver working as an oracle on the side. Essentially, we exploit
the fact that BDDs are a DAG representation of the space
that a DPLL-based enumerator treats as a tree. The method
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retains the advantages of different forms of caching in BDDs
(where models are accumulated) and in SMT (where theory
conflicts are discovered and stored). It is compatible with
advanced BDD-based techniques, and nicely integrates within
the CEGAR loop, providing incrementality in the computation
of the abstraction. The experimental evaluation shows that
our algorithm is able to outperform state-of-the-art existential
quantification based on SMT.
This paper is structured as follows. In Section II we out-
line some background. In Section III we propose the SMT-
framework for CEGAR. In Section IV we discuss the BDD-
SMT abstraction algorithm, while in Section V we discuss
the details of the implementation. In Section VI we compare
our approach to related work, and in Section VII we carry
out an experimental analysis. In Section VIII we draw some
conclusions and outline future work.
II. TECHNICAL PRELIMINARIES
Our setting is standard first order logic. We consider a sig-
nature to be composed by individual constants and variables,
function symbols, boolean variables, and predicate symbols.
A term is either a constant, a variable, or the application of a
function symbol of arity n to n terms. A theory constraint (also
called a theory atom) is the application of a predicate symbol
of arity n to n terms. An atom is either a theory constraint
or a boolean variable. A literal is either an atom or its
negation. A formula is either true () or false (⊥), a boolean
variable, a theory constraint, the application of a propositional
connective of arity n to n formulae, or the application of
a quantifier to an individual variable and a formula. We
use x, x′, x1, x2, . . . , y, y′, y1, y2, . . . for individual variables,
and x, y,v, . . . for vectors of individual variables. Terms
and formulae are referred to as expressions, denoted with
e, e′, e1, e2, . . .. We use c, c1, c2, . . . for theory constraints,
c(x) to stress the dependence of c on x, and c(x) to stress the
dependence on x. We use P, P ′, P1, P2, . . . , Q,Q′, Q1, Q2, . . .
for boolean variables, and P , Q, . . . for vectors of boolean
variables; we write Pi for the i-th variable in P . We write
Φ(Q) to highlight the fact that Q occurs in Φ.
Substitution is defined in the standard way (see for in-
stance [12]). We write φ[e/e′] for the substitution of every
occurrence of e in φ with e′. If e and e′ are vectors of (either
individual or boolean) expressions of the same size, we write
φ[e/e′] for the parallel substitution of every occurrence of ei
(the i-th element of e) in φ with e′i (the i-th element of e
′).
We use boolean quantification (i.e. quantification over boolean
variables) ∃Q.(Φ(Q)) as a shortcut for Φ[Q/] ∨ Φ[Q/⊥].
We use the standard semantic notion of interpretation and
satisfiability. We call truth assignment for a set (vector) of
atoms Q a total function µ : Q → {,⊥}. In propositional
logic, checking the safistiability (SAT) of a formula is finding
a truth assignment to the variables that will make it evaluate
to true. The problem is approached with enhancements of the
DPLL algorithm: the formula is converted into an equisatis-
fiable one in Conjunctive Normal Form (CNF); then, a truth
assignment is incrementally built, until either all the clauses
are satisfied, or a conflict is found, in which case backjumping
takes places (i.e. certain assignments are undone). Keys to
efficiency are heuristics for the variable selection, and learning
of conflicts (see e.g. [13]). Reduced Ordered Binary Decision
Diagrams (in the following simply called BDDs) [10] are a
canonical representation for propositional logic. Given a total
order for the propositional variables, there exists a unique
equivalent BDD, that represents as a DAG all the satisfying
assignments. Efficient packages are available [14] to construct
the BDDs corresponding to a formula; operations are also
available to compute the BDD corresponding to quantified
boolean formulae. SAT solvers and BDD packages are back-
bones to many formal verification tools.
The more general problem of SMT (satisfiability modulo
a background theory) corresponds to deciding whether there
exists an interpretation in the theory that satisfies the formula.
Examples of useful theories are equality and uninterpreted
functions (EUF), difference logic (DL) linear arithmetic (LA),
either over reals or the integers, the theory of bit vectors (BV),
and their combination.
We call the boolean abstraction of φ the formula Φ[c/ Q],
where c is the vector of constraints occurring in φ, and
Q is a set of boolean variables not occurring in Φ. Let
µ : Q → {,⊥} be a truth assignment to the variables
in Q. The set of constraints induced by µ is defined as
{ci(x)|µ(Qi) = } ∪ {¬ci(x)|µ(Qi) = ⊥}. We say that µ is
theory-consistent iff so is the corresponding set of constraints.
Most SMT solvers are based on the enumeration of the models
of the boolean abstraction, combined with a check of theory-
consistency. Typically, the DPLL algorithm is modified to
enumerate all models, and a number of optimizations are
applied in order to improve efficiency. Among these, we
mention: early pruning (i.e. applying a theory consistency
check on the partial model, so that theory inconsistent models
are not explored further); construction of theory conflict clause
(i.e. detecting a small subset of the theory constrains in the
inconsistent assignment), to be used for conflict analysis, back-
jumping, and learning; theory deduction (i.e. for constraints
that are currently unassigned, detection of truth values implied
by the other theory constraints). See [11] for a thorough
discussion.
III. THE CEGAR FRAMEWORK
We consider symbolically represented systems. Given a
theory, we consider a vector of current state (either individual
or boolean) variables v, and a vector of next-state variables
v′. A state is an assignment to a vector of state (either
individual or boolean) variables v, and a transition is a pair of
assignments to current and next state variables. A formula φ(v)
represents a set of states (e.g. the initial states, or a property)
while Ψ(v,v′) represents a set of transitions, where v′ is the
vector of next state variables. Let us consider a system with
initial states Ic and transition Rc, and let Pc be a property to
be verified.
The Counterexample Guided Abstraction Refinement (CE-














Fig. 1. The CEGAR Framework
searching the state space of the concrete program directly, we
create an abstraction of the program, which is amenable for
model checking. The abstraction is typically constructed to be
conservative, that is, every trace in the concrete space has a
counterpart in the abstract space. If there are no bugs in the
abstract space, then there are no bugs in the original system.
However, if an abstract counterexample exists, there may not
be a corresponding counterexample for the concrete system.
Such an abstract counterexample is then called a spurious
counterexample. Then, abstraction-refinement tries to discover
a new abstract model, which contains more detail in order to
rule out spurious counterexamples. This is done by extracting
information from counterexamples generated by the model
checker. The process is iterated until the property is either
proved or disproved.
We focus on Predicate Abstraction [15], one of the most
widely used abstraction techniques, where the abstract pro-
gram is constructed based on a given set of predicates γi(v) on
the variables of the concrete program. Each such predicate is
represented by a boolean variable Pi in the abstract program.
Intuitively, each abstract variable Pi partitions the concrete
space in two sets: one is the set of states satisfying γi,
associated to the case when Pi is true, and the other one is
the complement (Pi false). Thus, an abstract state is associated
with the set of concrete states corresponding to the intersection
of the sets corresponding to each abstract literal. The transition
relation of the abstract program is such that two abstract states
are related iff there exist two concrete states in the respective
concretizations that are in the concrete transition relation.
The initial states Ia(P ), the transition relation Ra(P , P ′)
and the property Pa(P ) of the abstract program are defined
using existential abstraction. We find out states (transitions
among the states) in the abstract program such that there exists
corresponding states (transitions) in the concrete program
involving concrete variables. More formally,
Ia(P ) =̇ ∃v.(Ic(v) ∧
∧
i
Pi ↔ γi(v)) (1)
Ra(P , P ′) =̇ ∃v,v′.(Rc(v,v′) ∧
∧
i
Pi ↔ γi(v) ∧
∧
i
P ′i ↔ γi(v′)) (2)
Pa(P ) =̇ ∃v.(Pc(v) ∧
∧
i
Pi ↔ γi(v)) (3)
The abstract system thus obtained is purely boolean, and
can be subjected to model checking to verify the abstraction
of the properties of interest.
Let us now consider a sequence of abstract states
s[0], · · · , s[k] (where each abstract state s[i] is a valuation for
P ). If the abstract property does not hold in the abstract model
we generate an abstract counterexample that must be checked
for spuriousness, i.e. we check whether it can be refined in
the concrete space. This can be done with a setting similar to
bounded model checking, where each state vector of both the
concrete and abstract machine are replicated at different time
steps, from 0 to k. We write v[h] for the replica of the concrete
state vector at time h, P[h] for the h-th abstract state vector
replica, and γ(v[h]) for the vector of predicates instantiated
at time h. Checking the spuriousness of a counterexample










P[h] ↔ γ(v[h]) ∧ ¬Pc(v[k])
The main idea behind the refinement phase is to learn more
information from the spurious counterexamples produced and
use the information to refine the abstraction in such a way that
it rules out the spurious counterexample. Spurious transitions
are those abstract transitions that do not have any correspond-
ing concrete transitions. If the most precise abstraction with
respect to the given set of predicates is computed, the spurious-
ness of the counterexample would be because of insufficient
number of predicates, i.e. the absence of information rich
enough to capture all the relevant behaviours of the concrete
system, even for the most precise abstraction. In the rest of this
paper, we focus on the phase of the CEGAR loop concerned
with the construction of the abstraction.
IV. ABSTRACTION BY BDDS MODULO THEORY
We describe the algorithm required for generation of the
abstract system in a more general setting, using the following
notation: Φ(x) is the formula to be abstracted; x is the set of
variables to be abstracted (notice that they can include both
individual and boolean variables, both current state and next
state). V is the set of boolean variables to be retained, also






In the following, let c be the vector of theory constraints
occurring either in Φ or in some γi. Our approach is based
on the following steps. First, for each theory constraint ci(x)
in c we create a fresh boolean (BDD) variable Qi, called
its boolean abstraction, we group all the Qi in Q, and the
abstraction bijection A is defined as {〈Qi . ci(x)〉}. Then, we
build (Φ(x) ∧ ∧i Vi ↔ γi(x))[c/ Q], i.e. the boolean formula
in the V and Q, by replacing each theory atom ci(x) with the
corresponding boolean abstraction Qi from the matrix of the
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1: function BddThAbstract(b, C, V )
2: if (b = ) ∨ (b = ⊥) then return b
3: v := var(b);
4: if BooleanAtom(v) then
5: tt := BddThAbstract(BddThen(b), C, V )
6: ee := BddThAbstract(BddElse(b), C, V )
7: if v ∈ V then
8: return BddITE(v, tt, ee)
9: else
10: return BddOr(tt, ee)
11: else
12: cv := VarToConstraint(v);
13: if BddThen(b)= ⊥ or ThInconsistent(C, cv) then
14: tt := ⊥
15: else
16: tt := BddThAbstract(BddThen(b), C ∪ {cv}, V )
17: if BddElse(b)= ⊥ or ThInconsistent(C, ¬cv) then
18: ee := ⊥
19: else
20: ee := BddThAbstract(BddElse(b), C ∪ {¬cv}, V )
21: return BddOr(tt, ee)
22: end function
Fig. 2. The function for existential quantification Modulo Theories
above formula. With standard techniques, we then construct
the corresponding BDD representation, that we also denote as
Ψ(V , Q).
If we apply a quantification of the unimportant vari-
ables Q, we are left with a formula in the V variables.
However, this is an overapproximation of the desired re-
sult, since the relation between theory constraints is com-
pletely lost. We would obtain the correct result if we were
able to obtain PruneMT (T,Ψ(V , Q)), i.e. a simplifica-
tion of the BDD Ψ(V , Q), so that only the paths that are
consistent with respect to the background theory are left.
PruneMT (T,Ψ(V , Q)) propositionally implies Ψ(V , Q),
and must be satisfied by every T -consistent model of Ψ(V , Q).
In a sense, PruneMT (T,Ψ(V , Q)) is the lifting to the
boolean case of the relationships between theory constraints.
A naive implementation of pruning modulo theories could
be to enumerate the satisfying assignments of the BDD. If
one is found to be theory-inconsistent, then we negate it
(or perhaps the conflict set), we conjoin it with the original
formula, and we restart. The resulting BDD is such that all
the assignments are also theory consistent. We proceed until
we reach a fix point. For each truth assignment, a call to
the theory solver is performed. Unfortunately, such approach
is likely to be extremely inefficient, for two reasons. First,
producing PruneMT (T,Ψ(V , Q)) may generate overly big
BDDs, either in the intermediate computations, or as a final
result. Second, the approach is in a sense eager, in that it
may “lift” to the boolean level parts of the theory that are not
required, because of the subsequent quantification.
The approach we propose, depicted in Fig. 2, inter-
leaves within the same routine boolean quantification and
pruning modulo theory. We solve our problem by calling
BddThAbstract with arguments Φ, { }, V . The A mapping
between theory constraints and their boolean variables is
assumed to be globally available. The function is recursively
defined over the structure of the BDD corresponding to the first
argument, and representing the first formula to be quantified.
The second argument is a set of constraints, called the context
of simplification, while the third one is the set of important
variables.
The algorithm is best explained as an extension of the
existential quantification in the purely boolean case, i.e. when
the A mapping is empty, so that the BooleanAtom test always
returns true. The lines from 11 to 21 are never executed, and
the algorithm boils down to standard existential quantification
for BDDs. In the base case, if b is either  or ⊥, then it is
simply returned (line 2). Otherwise, recursive calls are applied
both to the then and the else branches (lines 5 and 6). If the
variable v is important, then it must not be quantified, and the
results of the recursive calls are combined into an if-then-else
node, otherwise they are disjoined (lines 7-10).
In the more interesting case where some variables are indeed
theory constraints, then we apply a form of pruning, that
attempts to ensure theory-consistency of the traversed paths.
The key idea is the simplification context, i.e. the set of theory
constraints that “get activated” when descending from the
root to the node b. If the current variable is the abstraction
of a theory atom, then the current context can be extended
with either a positive or negative constraint, depending on the
branch we expand first. However, in order for either expansion
to lead to a model, it has to be theory consistent: if either
extension is inconsistent with the current context, then the
evaluation can be safely pruned. If the context extended with
the positive constraint is not satisfiable (line 13), then we
simply assign ⊥ for the right branch tt. In fact, there is no way
the path can be extended to a theory-consistent assignment. In
case of consistency, we recur with extended context C ∪{cv}.
Similar approach is taken for the left branch. The results are
recombined with disjunction, since the boolean abstraction of
constraints are quantified out.
The algorithm can also be interpreted in the setting of
SMT solving. The BDD can be thought of as a compact
representation of the boolean search space. The traversal of
the BDD can be seen as an enumerator, that differs from
the standard DPLL-approach in two ways. First, the order of
traversal is fixed (which is potentially a drawback). Second,
the BDD treats the search space as a DAG, while DPLL-
based enumerators are in fact traversing the corresponding
tree; learning can be seen as an attempt to mitigate this
problem. Checking the consistency of the context extension is
the counterpart of early pruning in DPLL-based SMT solvers.
V. IMPLEMENTATION AND INTEGRATION IN CEGAR
From the practical view point, the implementation of the
algorithm is not trivial, due to the combination of a BDD
package and an SMT solver – delicate balances have to be
taken into account.
To deal with the theory part, we use a Theory Context
Checker (TCC), which can be thought of as an SMT solver,








































Fig. 3. The interaction between the BDDs and the SMT engine
constraints can be activated, provides conflict detection and
storage, and can suggest values for variables.
The BDD enumerator and the TCC interact according to the
interface depicted in Fig 3. The TCC status, corresponding to
the active constraints, is managed in a stack-based manner. The
enumerator can ask the TCC to extend it assuming a constraint
positive or negative, or to undo the last assumption. The
enumerator can ask the TCC whether its status is consistent,
and ask for the current value of a constraint. Depending on
the theory, consistency checking can be carried out with an
incomplete (possibly cheaper) procedure; in such case it is
important to carry out a complete check when a complete
model is found.
Some remarks are in order. First, the TCC detects reasons
for inconsistencies (conflict sets), stores them as conflict
clauses, and carries out conflict analysis. In case of incon-
sistency, it can tell the enumerator the point of backtracking
necessary to undo the inconsistency. Obviously, in the case
we carry out early pruning with a complete procedure, we
are guaranteed that the status was consistent until the latest
addition, and thus only one step needs to be undone.
Second, it can carry out theory deductions, and boolean
constraint propagations over theory clauses. It is thus possible
that a constraint that is unassigned in the current BDD path
must in fact have a value. Third, the role of boolean constraint
propagation is to avoid repeating the same theory checks:
constraints that obtain a value because of Boolean Constraint
Propagation (BCP) are guaranteed to be theory consistent.
As for constraints unassigned in the BDD enumerator, with
values implied by the TCC status, there are two ways to
proceed. The choice that we currently implement is to delay
taking them into account until the corresponding level is
reached in the enumeration. Another possibility would be to
simplify the remaining BDD according to the corresponding
value before continuing with enumeration.
Most of the tricks in the BDD package (e.g. constant
time negation based on pointer complementation) can be
retained without changes. However, this is not the case for
memoization. Memoization plays a very important role in BDD
processing: it can be thought of as a way to avoid processing a
BDD (which is a DAG) as if it were a tree. In fact, the first time
we compute the result of an operation (e.g. the quantification
of node b results in ), we store it in a hash table, and so
that when the node is visited again (as a consequence of
descending a BDD along a different path) it can be simply
retrieved and returned. Unfortunately, this mechanism can not
be applied in a straightforward manner in our case, because of
the dependence on the context of the result of quantification:
if the same node is reached following two different paths
that activate different sets of theory constraints, the result
of the call is not the same in the general case. There are
several approaches to this problem. The first is simply to
disregard memoization. The second one is to memoize based
on the dependence of the context. The third one is to exploit
subsumption between contexts: if the quantification of node
b under context C has been computed to be r, then we can
know that the quantification of b under context C− ⊂ C is
implied by r; similarly, the quantification of b under C+ ⊃ C
implies r. This information may be particularly valuable in
the cases of C− when r is ⊥, and in the case of C+ when the
result is . However, the tradeoff between the cost of checking
context subsumption and the value of the information has to be
investigated. We currently take the first approach, also on the
grounds that some memoization is carried out in the recursive
calls to disjunction on unimportant variables; a study of the
trade-offs associated to the other solutions is object of future
work.
We notice that the search can be enhanced by exploiting
the levels of the BDD. In particular, if we see that a certain
node is below the level of the last important variable, and the
quantification of one of his children is not ⊥, then there is no
need to evaluate the other child.
We now discuss the integration of our approach in a CEGAR
setting. We first notice that our approach is fully amenable
to incrementality: The status of the TCC (i.e. the conflicts
learned during the abstraction in the first iteration) can be
used in the forthcoming iterations. Second, after one iteration,
the constraints between the variables of the abstract space can
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be used to constrain the enumeration at the boolean level; this
is in a sense similar to what static learning [16] does.
In addition, the TCC clauses that lift the relationships
between theory atoms to the boolean level, can be used
to constrain reachability analysis in the abstract space, thus
possibly obtaining a tighter characterization of the abstract
space.
Finally, such invariants can be used in the step of refinement
of the counterexample, in particular by shifting over time.
VI. RELATED WORK
In this section, we compare our approach with three streams
of work: existential quantification; computation of abstrac-
tions; integration between BDDs and SMT.
Existential Quantification: In the boolean setting, quan-
tification is typically used for the basic operation of Symbolic
Model Checking, i.e. image computation. BDD-based proce-
dures have been optimized over the years [17]. More recently,
SAT-based quantifier elimination has been investigated [18],
[19]. Basically, once a satisfying assignment is found, the
subset concerning the important variables is accumulated, and
used as a blocking clause. Cube enumeration approaches suffer
from a model explosion problem: the number of iterations
is linear in the number of cubes - which can easily grow
exponential. The most striking example is a set of clauses
ci = li1, . . . , l
i
n for i = 1, . . . ,m. When each clause has
independent variables, the number of prime implicants is mn,
which is the number of iterations required. The work on
cofactoring by Gupta et al. seems to provide a substantial
advantage over cube-based enumeration [20]. However, it is
unclear how this can be exploited in the setting of predicate
abstraction, given the specific structure of the predicates to be
retained. The work in [21] combines BDD-based and SAT-
based techniques.
Decision procedures for Abstraction: The idea of us-
ing decision procedures for computing abstractions has been
explored in [22]–[24]. The work in [9] improves over them
by lifting DPLL-based quantification to the case of SMT.
It also inherits the model explosion problem. In fact, both
BarceLogic and our implementation in MathSAT of [9] suffer
from exponential degrade in performance simply with the
addition of clauses over fresh boolean variables.
A possible approach is to trade precision for accuracy.
In fact, [9] also shows how to approximate the results. A
similar line is followed in [6], [8], where different approximate
methods for the computation of predicate abstractions are
presented. The main problem is that approximation in the
abstraction may lead to additional iterations in the CEGAR
loop. In this paper, we concentrate on the computation of the
exact abstraction for a given set of predicates.
BDDs for SMT: We are not aware of any other work in-
tegrating BDDs and SMT for quantification. The first versions
of Harvey [25] uses BDDs as model enumerators; however, in
solving “single” satisfiability modulo theory problems, DPLL-
based enumeration techniques seem to be vastly superior. A
BDD-based approach basically finds all the boolean models
before starting theory reasoning, which is basically overkill:
we stop as soon as one model is found, and many boolean
models may be theory inconsistent. Our choice of BDDs is
motivated by the fact that all the models have to be explored,
and also by the role played by quantification.
Armando [26] addresses a different problem, i.e. simpli-
fying the boolean part of a theory formula while preserving
equivalence; similar considerations apply to [27]. Closer to our
approach is [28], that presents simplification of a BDD with
respect to a background theory; the work is however limited
to the theory of abstract data types, and does not deal with
quantification.
Finally, BDD-based enumeration in an SMT setting is used
for LTL satisfiability [29]. Main differences are that prime
implicants are enumerated (rather than paths). Furthermore,
in [29] there is no early pruning, and each prime implicant is
managed separately, without exploiting the DAG structure of
the BDD.
VII. EXPERIMENTS
We tested the proposed algorithm within the NuSMT sys-
tem, an implementation of the CEGAR loop integrating SMT
techniques (specifically, the MathSAT solver) and the NuSMV
model checker. NuSMT uses the NuSMV language extended
to deal with real-valued and integer-valued variables. This
allows us to present the concrete program with formulae
characterizing the set of initial states, the invariants, and
the transition relation. The abstract program is a finite state
program. Although NuSMT implements a full-blown CEGAR
loop, with counterexample refinement and predicate discovery,
in the rest of this paper we focus on the predicate abstraction
part.
In addition to the method presented in the previous section,
we have also implemented in MathSAT (for a wide range of
theories) the SMT-based method proposed in [9]. In the follow-
ing we use AllMathSAT to refer to our implementation of the
SMT-based method proposed in [9], and BDD+SMT to refer to
the implementation of BddThAbstract. We conducted exper-
iments on networks of hybrid automata of different sizes, with
constraints in linear arithmetic over the reals. We compared
our BDD+SMT abstractor with AllMathSAT. The benchmarks
are available at http://sra.itc.it/people/roveri/fmcad07. In the
comparison, we were unable to include Barcelogic [9] for
technical reasons related to the lack of expressivity required
to deal with the benchmarks addressed in this paper. However,
we believe that AllMathSAT can be considered as reasonably
close to Barcelogic (and both show substantial degrade in per-
formance when the problem has a high number of implicants).
A test case with name “hann-ss-tt-vv” abstracts a compo-
sition of n hybrid automata, each of them having s locations
and t transitions. Each state of the automata is associated with
an invariant, while each transition has both a precondition and
an effect; all of them are formulae in LA over v variables.
All the experiments were run on a 3GHz Intel(TM)
Xeon(TM) Dual Processor running Linux equipped with 4GB
of RAM. For each experiment we fixed a memory limit of
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Benchmark BDD+SMT AllMathSAT
han2-s5-t10-v5 9 .401 5.104
han2-s5-t10-v5 8 .334 4.988
han2-s5-t10-v5 7 .105 10.902
han2-s5-t10-v5 6 .181 6.152
han2-s5-t10-v5 5 .225 4.933
han2-s5-t10-v5 4 .137 5.903
han2-s5-t10-v5 3 .215 7.587
han2-s5-t10-v5 2 .421 4.973
han2-s5-t10-v5 1 .350 9.270
han2-s5-t10-v5 0 .362 6.531
han2-s5-t30-v5 9 .165 6.576
han2-s5-t30-v5 8 .224 5.844
han2-s5-t30-v5 7 .267 5.066
han2-s5-t30-v5 6 .932 8.566
han2-s5-t30-v5 5 .192 3.701
han2-s5-t30-v5 4 .416 3.952
han2-s5-t30-v5 3 1.577 8.667
han2-s5-t30-v5 2 1.439 4.045
han2-s5-t30-v5 1 .191 6.344
han2-s5-t30-v5 0 .203 5.597
TABLE I
HYBRID AUTOMATA: A=2, S=5, T=10,30
Benchmark BDD+SMT AllMathSAT
han2-s10-t10-v5 9 .430 257.400
han2-s10-t10-v5 8 .419 268.184
han2-s10-t10-v5 7 .459 270.294
han2-s10-t10-v5 6 .375 320.186
han2-s10-t10-v5 5 .420 210.345
han2-s10-t10-v5 4 .314 274.153
han2-s10-t10-v5 3 .446 329.685
han2-s10-t10-v5 2 .284 221.098
han2-s10-t10-v5 1 .316 306.356
han2-s10-t10-v5 0 .462 319.609
han2-s10-t30-v5 9 5.396 268.046
han2-s10-t30-v5 8 5.050 283.478
han2-s10-t30-v5 7 4.969 352.261
han2-s10-t30-v5 6 4.157 362.505
han2-s10-t30-v5 5 5.480 328.484
han2-s10-t30-v5 4 5.177 325.571
han2-s10-t30-v5 3 4.278 266.207
han2-s10-t30-v5 2 4.849 299.664
han2-s10-t30-v5 1 4.661 306.017
han2-s10-t30-v5 0 5.117 327.222
TABLE II
HYBRID AUTOMATA: A=2, S=10, T=10,30
500MB and a CPU time limit of 900sec. We also used a proper
BDD variable ordering in the BDD+SMT experiments as to
minimize the size of the BDDs for the boolean abstraction.
The results (in seconds) are reported in Tables VII-VI.
Depending on the size of the problem, our approach is able to
gain up to two orders of magnitude over cube enumeration.
We remark that our implementation is rather naive; in
particular, we are not using any optimal ordering for BDD
variable ordering, and the reported time includes the construc-
tion of the BDD for the boolean abstraction. Second, BDD-
based enumeration does not exploit a wealth of preprocessing
techniques that are in fact applied in AllMathSAT. Despite this,
the experiments clearly shows the potential of the method.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we have presented a new approach to the
computation of exact predicate abstractions. The approach
Benchmark BDD+SMT AllMathSAT
han3-s5-t10-v5 9 1.579 573.552
han3-s5-t10-v5 8 1.904 610.045
han3-s5-t10-v5 7 3.152 661.323
han3-s5-t10-v5 6 5.422 644.350
han3-s5-t10-v5 5 3.813 747.640
han3-s5-t10-v5 4 2.170 496.716
han3-s5-t10-v5 3 2.620 597.161
han3-s5-t10-v5 2 2.247 554.023
han3-s5-t10-v5 1 1.833 329.028
han3-s5-t10-v5 0 2.965 585.501
han3-s5-t30-v5 9 19.840 575.759
han3-s5-t30-v5 8 12.318 485.817
han3-s5-t30-v5 7 42.894 480.681
han3-s5-t30-v5 6 189.370 591.740
han3-s5-t30-v5 5 131.216 462.630
han3-s5-t30-v5 4 185.886 681.669
han3-s5-t30-v5 3 131.115 502.559
han3-s5-t30-v5 2 56.284 453.767
han3-s5-t30-v5 1 164.576 619.993
han3-s5-t30-v5 0 65.202 672.153
TABLE III
HYBRID AUTOMATA: A=3, S=5, T=10,30
Benchmark BDD+SMT AllMathSAT
han3-s10-t10-v5 9 4.620 T.O.
han3-s10-t10-v5 8 2.504 T.O.
han3-s10-t10-v5 7 3.681 T.O.
han3-s10-t10-v5 6 3.921 T.O.
han3-s10-t10-v5 5 2.771 T.O.
han3-s10-t10-v5 4 3.436 T.O.
han3-s10-t10-v5 3 3.139 T.O.
han3-s10-t10-v5 2 2.634 T.O.
han3-s10-t10-v5 1 4.073 T.O.
han3-s10-t10-v5 0 2.531 T.O.
han3-s10-t30-v5 9 222.872 T.O.
han3-s10-t30-v5 8 124.455 T.O.
han3-s10-t30-v5 7 126.316 T.O.
han3-s10-t30-v5 6 122.800 T.O.
han3-s10-t30-v5 5 109.060 T.O.
han3-s10-t30-v5 4 125.406 T.O.
han3-s10-t30-v5 3 175.055 T.O.
han3-s10-t30-v5 2 156.781 T.O.
han3-s10-t30-v5 1 146.164 T.O.
han3-s10-t30-v5 0 170.785 T.O.
TABLE IV
HYBRID AUTOMATA: A = 3, S = 10, T = 10,30
embeds reasoning with respect to the background theory
within a BDD-based quantification algorithm, and is able to
outperform approaches purely based on SMT solvers.
We plan to extend this work along different dimensions.
First, we plan to investigate dedicated ordering heuristics,
to take into account the individual variables occurring in
the constrains, and to extend the algorithm to deal with
conjunctively partitioned transition relations. Second, we will
investigate the impact of incrementality of our approach in the
setting of a CEGAR. Finally, we will apply the approach to
the verification of timed and hybrid systems, as well as the
verification of Verilog systems.
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han4-s5-t10-v5 9 .856 T.O.
han4-s5-t10-v5 8 1.183 T.O.
han4-s5-t10-v5 7 .678 T.O.
han4-s5-t10-v5 6 2.142 T.O.
han4-s5-t10-v5 5 .280 T.O.
han4-s5-t10-v5 4 1.576 T.O.
han4-s5-t10-v5 3 .441 T.O.
han4-s5-t10-v5 2 2.796 T.O.
han4-s5-t10-v5 1 .265 T.O.
han4-s5-t10-v5 0 .321 T.O.
han4-s5-t30-v5 9 705.020 T.O.
han4-s5-t30-v5 8 1.586 T.O.
han4-s5-t30-v5 7 11.112 T.O.
han4-s5-t30-v5 6 23.025 T.O.
han4-s5-t30-v5 5 2.808 T.O.
han4-s5-t30-v5 4 12.246 T.O.
han4-s5-t30-v5 3 5.597 T.O.
han4-s5-t30-v5 2 3.035 T.O.
han4-s5-t30-v5 1 188.458 T.O.
han4-s5-t30-v5 0 4.885 T.O.
TABLE V
HYBRID AUTOMATA: A=4, S=5, T=10,30
Benchmark BDD+SMT AllMathSAT
han4-s10-t10-v5 9 6.359 T.O.
han4-s10-t10-v5 8 6.714 T.O.
han4-s10-t10-v5 7 5.527 T.O.
han4-s10-t10-v5 6 1.273 T.O.
han4-s10-t10-v5 5 7.498 T.O.
han4-s10-t10-v5 4 3.794 T.O.
han4-s10-t10-v5 3 2.787 T.O.
han4-s10-t10-v5 2 3.762 T.O.
han4-s10-t10-v5 1 5.235 T.O.
han4-s10-t10-v5 0 10.924 T.O.
han4-s10-t30-v5 9 486.974 T.O.
han4-s10-t30-v5 8 695.444 T.O.
han4-s10-t30-v5 7 594.663 T.O.
han4-s10-t30-v5 6 14.105 T.O.
han4-s10-t30-v5 5 331.554 T.O.
han4-s10-t30-v5 4 508.539 T.O.
han4-s10-t30-v5 3 371.207 T.O.
han4-s10-t30-v5 2 6.055 T.O.
han4-s10-t30-v5 1 234.709 T.O.
han4-s10-t30-v5 0 244.936 T.O.
TABLE VI
HYBRID AUTOMATA: A=4, S=10, T=10,30
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Abstract— Induction has been studied in model checking for
proving the validity of safety properties, i.e., showing the absence
of counterexamples. To our knowledge, induction has not been
used to refute safety properties. Existing algorithms including
bounded model checking, predicate abstraction, and interpolation
are not efficient in detecting long counterexamples. In this paper,
we propose the use of induction inside the counterexample guided
abstraction and refinement (CEGAR) loop to prove the existence
of counterexamples. We target bugs whose counterexamples are
long and yet can be captured by regular patterns. We identify
the pattern algorithmically by analyzing the sequence of spurious
counterexamples generated in the CEGAR loop, and perform
the induction proof automatically. The new method has little
additional overhead to CEGAR and this overhead is insensitive
to the actual length of the concrete counterexample.
I. INTRODUCTION
Induction techniques have been used in model checking to
prove safety properties in a state transition system. A property
is called safety if it can be refuted by examining a finite
computation path of the model. Properties of the form AGψ
(i.e., ψ is an invariant) are an important special case since
a general safety property can be reduced to an invariant by a
compilation process [1]. Conceptually, one can prove invariant
properties by showing that ψ holds in the initial states, and ψ
is maintained by the transition relation. SAT based induction
methods [2], [3], for instance, rely on the observation that a
failing property has a simple path from an initial state to a
bad state. An invariant holds if all paths of length k or shorter
satisfy ψ, and there is no simple path of length k + 1 or
longer from an initial state. Induction has a clear advantage
over other proof methods since it has to consider only paths
of a shorter length (up to k in k-induction) whereas bounded
model checking (BMC [4]), for instance, needs to check all
paths up to a completeness threshold.
However, induction has not been used to refute safety prop-
erties, that is, to show that a concrete counterexample exists.
Existing methods for finding bugs, including BMC, counterex-
ample guided abstraction refinement (CEGAR [5], [6], [7]),
and interpolation [8], are not efficient in the presence of long
concrete counterexamples. For example, BMC has been widely
regarded as effective in detecting shallow bugs in large models;
however, state-of-the-art BMC algorithms handle only up to
a few hundred unrollings on typical industrial-scale models.
When there are deep bugs, CEGAR and interpolation based
methods do not work well either, since they too rely on finding
a state-by-state match between the abstract and the concrete
counterexamples.
We propose an induction based refutation method for de-
tecting long counterexamples, whose computational overhead
(1) unsigned i , n ;
(2) ...
(3) n = 10000 ;
(4) ....
(5) i = 0 ;
(6) while ( i<=n ) {
(7) assert ( i<n ) ;
(8) i++ ;
}
(1) bool P = * ;
(2) ...
(3) P = * ;
(4) ....
(5) P = T ;
(6) while ( * ) {
(7) assert ( P ) ;
(8) P = P ? * : F ;
}
Fig. 1. The original C program and the first Boolean abstraction
is independent of the actual counterexample length. Our main
observation is that deep bugs can often be captured by a regular
pattern in the counterexample of a family of systems obtained
by introducing a parameter to the system under analysis.
Instead of looking for a state-by-state match of the abstract
counterexample to a particular concrete counterexample, we
prove by induction that there always exists a counterexample
of that general pattern.
Consider the program in Fig. 1, which has a simple and yet
representative bug in line 7 (e.g., an array bound violation).
Detecting this bug is challenging for all aforementioned meth-
ods. For illustration purposes, a standard predicate abstraction
procedure would add the following predicates, P:(i<10000),
P1:(i<9999), P2:(i<9998), etc. The procedure needs n refine-
ment iterations in order to produce a concrete counterexample.
One may argue that CEGAR is not well suited for finding this
type of bugs. However, if the loop condition were (i < n) and
the assertion never failed, then CEGAR is efficient in getting
the proof.
Our new method provides complementary strength (good for
refutation) to the popular CEGAR style abstraction algorithms
(good for proof). In Fig. 1, regardless of the initial value of
n, there is an assertion failure in Line 7. Furthermore, the
sequence of concrete counterexamples, in terms of the line
numbers leading to the failure, is
(1)(2)(3)(4)(5) {(6)(7)(8)}n (6)(7)
If we can prove that a counterexample of this regular pattern
exists for all n ≥ 1, then it follows that there exists a
counterexample for n = 10000.
Although CEGAR is not efficient in detecting long coun-
terexamples, it can be useful in identifying the regular pattern
of the counterexample. We present an algorithm to identify
the regular pattern of the counterexample, by analyzing the
failed counterexample concretization attempts inside the CE-
GAR loop. The basic idea behind this algorithm is that the
regular pattern of a concrete counterexample is often shown
in the series of spurious counterexamples encountered in the
CEGAR loop. In Fig. 1, for instance, the set of spurious
abstract counterexamples produced by the CEGAR procedure
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have the same regular pattern—they differ from the concrete
counterexample only in the number of copies of the recurring
segment (6)(7)(8).
The existence of a parameterized counterexample can then
be proved by induction: (1) in the base step, we show that
a concrete counterexample of the given regular pattern exists
for n = 1; (2) as an induction hypothesis, we assume that for
n = k, a concrete counterexample of the given pattern exists.
(3) in the induction step, we extend the counterexample for
n = k to build a new counterexample for n = k + 1, and
show that the new counterexample exists. One of our main
contributions is proposing a goal containment check that is
sufficient to establish the induction proof for n = k+1 based
on the induction hypothesis for n = k. In the goal containment
check, we align the common prefixes of the two consecutive
counterexamples for k and k + 1 and compare their suffixes.
We have implemented the proposed method in a standard
CEGAR procedure and conducted experiments on some soft-
ware examples from the public domain. The results show
that when augmented with the new induction based method,
CEGAR is able to find some very long counterexamples in
nontrivial examples, most of which would have eluded existing
model checking methods.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. After review-
ing the related work and introducing the notation, we present
the algorithm for identifying a counterexample pattern in Sec-
tion IV. We present our symbolic method for establishing an
induction proof in Section V. We demonstrate the effectiveness
of our method through experiments in Section VII, and then
conclude this paper in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
Detecting a long counterexample has been a well-known
problem in formal verification of both hardware and software
systems. In [9], Ho et al. attempt to solve the problem by
simulating up to a deep state and then searching around that
state exhaustively. This technique can be considered as a semi-
formal method, in that it combines directed random simulation
and model checking. A similar approach was adopted by
DART [10] in the context of program verification. Semi-formal
methods may miss bugs since they selectively, as opposed to
exhaustively, explore the state space.
In [11], Nanshi and Somenzi use guided pseudo-random
simulation in the search of a concrete counterexample,
where the guidance is provided by synchronous onion rings
(SORs [12]), a data structure that implicitly captures all
shortest abstract counterexamples. In [13], Bjesse and Kukula
present a repeat extender algorithm for counterexample gen-
eration within an abstraction refinement loop. They use the
abstract counterexample as backshell lighthouses without lim-
iting the BMC search to concrete counterexamples of the
same length. In [14], Kroening and Weissenbacher propose
a similar method targeting counterexamples with loops. After
heuristically identifying the loop, they put the assignment
statements of the loop body into a closed form representation,
and use a SAT solver to calculate a conservative bound on
the number of loop iterations. Then, they use BMC to iterate
through the loop exactly that number of times and derive a
concrete counterexample.
All these CEGAR based methods insist on finding a con-
crete path from an initial state leading to the bad state, which
makes them less scalable when the model is complex and the
counterexample is long.
In [15], Seghir and Podelski use transition abstraction to
shortcut the “transfinite” sequence of refinement steps. They
abstract not just states but also the state changes induced by
the structured language constructs including for and while
statements. In [16], Ball et al. analyze termination of loops
without refinement and without well-founded sets and ranking
functions. Their method is based on the symbolic reasoning
of abstract counterexamples; instead of using induction, they
try to identify must transitions in the abstract state transition
graph using conditions on the structure of the graph.
III. PRELIMINARIES
A. From CDFGs to Models
We represent the model under verification as a tuple M =
〈S, T, I, SE〉, where S is a set of states, T ⊆ S × S is the
transition relation, I ⊆ S is the set of initial states, and SE ⊆
S is the set of error states. Given a set X = {x1, . . . , xn} of
state variables, each state s ∈ S is a valuation of the variables
in X . A concrete path is a sequence of states s1 . . . sl such
that (si, si+1) ∈ T for all 1 ≤ i < l.
We use a control and data flow graph (CDFG) as the
intermediate representation, where CDFGs may be derived
from either hardware designs or software programs [17].
Definition 1 A control and data flow graph (CDFG) is a 5-
tuple G = 〈B, E , V,∆, θ〉 such that
• B = {b1, . . . , bL} is a finite set of basic blocks, where b1
is the entry block.
• E ⊆ B × B is a set of edges representing transitions
between basic blocks.
• V is a finite set of variables that consists of actual
design/program variables and the auxiliary variables
added for modeling the hardware/software semantics.
• ∆ : B → 2Sasgn is a labeling function that labels each
basic block with a set of parallel assignments. Sasgn is
the set of possible assignments.
• θ : E → Scond is a labeling function that labels each
edge with a conditional expression. Scond is the set of
possible conditional expressions.
Figure 2 shows a sample C program and its CDFG. Each
rectangle is a basic block. Block 1 is the entry block and block
7 is the error block. Basic blocks are connected with each other
by edges, which are labeled by conditional expressions. For
example, the transition from block 3 to block 4 is guarded
by (a<100). Edges that are not labeled by any condition are
assumed to have a true label.
The CDFG is regarded as an explicit representation of
the concrete model. To represent the CDFG symbolically as
a verification model M = 〈S, T, I, SE〉, we add a special

























a NS = 1;
b = 0;
LOOP:
if (a + b > 200)
ERROR
if (a < 100)
a NS = b + a;
b = a;
a = a NS;
goto LOOP;
}
Fig. 2. The control and data flow graph
of basic block indexes B = {b1, . . . , bn}. Furthermore, we
assume in the model M that X = {xpc}∪V is the set of state
variables (V consists of the original variables from the model).
If the entry block is b1 ∈ B and the error block is berr ∈ B,
then we have I = (xpc = b1) and SE = (xpc = berr).
B. Parameterized Counterexamples
An abstract model ̂M can be derived from an over-
approximated pair ( ̂T , ̂I) such that T ⊆ ̂T and I ⊆ ̂I . Given
a CDFG representation, a natural way of creating an abstract
model ̂M is to over-approximate the assignment statements.
For instance, if we ignore the assignment statements (by
assuming that arbitrary values can be assigned to the left-
hand side variables), the remaining control flow graph can
be regarded as an abstract model. In this abstract model ̂M ,
an abstract state is represented by the set ŝi = (xpc = bi),
where bi ∈ B. Since all the guards in ̂M can be either true or
false, ̂M has all the behaviors of M and possibly more. An
abstract path is a sequence of abstract states π = ŝi, . . . , ŝj .
Definition 2 A parameterized abstract counterexample ξ is an
abstract path of the form
ξ = ŝ1 . . . ŝi−1 { ŝi . . . ŝj}
n ŝj+1 . . . ŝl ,
such that ŝ1 ⊆ ̂I and ŝl ⊆ ̂SE . The recurring segment is
πr = ŝi . . . ŝj , the finite prefix is πp = ŝ1 . . . ŝi−1, and the
finite suffix is πs = ŝj+1 . . . ŝl. The integer n is the number of
copies of πr.
Any of the three segments in ξ can be empty. For example, if
ξ is used to match the concrete counterexample in a state-by-
state way, we assume that πr may be an empty segment.
Given a set Q of states, the post-condition (pre-condition) of
Q with respect to T consists of all successors (predecessors)
of Q. Formally,
pre (Q) = {s | ∃s′ ∈ Q : (s, s′) ∈ T} ,
post(Q) = {s′ | ∃s ∈ Q : (s, s′) ∈ T} .
The definition can be extended transitively with respect to a
control path π = ŝi, . . . , ŝj as follows,
pre∗ (π,Q) = {s | there is a concrete run inside π
from s to s′ such that s′ ∈ (Q ∩ ŝj)} ,
post∗(π,Q) = {s′| there is a concrete run inside π
from s to s′ such that s ∈ (Q ∩ ŝi)} .
Given a control path π, the transitive version of pre-condition
can be computed as follows: let Z = ŝj ∩ Q, and then
repeatedly compute Z = ŝi ∩ pre(Z) for all i ≤ j.
Function f(V ) is called disjunctively decomposable with
respect to the partition V = Va ∪ Vb if
f(V ) = (∃Va.f(Va, Vb)) ∧ (∃Vb.f(Va, Vb)) ,
C. The CEGAR Procedure
Counterexample guided abstraction refinement is an itera-
tive procedure consisting of three phases: abstraction, model
checking, and refinement. Algorithm 1 shows the pseudo code
of a generic CEGAR procedure. Typically, one starts with
a coarse initial abstraction ̂M and applies model checking.
If the property holds in ̂M , it also holds in M and the
property is proved. If the property fails and the model checker
returns an abstract counterexample (ACE), a concretization
procedure is used to check whether a concrete counterexample
(CCE) exists. If a concrete counterexample exists, the property
is refuted. Otherwise, the spurious counterexample is used
during refinement to identify the needed information currently
missing in the abstraction.
Algorithm 1 CEGAR(M,ψ)
1: M̂ = INITIAL ABSTRACTION(M,ψ);
2: while (1) do
3: ACE = MODEL CHECKING(M̂, ψ);
4: if (ACE is empty) then
5: return TRUE;
6: end if
7: CCE = CONCRETIZECEX(M,ACE);
8: if (CCE not empty) then
9: return (FALSE, CCE);
10: end if
11: M̂ = REFINEMENT(M,ACE);
12: end while
One inefficiency of CEGAR in detecting long counterex-
amples is due to its concretization algorithm. Algorithm 2 is
a standard concretization procedure which takes the abstract
counterexample π = ŝ1, . . . , ŝl as input. It starts from the error
states ŝl and repeatedly computes pre-conditions. If the pre-
condition q1 is non-empty, a concrete counterexample has been
found. If the precondition becomes empty before i decreases
to 1, concretization fails and the abstract counterexample is
marked as spurious. After the counterexample is declared as
spurious, the refinement step follows to improve the abstract
model by analyzing the spurious counterexample. The CEGAR
loop continues until either the property is proved (no abstract
counterexample), or a concrete counterexample is found, or
the procedure runs out of computing resources.
It may take a large number of refinement iterations for
the CEGAR procedure to produce an abstract counterex-
ample whose length matches the length of the concrete
counterexample—before that, all the abstract counterexamples
are declared as spurious. If the concrete counterexample has
a parameterized pattern, using Algorithm 2 to concretize it
is inefficient. Recall that ξ = πp{πr}nπs. When ξ contains
a large number of copies of πr, the pre- and post-condition
computations over ξ can be expensive.
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Algorithm 2 CONCRETIZECEX(M ,π)
1: i = l;
2: qi = ŝi;
3: while (i 6= 1) do
4: qi−1 = pre(qi) ∩ ŝi−1;
5: if (qi−1 6= ∅) then
6: i = i− 1;
7: else
8: return no concrete counterexample;
9: end if
10: end while
11: return a concrete counterexample;
IV. IDENTIFYING COUNTEREXAMPLE PATTERNS
To augment the standard CEGAR procedure, we add an
induction proof attempt right after concretization fails, but
before refinement. Our procedure tries to identify a regular
pattern from the set of abstract counterexamples by analyzing
the failed concretization attempts. The counterexample pattern
becomes a hypothesis, which subsequently will be validated by
an induction step. If we can prove that for all induction param-
eter values (including the one in the concrete counterexample),
an instance of the parameterized counterexample exists, then
the property is refuted. If this added induction proof attempt
does not succeed, we fall back upon the standard CEGAR loop
and continue with refinement.
A. The Recurring Segment
To characterize ξ, we need to identify the head and tail states
of πr from a given abstract path π = ŝ1 . . . ŝl. We accomplish
this by modifying the standard concretization procedure. We
rely on the fact that if the concrete counterexample is an in-
stance of a parameterized abstract counterexample πp{πr}nπs,
then the CEGAR procedure is likely to generate a series of
spurious counterexamples of the following form:
iteration 1: π = πp πr πs,
iteration 2: π = πp πr πr πs,
iteration 3: π = πp πr πr πr πs,
. . .
the sequence continues until the number of copies of πr
matches the value in the concrete counterexample.
Recall that for a spurious abstract path π = ŝ1 . . . ŝl, the
concretization procedure in Algorithm 2 will find a failing
index i such that 1 ≤ i < l and pre(qi+1) ∩ ŝi = ∅. In
Fig. 3, for instance, the failing index is i since qi is empty. In
Algorithm 2, once a failing index i is found, π is declared as








































Fig. 3. Backleap to identify the counterexample pattern
We modify Algorithm 2 to allow the search for a potentially
longer concrete counterexample by using a “backleap” strat-
egy. The new concretization procedure is given in Algorithm 3,
in which the additional steps (with respect to the standard
algorithm) are listed in lines 8-19. Cthres is a predetermined
threshold denoting the maximum number of backleaps allowed
in a concretization attempt.
The idea is to start from the failing index i and search
backward for a transition (ŝj , ŝk) with i ≤ k ≤ j ≤ l
such that in the concrete model ŝj is reachable from ŝk in
one step. If k and j exist, the concretization retreats from
qi+1 back to qk and makes a successful backleap from qk
to ŝj ; after that we continue the concretization process from
pre(qk) ∩ ŝj . At the same time, we record ŝj as a candidate
tail state of πr and ŝk as a candidate head state of πr. In
this modified concretization procedure, we can make backleaps
more than once (bounded by the constant Cthres)—therefore,
it is possible to find a concrete counterexample that is longer
than the abstract counterexample to be concretized.
Algorithm 3 CONCRETIZECEX BACKLEAP(M,π)
1: i = l; qi = ŝi;
2: ηbLeap = 0;
3: while (i 6= 1) do
4: qi−1 = pre(qi) ∩ ŝi−1;
5: if (qi−1 6= ∅) then
6: i = i− 1;
7: else
8: find k and j such that i ≤ k ≤ j ≤ l and pre(qk) ∩ ŝj 6= ∅.
9: if (k and j do not exits, or ηbLeap > Cthres) then
10: if ( PROVE CEX BY INDUCTION( ) ) then
11: return a concrete counterexample; //proved
12: else
13: return no concrete counterexample;
14: end if
15: end if
16: qj = pre(qk) ∩ ŝj ;
17: i = j;
18: ηbLeap + +;
19: add segment πk,j to a list of candidates of πr;
20: end if
21: end while
22: return a concrete counterexample;
If after making Cthres backleaps, the new concretization
procedure fails to find a concrete counterexample but some
πr = ŝk . . . ŝj have been recognized, we enter the induction
proof mode (lines 9-15). In Algorithm 3, induction proof is
implemented in the function PROVE CEX BY INDUCTION.
B. The Induction Parameter
Given a recurring segment πr = ŝk . . . ŝj , we need to
identify the potential induction parameter associated with πr
before calling PROVE CEX BY INDUCTION. We will show
in the next section that checking whether the induction proof
holds is cheap computationally (compared to model checking),
and only a correct induction parameter (paired with a true
recurring segment) allows the induction proof to hold. The
naive approach is to blindly try all the program variables one
by one as the induction parameter, and under that assumption
check whether the induction proof holds. The naive approach
can be costly, but it does not affect the correctness of the
overall CEGAR procedure.
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In practice, however, we need to reduce the overhead of
identifying induction variable. We first compute a list of
promising candidate variables, that is, the program variables
in V that are likely to be induction parameters. Then we try
the candidate variables one by one, to see whether treating
each of them as the induction parameter makes the induction
proof go through.
We use the following criteria to filter out non-induction
variables. Let πr = ŝk, . . . , ŝj and g(V ) be the conditional
expression guarding the transition from ŝj to ŝk (the back
edge). For a program variable n to be the induction parameter,
n needs to be in the transitive support of the expression
g(V ). Furthermore, all the guard expressions inside πr must
be monotonic with respect to variable n—this guarantees that
as long as a transition (of πr) is valid for n = k, it is valid
also for the n = k + 1 counterexample instance.
C. Counterexample Instances
In order to prove that ξ exists for all n ≥ 1, we need
to control the value of n in the model to produce a set
of parameterized counterexample instances. Conceptually this
is accomplished by finding inside πp the last assignment
statement to n, and replacing it with a statement assigning
a symbolic value k to n.
In Fig. 1, for instance, the prefix segment is
πp =(1)(2)(3)(4)(5) and the last assignment statement
to n is in line 3. A simple static analysis can locate the
statement n=1000 at line 3 and rewrite it into n=k, where k
remains a parameterized symbolic value. When setting k to
1, we can check whether ξ exists for the induction basis n=1.
In practice, when ξ and n are given, we have implemented
a procedure to locate the last assignment statement to n
inside πp, followed by an automatic rewriting of CDFG
representation of the concrete model1.
V. PROVING THE EXISTENCE OF COUNTEREXAMPLES
In this section we explain the underlying algorithm for
the function PROVE CEX BY INDUCTION. Recall that before
entering the induction proof mode, we have already identi-
fied a potential parameterized abstract counterexample ξ =
πp{ πr }n πs.
A. Induction Proof
The induction hypothesis is that there exists a concrete path
inside the abstract counterexample πp{πr}kπs. We divide the
counterexample instance into πp{πr}k and πs, and define the
intermediate pre-condition and post-conditions as follows:
G = post∗(πp, I)
F = post∗(πp {πr}k, I)
B = pre∗ (πs, SE)
To rephrase the induction hypothesis,
F ∩ B 6= ∅ .
1If n does not appear in πp, e.g., when loop condition is (i<CONST) and
we rewrite it as (i<n), we assume that n = k holds in the initial state.
That is, there exists s ∈ (F ∩B) such that s is reachable from
I through πp{πr}k and can reach SE through πs.
We want to prove that there also exists a concrete path
inside the abstract counterexample πp{πr}k+1πs. Similar to
the previous case, we divide the counterexample instance
into two parts: πp{πr}k and πrπs. The corresponding pre-
conditions and post-conditions are defined as follows:
G′ = post∗(πp, I)
F ′ = post∗(πp {πr}k, I)
B′ = pre∗ (πr πs, SE)
The existence of a concrete counterexample is rephrased as
follows,
F ′ ∩B′ 6= ∅ .
The induction step says that, if there exists a concrete state
s ∈ (F ∩ B) when n = k, then there exists a concrete state
s′ ∈ (F ′∩B′) when n = k+1. With a little abuse of notation
(F as a set and F (V ) as a formula), we express the induction
step formally as follows,
∃V . F (V ) ∧ B(V ) → ∃V . F ′(V ) ∧ B′(V ) .
Here V is the set of program variables. However, we shall
never compute F ′(V ) and F (V ) explicitly since they are over
parameterized segment (expensive to compute). Instead, we
rely on the analysis of G(V ) and G′(V ) to derive sufficient
conditions under which the induction holds.
B. Induction Condition
We partition the set V of variables into V = Va ∪ Vb. Vb
contains the induction parameter n and variables which are
assigned in πp to values that depends on n, and Va contains
the remaining variables. To get an induction proof, consider
the following requirement on Va and Vb (C0):
• in πr, variables in Vb do not appear in any assignment
(neither in left-hand side nor in right-hand side);
• guards g(Va, Vb) in πr are monotonic with respect to Vb.
In such cases, pre- and post-conditions over πr can be
computed by updating functions for Va and Vb separately (a
Cartesian product). This characteristic has been captured by
the notion of a disjunctively decomposable function described
in Section III.
Given G and G′, we define
Ga = ∃Vb . G(Va, Vb)
Gb = ∃Va . G(Va, Vb)
G′a = ∃Vb . G
′(Va, Vb)
G′b = ∃Va . G
′(Va, Vb)
The induction holds if the following conditions are satisfied:
C1: G and G′ differ only in the valuations of Vb:
G = Ga(Va) ∧Gb(Vb),






C2: B and B′ satisfy the following goal containment check:





All conditions can be checked algorithmically in the CDFG
model by a combination of static analysis (for checking the
partition of V ) and pre-condition and post-condition compu-
tations over finite counterexample segments.
C. Proof of Correctness
The correctness of the induction proof is established by
Theorem 3. The proof is illustrated pictorially in Fig. 4.
Theorem 3 If F ∩ B 6= ∅ and conditions C0,C1,C2 are
satisfied, then F ′ ∩B′ 6= ∅.
Proof: Since G and G′ are disjunctively decomposable,
Vb variables do not change their values in πr, and Va variables
are updated independently from Vb in πr, we know that F and
F ′ are also disjunctively decomposable; that is,
F = Fa(Va) ∧ Fb(Vb) = Fa(Va) ∧Gb(Vb),







and Fa = F ′a (because of Ga = G
′
a). From condition C2,
∃Vb.Gb ∧ B ⊆ ∃Vb.G′b ∧ B
′ ,




∃Vb.F ∧ B ⊆ ∃Vb.F ′ ∧ B′ .
∃V.F (V ) ∧ B(V ) ⊆ ∃V.F ′(V ) ∧ B′(V ) .
This means that if s ∈ F ∩ B exists, then s′ ∈ F ′ ∩ B′
exists. Note that s and s′ may differ only in their valuations









Fig. 4. The normal induction condition.
VI. GOAL CONTAINMENT CHECKING
A. The Working Example
In Fig. 1, when the set of predicates is empty (the ini-
tial abstraction), the abstract counterexample produced by
the CEGAR procedure is π =(1)...(5)(6)(7). This abstract
counterexample cannot be concretized by the standard con-
cretization procedure or our backleap algorithm. Furthermore,
our concretization algorithm cannot detect any counterexample
pattern; at line 8 in Algorithm 3 there does not exist a valid
index pair (j, k) for backleap.
After the first refinement iteration (which removes the spu-
rious counterexample), the induction proof attempt becomes
possible. Algorithm 3 will return the following counterex-
ample pattern: ξ = πp{πr}nπs such that πp =(1)...(5),
πr =(6)(7)(8), and πs =(6)(7).
The set V of program variables is partitioned into Va = {i}
and Vb = {n}. Inside πr, all the LHS variables are included in
Va, and the only variable in Vb does not change. Furthermore,
inside πr the guard g : (i ≤ n) is monotonic with respect to
n.
For the first two conditions,
G = (i = 0) ∧ (n = k) ,
G′ = (i = 0) ∧ (n = k + 1) .
Let Ga = G′a = (i = 0), Gb = (n = k), and G
′
b =
(n = k + 1); both G and G′ are disjunctively decomposable.
For the last condition,
B = pre∗(πs, i ≥ n) = (i = n)
B′ = pre∗(πrπs, i ≥ n) = (i + 1 = n)
Therefore,
∃Vb . Gb ∧ B = (i = k)
∃Vb . G′b ∧ B
′ = (i + 1 = k + 1)
This proves the goal containment,





Sets B′ and B are regarded as the goals of postcondition
computations over the common prefix πp{πr}k. The goal
containment check requires a decision procedure that supports
quantified formulas. In our implementation, we use a mixed
model checking procedure [18] which incorporates both bit-
level and word-level symbolic representations. If all program
variables are assumed to be in finite domains, one can also
choose to use standard BDD-based fixpoint algorithms
Since we always consider a single program path (a finite
prefix or suffix), the pre- and post-condition computations
can be made efficient in practice. Although the CDFG may
have many branching statements, when computing post∗() and
pre∗() over πp and πs, we do not need to consider more
than one branch at each pre or post step. For instance, given
π = si, . . . , sj and a propositional formula φ, the weakest
liberal pre-condition [19] of φ with respect to π, denoted by
wlp(π, φ), is computed as follows,
• For a statement s: v = e, wlp(s, φ) = φ(e/v);
• For a statement s: assume(c), wlp(s, φ) = φ ∧ c;
• For a sequence of statements s1; s2, wlp(s1 : s2, φ) =
wlp(s1, wlp(s2, φ)).
For a single CDFG path, there are only two types of
statements: assignment statements and branching statements
(assume(c) comes from if(c)). Complex C statements involv-
ing pointers, arrays, structures, function calls, etc. can be
rewritten into simple statements involving scalar variables only
during a preprocessing phase of the CDFG representation [20].
Therefore, the pre- and post-condition results over a single
CDFG path do not blow up. In practice, the time spent on
computing G,G′, B,B′ is often negligible when compared to
other phases of the CEGAR procedure.
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C. Strengthening Induction
The conditions can be strengthened by imposing a restricted
area within which goal containment should hold. This step
is optional, but may increase the chance of getting a proof.
Specifically, we identify a state subspace F∞ ⊆ S such that
goal containment within F∞ can establish the proof. We define






k, I ) .
By definition, F ∧ F∞ = F and F ′ ∧ F∞ = F ′.
Assume that F ∧B 6= ∅. We now prove that if ∃Vb. (Gb ∧
B ∧ F∞) → ∃Vb. (G′b ∧ B
′ ∧ F∞), then
F ′ ∧ B′ 6= ∅ .
Since goal containment holds inside F∞,




∃Vb. (F ∧B ∧ F∞) ⊆ ∃Vb. (F ′ ∧ B′ ∧ F∞)
∃Vb. (F ∧B) ⊆ ∃Vb. (F ′ ∧ B′)
This is further illustrated in Fig. 5. We call it a strengthening









Fig. 5. The strengthened induction condition.
Our use of F∞ is similar to the method in [21] on
strengthening BMC induction proof with over-approximated
reachable states. To ensure termination when computing F∞,
we compute exact post-conditions over πp{πr}k up to a finite
set of values of k and then switch to widening [22]. In the
working example, for instance, F∞ = i ≤ n.
D. Composition of Parameterized Traces
Extending the induction method to handle more complex
counterexample patterns is possible. For counterexamples in-
volving concatenation and embedding of recurring segments,
we have identified sufficient conditions (special cases) in
which goal containment can be check efficiently. Due to page
limit, we omit the discussion on these complex patterns; an
extended version of this paper is available upon request.
VII. EXPERIMENTS
We have implemented the new method in the F-Soft ver-
ification platform [23] and integrated with a CEGAR proce-
dure [24]. F-Soft is a tool for analyzing safety properties in
C programs by checking whether certain labeled statements
are reachable. It has a preprocessing phase in which complex
C statements (such as pointers, arrays, function calls, etc.)
are rewritten into simple statements involving scalar variables
only. For the simplified C program, it builds a CDFG repre-
sentation, which is taken as input by subsequent analysis pro-
cedures, including CEGAR and our induction based method.
Our test cases are several software benchmarks in the public
domain. For each test case, we run both standard CEGAR
and the augmented version (with our induction method) of the
same CEGAR procedure. All the experiments were conducted
on a workstation with 3 GHz Pentium 4 processor and 2GB
of RAM running Red Hat Linux 7.2.
A. The GNU bc Example
Our first test case comes from the GNU bc package
(bc-1.06), which implements a Unix command line calculator
with arbitrary precision. There is a known array bounds viola-
tion bug in line 176 of the file storage.c. The bug is illustrated
in the last line of Fig. 6, where the guard (indx<v count) should
be changed to (indx<a count). This bug is inherently difficult
to find with testing [25], since the corrupted heap does not
always cause an immediate crash—it often causes a crash









for (indx=1; indx<old_count; indx++)
arrays[indx] = old_ary[indx];
for (; indx < v_count; indx++)
arrays[indx] = NULL; //failure
Fig. 6. Code in more arrays() of the GNU bc example
This bug cannot be detected using standard CEGAR when
a count=256. However, if a count is set to some small value,
standard CEGAR may find a concrete counterexample. In our
experiments, a count is set to various values starting with 1,
2, 3, ... The result is given in Fig. 7. With a small initial
value, standard CEGAR found the concrete counterexample,
but it demonstrates poor runtime performance and is clearly
not scalable.
The CEGAR procedure augmented with our induction
method was able to identify and prove the existence of
bc













Fig. 7. Run time of the standard CEGAR procedure: x-axis: values of n;
y-axis: run time in seconds.
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a parameterized counterexample within 10 seconds. This is
slightly slower than standard CEGAR for a count=3. However,
the proof is valid (i.e., a concrete counterexample instance
exists) for all a count= 1, 2, ..., k.
B. The Aeon Example
Our second test case comes from the Linux mail transfer
agent Aeon 0.02a. There is a buffer overflow inside the func-
tion getConfig, whenever it calls strcpy to duplicate a string
returned by the function getenv to a buffer with size MAX LEN.
This bug is representative for many buffer overflows leading
to possible security breaches. This example was also studied
by Kroening and Weissenbacher in [14].
We applied standard CEGAR as well as the augmented
version to this example. When MAX LEN=512, our implementation
of standard CEGAR failed to detect the bug within 4 hours
(BLAST [26] and SLAM [7] also timed out, as reported in
[14]). Our induction based method was able to identify and
prove the existence of a parameterized counterexample within
6 seconds. In comparison, the loop detection method in [14]
detected the bug within 254.5 seconds; the runtime of their
method will keep increasing as MAX LEN becomes larger (its
runtime was 25.0 seconds when MAX LEN=25). In contrast, our
proof is valid (i.e., a concrete counterexample instance exists)
for all MAX LEN= 1, 2, ..., k.
C. The ftpd Example
Our third test case comes from the wu-ftpd-2.6.2 package.
There is a buffer overrun inside ftprestart.c when the function
newfile is called. The induction parameter is numfiles, which
is 1024 in the concrete counterexample. This example was
also studied in [27]. Standard CEGAR failed to detect the
bug (although it can find a bug when we set numfiles to
smaller values, as is shown in Fig. 7), whereas our induction
augmented CEGAR procedure found the bug in 22 seconds.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented an induction based method for proving
the existence of long counterexamples. The method avoids
a state-by-state match of the abstract counterexample during
the search for concrete counterexamples. It provides comple-
mentary strengths to the popular CEGAR methods. For future
work, we want to extend the induction method to handle more
complex counterexample patterns.
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Abstract— Craig interpolants are often used to approximate
inductive invariants of transition systems. Arithmetic relation-
ships between numeric variables require word-level interpolants,
which are derived from word-level proofs of unsatisfiability.
While word-level theorem provers have made significant progress
in the past few years, competitive solvers for many logics are
based on flattening the word-level structure to the bit-level. We
propose an algorithm that lifts a resolution proof obtained from
a bit-flattened formula up to the word-level, which enables the
computation of word-level interpolants. Experimental results for
equality logic suggest that the overhead of lifting the propositional
proof is very low compared to the solving time of a state-of-the-
art solver.
I. INTRODUCTION
Fifty years ago, William Craig showed that for each incon-
sistent pair of logical formulas 〈A,B〉, there exists a formula
φ – the Craig interpolant – that is implied by A, inconsistent
with B, and refers only to non-logical symbols common to A
and B [1]. Intuitively, the interpolant φ can be understood
as an abstraction of A. This result has been recently re-
discovered and is the basis of various abstraction techniques in
several automated verification tools. All of these verification
techniques require an efficient decision procedure that is able
to generate interpolants for unsatisfiable formulas. In program
verification, the queries that typically arise are stated in
quantifier-free Presburger arithmetic, equality- or difference-
logic. These theories enjoy the small-model property, i.e., if
a formula is satisfiable, then it has a satisfying assignment
in a finite domain. Many decision procedures exploit this
property and translate the original problem (either eagerly
or lazily) into propositional logic. These instances can then
be solved efficiently due to the recent advances in Boolean
satisfiability solving [2]. The disadvantage of this approach is
the loss of structure: Even though interpolants can be easily
extracted from the resolution proofs provided by proof logging
SAT solvers [3], it is prohibitively complicated to use the
resulting bit-level interpolants in combination with word-level
implementations or specifications.
Contribution: While interpolating decision procedures
that generate word-level interpolants do exist [4], they are
not yet competitive with state-of-the-art SAT-based theorem
provers. We solve this problem by lifting existing resolution
proofs generated by a SAT-based decision procedure to word-
level proofs, from which the corresponding word-level inter-
This research was supported by Microsoft Research through its European
PhD Scholarship Programme, by SRC contract no. 2006-TJ-1539, and by an
award from IBM Research.
polants can be easily extracted. Exemplarily, we provide a
proof-lifting algorithm for equality logic.
Related Work
Our algorithm is not the first that constructs word-level
interpolants: McMillan’s theorem prover FOCI generates in-
terpolants for quantifier free formulas with linear inequalities
and uninterpreted function symbols [4]. His approach requires
a tailor-made theorem prover for these theories. The technique
presented in this paper is suitable for off-the-shelf, bit-level
decision procedures, which are known to perform very well
on a variety of logics, e.g., equality logic and bit-vector
arithmetic.
Interpolants have various applications in software and hard-
ware model checking. For instance, interpolation can be used
to derive an abstract image operator from failed attempts to
disprove a property of a finite state transition system. By
computing a fix-point for this operator, one can obtain an
inductive invariant of the transition system [5].
II. BACKGROUND
A. Propositional Craig Interpolants
A propositional formula consists of atoms (indicated by
Boolean identifiers ai, i = 1, 2, 3, . . .), the constants true and
false, and the operators ∧, ∨, and ¬. We use ai as an
alternative notation for ¬ai. A propositional formula is either
an atom, or of the form (F∧G), (F∨G) or F , where F and G
are also propositional formulas. We write A(F ) to denote the
set of atoms that occur in F . We use Σ to denote a valuation
to A(F ). Σ(ai) denotes the truth value of the atom ai in Σ,
and Σ(ai) = ⊥ denotes that ai is not assigned by Σ. F is
tautological if it evaluates to true for all Boolean valuations
of A(F ), and unsatisfiable if there is no such valuation.
A literal is either an atom or the negation of an atom. A
disjunction of literals is called a clause. In clauses, we some-
times omit the disjunction operator ∨, e.g., we write (a1a2a3)
instead of (a1 ∨ a2 ∨ a3). Furthermore, we use  to denote







, with Li,j ∈ {a1, a2 . . .} ∪ {a1, a2, . . .},
is in conjunctive normal form (CNF). For each propositional
formula, there exists a logically equivalent formula in CNF.
Given two clauses ai ∨ Θ and ai ∨ Θ
′ (where Θ and Θ′
represent disjunctions of literals), the resolvent of these clauses
is the clause Θ ∨Θ′. The corresponding proof rule is known
as resolution:
RES
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A propositional formula F in CNF is unsatisfiable iff the
empty clause can be derived by a sequence of such resolution
steps starting from the clauses of F .
A sequence of resolution steps can be represented by a
directed acyclic graph, where each vertex c with no prede-
cessor is a clause of F , and all other vertices are resolvents
of their (exactly two) predecessors. Such a graph is a proof of
unsatisfiability if its root node is the empty clause.
Given an unsatisfiable formula F partitioned into two sets
of clauses 〈A,B〉, an interpolant for A and B is is a formula
P such that
• A implies P ,
• P ∧B is unsatisfiable, and
• P refers only to the common atoms of A and B.
An interpolant for an unsatisfiable set of clauses 〈A,B〉 can
be derived from a resolution proof in linear time [3], [4].
B. Propositional Encodings of Decision Problems
In logics that are more expressive than propositional logic
(e.g., equality logic), formulas may contain atoms that are
specific to the theory that is used. We call these atoms the
Theory Atoms. Let AT (ϕ) ⊆ A(ϕ) denote the set of Theory
Atoms in ϕ that are not Boolean identifiers or constants.
Definition 1 (Propositional Skeleton): The Propositional
Skeleton of ϕ is denoted by ϕsk and is obtained by replacing
every theorem atom α ∈ AT (ϕ) by a new Boolean identifier.
The Boolean identifier that replaces α is denoted by eα.
We simply write AT for AT (ϕ) if the formula ϕ is clear
from the context.
Definition 2 (Corresponding Constraint): Given a truth as-
signment Σ : AT −→ {true, false,⊥} to the theory atoms of
formula ϕ, we define the corresponding constraint Ψ(Σ) as
the conjunction of the theory atoms α ∈ A with Σ(α) 6= ⊥,





α : Σ(α) = true
¬α : Σ(α) = false
III. INTERPOLATION FOR EQUALITY LOGIC
A. Flattening Equality Logic
We describe how to lift propositional proofs for equality
logic to the word level. Equality logic permits formulas with
an arbitrary Boolean structure, but limits atoms to Boolean
variables and equalities of the form x = y, where x, y are
variables or numeric constants over some infinite domain D.1
We call these non-Boolean variables the theory variables, and
denote the formula by ϕ.
Theorem provers for equality logic and uninterpreted func-
tions are reasonably efficient, and usually rely on a combi-
nation of a propositional SAT solver and an implementation
of Congruence Closure, which is based on the union-find
algorithm. They compute a propositional encoding in a lazy
1A construction of a word-level proof that uses only the tree proof rules for
equality given in Sec. III-D from a bit-level refutation is not always possible
for a finite domain.
manner. Nevertheless, algorithms that perform range alloca-
tion for equality logic are still superior to procedures that
compute encodings lazily.
The idea of range allocation is to compute a bounded range
of integer values for the theory variables in ϕ. This range is
constructed such that it is sufficient for a satisfying assignment
of ϕ, if one exists. We restrict the presentation to ranges that
can be encoded with bit-vectors, i.e., values from 0 to 2n − 1
for some integer n.
Definition 3 (Range): Let V denote the set of theory vari-
ables in ϕ. A range R : V −→ N is an assignment of a
number of bits to each variable in V . We denote the Boolean
variable that encodes bit i ∈ {0, . . . , R(x)− 1} for x ∈ V by
xi. These Boolean variables are called vector variables.
We assume that the range is consistent, i.e., for any equality
x = y in ϕ, R(x) = R(y) holds.
Definition 4 (Small-Domain Assignment): An assignment
σ to the variables V with σ(x) ∈ {0, . . . , 2R(x)− 1} is called
a small-domain assignment.
Definition 5 (sufficient): A range is sufficient for a formula
ϕ if there is a small-domain assignment σ for every satisfiable
corresponding constraint Ψ(Σ) (see Def. 2).
Given a consistent range, the variables are interpreted as bit-
vectors with just enough bits to encode the values in the range.
Formally, we denote the propositional constraint for x = y,
where x and y are non-Boolean variables, by E(x = y). Let
n = R(x) = R(y). The propositional constraint is defined as
follows:




xi ←→ yi (2)
Recall that ex=y is the variable used to replace x = y in
the skeleton ϕsk . We assume that the constants in the formula
are mapped to the range. The propositional encoder for an
equality between a variable and a constant is straight-forward.





are equi-satisfiable. We denote formula (3) as ϕenc .
We assume that a sufficient range is given. An obviously
sufficient range is R(v) = ⌈log2 |V |⌉ [6]. Procedures to
compute a smaller but still sufficient range are beyond the
scope of this article. The techniques we propose are still
applicable even if smaller ranges are used as long as the range
is sufficient according to Def. 5.
Example 1: Consider the formula
x = y ∧ y = z ∧ z 6= x
as a running example. A sufficient range is R(x) = R(y) =
R(z) = 2, which results in the following propositional
encoding:
ex=y ←→ (x0 ←→ y0 ∧ x1 ←→ y1) for x = y,
∧ ey=z ←→ (y0 ←→ z0 ∧ y1 ←→ z1) for y = z,
∧ ez=x ←→ (z0 ←→ x0 ∧ z1 ←→ x1) for z = x,
∧ ex=y ∧ ey=z ∧ ez=x for ϕsk
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B. Bit-Level Resolution Proofs for Equality Logic
The propositional formula ϕenc can be converted into CNF,
and is then passed to a propositional SAT solver. In case ϕ
is unsatisfiable, so is ϕenc , and we can obtain a propositional
resolution proof from the SAT solver. The form of this proof
depends on the particular encoding that is used to convert
ϕenc into CNF. We define a particular encoding in order to
record claims about the propositional resolution proofs that are
obtained. However, the method is not limited to a particular
encoding.
We restrict the presentation to CNF obtained by means of
Tseitin’s encoding [7], which is the basic technique behind
most tools that generate CNF.
Definition 6 (Bit-Flattening of E): The propositional con-
straint E(x = y) is transformed into CNF using auxiliary
variables o0, . . . , on−1, where oi holds if xi ←→ yi. Note
that these auxiliary variables are specific to E(x = y), and
are not shared with other constraints.









(oiex=y) ∧ (o0 . . . on−1ex=y)
(4)
This encoding may be optimized in numerous ways, e.g.,
many clauses can be omitted if the polarity of the atoms
is exploited. These techniques are beyond the scope of this
article, but our method is still applicable after applying the
commonly used optimizations. The propositional skeleton ϕsk
is transformed by similar means, i.e., introducing a new
auxiliary variable for each node of the parse-tree of ϕsk .
Example 2: Continuing our running example from the pre-
vious subsection, the following set of clauses2 is a CNF
encoding of the formula ϕenc :
for x = y:
x0y0o10 x0y0o10 x1y1o11 x1y1o11 o10ex=y o11ex=y
for y = z:
y0z0o20 y0z0o20 y1z1o21 y1z1o21 o20ey=z o21ey=z
for z = x:
x0z0o30 x0z0o30 x1z1o31 x1z1o31 o30o31ez=x
for ϕsk :
ex=y ey=z ez=x
The variables o10, o11, and so on are auxiliary variables
added for Tseitin’s encoding of the conjunction required for
decomposing the equalities.
C. Lifting Bit-Level Proofs for Equality Logic
We represent propositional resolution proofs P as a binary
tree, where the nodes represent the clauses that were resolved
from their antecedent nodes using the RES rule (see (1) in
Section II-A). For instance, Figure 1(a) shows the resolution
2In order to simplify the presentation, the clauses that are trivially satisfied
after propagation of the unit-clauses ex=y , ey=z , and ez=x are omitted.
tree for the set of clauses given in Example 2. We write
root(P ) for the root-node of P . We write leaf (n) if n is a leaf
node. Otherwise, we write L(n) and R(n) for the left and right
antecedent nodes, respectively. We write L(n) to denote the
fact at node n ∈ P (the label of node n). For leaf-nodes that
are generated for a specific atom (as opposed to the skeleton),
we write AT (n) to denote the theory atom that the clause was
generated for. A proof P shows unsatisfiability of a formula
ϕ if its leaves are trivially implied by ϕ and L(root(P )) = .
We write ϕ ⊢P  in this case.
Our proof-lifting algorithms take a propositional resolution
proof P for ϕenc as input, and lift it up to a new proof for
ϕ that uses a word-level logic by replacing the labels of the
nodes. The structure of the graph is not changed, up to a final
minimization step.
For the theory of equality and the encoding described above,
the lifted propositions have one of the following three forms,
where Ti denotes a theory predicate:
F1 T1 ∧ . . . ∧ Tk, or
F2 T1 ∧ . . .∧Tk ∨Θ, where Θ is a propositional clause, or
F3 a propositional CNF-clause, including the empty clause.
We define the following lifting-function λ(n) for the propo-
sitions that are used to label the leaf-nodes of P by means of













x 6= y ∨ oi : for L(n) = (xiyioi)
x 6= y ∨ oi : for L(n) = (xiyioi)
x = y ∨ oi : for L(n) = (xiyioi)
x = y ∨ oi : for L(n) = (xiyioi)
L(n) : otherwise
(5)
We note that the clauses generated by λ(n) for leaf-nodes
have either one of the forms F2 or F3. It is easy to see that the
label returned by λ is trivially implied by ϕ for all leaf-nodes
n of P .
The inner nodes of P (i.e., those that are the result of a
resolution step) are also lifted. Let
λ(L(n)) = T L1 ∧ . . . ∧ T
L
j ∨Θ, and




be the lifted labels of the two antecedent nodes of n, where Θ
and Θ′ stand for (possibly empty) propositional clauses. We
define Tn to denote the conjunction




1 ∧ . . . ∧ T
R
k .
There are two cases, depending on whether the resolution that
results in node n is performed on a vector variable:
• If the resolution for node n is performed by resolving on
a vector variable, we define λ(n) := Tn ∨Θ ∨Θ′ if Tn
is satisfiable, and λ(n) := Θ ∨Θ′ otherwise.
• Otherwise, the resolution for node n is performed on a
non-vector variable. Let RES(Θ,Θ′) denote the resolvent
of Θ and Θ′ according to Rule (1) in Section II-A. Then,








Note that the second transformation may violate the assump-























o20y = z ∨ o20
x = y ∨ o10
x 6= z ∨ o30 x = y
x 6= z ∧ x = y ∨ o30 y = z
o30
y = z ∨ o20
x = y ∨ o10
x = y x 6= z ∨ o30







Fig. 1. Resolution graph and the corresponding lifted proof for the clauses in Example 2. The right part of the respective graphs is symmetric to to the left
part and has therefore been omitted.
Therefore, it is only performed if either TL1 ∧ . . .∧T
L
j is equal
to TR1 ∧ . . . ∧ T
R
k , or at least one of these terms is false. In
all other cases, the lifting of the propositional proof fails. This
case occurs in none of our benchmarks (see Section IV). The
satisfiability of T n can be checked efficiently using a union-
find data structure.
Theorem 1: The new labels λ(n) imply the old labels L(n).
Proof: (By induction) For the leaf nodes, one can easily
show that λ(n) implies L(n) by flattening the theory atom in
L(n) according to Definition 6. This constitutes the base case.
It remains to show that λ(n) implies L(n) for an inner node
n. By our induction hypothesis, λ(L(n)) implies L(L(n))
(and λ(R(n)) ⇒ L(R(n)), respectively). Observe that the
lifting function λ preserves the propositional structure of




i ∨ Θ, where each L
L
i denotes a literal for a vector
variable, and Θ contains no vector variables, then λ(L(n)) is
of the form TL1 ∧ . . . ∧ T
L
j ∨Θ.
First we consider the case that resolution is performed on
a vector variable. We prove
(TL1 ∧ . . . ∧ T
L
j ) ∧ (T
R
1 ∧ . . . ∧ T
R










LRi ) ∨ (Θ ∨Θ
′)
(6)
by performing a case split over values of the elements of the
disjunction on the left side of the implication: If (Θ ∨ Θ′)
is true, or the expression on the left side is false, then the
implication holds trivially. In the remaining case, Θ ∨ Θ′ is
false, and (TL1 ∧ . . . ∧ T
L
j ) ∧ (T
R
1 ∧ . . . ∧ T
R
k ) holds. Then






i , and T
R






i by our induction hypothesis, and (6) holds.
For the remaining case (i.e., when we perform resolution
on a non-vector variable), we have to show that
(T L1 ∧ . . . ∧ T
L
j ) ∨ (T
R
1 ∧ . . . ∧ T
R









LRi ∨ RES(Θ ∨Θ
′)
This is trivial, since the new label λ(n) as well as the old label
L(n) is obtained from the predecessors of n by resolution.
It is left to show that the lifted labeling actually corresponds
to a proof.
Theorem 2: For all inner nodes n of P , the new label is
implied by the conjunction of the new antecedent labels:
λ(L(n)) ∧ λ(R(n)) ⇒ λ(n) (7)
Proof: In the case that the resolution is performed on a
vector variable, we have to show that
(












(TL1 ∧ . . . ∧ T
L
j ) ∧ (T
R
1 ∧ . . . ∧ T
R
k ) ∨ Θ ∨Θ
′
holds. This can be easily achieved by applying the distributive
law to the left side of the implication.
The remaining case is trivial, since the λ(n) is obtained by
performing resolution on the labels of L(n) and R(n).
The lifting-function λ can be applied recursively to a proof
P together with labels L, beginning with the leaf-nodes, to
produce a new set of labels. We write λ(P ) for this new proof.
Theorem 3: Let P denote a proof with ϕenc ⊢P , let λ
denote a lifting-function, and P ′ := λ(P ) a proof generated
by lifting P using λ. If the lifting function has the following
properties, then P ′ shows unsatisfiability of ϕ:
1) The lifted leaf-node labels are implied by ϕ,
2) the lifted inner node labels imply the old labels.
Proof: Observe that L(root(P )) = . Because of the
second premise, λ(root(P )) = . As the leaves λ(leaf (n))
are implied by ϕ, and P ′ is a proof, we have ϕ ⊢P ′ .
D. Interpolation using Lifted Proofs
In this section we explain how an interpolant can be derived
from the lifted proof λ(P ). Note that the all lifted labels are of
form F1, F2 or F3 (see Section III-C). Our implementation
guarantees that the formula P(T1, . . . , Tk) over the theory
predicates is always of form T1 ∧ . . . ∧ Tk.
The decision procedure for equality logic (as presented
in [4]) makes use of transitivity, reflexivity, and contradiction.
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The following two rules are sufficient to decide pure equality
logic:
TRANS






If the formula is unsatisfiable, then a contradictory fact (ti =
tj) ∧ (ti 6= tj) can be inferred for some i, j.
A chain of equalities (x = t1)∧(t1 = t2)∧· · ·∧(tn = y) can
be partitioned into maximal sub-chains (ti = ti+1) · · · (tj−1 =
tj), i < j consisting of either only equalities from A, or only
equalities from B. Each subchain can then be summarized by
(ti = tj). We maintain such summaries for each node of the
lifted proof. By constructing summaries from A such that the
terms ti and tj also occur in B (i.e., are global) one can obtain
an interpolant for A and B.
Example 3: Consider the lifted proof in Figure 1(b), and
the partitioning A = (x = y) ∧ (y = z) and B = (z 6= x).
The variable y is local to A, while x and z are global.
Consider the resolvent of x 6= z ∧ x = y ∨ o30 and y = z.
Using transitivity, we derive
TRANS
x = y y = z
x = z
{(x = y), (y = z)} ⊆ A
and obtain a maximal chain x = z as summary for A. We




¬(z = x) ∈ B
This yields (x = z) as an interpolant for (x = y) ∧ (y =
z) ∧ (z 6= x). We apply the rules presented in [4] to the
remaining propositional resolution steps of the lifted proof.
Since the propositional structure of ϕ contains no disjunction,
this results in (x = z) as the interpolant for 〈A,B〉.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We have implemented the techniques described above in a
tool called LIFTER. It uses MiniSat [2] as the solver for the
encoding ϕenc .
We compare the performance of LIFTER with the SMT
solver Yices [8] and with FOCI [4]. Of these provers, only
FOCI and LIFTER are interpolating. We nevertheless include
Yices in the comparison as a reference point.3
The benchmarks we use have been suggested in [6], [9],
and are available for download. We remove ‘easy’ benchmarks
from the set by eliminating a benchmark if all solvers are
able to solve it within 0.1s or less. All formulas we consider
are unsatisfiable. For the purpose of computing an interpolant,
we split the formulas into two parts. We plot the run-time of
LIFTER and Yices in Fig. 2. We omit the comparison with
FOCI, as Yices outperforms FOCI on most of these queries.
The experiments show that on this set of benchmarks, the
range encoding is typically faster than the DPLL(T)-based
solver. The run-time of LIFTER is dominated by the time taken
to build ϕenc and transform it into CNF. Both the time taken by
3Yices won the most recent SMT competition in all divisions. We also ran
CVC3 on all benchmarks, and found that Yices always outperforms CVC3.


















Fig. 2. Comparison of LIFTER and Yices on Equality Logic formulas
MiniSat and the lifting-procedure are negligible. The lifting-
procedure was always able to generate a word-level proof.
V. CONCLUSION
We present a procedure for constructing a word-level proof
for equality logic. We do not rely on a deductive engine to
build a proof for the original formula, but instead transform an
existing bit-level proof to the word-level. Thus, the deductive
engine only has to work on a restricted set of theory-literals,
and does not perform any case-splitting. From the resulting
proofs, word-level Craig interpolants can be obtained. The
procedure generates a word-level interpolant for all of our
equality logic benchmarks. As future work, we plan to lift
proofs obtained from highly optimized incremental encodings
for bit-vector arithmetic, e.g., the one described in [10].
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Global Optimization of Compositional Systems
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Abstract—Embedded systems typically consist of a composition
of a set of hardware and software IP modules. Each module
is heavily optimized by itself. However, when these modules
are composed together, significant additional opportunities for
optimizations are introduced because only a subset of the entire
functionality is actually used. We propose COSE—a technique
to jointly optimize such designs. We use symbolic execution to
compute invariants in each component of the design. We propa-
gate these invariants as constraints to other modules using global
flow analysis of the composition of the design. This captures
optimizations that go beyond, and are qualitatively different
than, those achievable by compiler optimization techniques such
as common subexpression elimination, which are localized. We
again employ static analysis techniques to perform optimizations
subject to these constraints. We implemented COSE in the
Metropolis platform and achieved significant optimizations using
reasonable computational resources.
I. INTRODUCTION
An embedded system performs one or more dedicated tasks
using one or more processors that communicate with other
dedicated devices, without being referred to as a computer [1],
[2]. Embedded systems arise in many applications: examples
include communications, image processing, and automotive
electronics [2].
Embedded systems are heterogeneous by nature. For ex-
ample, they combine application specific integrated circuits
(ASICs) and field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) with
embedded software. A diversity of platforms try to employ and
integrate different models of computation (MoC) to address
the co-design problem of embedded systems. The platforms
need to provide tools to specify, synthesize, and validate an
embedded design.
Metropolis is an example of a design tool for embed-
ded systems. The designer specifies the system using the
Metropolis Metamodel (MMM) and Metropolis synthesizes
the design by configuring parametrized architectural elements,
dynamic scheduling algorithms, interface blocks, as well as
final software and hardware implementation. Many techniques
exist to optimize each of these components as well as the
underlying communication network [3], [4], [5]. However,
there is a need for developing new techniques that can perform
optimizations across hierarchical boundaries.
We present co-optimization using symbolic execution
(COSE), a novel technique that works across components of
an embedded design to optimize structures therein. COSE
automatically detects opportunities for optimization thereby
avoiding labor on the part of the designer who would otherwise
have to manually select the subset of functionality used. COSE
detects invariants that the designer may not know or may
not recognize as useful for optimizing other components.
Furthermore, there is anecdotal evidence that having a designer
manually simplify components using knowledge of their en-
vironments is a buggy process; we use a formal technique to
compute opportunities for optimization, thereby guaranteeing
the optimized and original designs are functionally equivalent.
Key to our approach is symbolic execution (SE) [6], [7]. We
use SE to analyze software components and define a limited
set of values that software feeds hardware as constraints. SE
explores all possible paths of execution of the code specifying
a component. It does this by accumulating path conditions
(PCs) and annotating them to the corresponding segments
of the component. A PC is associated with a branch of
code and consists of the conjunction of conditions over input
and state variables necessary and sufficient for the branch
to execute. These PCs define constraints that limit the set
of values that software feeds hardware. We propagate these
constraints across the networks of the design and use static
analysis techniques such as constant propagation, redundancy
removal, and don’t care optimizations to reduce the hardware
components.
SE performs particularly well in the context of simple
inequality checks and mapping assignments. This makes it
suitable for our problem of detecting invariants that raise from
different configurations and parameterizations of hardware
components in software. COSE applies Juzi [6], an SE tool,
to extract PCs for every line of code in an MMM component.
Juzi uses CVC-lite [8] to solve or simplify PCs. CVC-Lite is a
theorem prover for the Satisfiability Modulo Theory problem
and it operates on logics that can express equality, inequality,
and arithmetic operations.
We make the following key contributions:
1) We develop COSE—a technique that crosses software
and hardware boundaries to perform joint optimizations.
2) We use SE to detect opportunities for optimization that
are qualitatively different from those detectable with
localized compiler optimizations and computationally
infeasible with pure Boolean netlist analysis.
3) We implemented a prototype for COSE in the Metropo-
lis framework and achieved significant results on two
designs with significant complexity—a realtime image
processing system and a switch fabric supporting mixed-
mode traffic.
Our paper is structured as follows: we present a motivating
example in Section II. In Section III-A we introduce Metropo-
lis and the MMM. We illustrate SE with an example and
elaborate on its advantages and limitations in Section III-B.
In Section IV we present our prototype implementation. We
present two case studies in Section V. We discuss related work
in Section VI, and we finally conclude in Section VII.
We convey the key ideas behind COSE using examples and
high-level description and rely on the Metropolis metamodel
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Fig. 1. Modified seat belt
to formalize the different techniques we use as well as their
compatibility. We use the informal style for pedagogical
reasons, as well as the 8 page submission limit.
II. EXAMPLE
The state diagram in Figure 1(a) describes the classical seat
belt controller of [9]. The controller waits for at most 32
seconds after the car key is turned on for the seat belt to be
locked. If the seat belt was not locked, then the alarm will be
on. Figure 1(b) shows the counter that implements the timer.
Since it counts till 32, then at least 5 state bits are needed in
the hardware implementation.
Suppose the car manufacturer decides to add a new safety
feature and a designer implements it in a new component as
shown in Figure 1(c). The new component monitors the same
timer signal and forces the car to turn off if the seat belt was
not locked before 6 seconds have elapsed. All we need to count
for now is 6, and thus we only need 3 bits. However, we can
see the potential for this reduction only when we co-optimize.
The same phenomenon is routinely faced in embedded sys-
tem design. Examples include bus controllers with preemptive
logic used in non-preemptive applications, cache IP that has
pollution logic used in an application that never invalidates
the data, an Internet Protocol processor that supports IPv6
used in a router that drops all IPv6 packets at the ingress,
a microprocessor core that supports multiplication used in an
application that is purely control dominated, etc.
III. BASIC CONCEPTS
In this chapter we review the Metropolis development
environment. Metropolis provides a framework that integrates
a set of tools to operate and manipulate a common design rep-
resentation. We then introduce and illustrate the SE technique
with an example.
A. Metropolis Overview
Metropolis provides a metamodel to support existing MoCs
and accommodate new ones. Similar to other platforms like
Polis [10], Ptolemy [11], SystemC [12], and SpecC [13].
Metropolis allows concurrent design of multiple processes and
uses channels to communicate between them. It is different
in that it introduces orthogonalities between (1.) computation
versus communication, (2.) functionality versus architecture,
and (3.) behavior versus performance. These processes are
orthogonal since computation refinement is usually a manual
process, functional and architectural specifications are decided
by different groups, and performance constraints are specified

















Fig. 2. Metropolis platform
The tools integrated in Metropolis allow designers to spec-
ify, partition, synthesize, and validate an embedded system.
By partition we mean to decide which parts of the design get
implemented by software that runs on programmable compo-
nents and which parts get implemented directly in dedicated
hardware devices. Synthesis compiles the software to opti-
mized object code and hardware into optimized configurations
of logic gate libraries. Validation checks whether the final
implementation meets the properties in the specifications [14].
Metropolis uses MMM, an extension of the Java program-
ming language with access restriction paradigms, as the design
description language.
The diagram in Figure 2 shows the different components
of the Metropolis platform. Metropolis provides several tools
to manipulate the design. The two most commonly used are
the Elaborator and the SystemC [12] code generator. The
Elaborator parses the MMM specifications and generates an
abstract syntax tree (AST). All the other tools in the Metropo-
lis framework operate on the AST. The SystemC generator
provides a path to simulation, verification, and synthesis.
Metropolis also has another verification path to the SPIN [15]
model checker.
1) Design Methodology: Metropolis allows a recursive
design cycle with three phases. In Phase 1, the designer
specifies the functional behavior of the design. This uses one
or more MoC to describe (1.) the computation components,
(2.) the communication components, (3.) the connections, and
(4.) the hierarchy of the design. In MMM these are referred
to as processes, media, interfaces and netlists respectively.
In Phase 2, the designer describes the target architecture
platform of the design as a library of services. In Phase 3, the
designer maps the functional specifications to the architecture
services. In summary, the mapping is an intersection operation
that constrains a functional interface to an architectural one.
The functional and architectural netlists may be developed
by Metropolis designers and may also be provided as libraries.
A platform vendor, for instance, may provide an architecture
MMM of an FPGA to its customers. Similarly, a design team
may develop a standard library of commonly used functional
processes to promote reuse.
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(c) Juzi instrumented code
[A > B, B − A > 0] infeasible
[A > B ] y = A + B − B = A
[A > B ] x = A + B − A = B
x=A, y=B
[A > B , B − A <= 0] end[A <= B] end
[A > B] x=A + B
     A > ? B
[A > B ] B − A > ? 0
end
1: int x,y;
5:    x = x − y;
4:    y = x − y;
3:    x = x + y;
2: if (x > y) {
6:    if (x − y >  0 )
7:        assert( false );
8: } }
SymbolicInt x,y;
    if( x.subt(y).if_cmpgt(0)) 
    y.assign( x.subt(y));
    x.assign( x.subt(y));  
    x.assign( x.add(y));
if( x.if_cmpgt(y)){
        assert(false);
(a) original code (b) SE execution with annotated PCs
Fig. 3. Symbolic execution
2) The Meta Model: Metropolis uses a meta model to
represent a design. Like the tagged-signal model [16], MMM
is not tied to a particular MoC. MMM provides a set of
computation and communication building blocks that can be
customized to describe the semantics of many different MoCs
thus enabling the modeling of heterogeneous systems.
MMM builds on the syntax and semantics of the Java
programming language. It restricts itself to a subset of Java that
includes inheritance, basic logical and arithmetic operators,
loops, and conditionals. MMM introduces special class speci-
fiers such as process, media, and quantity and supports method
and field access control using modifiers like eval, update,
and port. It also supports logical implication and equivalence
operators in its embedded linear temporal logic (LTL) [17]
used to specify constraints.
Processes are the active elements of the design and are
typically used to perform computations via executing their
thread methods. To decouple communication from computa-
tion, processes do not communicate directly with each other,
they connect through interface ports and media. This allows
the communication semantics to change without the need to
change the processes.
Media are the communication components of the design and
facilitate communication between processes and other media.
They are passive, meaning they do not perform computation,
but they may contain data and state.
The Metamodel supports two constraint formula types:
LTL and logic of constraints (LOC). In addition, often LTL
constraints form mappings expressing the equivalence between
functional and architectural components.
A netlist connects the Metamodel components. Functional
netlists usually consist of processes and media, while ar-
chitectural netlists consist of processes, media, quantities,
and constraints. Netlists may be connected hierarchically. A
mapping netlist, for instance, can contain a functional netlist,
an architectural netlist, and constraints between the two.
B. Symbolic Execution
SE is a technique that explores all possible executions of a
program by traversing all possible branching conditions while
bookkeeping symbolic values for all variables involved in the
program at each atomic step. For every branch, SE adds the
condition for the branch it takes to a PC in conjunction. Upon
completion, all PCs are evaluated. Some of the accumulated
PCs may be proved unsatisfiable, and thus the code these
PCs annotate is proved dead since there is no setting for the
program variables that satisfies its PC.
In Figure 3(b) we show the symbolic execution of the
generic code in Figure 3(a). SE techniques start by initializing
variables x and y to symbolic values A and B. At the first
branch on line 2, the two choices are valid so they are both
considered. The first, A ≤ B, exits the block. The second,
A > B, enters the body of the conditional statement. The
values of x and y are updated at each line until the next
branch is reached on line 6. At that point the first condition,
B − A ≤ 0, exits the block. The second, B − A > 0, leads
to the assert statement. However the PC, accumulated from
the branch on line 2, conflicts with the symbolic check on
the values of x and y. Thus we can conclude that the assert
statement is not accessible.
This shows how the SE technique can effectively detect
dead code in control and data flow dominated circuits. With
SE we can also annotate each line of code with all the PCs that
allow the line to be executed. The tool Juzi [6] implements SE
for Java code. It does so by instrumenting the Java-byte code
of the Java class in question to use symbolic implementations
for its variables. Figure 3(c) shows the Java code equivalent to
the automatic Juzi instrumentation for the code in Figure 3(a).
The variables x and y are declared as SymbolicInt variables and
the arithmetic and Boolean operations and conditions applied
to them are replaced by symbolic operations. The symbolic
assign, add, and subt operations update the correspondence be-
tween x and y and the symbolic values A and B respectively.
The if cmpgt updates and checks the PC with the different
choices it makes. Juzi also introduces lazy initialization where
it initializes a variable only when it is actually used rather
than when it is declared. Juzi supports dynamically allocated
structures and data structures with self-loops – e.g., linked
lists, and respects method preconditions.
Under the hood, Juzi uses CVC-lite to decide a PC or
to simplify it into an equivalent more compact PC. CVC-
lite is a validity checker for typed first order logic with
interpreted theories. It supports integer and real arithmetic,
equality and inequalities, predicate subtypes, partial functions,
uninterpreted functions, arrays, records, bitvectors, and quanti-
fiers [8]. COSE leverages these capabilities to work on a high
level of abstraction and detect invariants that are qualitatively

















Fig. 4. COSE in Metropolis
IV. OUR APPROACH
Before we proceed to present the technical solution, we
discuss two fundamental questions. First, one may question
whether software can be developed before hardware is com-
mitted. Second, new versions of software may try to use
hardware that was optimized away.
The software dependence on ready hardware question is
methodology specific. The MMM assumes a complete design
at every level of abstraction, and thus the reductions obtained
by co-optimization apply only to that level. At any refinement,
reductions need to be discarded and co-optimization can
be applied again. The flexibility question is inherent in all
models and is specific to the co-optimization technique. COSE
provides the sets of constraints it detected and used to optimize
other components. Thus it allows the designers to either stay
within the framework of the optimizations or to discard the
optimizations and run COSE again in case new conflicting
constraints were found.
A. COSE Overview
Figure 4 shows how COSE is integrated into the Metropolis
framework. COSE is an iterative process that uses SE and
static analysis techniques to optimize a design at hand. It takes
as input an MMM netlist Φ, and a starting PC σ that could be
empty. It selects one interesting process Π in Φ, and it uses
Juzi to symbolically execute the thread function in Π, with σ
as the starting PC.
COSE uses Juzi and CVC-lite to perform SE. This is
convenient since MMM is an extension to Java with access
restrictions. COSE translates Π to Java and calls it ΠJava. The
translation to Java is straightforward and works with inlining
method calls and substituting ports by variables with Boolean
validity guards to control read and write operations and allow
a run-time protection mechanism. Then COSE compiles ΠJava
into byte-code, ΠBC , and feeds that to the Juzi instrumentor
class. COSE then symbolically executes the instrumented class
and gathers the generated PCs.
COSE follows the usage of ports in the process and joins
all the path conditions annotated to the code of the ports in
disjunction into σporti . Then each σ
port
i is treated as a con-
straint to the port and is propagated through the corresponding
connections in Φ. COSE repeats these steps for every medium
and process that connects to Π through a constrained port.
B. COSE Optimizations
We annotate each line of MMM code with the disjunction
of the PCs generated for it from Juzi. We resolve and compact
the PCs using CVC-lite. A PC that evaluates to false is
infeasible and the code it annotates is dead-code and thus can
be optimized away.
COSE can also perform range restriction optimizations. If,
for example, COSE detects PCs restricting all indexes reading
and writing into an array to a specific range, it can resize the
array and use a smaller number of bits for the indexes.
COSE also checks for mutually exclusive blocks of code
via evaluating the PCs of interesting blocks of code that use
the same ports. Once two mutually exclusive blocks of code
are detected, COSE adds a constraint to the netlist connecting
the two blocks of code to declare they are mutually exclu-
sive. Synthesis tools can use this to optimize communication
between ports depending on the underlying MoC [18].
COSE generates optimized MMM modules that are an-
notated with detected and simplified PCs. In addition to
conditional statements, COSE embeds the PCs it detected on
ports as LTL constraints in the MMM module describing the
netlist connections of the design. We pass the optimized and
constrained MMM to a synthesis tool where we target reduc-
tions achieved by static analysis such as constant propagation,
redundancy removal [19], [20], and observability don’t care
optimizations [21].
COSE operates only on the MMM level. It uses the netlist
connecting the different components of a design only to follow
the connections regardless of the semantics of the underlying
MoC. Thus the optimizations and constraints computed by
COSE are valid regardless of the underlying MoC.
C. Dependency Map and Constraint Propagation
COSE propagates constraints through ports. A port has an
interface type and allows access to methods declared in the
interface. More than one process may own ports with the same
interface type, and media implement the interface methods.
COSE follows the port declarations and usages in the entire
netlist Φ and forms a dependency graph. The nodes of the
dependency graph are processes, media, and interfaces. The
arcs are connected ports. All the connections in MMM are
done with the connect keyword which facilitates building such
a map. Connections in MMM have to be resolved statically
and are done at the netlist level. This helps run SE on
the component level only and helps COSE scale to large
compositions. A PC is coded into a conditional constraint and
is annotated either to the thread method of a process, or to the
implementation of an interface method in a media.
D. Synthesis Reduction Techniques
COSE can use the native synthesis tools in Metropolis
or can run public domain synthesis optimization tools like

































Fig. 5. Switch fabric design
constraints. We obtain the best optimization gains when COSE
detects dead code that instantiates or activates other compo-
nents of the netlist. Constraint based optimizations intersect
with sequential don’t care reductions. As previously stated,
COSE has the advantage of detecting invariants on a level
of abstraction higher than classical don’t care optimization
techniques which use Boolean constraints. This is mainly
because COSE uses SE which produces PC expressed with
equality, inequality and arithmetic logic.
E. Illustration on the Seat Belt Example
For the modified seat belt example described in Section II,
in a single iteration COSE propagated a PC that constrains the
counter port to ≤ 6 in the timer. If the timer is implemented in
hardware, this is enough to set the two most significant state
bits of the counter to 0. Constant propagation techniques can
propagate the 0 values and drop the constant state bits. Juzi
instrumented and symbolically executed the seat belt example
in less than 5 seconds.
V. CASE STUDIES
In this section, we apply COSE to reduce two designs with
significant complexity. The first is a switch fabric for mixed IP
and ATM traffic that can be deployed in several configurations
such as an IP-only traffic application. The second is an image
processing system that identifies objects in real time pictures
and it also can be used in different configuration such as
military usages and home video surveillance.
A. Switch Fabric
In Figure 5 we show the organization of a shared-memory
switch fabric [22] for mixed ATM and IP traffic. The switch
fabric receives packets of data on its input ports and correctly
forwards them to their destination ports. A packet can be
described as a data structure composed of a protocol field, a
class field, a destination address and a payload stream of data.
Input ports are modeled by queued buffers of packets. Output
ports are assumed to hold the data for immediate consumption.
When two packets arrive which need to be forwarded to the













Fig. 6. Class diagram for switch fabric metamodel
packet memory leads to better buffer utilization [23], and high-
end core routers, such as the Juniper M-series are organized
in this fashion [24].
The switch fabric in Figure 5 supports both IP and ATM
traffic. It implements class-of-service: each packet has a class-
of-service field which identifies its priority. The control pro-
cessor computes two schedules, taking into account the free
packet buffers: the input schedule maps input ports to available
packet buffers, and the output schedule maps valid packet
buffers to output ports. The physical transfer of packets is
performed via the crossbars after the schedule is computed.
The design is configured using in-band signaling through IP
and ATM packets specially marked with a control code in the
first byte of the packet payload. A control packet contains a
destination and a port number and instructs the switch fabric
node to update the forwarding table to map the destination to
the output port. The design in Figure 5 implements this via two
lookup tables for the protocols it supports. The lookup tables
are used later to map data packets with destination addresses
to the correct ports.
1) MMM for Switch Fabric: Figure 6 shows the MMM
class diagram of the switch fabric design. Boxes denote
process classes, dotted boxes denote interfaces, ellipses show
media classes, and filled and empty arrows denote ownership
and inheritance relations respectively. The design is connected
through the netlist object sf netlist. The input and output
schedules are media objects that implement the ScheduleIfc
interface. The IP and ATM lookup tables are media objects that
implement the LookupTableIfc interface. The internal memory
is a two dimensional array of the SFPktBuffer media which
implements the PacketIfc interface. The sf netlist has input
and output port interfaces that also implement the PacketIfc
interface. The computational elements of the switch fabric de-
sign are expressed in three processes. The SFUpdateTablesProc
process receives control input packets and updates the lookup
tables. SFComputeScheduleProc looks at the input and output
ports and the internal memory through PacketIfc and updates
the input and output schedules. SFPerformTransferProc is the
third process and it actually reads the schedules and performs
the data transfer accordingly.
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2) Results for Switch Fabric: We assumed the deployment
of the switch fabric design in Figure 5 in multiple scenarios.
The first scenario is with network elements that produce IP
only traffic. The second scenario was with local network
elements that are limited to the use of few output ports.
We modeled the IP-only traffic by a CreateInputs process. The
following fragment of pseudo code from CreateInputs shows
how the protocol field is set to IP PROTOCOL for valid inputs.
int inIdx;
for ( inIdx = 0 ; inIdx < NUM_IN; inIdx++ ) {
inBuff[inIdx].valid = chooseBoolean();
if(inBuff[inIdx].valid == 1){
// if (chooseBoolean() == 1)
inBuff[inIdx].pkt.protocol = IP_PROTOCOL;
//else
// inBuff[inIdx].pkt.protocol = ATM_PROTOCOL;
... }
Similar to Figure 3, COSE instruments all fields of
the pkt as SymbolicInt and thus detects the path condition
PCprtcl, inBuff[inIdx].protocol == IP PROTOCOL, in all exe-
cution branches of the CreateInputs process. COSE propagates
PCprtcl to SFComputeSchedule through the InputIfc ports.
COSE was able to determine that all blocks of code condi-
tioned with if(inBuff[inIdx].protocol == ATM PROTOCOL) are
infeasible in all branches of execution of SFComputeSchedule.
COSE annotates all these blocks of code with an if(false)
PC and thus optimizes them out. In addition, COSE an-
notated the PacketIfc and the ScheduleIfc interfaces with
PCprtcl since it still holds across all execution branches
in SFComputeSchedule. Then in turn, COSE propagated the
PCprtcl to the SFPerformTransferProc process. All blocks
of code therein conditioned with if(inBuff[inIdx].protocol ==
ATM PROTOCOL) were optimized out.
With 4 input ports, 4 output ports, and an 8 × 16 internal
packet buffer, it took COSE 3 hours and 12 minutes to com-
plete this optimization with 36, 816 symbolic integer variables
and more than 2 million branches of execution.
We modeled the network with limited output port acces-
sibility with a CreateInputs process that sends control packets
with a limited destination port value.
int inIdx;
for(inIdx = 0; i < NUM_IN; i++){
inBuff[inIdx].valid = chooseBoolean();
if(inBuff[inIdx].valid == 1){








} else { // setup data packet
...} } }
COSE was able to detect the path condition PCport,
(inBuff[inIdx].pkt. data[0] == CTRL PKT) AND (inBuff[inIdx].pkt.
data[2] ¡ 4). COSE propagated the PCport condition,
through the InputIfc interface, to SFUpdateTablesProc and
then annotated all the LookupTableIfc interfaces with
lookupTable[tableIdx].outputPort ¡ 4. COSE propagated the latter
PC to SFPerformTransferProc and annotated the only block of
code that writes to the output ports with it.













Fig. 7. Flow diagram for the ObjectID application
outBuff.[outPortIdx].valid = 1;
outBuff.[outPortIdx].pkt = getPcktFromScheduleAndMemory();
... } // END COSE ANNOTATION
With this annotation COSE enabled the synthesizer to drop
the 4 output ports that are never written to or validated. COSE
ran with 61, 018 symbolic integer variables and took 4 hours
and 7 minutes to inspect all feasible branches of execution and
compute this optimization.
B. Case Study: Video Surveillance
Figure 7 shows an image processing video surveillance ap-
plication, also called object identification, that was developed
in an MS project [25]. The system accepts an image and
produces labels of the objects with their coordinates in the
image. One or more edge detectors scan the image and produce
edge marks that are visited by one or more segmentation
algorithms to produce segmentation marks. The segmentation
marks partition the image with the borders of the main shapes
in it. Then a pattern recognition algorithm is used to match
the shapes in the segmented image to a library of objects.
The application instantiates 4 edge detectors and 3 segmentors
and uses them depending on the resolution of the requested
edge and recognition. We assume the system was designed for
military usages that need high resolution analysis, and then it is
used for home surveillance purposes where lower resolutions
are suitable. If only home surveillance resolution is desired,
just two detectors and one segmentor are needed.
1) MMM Model for ObjectId: We implemented the
object identification example in MMM. The system originally
took 16 weeks of work by one designer and is around 4000
lines of C and RTL code. We modeled it with around 1255
lines of MMM code. The diagram in Figure 8(a) shows
the high abstract view of the ObjectID application, and the
diagram in Figure 8(b) shows the detailed class diagram.
The OIDImage media implements OIDImageObjectIfc
which defines interfaces for object identification and inherits
image, edge, and segment interfaces. An OIDEdge process
accesses the OIDImage media through owning a port of type
ImageEdgeIfc. OIDGaussianEdge extends the OIDEdge
process and implements one type of edge detectors which uses
a Gaussian mask to differentiate pixels. We only named one
type of edge detectors for brevity. Other well known tech-
niques for edge detection such as the Sobel, Prewitt, Laplacian
of Guassian (LoG), and the Canny detectors [26] may be
























(a) abstract class diagram of ObjectID (b) detailed implemetation class diagram of ObjectID
Fig. 8. Levels of abstraction of the Object ID application
ImageSegmentIfc, and OIDSegmentLinear implements
one type of segmentation algorithms. The OIDFusion medium
owns a CaptureIfc, and an ImageObjectIfc. It also im-
plements the FusionControllerIfc and FusionProcIfc
interfaces. OIDFusionProc owns FusionProcIfc and
RecognizeIfc interfaces. The OIDRecognize process also
owns similar interfaces.
The netlist oid_netlist instantiates 4 OIDGaussionEdge
processes, 2 OIDSegmentLinear processes, one OIDImage
medium, one OIDFusion medium, and one OIDFusionProc
process. It also connects them appropriately through their
owned and implemented ports. CaptureIfc and the object
part of ImageObjectIfc are open to the outside world where
the system can accept controlled input.
2) ObjectID Dependency Map: Figure 9 shows the code
of the ObjectID netlist, OIDFusion, and OIDGaussianEdge.
The arrow on the connect method call in the netlist con-
structor links the usage of the oid fusion ifc port to its im-
plementation in OIDFusion. If the capture and the recognition
interfaces happen to be set to 120 and 105 then the body of the
thread method of the OIDGaussianEdge detectors instantiated
as edge3 and edge4 will be dead code since the first statement
in the condition is going to be always false. The arrows in
the figure show how the dependency map was built from
instantiations and connections in the netlist and usages of ports
in process classes.
3) COSE ObjectID Results: In the ObjectID, we assumed
a capture medium implementation that requires a low reso-
lution. We were able to detect infeasible PCs on lines that
activate the two high resolution edge detectors in one COSE
iteration. In the second iteration and after propagating the
infeasible PCs we were also able to detect dead code for the
lines that activate one of the segmentation processes. We were
able to reduce the system by 2 edge detector components and
one segmentation component. It took COSE 15 minutes to
instrument and symbolically execute the ObjectID code.
VI. RELATED WORK
Compared to sequential optimization techniques from
logic synthesis, specifically, those based on sequential don’t
cares [27], COSE operates at much higher level of abstraction
than Boolean netlists—we treat high-level constructs such as
integer variables, memories, etc., natively. We also make use
of the decomposition of the design into modules. This leads
to more compact models, reducing run-time complexity which
has been a major drawback to sequential logic synthesis.
Analyzing software components with Boolean methods is
far beyond the reach of current tools—there is too much
state associated with the instruction set. We have in the past
experimented with verifying a switch fabric with VIS [28],
We implemented the scheduling in hardware, and it was con-
siderably simpler than the scheduler employed in this paper.
However, verification still suffered from BDD-blowup, and we
were unable to verify elementary properties of a 2-input 2-
output shared memory switch with 4 packets of buffering, no
control packets, and no support for mixed-mode traffic.
Our SE technique is different from symbolic reachability
analysis [28] in many aspects. First, it does not examine the
transition system of a component in whole and rather looks
at the transition of interleaving variables that define the state
space via executing the code line by line. Also it only considers
reachable states via pruning infeasible PCs.
Prior dead-code detection techniques [29], [30] make use
of conservative static analysis and can therefore erroneously
classify paths as alive; in contrast, SE coupled with a decision
procedure gives more accurate results for programs with
bounded loops and recursion.
Similar to VeriSoft [31], COSE performs a state-less search:
it systematically explores an execution tree, which represents
all execution paths up to a desired bound, and backtracks using
re-execution, ensuring that all (feasible) paths are explored.
This contrasts with the state-full search of SPIN [15], which
stores states using hashing. COSEs use of symbolic execution
also contrasts with VeriSoft and SPIN, who do not use off-
the-shelf decision procedures and require the user to a priori
provide (tight) bounds on integer inputs.
VII. SUMMARY
We introduced the use of SE to co-optimize embedded
systems, presented COSE and implemented a prototype that
uses Java inlining. We integrated COSE in the Metropolis
framework and showed it can lead to significant optimiza-
tions on representative examples. COSE is a co-optimization
mechanism that can find constraints in software and effectively
propagate them to hardware. These constraints may not be
observable by designers and lead to optimizations that are
qualitatively different than reductions possible with localized
compiler optimizations and Boolean level transformations.
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medium OIDFusion implements FusionControllerIfc {public netlist oid_netlist{
  static final int RESOL = 50;
  ...
  public oid_netlist(String name, int res, int sel, int sense, int neighboors)
  {
    OIDEdgeGaussian edge1 = new OIDEdgeGaussian(RESOL, SELECT);
    OIDEdgeGaussian edge2 = new OIDEdgeGaussian(2*RESOL, SELECT);
    ...
    //connect edge − fuse
    connect(edge1, oid_fusion_ifc, fuse);
    connect(edge2, oid_fusion_ifc, fuse);
    connect(edge3, oid_fusion_ifc, fuse);
    connect(edge4, oid_fusion_ifc, fuse);
  }
}//end of netlist
    OIDFusion fuse = new OIDFusion(REQ_EDG, REQ_SEG);
    OIDEdgeGaussian edge3 = new OIDEdgeGaussian(3*RESOL, 2*SELECT);
    OIDEdgeGaussian edge4 = new OIDEdgeGaussian(4*RESOL, 2*SELECT);
process OIDEdgeGaussian extends OIDEdge
{
  parameter int resolution;
  int m_state = no_op;
  thread()  {
     if(m_state == no_op)
              oid_fusion_ifc.selection() < selectiveness &&
              oid_fusion_ifc.goodtime()){
          int pixels[][] = oid_iem_ifc.refImage();
          int marks[][] =  oid_iem_ifc.refEdge();
          doGaussianMark(pixels, marks, m_state);}
          m_state = mask_on;
    else
       doGaussianMark(oid_iem_ifc.image(),  oid_iem_ifc.edgeMarks());
  ...}
    return max(oid_rec_ifc.res(), oid_cap_ifc.res()); } }
  eval int resolution() {
Fig. 9. Dependency map of ObjectID
Given the different levels of abstractions possible in Metropo-
lis, COSE can accompany the concretization process one step
at a time. COSE guarantees that the result of its optimization
is functionally equivalent to the original design. In the future,
we plan to optimize COSE via integrating it with a native
difference equation solver instead of calling CVC-Lite. We
are also exploring the use of SE to optimize linking programs
across compilable software modules.
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Abstract—In simulation-based verification, we check the cor-
rectness of a given program by executing it on some input
vectors. Even for medium-size programs, exhaustive testing is
impossible. Thus, many errors are left undetected. The problem
of increasing the exhaustiveness of testing and decreasing the
number of undetected errors is the main problem of software
testing. In this paper, we present a novel approach to software
testing, which allows us to dramatically raise the probability
of catching rare errors in large programs. Our approach is
based on the cross-entropy method. We define a performance
function, which is higher in the neighborhood of an error or a
pattern we are looking for. Then, the program is executed many
times, choosing input vectors from some random distribution.
The starting distribution is usually uniform, and it is changed
at each iteration based on the vectors with highest value of
the performance function in the previous iteration. The cross-
entropy method was shown to be very efficient in estimating
the probabilities of rare events and in searching for solutions
for hard optimization problems. Our experiments show that the
cross-entropy method is also very efficient in locating rare bugs
and patterns in large programs. We show the experimental results
of our cross-entropy based testing tool and compare them to the
performance of ConTest and of Java scheduler.
I. INTRODUCTION
Software testing (also called simulation-based verification)
is a family of analyses that involve an automatic or semi-
automatic exploration of the state space of a program.
Simulation-based verification is traditionally used in order to
check the program with respect to some input vectors [2].
It is widely used today as a primary means for checking the
correctness of programs. Thus,in simulation-based verification,
the challenge of making the verification process as exhaustive
as possible is crucial. Each input vector induces a different
execution of the program, and a program is correct if it
behaves as required for all possible input vectors. In the
ideal world, a program would be tested on all input vectors.
This approach, however, is infeasible even for medium-size
programs, whereas today it is common to find programs with
a few million lines of code. To make matters worse, reuse of
components (that may have never been tested with the new
use in mind) makes it possible to assemble products orders of
magnitude larger, in the same time.
Since simulation-based verification is a technique that re-
places the infeasible task of checking all input vectors, it is
very important to increase the capability of simulation-based
verification to find errors and to make the testing process
as thorough as possible. The research in this area focuses
on several different directions, which we describe in more
detail in Section II. While the existing techniques have been
successful in specific applications, none of them has proven
successful in efficiently finding a large variety of rare bugs in
large programs. The problem is especially acute in concurrent
programs, which many have exponentially many possible
behaviors resulting from different possible schedulings of
threads.
In this paper we propose a new approach to testing of large
programs, which is based on the cross-entropy method. The
cross-entropy (CE) method is a generic approach to rare event
simulation [19]. It derives its name from the cross-entropy
or the Kullback-Leibler distance, which is a fundamental
concept of modern information theory [13]. It is an iterative
approach, and is based on minimizing the cross-entropy or the
Kullback-Leibler distance between probability distributions.
The CE method was motivated by an adaptive algorithm for
estimating probabilities of rare events in complex stochastic
networks [17]. Then, it was realized that a simple modification
allows to use this method also for solving hard combinato-
rial optimization problems, in which there is a performance
function associated with the inputs. The CE method involves
an iterative procedure, where each iteration consists of two
phases:
1) Generate a random data sample according to a specified
mechanism.
2) Update the parameters of the random mechanism based
on the data to produce a “better” sample in the next
iteration, where “better” is chosen according to the
predefined performance function.
A sample is evaluated according to a predefined performance
function. The procedure terminates when the “best” sample,
that is, a sample with the maximal value of the performance
function (or, if the global maximum is unknown in advance,
with a sufficiently small relative deviation), is generated. The
CE method is used in many areas, including buffer allocation
[1], neural computation [8], DNA sequence alignment [12],
scheduling [14], and graph problems [18].
In testing, in order to make the CE method applicable
we shift the focus from searching for bugs to focusing our
attention on the most error-prone areas of a program. The
following example helps to clarify the difference between
the approaches. Assume that we are given a program, which
we want to test for buffer overflow errors. A bug-oriented
testing tool searches for executions in which the buffer is
overflowed. These executions might be very rare and might
escape our testing efforts. In cross-entropy-based testing, we
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direct the execution to the areas in which the buffer reaches
its maximal capacity. The advantage of this approach is that
this area, while can be small, is not of negligible size, and
can be discovered during random testing. Also, if there exists
an erroneous execution in which the buffer is overflowed, it
surely occurs in this area.
We argue that many common bugs and patterns which may
contain bugs have a natural performance function. For exam-
ple, in case of the buffer overflow, the natural performance
function for an execution gives the value which is equal to
the maximal size of the buffer in this execution. We describe
many more examples of common bugs and bug patterns and
their associated performance functions.
Our way of using CE method in testing is suitable for
programs with many points of non-deterministic decisions. In-
formally, such programs create a large control-flow graph with
many branching points, which allows us to view the testing
setting as a variation of a graph optimization problem. While a
serialized program can, in theory, have many points with non-
deterministic decisions (for example, statements conditional on
the result of coin-tossing), the most common example of such
programs is concurrent programs. In concurrent programs,
at each synchronization point the decision of which process
(or thread) makes the next step is made by the scheduler
and can be viewed as non-deterministic when analysing the
program. In this work, we focus on concurrent programs
and apply the CE method to errors related to concurrency
(such as a way of scheduling the threads that leads to buffer
overflow). Our work can, in theory, be extended to arbitrary
non-deterministic programs. However, we believe that testing
concurrent programs is the area in which CE method has the
maximal advantage.
We implemented our algorithm in a tool named ConCEnter,
which stands for “Concurrent Cross-Entropy based Error Re-
vealer”. We provide the details of implementation and the ex-
perimental results of running ConCEnter on several programs
with different bug patterns1. We compare the performance of
ConCEnter with the performance of ConTest, a randomized
testing tool for concurrent programs developed in IBM [9].
We show that ConCEnter performs better than ConTest by an
order of magnitude.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we briefly survey the existing work in the
area of improving the capability of simulation-based verifica-
tion to find bugs.
One direction is to focus on bugs that manifest themselves
under a heavy load on the system during runtime, such as
buffer overflows, timeouts, etc. The traditional method of
testing for these bugs is called stress-testing. The method
takes single-thread tests and creates stress tests by cloning
them many times and executing them simultaneously (see, for
example, [10]).
1The executable of ConCEnter with some test programs is available from
the authors on request.
Another approach to testing is to create random interference
in the scheduler which leads to randomized interleavings of
the thread executions (these tools are also called “noise mak-
ers”) [9], [22]. The interference is created by injecting noise
to the scheduler forcing the scheduler to create uncommon
interleavings, which are rare during usual execution. However,
a chance of finding a very rare bug is small, since the random
distribution (created by injecting noise) is not adjusted to a
specific pattern.
The most commonly used method to maximize the ex-
haustiveness of testing is coverage estimation. There is an
extensive research simulation-based verification community on
coverage metrics, which provide a measure of exhaustiveness
of a test [23]. Coverage metrics are used in order to monitor
progress of the verification process, estimate whether more
input sequences are needed, and direct simulation towards un-
explored areas of the program. Essentially, the metrics measure
the part of the design that has been activated by the input
sequences. For example, code-based coverage metrics measure
the number of code lines executed during the simulation. There
is a variety of metrics used in coverage estimation (see, for
example, [7], [15], [16], [23], [26]), and they play an important
role in the design validation effort [24]. Still, since there is
no special effort directed to a possibly erroneous pattern in
the code, rare bugs can remain in the code even after testing
reached a high coverage of it.
Existing testing methods that look for predefined patterns in
programs rely on heuristics specifically targeted to a pattern,
for example, delaying read/write instructions [3], or denying
the application certain services [25]. This approach is quite
efficient for finding predefined patterns, however, it requires a
different heuristic to be invented for each new bug.
An approach based on exploiting genetic algorithms [11] in
testing led to several prototypes of testing tools implementing
this idea (see, for instance, [20], [21]). These algorithms,
however, normally require a very long execution time, and
they have also been shown to be ineffective in finding rare
and hard-to-reproduce bugs.
III. PRELIMINARIES
A. The Cross-entropy Method in Optimization Problems
The cross-entropy (CE) method was developed in order to
efficiently estimate probabilities of rare events, where an event
e is considered a rare event if its probability is very small, say,
smaller than 10−5. In this method, we are given a very large
probability space and a function S from this space to IR+,
and we say that e occurs on an input X (from the probability
space) if S(X) > γ for some predefined value γ ∈ IR+. Since
the space is very large, it is infeasible to search it exhaustively,
therefore the estimation of the probability l of e is made by
sampling. A straightforward way to estimate l is to draw a
random sample according to the given probability distribution
f on inputs, and then estimate l by examining the sample.
The problem is, that when e is a rare event, the sample might
have to be very large in order to estimate l accurately. A
better way is to draw the sample according to some other
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probability distribution g that raises the probability of e. The
ideal probability distribution here would be gl, which gives
the probability 0 to inputs that do not contain e. The CE
method attempts to approximate gl. The distance between two
distributions that is used in this approximation is the Kullback-
Leibler “distance” (also called cross-entropy). The Kullback-
Leibler “distance” between g and h defined as:







Note that this is not a distance in the formal sense, since
in general it is not symmetric. Since gl is unknown, the
approximation is done iteratively, where in iteration i we
draw a random sample according to the current probability
distribution fi and compute the (approximate) cross-entropy
between the fi and gl based on this sample. Then we construct
fi+1 by updating fi based on the cross-entropy result. The
reader is referred to Appendix for more formal explanation
and to the book on cross-entropy for the complete description
of the method [19].
Our method of testing large program is based on the
application of CE method to graph optimization problems.
In these problems, we are given a (possibly weighted) graph
G = 〈V,E〉, and the probability space is the set of paths
in G represented by the sets of traversed vertices. This setting
matches, for example, the definitions of the traveling salesman
problem and the Hamiltonian path problem in the context
of CE method. This is also the setting which we use in
our approach. Our goal is to find executions of the program
under test in which the system enters a predefined state. For
example, in order to test stack overflows, we are interested
in executions in which the stack occupancy is maximal.
As we explain in Section III-B, we represent the program
under test as a graph. Then, paths in this graph correspond
to executions of the program. We define S (which we call
a performance function) so that S(X) reaches its global
maximum on paths in which the system is brought to the state
we are testing. As we argue in Section IV-C, many common
bugs and bug patterns admit a natural performance function.
The probabilities can be assigned to edges or to vertices of the
graph (depending on how the sample is drawn). W.l.o.g, we
assume that the probabilities are assigned to edges. We start
with uniform probability distribution. In each iteration i, we
sort the sample Xi = {X1, . . . , XN} generated in this iteration
in ascending order of their performance function values. That
is, S(X1) ≤ S(X2) ≤ . . . ≤ S(XN ). For some q  1, let
Q(Xi) = {X(1−q)N,X(1−q)N+1, . . . , XN}
be the best q-part of the sample. The probability update




where e ∈ E is an edge of G that originates in the vertex v,
Q(v) are the paths in Q(Xi) which go through v and Q(e)
are the paths in Q(Xi) which go through e. Intuitively, the
edge e “competes” with other edges that originate in v and
participate in paths in Q(v). We continue in the next iteration
with the updated probability distribution f ′. The procedure
terminates when a sample has a relative standard deviation
below a predefined threshold parameter (usually between 1%
and 5%).
Remark 3.1 (Smoothed updating): In optimization prob-
lems involving discrete random variables, such as graph opti-
mization problems, the following equation is used in updating
the probability function instead of Equation 1:
f ′′(e) = αf ′(e) + (1 − α)f(e), (2)
where 0 < α ≤ 1 is the smoothing parameter. Clearly, for
α = 1 we have the original updating equation. Usually, a value
of α between 0.4 and 0.9 is used. The main reason why the
smoothed updating performs better is that it prevents losing a
good sample forever (if one of its edges is assigned 0 in one
of the iterations).
B. Definitions
In this work we focus on finite multi-threaded programs.
Let t stand for the number of threads in the program. As all
executions of the program are finite, we can talk about the
unwound code of the program. That is, the code of each loop
is duplicated the maximum number of times it may run and all
function called are embedded in the code of the main function.
Definition 3.2 (PL): Program location (PL) is a line num-
ber in unwound code of the program.
Definition 3.3 (CFGi): A control flow graph (CFGi) of
thread i (i ∈ [t]) is a directed graph Gi = 〈Li, Ei, µi〉 where
Li is the set of all program locations in the unwound code
of the thread, Ei is the set of edges such that 〈v, u〉 ∈ Ei if
a statement at location u can be executed immediately after
the statement at location v, and µi ∈ L is the initial program
location of the thread.
Definition 3.4 (PLV): Program location vector (PLV) v is
a t dimensional vector such that for each i ∈ [t] vi ∈ Li.
At each moment m during the execution of the program, we
say that the execution is at PLV v if for each i ∈ [t] vi is the
next program location to be executed in thread i.
Clearly, the set of all PLVs is equal to the cross product of
the Lis.
Definition 3.5 (JCG): The joint control graph (JCG) of the
tested program is a graph 〈V,E〉 whose vertices are the PLVs.
There is an edge in the JCG between vertices u and w if there
exists an execution path in which w is the immediate successor
of u.
Note that at each moment only one thread can make a move.
Therefore, the branching degree of each vertex is at most t.
Since the code is unwound, every statement in it is executed
at most once and the statements are executed in the increasing
order of their program locations. Therefore, JCG is a finite
directed acyclic graph (DAG). The source vertex of the JCG is
a PLV which is composed of the initial PL µi for each thread
i.
103
Definition 3.6 (PF): Probability function PF : V (JCG)×
[t] → [0, 1] such that the probability sum over the outgoing
edges of each vertex is 1.
This function defines for each vertex v and each of its
outgoing edges ei the probability of the thread i to advance
when the execution reaches v. If not all threads are enabled
at v, we take the relative probabilities of the enabled ones. If
Ten ⊆ [t] is the set of the enabled threads at this moment then
the relative probabilities are:






if i ∈ Ten
0 otherwise
Definition 3.7 (Visible thread state): A visible thread state
(VTS) s of a thread i is the pair 〈v, σ, τ〉 where v ∈ Li denotes
the current PL, σ denotes the valuation of all local variables,
and τ denotes the valuation of the global variables accessed
by the statement at program location v.
Intuitively, the set of visible thread states are all possible
states of the system as visible by the thread when it accesses
various parts of this system.
We assume that correct locking policy was implemented
in the program (this can be checked statically). Therefore,
any VTS that can be reached by any program execution, can
be also reached by some program execution when context
switches are allowed only at locking or unlocking statements.
Thus, under such context-switch policy the only vertices of
the JCG which may have more than one successor are those
PLVs with program locations of lock or unlock statements.
Then, all vertices with a single successor can be collapsed
without losing any synchronization information, and therefore
we can assume that the JCG graph contains only program
locations of locking/unlocking statements 2. This restriction
on the context-switch policy was introduced in [4], [5].
For a single execution of the program, we call the sequence
of vertices of JCG that it visits an execution path in JCG.
IV. CROSS-ENTROPY FOR TESTING
A. Algorithm
The algorithm starts with choosing the performance function
S according to the state of the system to which we want
to converge (we list some of the more natural performance
functions in Section IV-C). A concurrent program is viewed
as a JCG, which is a product of DAGs of its threads. Each
DAG corresponds to the unwound program of a thread. The
JCG is not constructed in advance - edges between PLVs are
discovered during the execution of the algorithm.
Essentially, the algorithm simulates a random walk on the
control graph of the program by deciding, at each synchroniza-
tion point, which thread makes the next step3. The structure
of the algorithm is presented in Figure 1, and we also describe
it in more detail below.
1) The probability distribution table contains probability
distribution on edges and is updated at each iteration.
2We assume a single statement per program location.










Fig. 1. The structure of our algorithm
Initially, the edges are unknown, so the table is empty,
assuming uniform distribution.
2) The program is instrumented by adding callbacks at
synchronization points. This enables the algorithm to
stop the execution at these points and decide which
edge is going to be traversed next (that is, which thread
makes a move). At this point, the algorithm gathers the
knowledge of the edges of JCG and stores it.
3) At each iteration, the algorithm performs the following
tasks:
a) The istrumented program is executed a number
of times that is sufficient to collect a meaningful
sample (the number of executions depends on the
size of JCG). Executions are forced to perform
scheduling decisions according to the current prob-
ability distribution on edges. Stopping the execu-
tion and deciding which thread is allowed to run
next is performed by separate components in our
implementation.
b) The executions are used in order to compute the
new probability distribution (see Equation 1 and
Equation 2). We discuss the choice of the param-
eters q and α in Section V.
4) The algorithm terminates when the collected sample
of the current iteration has a sufficiently small relative
standard deviation (between 1% and 5%, as discussed
in Section III-A).
B. Heuristics for improving performance
Dealing with unwinding: To generate the full JCG of the
unwound program (without actually generating the unwound
code), a program location is composed from the line number in
the original (not unwound) code and an additional parameter,
which reflects the unwinding. This parameter is a vector of
values of loop counters for all loops the program is currently
in. The example in Figure 4.1 illustrates why a single counter
is not enough to determine the program location uniquely.
Example 4.1: The program block in Figure 2 contains
nested loops. The values of maxI and maxJ are received
from other thread and define the number of iterations of each




for(i = 0; i ≤ maxI; i+ +)
for(j = 0; j ≤ maxJ ; j + +)
foo(i, j);
Fig. 2. An example of nested loops
and (2) maxI = 2 and maxJ = 1. Consider the second call
to foo(i, j). In each of these cases, this call will appear in
a different place in the unwound program, but the value of a
single counter in both cases would be the same.
For the general case, we present a better parameter, using
which, a 1-1 mapping can be created for any inner iterative
structure of the program. This parameter will take the form of
a stack. Each time the thread execution reaches a loop it pushes
a new counter with value 0 on top of the stack, before entering
the loop. Each time the execution starts a new iteration of a
loop it increases the value of the top counter on the stack.
Each time the execution exits the loop scope we pop the top
counter of the stack. The same idea can be applied to function
calls. Currently we do not test programs with recursion, though
the method can be applied to recursive programs after minor
changes.
Modulo reduction: In practice, the JCG of the unwound
program can be huge even for medium-size programs. The
problem with this is twofold. First, the graph itself may be
two big to fit in the memory and to search efficiently. Second
and more important, the set of execution samples generated
at each iteration of the algorithm may be too sparse when
projected on the JCG. In such case, the probability is updated
only for a small fraction of the nodes. The consequence is
that the algorithm converges to an arbitrary local maximum,
instead of the target global maximum. We solve both problems
by introducing the modulo reduction, in which the counters in
program locations are computed modulo some small integer.
The modulo reduction creates a modulo joint control graph
(MJCG) form the original JCG. Each vertex of JCG is mapped
to a vertex of MJCG by taking the modulo value of all its
counters. The modulo reduction decreases the size of the
graph significantly, however, it does not preserve the desired
1-1 mapping to unwound program locations. Our experiments
show that with some fine tuning, it is possible to find the
optimal modulo parameter, in which the many-to-one mapping
does not confuse the CE computation, and yet, the MJCG is
dense enough to allow the CE method to converge to a global
(and not local) maximum.
C. Applications
In this section we show that CE method is useful for testing.
The necessary prerequisite of using the CE method to find
a rare pattern or bug is the ability to define a performance
function for this pattern. We show that many (if not the
majority) of potential problems in programs admit a natural
performance function, and thus can be discovered using the
CE method. As an easy example, consider searching for
buffer overflows. Using the CE method, we can direct the
executions of the program to areas where the buffer occupancy
is maximized. The natural metrics for this problem is the
number of elements in the buffer. The following is a partial
list of other common patterns in programs, often associated
with bugs, for which there exist natural metrics, and which,
therefore, can be found using the CE method.
• Discovering data races: the function is the number of
shared resources accessed during the execution.
• Testing error paths: the function is the number of error
paths taken during the execution.
• Incorrect use of synchronization primitives: the function
is the number of calls to mutually exclusive functions in
an execution.
• Bugs caused or related to wait-notify situations: the
function is the number of lost notifies.
• Testing recovery from multiple failures of threads/tasks:
the function is the number of canceled threads/tasks.
• Simulation of the environment that triggers many excep-
tions: the function is the number of generated exceptions.
• Not releasing resources properly or exhaustion of re-
source pools: the function is the number of allocated
resources minus the number of released ones.
V. IMPLEMENTATION AND EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The algorithm we describe in Section IV-A is implemented
in Java and tested on several examples that we constructed.
In this section, we briefly describe the implementation details
and present our experimental results.
A. Implementation
The cross-entropy-based testing tool ConCEnter is written
in Java. Its structure is reflected in Figure 1, and we briefly
describe each part of it below.
• Instrumenter is an instrumentation tool that adds call-
backs at synchronization points, i.e., immediately before
and after each synchronized block.
• Decider receives a node v of the JCG of the program
under test and chooses which thread is allowed to run
next according to current relative probabilities RP (v) on
the control graph edges.
• Stopper: on callbacks from the instrumented code it stops
the currently running thread using a mutex designated for
this thread. Then, it calls notify() on the mutex of the
thread that can make the next step (based on Decider’s
decision).
• Evaluator collects the edges of the JCG traversed by the
execution path. At the end of each execution it computes
the S value of the execution.
• Updater updates the probability distribution table for the
next iteration based on the computations of Evaluator.
During the execution, Decider and Evaluator collect big
amounts of data. To minimize the sizes of the memory buffers
for this data, it is periodically written to files.
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B. Experimental Results
We performed several experiments on different metrics and
different types of bugs. The tests were written in Java version
1.5.0 and executed on a 4 CPU machine 64bit “Dual Core
AMD Opteron(tm) Processor 280” with clock rate of 2.4GHz
and 1MB cache size each. The total memory of the machine
is 8GB. The operation system it runs is GNU/Linux 2.4.21-
37.ELsmp.
We constructed several examples of programs with bugs that
admit a natural performance function. The programs and bugs
introduced in them are as follows.
1) Buffer overflow and underflow in a standard producer-
consumer program. The test program consists of four
threads (2 producers and 2 consumers) running concur-
rently. The buffer size is 5, and each thread can perform
10 push or pop operations.
2) Buffer overflow in a scenario similar to the previous case
but with the buffer size 45 and 25 operations for each
thread.
3) Buffer overflow and underflow similar to test 1 but with
modulo parameter.
4) Stack overflow in a program with two types of threads,
A and B, and two threads of each type. The pseudo-
code of a thread is presented In Figure 3. Each thread
performs 10 operations, and the size of the stack is 36.
We note that in this test, buffer overflows are very rare
(the probability of experiencing a bufer overflow in a
random execution under uniform distribution on edges
of the JCG is O(1/2n), where n is the size of the buffer),
since the buffer is filled up only in executions in which
thread types continuously alternate.
myName = A; // or B
for(i = 0; i < 10; i+ +)
synchronized(buffer) {




} // end loop
Fig. 3. The pseudo-code of the stack overflow example with two types of
processes
5) Deadlocks. The test program has 10 mutexes and three
locking threads. Most of the time, a correct locking
policy is enforced (mutexes are numbered and the lock-
ing is attempted only in the order of their numbering).
However, in a small percentage of the executions, a
thread locks mutex 8 before locking mutex 7 and thus
can cause deadlock.
In each test, we fine-tuned the parameters q (the best part
of the sample), α (the smoothing parameter), and the modulo
parameter to achieve the fastest convergence to the global
maximum. The results of ConCEnter are compared with the




% successful 100% unstable 99%
executions
runtime 15 sec 10 sec for 3 sec
2000 tests
Buffer Overflow with a large buffer
ConCEnter ConTest Java
scheduler
% successful 100% from 0.02% 99%
executions to 30%
runtime 20 sec 30 sec for 3 sec
5000 tests
Buffer Overflow with MJCG
ConCEnter ConTest Java
scheduler
% successful 100% unstable 99%
executions
runtime 15 sec 10 sec for 3 sec
2000 tests
Stack Overflow with A and B threads
ConCEnter ConTest Java
scheduler
% successful 90%  2.5% 0%
executions




% successful 90% at most 1 out ≈ 0%
executions of 5000 tests
runtime 20 min 300 sec 2 sec
Fig. 4. Experimental results
examples. We summarize the results in Table 4. In all examples
ConCEnter converged in less than 20 iterations.
We also studied the influence of various CE method param-
eters on the performance of ConCEnter on the example of test
3 (stack overflow with A and B threads). In our experiments,
we did not see a significant influence of q and α parameters
on the performance of ConCEnter. The conclusion is that the
modulo parameter is the parameter that seems to have a crucial
role in the performance of ConCEnter. It seems that there is
a lower and an upper bound for it, between which ConCEnter
performs well. If the modulo parameter is smaller than its
lower bound, then MJCG loses too much information and thus
the CE method does not converge. If, on the other hand, the
modulo parameter is larger than its upper bound, then MJCG
is too sparse and CE method converges to a local maximum.
We summarize these results in Table 5. The runs that did not
converge neither to the global nor to the local maximum, did
not converge at all after 40 iterations.
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modulo
# samples % convergence to
per global local
iteration maximum maximum
none 100, 200, 0 100%
400
2 200 30% 70%
2 400 15% 0%
3 100 20% 55%
3 200 55% 25%
3 400 75% 10%
4 100 5% 80%
4 200 50% 45%
4 400 85% 5%
8 100, 200, 0 100%
400, 1000
Fig. 5. Influence of modulo parameter
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We showed a way to find rare bugs in large programs using
the CE method by describing an algorithm that adapts the set-
ting of testing of a program to the setting of the combinatorial
optimization problem and performs an iterative procedure of
CE method for a given performance function. We listed many
interesting (potentially buggy) patterns in programs which
have natural performance functions. We implemented a testing
tool based on the CE method, called ConCEnter. We described
the structure of ConCEnter and presented experimental results
of running it on several patterns. We compared the perfor-
mance of ConCEnter to this of ConTest, an IBM testing tool.
In future work, we will apply ConCEnter to other patterns. We
will also investigate other, more sophisticated ways to use CE
method in testing. Mainly, we are interested in the following
directions:
• Fine-tuning ConCEnter parameters. Our experiments
show that in many cases choosing the best parameters for
a given performance function is hard. It is interesting to
devise an automatic method to find optimal parameters.
• Finding the second best. Our method converges towards
some parts of interleaving space where the performance
function is maximized locally or globally. There may be
other areas where the performance function is maximized.
We would like to develop a method to find these other
arias which where not covered in previous executions of
the algorithm.
• Increasing the modulo in a part of the graph. The
parameter that defines the modulo reduction seems to be
critical to the convergence of the method and it is hard
to find the value which will be optimal to all nodes of
the JCG. The best strategy here is probably to define
a different modulo value for each node. We guess that
this can be done by analyzing the graph of previous
executions.
• Coverage. As mentioned above, increasing test coverage
is one of most widely used methods of program verifica-
tion. In testing, a huge effort is made to create tests which
cover more of the program. We intend to use CE method
with “find the second best” technique to iteratively create
execution paths which increase coverage.
• Partial Replay. It is often important to replay a previous
execution of the program (for example, in order to
reproduce a bug). Unfortunately, full replay is very hard
or even impossible to achieve in practice. It seems that
using the CE method with the performance function that
reaches its maximal value on the execution we are trying
to replay can produce an execution that resembles it to a
high extend.
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APPENDIX
Here we present the more formal explanation of CE method.
The main ideas behind the CE algorithm are as follows. Let X
be a space of vectors. Let {f(·; v)} be a family of probability
density functions (pdfs) on X ,where v is a parameter vector.
Let S : X → IR+ be a function that gives each vector in X a
non-negative value. In the general version of the CE method,
we estimate the probability
l = Pu(S(X) ≥ γ) = EuI{S(X)≥γ} (3)
for some γ ∈ IR - under input f(·;u) pdf. If this probability is
very small, say, smaller than 10−5, we say that {S(X) ≥ γ}
is a rare event. A straightforward way to estimate l is to draw
a random sample X1, . . . , XN from X according to f(·;u),
and then estimate l by examining the sample. The problem
is, that when l is a rare event, the sample might have to be
very large in order to estimate l accurately. A better way is to
draw the sample according to some other probability density
function g that raises the probability of S(X) ≥ γ. Using the










The g called importance sampling density. An unbiased esti-











where l̂ called importance sampling (IS) estimator.









for all i. The g∗ function depends on l which is unknown. It
is convenient to choose g from the {f(·; v)} family. The idea
is to choose tilting parameter v such that distance between g∗
and f(· : v) is minimal. For this purpose the CE method uses
Kullback-Leibler “distance” (also called cross-entropy). The
Kullback-Leibler “distance” between g and h defined as:







Minimizing the Kullback-Leibler “distance” between g∗ in




g∗(x) ln f(x; v)dx,
since the the value of
∫
g∗(x) ln g∗(x)dx is constant. Substi-







which is equivalent to
maxvD(v) = maxvEuI{S(x)≥γ} ln f(x; v),
and using importance sampling again with a change measure





The optimal solution is
v∗ = argmaxvEwI{S(x)≥γ} f(x;u)
f(x;w)
ln f(x; v)












where X1, . . . , XN is a random sample from f(·;w).
The CE method in each iteration solves Equation 6 based on
the solution of previous iteration. We demonstrate the solution
in one iteration by example, which is very similar to the use
of the cross-entropy method in the paper.
Let X be a random vector (X1, . . . , XN ) ∼ Ber(p), and
parameter v = p. The probability density function is




pXii (1 − pi)1−Xi ,
and since each Xj can only be 0 or 1, we have
∂
∂pj




1 − pj =
Xj − pj
(1 − pj)pj .
We can compute the maximum in Equation 6 by setting
the first derivatives with respect to pj equal to zero, for













I{S(Xi)≥γ}(Xij − pj) = 0,
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Abstract—In this paper, we present AutoGSTE, a comprehen-
sive approach to automatic abstraction refinement for generalized
symbolic trajectory evaluation (GSTE). This approach addresses
imprecision of GSTE’s quaternary abstraction caused by under-
constrained input circuit nodes, quaternary state set unions,
and existentially quantified-out symbolic variables. It follows the
counterexample-guided abstraction refinement framework and
features an algorithm that analyzes counterexamples (symbolic
error traces) generated by GSTE to identify causes of impre-
cision and two complementary algorithms that automate model
refinement and specification refinement according to the causes
identified. AutoGSTE completely eliminates false negatives due to
imprecision of quaternary abstraction. Application of AutoGSTE
to benchmark circuits from small to large size has demonstrated
that it can quickly converge to an abstraction upon which GSTE
can either verify or falsify an assertion graph efficiently.
I. INTRODUCTION
Symbolic trajectory evaluation (STE) [1]–[3] is a powerful
model checking technique based on quaternary symbolic simu-
lation. Within its application domain, STE is often much easier
to use and less sensitive to state space explosions, compared
to classic symbolic model checking (SMC) techniques [4]–[6].
Despite its efficiency, capacity, and ease-to-use, STE is limited
in property expressiveness: properties over infinitely long time
intervals cannot be specified and verified using STE.
Generalized symbolic trajectory evaluation (GSTE) [7], [8]
represents a significant extension to STE. GSTE supports veri-
fication of properties over infinitely long time intervals, namely
ω-regular properties, thus making it as expressive as classic
SMC for linear time logics. Meanwhile, GSTE maintains the
efficiency, capacity, and ease-to-use of STE, in particular,
GSTE inherits STE’s automatic abstraction techniques.
The key to the high capacity of STE and GSTE is the
abstraction based on a quaternary state representation (a.k.a.,
quaternary abstraction) which, however, is also their weakness.
The imprecision of quaternary abstraction may lead to false
negatives: STE and GSTE may report the result of X (un-
known) instead of 0 or 1. This is worsen by the fixed-point
computation of GSTE which introduces additional possibilities
for unknowns to creep into verification. As a result, there are
three possible causes of abstraction imprecision in GSTE:
1. Under-constrained input circuit nodes.
2. Quaternary state set unions.
3. Existentially quantified-out symbolic variables.
Currently in GSTE, imprecision due to Cause 1 is addressed
by manually introducing symbolic constants or variables to
constrain input nodes. Imprecision due to Causes 2 and 3
is eliminated manually by (1) model refinement: introduc-
ing boolean variables (a.k.a., precise nodes) to represent the
state space more accurately or (2) specification refinement:
applying semantics-preserving transformations to the assertion
graph [9]. These manual refinements are often quite involved
and require in-depth knowledge of the circuit being verified.
Furthermore, the level of abstraction determines the verifica-
tion complexity of GSTE: the more detailed the abstraction,
the higher the verification complexity. Therefore, automatic
abstraction refinement algorithms that can quickly converge
to an appropriate level of abstraction are highly desired.
In this paper, we present AutoGSTE, a comprehensive
approach to automatic abstraction refinement for GSTE, which
addresses abstraction imprecision due to under-constrained
input nodes, quaternary state set unions, and quantified-out
symbolic variables. It follows the counterexample-guided ab-
straction refinement framework and features an algorithm that
analyzes the counterexample (symbolic error trace) generated
by GSTE to identify causes of imprecision and two com-
plementary algorithms that automate model refinement and
specification refinement according to the causes identified.
• The analysis algorithm identifies these causes by back-
tracking through the counterexample and conducting fan-
in analysis over the circuit.
• If imprecision is due to under-constrained input nodes,
symbolic constants are introduced on non-loop edges of
the assertion graph while symbolic variables are intro-
duced on loop edges of the assertion graph.
• Using model refinement, the circuit nodes which obtain
the unknown values due to imprecision caused by quater-
nary state set unions or quantified-out symbolic variables
are identified and marked as precise nodes in the circuit.
• Using specification refinement, according to the causes
identified, the appropriate kind of semantic-preserving
transformation is applied to the assertion graph: for
imprecision due to quaternary state set unions, loop-
unrolling is applied and for imprecision due to quantified-
out symbolic variables, case-splitting is applied.
We have implemented AutoGSTE in the Intel Forte envi-
ronment [10] and upon GSTE, and applied it to benchmark
circuits from small to large size. The experiments demonstrate
that AutoGSTE can quickly converge to an abstraction upon
which GSTE can verify or falsify an assertion graph efficiently.
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Related Work. There has been much research on ab-
straction refinement for model checking of both hardware
and software. Space limitation precludes a detailed discus-
sion. Counterexample-guided abstraction refinement is a well-
known methodology in model checking to combat the state
space explosion problem [4], [11], [12]. Particularly relevant
to our research is the work on abstraction refinement for STE.
In [13], symbolic constants are automatically introduced to
constrain under-constrained input nodes of circuits based on
counterexamples from STE. In [14], a SAT-based algorithm
was developed to assist manual refinement of STE assertions.
To our best knowledge, our approach is the first automatic
abstraction refinement framework for GSTE that completely
eliminates false negatives caused by abstraction imprecision.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we introduces the basics of STE and GSTE and the quaternary
abstraction that they employ. In Section III, we discuss in
detail the potential causes for imprecision of the quaternary ab-
straction. In Section IV, we present AutoGSTE, our approach
to automatic abstraction refinement. In Section V, we evaluate
our algorithms on small to large size benchmark circuits. In
Section VI, we conclude this paper and touch on future work.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we introduce a simple circuit model upon
which STE and GSTE were developed, the basics of STE and
GSTE, and their quaternary abstraction. For more details on
STE and GSTE, we refer the readers to [1], [2], [7], [8].
A. A Simple Circuit Model
A circuit M consists of a set of boolean nodes N . A state
is an assignment to all the nodes in N . The node set N can
be partitioned into two disjoint sets: state nodes NS and input
nodes NI . There is a next-state function χn(N) for each state
node n ∈ NS. The set of next state functions defines how
the circuit transitions between states. The transition can also
be defined by the equivalent transition relation R(N,N ′) =
∧
n∈NS(n
′ = χn(N)), where N ′ is a copy of N to hold the
values for N after the transition and n′ ∈ N ′ is the copy of n.
A trace of the circuit is a state sequence σ = [s0, s1, s2, . . .]
such that for every index i, si+1(n) = χn(si(N)) for every
state node n ∈ NS and si+1(n) is unconstrained for every
input node in n ∈ NI .
B. Symbolic Trajectory Evaluation
An STE assertion can be viewed as a labeled linear graph
representing a finite time line. Each edge in the graph repre-
sents a time unit and is labeled with two sets of circuit states
(or equivalently state predicates), one of which is called the
antecedent label and the other the consequent label.
The symbolic simulation algorithm in STE starts from the
first edge (v0, v1) in the graph and computes the set of states
sim(v0, v1) simulated by the edge. In this case, it is the set
of states satisfying the antecedent label on the edge. The
algorithm then performs a single simulation step by computing
the post-image, post(sim(v0, v1)), of this simulation state set
and intersects the result with the set of states satisfying the
antecedent label on the second edge. The result is the set of
states sim(v1, v2) simulated by the second edge. The post-
image of a state set S(N), denoted by post((S(N)), is given
by ∃N−.S(N−)∧R(N,N−), i.e., the set of states reachable
from a state in S(N) in a single state transition. The algorithm
repeats this step until it reaches the last edge in the graph. Once
the simulation is complete, the consequent label on each edge
is checked against the set of states simulated by this edge to
see if it is satisfied, i.e., the set of states simulated by the edge
is a subset of states allowed by the consequent predicate.
C. Generalized Symbolic Trajectory Evaluation
A GSTE assertion graph is defined as a quintuple G =
(V, v0, E, ant, cons), where V is a set of vertices, v0 is the
initial vertex, E is a set of directed edges, and ant and cons
are functions that map each edge to an antecedent label and a
consequent label, respectively. Every finite path in the GSTE
assertion graph from the initial vertex is an STE assertion
graph. Therefore, a circuit M satisfies a GSTE assertion graph
G if it satisfies every STE assertion graph derived from the
GSTE assertion graph by following a finite path from the
initial vertex in the graph. More formally, the circuit satisfies
the assertion graph, denoted by M |= G, if for every boolean
assignment to all the symbolic constants, every finite path in
the graph, and every finite state trace in the circuit of the same
length, the trace satisfies the antecedent sequence on the path
implies it also satisfies the consequent sequence on the path.
To model check a GSTE assertion graph against a circuit,
a symbolic simulation is performed to compute a set of states
simulated by each edge in the graph. A state is in this set
if there is a finite path from the initial vertex leading to the
edge and a finite trace leading to the state such that the trace
satisfies the sequence of the antecedent labels along the path.
Obviously, for an edge coming out of the initial vertex, any
state satisfying the antecedent label on the edge is simulated
by the edge. Further, for an edge e and a successor edge e′
of e, if s is a state simulated by e, then any next state s′
of s that satisfies the antecedent label on e′ is simulated by
e′. This leads to a GSTE model checking algorithm with an
iterative symbolic simulation phase. Since an assertion graph
may contain loops and an edge may be reached from the initial
vertex through different paths, the algorithm requires a form
of least fixed-point computation in the simulation phase [7].
D. Quaternary Abstraction
When the circuit becomes large, the likelihood for a sym-
bolic model checking algorithm to encounter the state explo-
sion problem increases drastically. To overcome the problem,
some sort of abstraction must be applied to the circuit. In
STE, it is the quaternary modeling of the circuit where each
node has the four quaternary values {0, 1, X,} instead of
the two boolean values. There is a partial information order
among the four quaternary values as shown in Figure 1 (a). For
instance, X contains less information than either 0 or 1. Both
0 and 1 contain less information than , which represents the
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over-constrained value. Besides the quaternary generalization
of the boolean operations, two new operations are defined: the
greatest lower bound  and the least upper bound  of any
two quaternary values. Figure 1 (b) lists the truth tables for
the basic quaternary operations.
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(a) quaternary values and information ordering
(b) quaternary operations
Fig. 1. Quaternary Operations
Given such a quaternary abstraction, any state set in the
circuit can be represented either precisely or approximately by
a quaternary assignment to the nodes in the circuit. A node has
a boolean value in the quaternary assignment if it has the same
boolean value in every state of the state set. Otherwise, it has
value X . The empty set is represented by assigning  to one
or more variables depending on where the conflict occurs in
the circuit. For instance, consider a circuit with three nodes p,
q and r. The quaternary assignment for the singleton state set
{[p=1, q=0, r=1]} is [p=1, q=0, r=1], and the assignment
for the state set {[p=1, q=0, r=1], [p=1, q=1, r=1]} is
[p=1, q=X, r=1].
With this abstraction, the state space becomes much smaller.
In general, for a circuit with n boolean nodes, there are 2n
different states and thus 22
n
different sets of states. On the
other hand, there are only 4n different quaternary assignments.
Furthermore, all the operations become much more efficient in
the quaternary abstraction. For instance, the intersection ∩ of
two state sets becomes a bit-wise  of the two corresponding
quaternary assignments, and the union ∪ becomes the bit-wise
. The post-image function becomes the bit-wise quaternary
generalization of the next state functions for the state nodes
together with X for the input nodes. Instead of mapping a
state set to another state set, it maps the quaternary assignment
representing the first state set to the one representing the
second state set.
A problem with the scalar quaternary model, though, is that
it is often too coarse. This could easily lead to false negative
verification results, since many types of constraints among
nodes are lost in the abstraction. To overcome this problem,
STE uses a technique called symbolic indexing to encode a set
of quaternary assignments. For instance, for the circuit with
three nodes p, q and r, consider the following set of boolean
assignments
{[p=0, q=1, r=1], [p=1, q=0, r=0], [p=1, q=0, r=1]}.
It captures two basic boolean constraints: (1) p and q are
mutual exclusive, and (2) q is true implies r is true. These
two constraints are completely lost in the single quaternary
assignment corresponding to the set [p = X, q = X, r = X ].
However, using a symbolic constant C, the two constraints
can be precisely encoded in the following symbolic indexing
expression
(!C→ [p=0, q=1, r=1])∧(C→ [p=1, q=0, r=X ]),
which means that when C is 0 then the first quaternary is
chosen, and when C is 1 then the second is chosen. For
simplicity, we omit X’s in the quaternary assignments below.
When verifying an STE assertion against a circuit, any
boolean constraint in the STE assertion can be expressed as
a symbolic quaternary assignment using symbolic constants
in order to drive the symbolic quaternary simulation in STE.
Furthermore, the abstract symbolic quaternary simulation of
the circuit can be made into the precise symbolic boolean
simulation by assigning enough symbolic constants to the
circuit nodes in the antecedent of the assertion. However, the
same is no longer true in GSTE for assertion graphs with
loops. To address this problem, GSTE allows introducing sym-
bolic variables into symbolic quaternary assignments. Unlike
a symbolic constant, a symbolic variable is a boolean variable
that can change its value, and is existentially quantified out
after every single step simulation. One way to look at the
difference between symbolic variables and symbolic constants
is that symbolic variables symbolically index a set of edges
with scalar values while symbolic constants symbolically
index a set of assertion graphs with scalar values.
III. IMPRECISION OF QUATERNARY ABSTRACTION
A. Three Causes of Quaternary Abstraction Imprecision
There are three causes of imprecision in GSTE’s quaternary
abstraction: one inherited from STE and the other two new
in GSTE. In this section, we elaborate on these causes and
present a simple illustrative example.
1) Under-constrained input circuit nodes: In (G)STE, the
input nodes of a circuit are constrained by the antecedent
on each edge of an assertion graph. If an input node is
unconstrained, it will be assigned the value of X . Such X’s
may cause consequent violations in the symbolic simulation.
2) Quaternary state set union: In the fixed-point compu-
tation of GSTE, a set of circuit states simulated by each
edge in the assertion graph is computed. The set of states is
represented approximately by a quaternary assignment and the
union of two sets of states is approximated by the bit-wise 
of the two corresponding quaternary assignments. Such unions
may introduce additional X’s into the verification.
3) Existentially quantified-out symbolic variables: In
GSTE, a symbolic variable is a boolean variable that can
change its value every time the corresponding edge is visited,
and is existentially quantified out after every single step
simulation. So after leaving the edge with symbolic variables,

























(b) Unrolled Assertion Graph
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Fig. 3. Assertion Graph for Buffered Register
TABLE I
QUATERNARY SIMULATION
(V0, V1) (V1, V1)
0 [din=DATA, wr=1] TOP
1 [din=DATA, wr=1] [b=DATA, c=0, rd=1, wr=0]
2 [din=DATA, wr=1] [b=DATA, rd=1, wr=0]
3 [din=DATA, wr=1] [b=DATA, rd=1, wr=0]
B. A Simple Illustrative Example of Imprecision
Figure 2 shows a simple buffered-register circuit: the input
to the register is first written into a buffer and then transferred
into the register in the next clock cycle after the write.
Figure 3(a) shows an assertion graph capturing a property
to be verified on the circuit: after a write, if there are only
read requests, the output is always the data accompanying the
write. We run GSTE to verify the circuit against the assertion
graph. The step-by-step result of the quaternary simulation is
listed in Table I. GSTE reports a violation of the consequent
dout = DATA on the loop edge (V 1, V 1) due to an X
assigned to dout. However, it is not difficult to observe that the
property holds on the circuit. Therefore, GSTE has reported
a false negative. The quaternary assignment of (V 1, V 1) in
Iteration 2, [b = DATA, rd = 1, wr = 0], is obtained
from the union of the assignment of (V 1, V 1) in Iteration
1, [b = DATA, c = 0, rd = 1, wr = 0], and the assignment
representing the set of new reachable states in Iteration 2,
[b = DATA, r = DATA, c = 1, rd = 1, wr = 0]. This union
introduces additional X’s, which lead to the X value of dout.
IV. ABSTRACTION REFINEMENT
In this section, we start by reviewing the state-of-art manual
abstraction refinement for GSTE and then present AutoGSTE,
our approach to automatic abstraction refinement for GSTE.
First, we give its overarching framework. Then, we introduce
our algorithm for identifying causes of abstraction imprecision
from counterexamples generated by GSTE. After that, we
discuss how we automate abstraction refinement according to




(V0, V1) (V1, V2) (V2, V2)
0 [din=DATA, TOP TOP
wr=1]
1 [din=DATA, [b=DATA, c=0, TOP
wr=1] rd=1, wr=0]
[din=DATA, [b=DATA, c=0, [b=DATA, r=DATA, c=1,
2 wr=1] rd=1, wr=0] rd=1, wr=0]
[din=DATA, [b=DATA, c=0, [b=DATA, r=DATA, c=1,
3 wr=1] rd=1, wr=0] rd=1, wr=0]
A. Manual Abstraction Refinement
Currently in GSTE, the imprecision due to quaternary state
set unions and quantified-out symbolic variables is addressed
with two manual strategies. The first strategy is to manually
mark a set of circuit nodes as precise nodes [9]. For these
nodes, by using the parametric representation, their values and
the relationships among them are always represented exactly
by using boolean expressions as their values. In the above
example, we can mark the node c as a precise node. This will
prevent the union of [b = DATA, c = 0, rd = 1, wr = 0] and
[b = DATA, r = DATA, c = 1, rd = 1, wr = 0]. We rerun
GSTE to verify the circuit with the precise node against the
original assertion graph in Figure 3(a). GSTE reports that the
assertion graph holds on the circuit.
The second strategy is to manually apply semantics-
preserving transformations to the assertion graph. Typical
transformations include case-splitting of an edge and unrolling
of a loop. In the case of the above example, we can apply
loop-unrolling to the assertion graph in Figure 3(a) to obtain a
semantically equivalent assertion graph shown in Figure 3(b).
We run the circuit against the refined assertion graph and
the step-by-step simulation is listed in Table II. In essence,
the loop-unrolling prevents the union of [b = DATA, c =
0, rd = 1, wr = 0] and [b = DATA, r = DATA, c = 1, rd =
1, wr = 0], which are now associated with two separate edges
(V 1, V 2) and (V 2, V 2), respectively. Intuitively, this refines
the assertion graph to mimic the real computation flow of the
circuit.
Both strategies above require manual efforts. To apply these
strategies, one must have in-depth understanding of the circuit
being verified and be able to identify where the imprecision
is introduced by GSTE. Therefore, it is highly desired that
the causes for imprecision can be automatically identified
and these manual strategies can be automated. (For more
discussion of the manual strategies, we refer readers to [9]).
B. AutoGSTE: Automatic Abstraction Refinement
AutoGSTE employs a counterexample-guided abstraction
refinement loop formed by GSTE, the counterexample analysis
algorithm, and the abstraction refinement algorithms, as shown
in Figure 4. GSTE applies quaternary abstraction to verify
a circuit M against an assertion graph G. If GSTE reports
an assertion violation: a consequent in the assertion graph
is violated, it generates a counterexample (a symbolic error


















Fig. 4. Automatic Abstraction Refinement Loop for GSTE
to the consequent violation. The counterexample analysis
algorithm exams the counterexample to identify the causes of
the consequent violation. If it is caused by conflicting values
to certain circuit nodes, the assertion fails. Otherwise, the
refinement algorithms conduct abstraction refinement accord-
ing to the causes identified. The model refinement algorithm
automatically identifies precise nodes that need to be marked
in the circuit. The specification refinement algorithm applies
semantics-preserving transformations to certain edges of the
assertion graph on-the-fly in the GSTE symbolic simulation.
C. Identification of Causes for Consequent Violation
1) Counterexample Generation from GSTE: When GSTE
reports an assertion failure, it also presents a computing history
which is a symbolic searching tree of triples (e, src, dest),
where e is an edge that GSTE simulated, and src and dest
are the quaternary states before and after the simulation of
the edge e. Given the triple which causes the consequent
violation, we backtrack through the computing history to find
the occurrence of the triple (e′, src′, src), and then continue
the backtracking until we reach an edge originated from the
initial vertex in the assertion graph. The sequence of triples
traversed during the backtracking forms a counterexample CE
that leads to the consequent violation. Formally, we define the
counterexample as a sequence of triples CE = [t1, t2, . . . , tl]
such that for every index 1 ≤ i ≤ l, ti = (edgei, srci, desti),
where edgei is the edge traversed in step i and srci and desti
are the states before and after this simulation of edgei.
2) Identification of Causes: Once the counterexample is
generated, the counterexample analysis algorithm is applied
to determine the causes of the consequent violation. If the
violation is due to conflicting values to certain circuit nodes
in a circuit state and a corresponding consequent, we know the
circuit does not satisfy the assertion graph. If the violation is
caused by the unknown value of a circuit node, starting from
the circuit node, our algorithm backtracks through the error
trace and conducts fan-in analysis over the circuit to identify
the circuit nodes where the unknown values were introduced.
The analysis algorithm is shown in Figure 5. It inputs
the counterexample CE, the post-image function post and
Algorithm: AnalyzeCounterExample(CE[1 : l], post)
1: V iolators← {n|n ∈ N,n violates cons(CE[l].edge)
due to unknown value}
2: Candidate← ∅, Q← ∅
3: forall n ∈ V iolators do Q.enqueue((n, l))
4: while Q = ∅ do
5: (n, step) ← Q.dequeue()
6: if n ∈ NI then
7: add (n, step, INPUT) to Candidate
8: else if n depends on symbolic variables from
ant(CE[step− 1].edge) then
9: add (n, step, WEAK) to Candidate
10: else if n has precise value in post(CE[step −
1].dest) then
11: add (n, step, UNION) to Candidate
12: else
13: New ← {(n′, step− 1)|n′ ∈ fanin(n), n′ is un-
known in CE[step− 1].dest and may contribute





Fig. 5. Counterexample Analysis Algorithm
outputs a set of circuit nodes Candidate which get unknown
values directly due to inputs, quaternary state set unions, and
quantified-out symbolic variables. The cause for the unknown
value is attached to each node. In this algorithm, fanin(n)
is the function that identifies all circuit nodes that affect the
value of a circuit node n.
Given the counterexample CE, we start with the time
step l at which a consequent violation is reported. We first
decide which circuit nodes have unknown values and cause
the violation. This can be done by comparing the quaternary
assignment representing the set of states simulated by the
edge, CE[l].dest, and the quaternary assignment representing
the consequent of the edge, cons(CE[l].edge). If a circuit
node n has an unknown value in CE[l].dest, while having a
boolean value in cons(CE[l].edge), we know that n violates
cons(CE[l].edge). All violating circuit nodes are put into a
queue Q (Steps 1-3).
For each node n in Q, if n is an input node, we identify n
and mark the cause as “INPUT” (Steps 4-7). If n depends on a
symbolic variable in ant(CE[l− 1].edge), we identify n and
mark the cause as “WEAK” (Steps 8-9). If n has precise value
in post(CE[l − 1].dest), we identify n and mark the cause
as “UNION” (Steps 10-11). All the identified circuit nodes are
added into the node-cause set Candidate.
If none of the above conditions holds, we backtrack to the
previous time step l − 1. We also conduct a one-level fan-in
analysis from n in the circuit to identify all nodes that affect n.
Among these nodes, for each node n′ with an unknown value
in the quaternary assignment of CE[l− 1].dest and that may
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contribute to the unknown value of n in CE[l].dest, we repeat
this analysis for n′ until one of the three causes above is found
in the counterexample, by putting n′ into Q (Steps 13-14). We
improve the accuracy of this analysis through examining the
different types of gates case-by-case.
It is possible that at the same time, a circuit node can get
unknown value due to both a state set union and a quantified-
out symbolic variable. In our refinement loop, one cause is
identified at a time and eventually both causes are identified.
Using the parametric representation, a circuit node can have
a partially unknown value, i.e., under certain condition, node
n has an unknown value. In the backtracking, we keep track
of the condition under which node n has an unknown value. In
the fan-in analysis of n, the condition is propagated to n′ the
same way as backward reasoning in bidirectional GSTE [8].
D. Refinement Algorithms
1) Constraining Input Nodes: If a circuit node identified by
the analysis algorithm is an input node, a symbolic constant or
variable is introduced in the antecedent of the corresponding
edge of the assertion graph to rule out the unknown value of
this node. In STE, this type of imprecision can be addressed by
constraining the inputs using symbolic constants. In [13], an
approach to automatically constraining the input nodes with
symbolic constants has been proposed for STE. The same
heuristics can be applied in our approach. However, in GSTE,
constraining symbolic constants on loop edge may cause the
input nodes have the same input signals every time the edge
is simulated. Therefore, if the edge is on a loop, a symbolic
variable should be introduced.
2) Marking Precise Nodes: After we identify the circuit
nodes (i.e., the nodes in Candidate) that get unknown values
due to quaternary state set unions or quantified-out symbolic
variables, we can refine the circuit model M by marking these
nodes as precise nodes, and then rerun GSTE with the refined
model. The correctness of this refinement is guaranteed by
Lemma 4.1. Let precise(M,p) be the circuit model with the
circuit node p marked as a precise node in M .
Lemma 4.1: (Yang and Seger [9])
Given G, ∀p ∈ NS(M),M |= G iff precise(M,p) |= G.
There are two strategies in marking the identified nodes: we
can mark them either all at once or one at a time. It is easy
to see that there is a trade off between these two strategies.
The first strategy may converge faster while it may lead to
more precise nodes than necessary. The second approach may
find a smaller set of precise nodes while it may require more
iterations to converge. Heuristics can be applied to improve
these two strategies, for instance, an effective heuristic in
practice is to pick control nodes as precise nodes over data
nodes when using the second strategy.
3) On-the-fly Transformations of Assertion Graphs: Mak-
ing too many nodes precise may cause state space explosions.
And identifying a minimal set of circuit nodes as precise nodes
is challenging. An alternative approach to address imprecision
caused by unions or symbolic variables is to conduct on-the-
fly semantics-preserving transformations to the assertion graph
Algorithm: ExtendedGSTE(G, post, Edges)
1: for all e from v0 do Q.enqueue((e, ant(e)))
2: for all e ∈ Edges do Hash(e) ← ∅
3: while Q = ∅ do
4: (e′, sim(e′)) ← Q.dequeue()
5: for all successor edge e of e′ do
6: NewState← post(sim(e′)) ∩ ant(e)
7: if e ∈ Edges then
8: if e is marked UNION then
9: if NewState /∈ Hash(e) then
10: Hash(e) ← Hash(e) ∪ {NewState}
11: Q.enqueue((e,NewState))
12: end if
13: else if e is marked WEAK then
14: Weak ← {states derived from NewState
by assigning all combination of boolean val-
ues for symbolic variables in ant(e)}
15: for all s ∈Weak do
16: if s /∈ Hash(e) then






23: sim(e) ← sim(e) ∪NewState





28: for all e ∈ V do consequent check
Fig. 6. GSTE Extended with Semantic-Preserving Transformation
G. The motivation is that in some cases, the circuit nodes only
need to keep precise values on some assertion graph edges and
making them precise in the whole simulation is too costly.
Our algorithm for on-the-fly transformation of assertion
graphs, shown in Figure 6, extends the basic GSTE algo-
rithm to support dynamic loop-unrolling and case-splitting
of assertion graph edges in the symbolic simulation. Here
Edges =
⋃
(n,i)∈Candidate{CE[i].edge}, namely the set of
assertion edges that need to be transformed. The algorithm
includes two parts: the on-the-fly transformation (Steps 7-21)
and the normal GSTE fixed-point computation (Steps 22-25).
In the transformation, to keep precise states, we built a hash
table for each edge e in Edges (Steps 1-2). When a new
post-image NewState of edge e is generated, we first check
if edge e is marked as UNION. If yes, we exam the hash table.
If NewState is not in the hash table, NewState is added to
the hash table and the simulation continues with NewState;
otherwise, a fixed point is reached (Steps 8-12). In essence, this
realizes loop-unrolling: Loops in G are expanded to mimic the
real computation flow of the circuit. The correctness of this
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loop-unrolling transformation is guaranteed by Lemma 4.2.
Let l be a set of edges forming a loop in G and unroll(G, l)
be the assertion graph with l unrolled in G.
Lemma 4.2:
Given M , for any loop l in G,
M |= G iff M |= unroll(G, l).
The key intuition of the proof for Lemma 4.2 is as follows.
For any finite path in G, there is one and only one finite path in
unroll(G, l) with the same length and labels, and vice versa.
(Space limitation precludes presentation of detailed proofs for
Lemma 4.2 and the lemmas and theorems below.)
If edge e is marked as WEAK, we generate all possible
combinations of boolean assignments to the symbolic variables
in ant(e), and apply these combinations to NewState to get a
set of states Weak. Each state in Weak which is not reached
before is put into the queue (Steps 13-21). This is equivalent
to case splitting of certain edges. The correctness of this
transformation is guaranteed by Lemma 4.3. Let split(G, e)
be the assertion graph with edge e case-split in G.
Lemma 4.3:
Given M , ∀e ∈ E(M),M |= G iff M |= split(G, e).
The key intuition of the proof for Lemma 4.3 is as follows.
As e is case-split into e1, · · · , ek, where ant(e1) ∪ · · · ∪
ant(ek) = ant(e) and cons(e1) = · · · = cons(ek) = cons(e).
In split(G, e), e1, · · · , ek cover all the possible cases which
are covered by e in G, without introducing any new cases.
E. Correctness of AutoGSTE
The abstraction-refinement loop terminates when either
GSTE reports verification success or it reports a consequent
violation due to conflicting values to certain circuit nodes. The
termination of this loop is guaranteed by Theorem 4.1.
Theorem 4.1:
AutoGSTE(M,G) terminates.
The basic idea for proving this theorem is that the circuit to
verify is finite-state. Our refinement algorithms add input node
constraints, mark precise nodes, and apply semantics preserv-
ing transformations in a monotonic fashion. The correctness
of whole AutoGSTE immediately follows from Lemma 4.1,
Lemma 4.2, Lemma 4.3, and Theorem 4.1.
Theorem 4.2:
M |= G iff AutoGSTE(M,G) returns true.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We have implemented AutoGSTE in the Intel Forte environ-
ment [10] and upon GSTE. We have conducted experiments on
a family of benchmark FIFO circuits from Intel, and analyzed
how our approach scale with the depth of FIFO. Figure 7
shows a simple stationary 3-entry 8-bit FIFO circuit. The as-
sertion graph for this circuit is shown in Figure 8. The assertion
graph checks whether the empty and full signals of the FIFO
circuit are set correctly. The assertion graph is independent
of the circuit implementation and data width, and exposes
















Fig. 7. Stationary FIFO Implementation
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Fig. 8. FIFO Assertion Graph
TABLE III
MODEL REFINEMENT RESULTS FOR 8-BIT FIFOS
Circuit Mark precise nodes all at once Mark precise nodes one a time
FIFO # of # of # of P. Time BDD Mem # of P. Time BDD Mem
Depth Nodes Iter. Nodes (Sec.) Nodes (MB) Nodes. (Sec.) Nodes (MB)
3 181 1 5 0.12 10232 17 3 0.26 8996 17
8 296 1 7 0.4 32923 19 4 0.81 26708 18
16 476 1 9 1.1 72189 22 5 2.37 58250 22
24 787 1 11 2.38 131236 24 6 6.83 104246 24
unions and quantified-out symbolic variables. All experiments
were conducted on a workstation with 3GHz Intel R© Xeon R©
processor with 2GB memory, and all verifications were done
on the original circuits with no prior abstraction.
Table III lists the verification results for model refinement.
In [9], manual analysis showed the imprecision for the sta-
tionary FIFO implementation is caused by different values
in the head and tail pointers as well as the wrap bit. Our
counter example analysis algorithm identified the same set of
potential circuit nodes. If we mark these circuit nodes all at
once, only one refinement iteration is needed, and it makes
all the non-data-path elements in the circuit precise, which
has the same effect as manual effort. If we mark precise
nodes one at a time, more iterations are needed. However,
interestingly, it finds a smaller set of precise nodes than manual
analysis. That is we only need to make the head pointer and
the first bit of tail pointer precise. This leads to a smaller
number of BDDs generated, which takes less memory than the
first strategy. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude the first
strategy requires fewer iterations but more BDDs, while the
second strategy is more likely to converge into a smaller set of
precise nodes but take more iterations. In practice, there is no
definite evidence that which strategy would terminate more
quickly since in the first strategy, each iteration takes more
time and in the second strategy, more iterations are needed.
Table IV lists the verification results for specification re-
finement. In the stationary implementation, every assertion
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TABLE IV
SPECIFICATION REFINEMENT RESULTS FOR 8-BIT FIFOS
Circuit GSTE on Original assertion graph Semantic-Preserving Transformation
FIFO # of Time BDD Mem Result # of Time BDD Mem Result
Depth Edges (Sec.) Nodes (MB) Edges (Sec.) Nodes (MB)
3 11 0.01 5 17 Unknown 31 0.23 6 17 Pass
8 26 0.02 5 17 Unknown 201 2.69 6 19 Pass
16 50 0.04 5 17 Unknown 785 17.31 6 26 Pass































time for spec ref.
time for model ref.
mem for spec ref.
mem for model ref.
Fig. 9. Time and Memory for Verification of FIFOs
graph edge corresponds to several different combinations of
the head and tail pointer values, so the refined assertion
graphs grow quickly as the depth of FIFO increases. It is very
difficult to conduct this refinement manually [9]. Our counter-
example analysis algorithm identified all the edges to be
refined, and our refinement algorithm applies the appropriate
transformations. The transformations eliminate all the UNION
and WEAK cases without increasing the number of BDDs
needed. Different from the model refinement, here the memory
usage is largely dependent on the number of actual assertion
graph edges generated rather than the number of BDDs.
We plot the time and space complexity data of both model
refinement and specification refinement in Figure 9. The time
and space complexities for model refinement grow almost
linearly while those of the specification refinement grow
exponentially, with respect to the depth of FIFO. The reason
for the later case is that the symbolic variable on every loop
edge will split every state into two states carrying different
values for the symbolic variable, the verification complexity
is determined by the stationary implementation itself. In this
experiment, the model refinement approach is more favorable
than the specification refinement approach. However, in some
cases, the circuit nodes only need to keep precise values on
certain edges, or the number of different states simulated by
these edges is small, specification refinement would be more
efficient than model refinement, and is less likely to suffer
from state space explosions. Furthermore, the specification
refinement reveals the real computation flow of the circuit,
which allows the initial specification to be very high level,
and provides a good guidance for debugging in practice.
As we can observe, the verification time for our automatic
refinement approach is fairly small, and the amount of memory
used is of reasonable size. None of the two kinds of refinement
is easy to conduct manually as the sizes of the circuit and
assertion graph increase. Our experiments demonstrate the
correctness and effectiveness of our approach.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have presented AutoGSTE, a comprehen-
sive approach to automatic abstraction refinement for GSTE.
It completely addresses the imprecision of GSTE’s quaternary
abstraction caused by under-constrained input circuit nodes,
quaternary state set join, and quantified-out symbolic variables.
Its application to small to large size circuits has demonstrated
that it is able to quickly converge to an abstraction upon which
GSTE can either verify or falsify an assertion graph efficiently.
Regarding model refinement, further research is needed
to explore effective methods for determining a minimal set
of circuit nodes as precise nodes in order to minimize the
state space that has to be explored. Regarding specification
refinement, further research is needed to develop heuristics that
can reduce unnecessary loop-unrollings and case-splittings. It
is also interesting to see how these two automatic refinement
approaches can be integrated to further speed up the conver-
gence of our refinement loop into the right level of abstraction.
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Abstract—The formal hardware verification technique of Gen-
eralized Symbolic Trajectory Evaluation (GSTE) traditionally
uses diagrams called assertion graphs to express properties.
Although the graphical nature of assertion graphs can be useful
for understanding simple properties, it places limitations on
formal reasoning. Clean reasoning is important for high-level
verification steps, such as property decomposition. In GSTE,
formal reasoning is also required to justify abstraction refinement
steps, which are achieved via property transformation. This paper
proposes a linear temporal logic, generalized trajectory logic, to
provide a basis for reasoning about GSTE properties. The logic
is textual and algebraic in nature, so it induces clean reasoning
rules. We describe model checking for the logic, and look at rules
for semantic equality, property decomposition and abstraction
refinement.
I. INTRODUCTION
Generalized Symbolic Trajectory Evaluation (GSTE) [1] is a
form of model checking used for formal hardware verification.
Developed by Intel as an extension to Symbolic Trajectory
Evaluation (STE) [2], it has shown itself to be successful at
verifying components of next-generation microprocessors [3].
GSTE uses operations based on partial gate-level simulation
to check how a circuit reacts to particular patterns of input
traces. It has several variants, including a fairness extension
for ω-regular properties. Some of these variants correspond
to standard model checking algorithms [4]. In this paper, we
consider the foundational strong semantics [1]. This is the
most commonly used form in practice, and expresses regular
properties. We will also make use of the compositional model
checking extension from [5].
GSTE is fundamentally distinguished from other forms of
model checking by the abstract representation that it uses for
sets of circuit states. One key advantage of this representation
is that each particular set is represented by a range of different
approximations. The less precise a particular approximation
is, the less space it consumes in the model checker. Therefore
an abstraction trade-off can often be achieved between losing
too much information and requiring too much space. User
feedback is used to refine abstraction, by directing the model
checker on how to pick the best representatives for verifying a
given property. The structure of the property itself determines
the control flow of model checking, which in turn determines
the degree of abstraction employed.
Traditionally, specifications are expressed using the graph-
ical notation of assertion graphs [1]. Assertion graphs are a
variety of universal-automata [6], where each run represents
an assertion made about the allowable execution traces. The
GSTE algorithm directly traverses the graph during model
checking, so its shape directly affects the level of model check-
ing abstraction. To control abstraction, manual transformations
are applied directly to the graph.
The graphical nature of assertion graphs can be useful for
displaying simple properties in a visual manner, but it places
strict limitations on formal reasoning. Formal reasoning is
important for managing verification, as experience from STE
has shown [7]. Although some progress has been made on
reasoning with assertion graphs [6], [8], the resulting rules tend
to be complicated, because they deal directly with graphical
structures. The compositional GSTE model checker further
complicates matters by using specifications that mix assertion
graphs with logical syntax. For cleaner reasoning, we require
a unified property representation that is more structured and
controlled.
In this paper we address this problem by introducing a
linear-time temporal logic, generalized trajectory logic (GTL),
for representing GSTE properties. We describe a model check-
ing algorithm for GTL that simplifies compositional GSTE,
whilst maintaining its core methodology. We believe that GTL
is a good match for GSTE, and also induces the fundamental
logical characteristics that are necessary for formal reasoning.
We demonstrate this by building up rules for semantic equiv-
alence, property decomposition and abstraction refinement,
each illustrated with examples.
The only other existing language for specifying runs of
GSTE is the language of compositional specification described
in [5]. Although we draw inspiration from this language, there
are several important differences between it and GTL. First
and foremost, the language of compositional specification was
primarily introduced to explain compositional GSTE model
checking. Therefore it does not address other important aspects
of GSTE, such as the symbolic features that play an important
role in abstraction control. Secondly, we define our language as
a temporal logic. This brings in associated results and intuition.
Thirdly, we believe that our logic has a simpler semantics that
makes it more amenable to reasoning and composition.
II. GENERALIZED SYMBOLIC TRAJECTORY EVALUATION
This section contains an overview of GSTE, highlighting
the important characteristics that govern the language choices
that we have made in defining our logic.
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A. Model Checking Outline
GSTE properties make assertions about the state of a circuit
after it has received a particular pattern of inputs. The pattern
of inputs is called the antecedent, and the assertion is called
the consequent. The image of an antecedent is the set of states
that a circuit can be in after it has performed an execution
trace that satisfies the antecedent. In GSTE, the antecedent
drives a calculation of its own image, which is then compared
with the consequent. Since it is based on forwards simulation,
GSTE can only verify effect-of-cause properties, which is
why properties are separated out into antecedent (cause) and
consequent (effect) parts.
For example, suppose we wish to verify that a register
correctly stores the number zero. We can use antecedent: “The
register has most recently been written to with value zero, and
is currently being read”. and consequent: “The output is zero”.
Running GSTE effectively tests the consequent for every trace
under which the antecedent holds.
In other GSTE formalisms, multiple antecedent/consequent
assertions are combined into a single model checking run. This
is so that a single simulation can take place with multiple
consequents checks made along the way. For reasoning about
properties, however, it is useful to keep the antecedents and
consequents distinct, since this leads to a much simpler
semantics. If necessary, properties can be combined into a
single more efficient run after reasoning.
B. Circuit Model
We model circuit states as boolean vectors in BN where N
is the set of observable circuit nodes. We define S ⊆ BN be
the subset of consistent states that agree with the constraints
imposed by the combinational logic of the circuit gates. A
circuit model is a Kripke structure (S, T ) where T ⊆ S×S is
a total model transition relation between consistent states. For
the rest of the paper, we will assume that we are dealing with
model M = (S, T ). We define post(R) to be the post-image
of states R under T .
Circuit traces are modeled using non-empty finite words
from S+. We define tr(M) to be the set of such words that
respect the model’s transition relation. We will write last(t)
to mean the last state in trace t.
C. Abstraction
Instead of storing precise sets of circuit states, GSTE uses a
ternary vector representation to encode upper-approximations.
1) Abstract State-Set Representation: The ternary domain,
T = {0, 1,X}, is used to represent the possible values of a
node in a particular set of states. Value 0 represents that a
node is low in every state, 1 represents that a node is high
in every state, and X that a node might have either value.
We define the partial order T to provide a measure of how
approximate these values are. Since X approximates 0 and 1,
we have 0 T X and 1 T X.
In GSTE, sets of bit-vectors are represented using ternary
vectors in TN . For example, the set {0011, 0001} can be
represented precisely using the ternary vector 00X1, and
(a) s (b) |s| (c) ˆpost(s)
Fig. 1. Ternary simulation in GSTE
approximately by 0XX1, or even XXXX. Some sets cannot be
represented precisely using ternary vectors alone. For example,
the most precise ternary representation for {0011, 0101} is
0XX1. However, GSTE includes symbolic constructs that can
be used to prevent this loss of precision, as we will see.
The use of ternary vectors is an example of a Cartesian
abstraction [9], and ignores dependencies between circuit
nodes. It is successful in hardware verification because useful
properties often correspond to simple constraints on a small
number of circuit nodes, which can be efficiently and precisely
encoded as ternary vectors. Ternary vectors are also directly
amenable to simulation-based calculations.
The relation between ternary vectors and sets of circuit
states has been explained in [10] using the theory of abstract
interpretation. By extending T point-wise to vectors and
adding a bottom element, a complete lattice of ternary vectors
is obtained. This relates to the complete lattice of sets of
states, ordered by inclusion, via the concretization function
γ : TN ∪ {⊥} → 2S , defined by
γ(a) =
{ ∅ for a = ⊥
{s ∈ S | ∀n ∈ N : sn T an} for a ∈ TN .
2) Abstract Operations: An example GSTE simulation is
illustrated in Fig. 1. In this figure, the d-blocks represent
delay elements. Fig. 1 (a) shows a ternary vector s that
represents all consistent circuit states where the node marked
0 is low. GSTE simulation propagates this constraint, based on
simulation of the circuit logic, to deduce more state constraints
downstream. This is shown in Fig. 1 (b) and formalized by
the propagation operation, written | · |, which is a lower
closure on ternary vectors [11]. We will call the image of
this closure the set of ternary propagations. GSTE’s abstract
post-image function, ˆpost, is calculated by first performing
a propagation, and then setting every node to X, except
for the delay element outputs, which take on their previous
input values (Fig. 1 (a)-(c)). In this way, the new simulation
state only contains constraints carried-over from state-holding
elements. Notice that this simulation approach eliminates the
need for a monolithic transition relation.
To approximate union and intersection operations on sets
of states, GSTE uses the join, 	, and meet, 
, on the lattice
of ternary propagations. For example, X10 	 111 = X1X and
X1X 
 0XX = 01X.
Given a map f , on sets of states, and its abstract counterpart
f , defined over ternary vectors, we say that f  is a sound
approximation of f if f(γ(a)) ⊆ γ(f (a)) for any ternary
vector a. It is furthermore complete if it precisely represents
f , i.e. f(γ(a)) = γ(f (a)).
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Every GSTE operation is a sound representation of its
set-based counterpart, and so maintains upper-approximations
of the simulated state-sets. However, not all operations are
complete, so some state information can be lost. Since the
propagation step only goes forwards, it can lose informa-
tion about the values of preceding nodes. Join is also not
complete—the join of 101 and 011 is XX1, but the union of
γ(101) and γ(011) is a strict subset of γ(XX1). In contrast,
it is easy to show that meet is a complete representation of
intersection.
D. Symbolic State-Set Representations
It is often necessary, during practical verification, to repeat
a particular computation on a large number of different inputs.
If the computation and domain have suitable structure, some
of this effort can be shared. For example, suppose we wish
to calculate f(x, g(y)) for (x, y) in {(1, 0), (2, 0), (3, 0)}.
Even though we are computing the result for three different
inputs, we need only perform the sub-computation g once,
namely to obtain g(0). GSTE uses symbolic representations
to take advantage of this observation during abstract circuit
simulation.
Let V be a finite set of Boolean-valued variables and
V = V → B be the set of their possible valuations. We
will use RV to model the set of symbolic representations
for set R. These are functions from variable valuations to R,
defining how the representation evaluates in each valuation.
We will use the notation x〈ν〉 to mean the evaluation of
symbolic representation x in valuation ν ∈ V . For example,
(u, u ∧ v) is a symbolic representation of bit-pairs where
(u, u ∧ v)〈[u → 0, v → 1]〉 evaluates to (0,0).
GSTE uses symbolic representations of ternary propaga-
tions during model checking [2]. Multiple model checking runs
can be shared by encoding them as different valuations of one
single symbolic run. For such sharing to take place, properties
must also be specified symbolically. The role of particular
variables in these properties often corresponds directly with
specific data values in the circuit design, so these symbolic
values ‘flow’ independently through the circuit during simu-
lation. For example, the following symbolic property uses a
vector of variables, u, to check that a register functions for
any data value:
Property 1: “The register has most recently been written to
with value u, and the register is currently being read” leads
to “The data output is u”.
III. GENERALIZED TRAJECTORY LOGIC
In this section we introduce generalized trajectory logic
(GTL), a linear-time temporal logic that allows GSTE runs to
be expressed precisely, in a clean formal setting. We describe
how circuit properties can be expressed using this logic, and
examine some of its semantic characteristics.
A. Formal Definition
Let V be the finite set of Boolean-valued variables that we
will use for symbolic representation. The syntax of GTL is
f ::= tt True
| ff False
| n Node is high
| ¬n Node is low
| f ∧ f Conjunction
| f ∨ f Disjunction
| Yf Yesterday
| Z Fixed-point variable
| µZ.f Least fixed-point
| Q→ f | f Symbolic conditional
| f (u := Q) Symbolic substitution
Fig. 2. Syntax of GTL
‖ tt ‖νρ = S+
‖ ff ‖νρ = ∅
‖ n ‖νρ = {t ∈ S+ | (last(t))n = 1}
‖ ¬n ‖νρ = {t ∈ S+ | (last(t))n = 0}
‖ f ∧ g ‖νρ = ‖ f ‖νρ ∩ ‖ g ‖νρ
‖ f ∨ g ‖νρ = ‖ f ‖νρ ∪ ‖ g ‖νρ
‖ Yf ‖νρ = {t.s ∈ S+ | t ∈ ‖ f ‖νρ}
‖ Z ‖νρ = ρ(Z)〈ν〉
‖ µZ.f ‖νρ =
⋂{T 〈ν〉| ∀ν ∈ V.‖ f ‖νρ[Z →T ] ⊆ T 〈ν〉}
‖ Q→ f | g ‖νρ = if Q〈ν〉 then ‖ f ‖νρ else ‖ g ‖νρ
‖ f (u := Q) ‖νρ = ‖ f ‖ν[u→Q]ρ
Fig. 3. Semantics of GTL
defined in Fig. 2, where n is any circuit node, u is any variable
in V and Q is any Boolean predicate over V . We make the
requirement that within µZ.f , every occurrence of Z in f is
bound by an occurrence of Y.
The semantics of GTL is defined by giving the set of words
from S+ that each formula satisfies in each symbolic valuation
ν ∈ V . We write ‖ f ‖νρ for this, where ρ is a function that
provides a context for fixed-point variables.
The semantics is defined in Fig. 3. Every trace satisfies
truth, tt, and no trace satisfies falsity, ff. A trace satisfies
the atomic proposition n, or ¬n, if node n is high, or low,
respectively, in the final state of the trace. The connectives
∧ and ∨ are defined like their counterparts in propositional
logic. Unlike propositional logic, however, we do not allow
negation of arbitrary formulas. This is to be in alignment with
GSTE’s use of upper-approximations, for which no sensible
interpretation of negation exists.
The only temporal operator is the Yesterday operator, written
Y. Intuitively, Yf expresses that f held one time-step ago. A
trace t satisfies Yf if t with its last state removed satisfies f .
Past time is preferred over future time, as it complements the
forwards nature of GSTE. In particular, past time allows us
to define compositional simulation—we can simulate Yf by
first simulating f , and then calculating its post-image.
We handle fixed-point recursion in the manner of the µ-
calculi. Such recursion is what differentiates GSTE from
STE, and allow us to simulate over unbounded time-frames.
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Intuitively, this can be seen as finite recursion. For example,
µZ.f ∨YZ expresses that f has held at some point in the past.
In this respect, GTL bears resemblance to the linear-time µ-
calculus [12].
Finally, GTL has constructs for describing symbolic repre-
sentations. The symbolic conditional Q → f | g is equivalent
to f in valuations where Q holds, and g otherwise. This is an
extension of the symbolic guard construct in STE’s Trajectory
Evaluation Logic [2]. For example, the formula u → n | ¬n
describes the symbolic traces ending in states where node n
has value u. We will write ‘n is u’ as short-hand for this.
The symbolic substitution construct allows us to explicitly
change the current variable valuation context. This is useful
during model checking because it allows us to ‘look-up’ the
sets of states simulated in a particular valuation. For example,
(Y(n is u))(u := T) symbolically simulates the circuit with
variable u, then, afterwards, uses the symbolic result to find
out what would have happened if u was true.
B. Syntactic Sugar
We define the following symbolic quantification shorthands:
(∃u : f ) for f (u := T) ∨ f (u := F)
and (∀u : f ) for f (u := T) ∧ f (u := F).
We also define some traditional linear-time temporal opera-
tors for common temporal patterns. Previously f , written Pf ,
asserts that f held at some point in the past: Pf := µZ.f ∨YZ.
A second operator, f Since g , written f S g , expresses that f
holds at every point backward in time until some point where
g holds: f S g := µZ.g ∨ (f ∧ YZ). Previously and Since
mirror LTL’s Finally and Until operators.
C. Semantic Characteristics
This section contains two useful theorems about GTL.
Firstly, we define FZ,f ,ρ(R) to be the semantic value of f
in formula context ρ extended by mapping variable Z to R:
FZ,f ,ρ(R) = ‖ f ‖ρ[Z →R].
Theorem 1 (Continuity): For any increasing chain Xi of
symbolic trace sets,
⋃
i FZ,f ,ρ(Xi) equals FZ,f ,ρ(
⋃
iXi).
This theorem, shown by structural induction over the syntax of
f , says that GTL formulas are continuous with respect to their
free recursion variables. By Tarski’s Fixed-point Theorem, this
shows that the limit of the approximants over ω, defined by




‖ µnZ.f ‖ρ = ‖ µZ.f ‖ρ.
This provides a basis for model checking fixed-points using
iterative simulation. As a result of continuity, every GTL
formula is also monotonic with respect to its free formula vari-
ables. This allows GSTE abstraction to proceed using upper-
approximations. GTL also has unique fixed-points, which
provide a useful reasoning device:
Theorem 2: If every occurrence of Z in f is bound by Y
then FZ,f ,ρ has a unique fixed-point.
D. GTL Properties
We will say that a GTL formula is closed if every occurrence
of a recursion variable is bound by a corresponding µ-
expression. A GTL property is defined to be of the form
antecedent A leads to consequent C, written A → C, where
A and C are both closed formulas of GTL. For example, we
can express Property 1 from Section II-D as
rd ∧ ((¬wr) S (wr ∧ in is u)) → out is u.
The language satisfied by A → C, consists of those words
where A implies C under every symbolic valuation:
L(A → C) =
⋂
ν∈V
(S+ \ ‖ A ‖ν) ∪ ‖ C ‖ν .
We will say that model M satisfies property P , written M |= P
when the traces of the model are included in this language,
tr(M) ⊆ L(P).
E. GTL Vector Properties
Because of their flat syntax, µ-expressions are useful for
expressing and reasoning about fixed-points. However, nested
fixed-point expressions can quickly become incomprehensible
to the human reader. In such cases, we can define properties
using mutually dependent systems of equations. For example,
we can specify Property 1 equivalently as
Write = wr ∧ in is u
Written = Write ∨ (¬wr ∧ Y(Written))
rd ∧ Written → out is u.
Such systems of equations are guaranteed to have a unique
solution by Theorem 2, provided that each recursive cycle
passes through Y. This style of presentation also allows us to
specify multiple consequent checks in a single run of GSTE.
IV. MODEL CHECKING
We describe a model checking algorithm for GTL properties
that is a generalization of compositional GSTE [5] to our less
restrictive specification notation. We simulate those execution
traces that satisfy the antecedent, and then assert that the
consequent holds for all of them. For simplicity, we will
only describe model checking for properties with atemporal
consequents (containing no Y). Since we are only considering
regular properties, this does not pose a restriction in practice.
A. Set-Based Model Checking
First, we define model checking in terms of sets of states.
Similar to the standard approach for CTL [13], the simula-
tion of a formula is defined by structural recursion on the
syntax of a formula. For symbolic valuation ν and fixed-
point context τ , Fig. 4 defines the simulation of f , written
[ f ]ντ . We say that set-based model checking succeeds, written
GSTEset(M,A → C), when [ A ]ν ⊆ [ C ]ν in every valuation
ν.
Theorem 3: If C is atemporal then GSTEset(M,A → C)
implies M |= A → C.
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[ tt ]ντ = S
[ff ]ντ = ∅
[ n ]ντ = {s ∈ S | sn = 1}
[¬n ]ντ = {s ∈ S | sn = 0}
[ f ∨ g ]ντ = [ f ]ντ ∪ [ g ]ντ
[ f ∧ g ]ντ = [ f ]ντ ∩ [ g ]ντ







[Q→ f | g ]ντ = if Q〈ν〉 then [ f ]ντ else [ g ]ντ
[ f (u := Q) ]ντ = [ f ]
ν[u→Q〈ν〉]
τ
Fig. 4. Set-based simulation
 tt νσ = λm.X
ff νσ = ⊥


























 f ∨ g νσ =  f νσ 	  g νσ
 f ∧ g νσ =  f νσ 
  g νσ




Q→ f | g νσ = if Q〈ν〉 then  f νσ else  g νσ
 f (u := Q) νσ =  f ν[u→Q]σ
Fig. 5. Abstract simulation
Proof: We define the image of formula f in valuation
ν to be imageM(f , ν) = last(tr(M) ∩ ‖ f ‖ν). It can be
shown by structural induction that imageM(A, ν) ⊆ [ A ]ν for
any formula A, and imageM(C, ν) = [C ]ν for any atemporal
formula C. Suppose t is a trace of M that satisfies A. Then
last(t) is in the image of A by definition. If model checking
succeeds, it must therefore also be in imageM(C, ν). Now,
since C is atemporal, any trace ending in last(t) must also
satisfy it. Hence t satisfies C and M |= A → C.
Notice that the algorithm is not complete, because we are
using a branching simulation algorithm to verify a linear
logic. For example, Yn ∧ Y¬n is ff, but its simulation is
not necessarily empty, since there may exist two states with a
common successor, that each satisfy n and ¬n respectively.
B. Abstract Model Checking
We can adapt our set-based algorithm to use the abstract
GSTE state-set representation described in Section II-C2. This
results in abstract simulation, defined in Fig. 5. For simplicity,
this figure presents ternary vectors as functions from nodes to
ternary values. Since the abstract operations for disjunction
and post-image are not complete, they cannot be used during
consequent simulation—it is unsound to over-approximate
the consequent assertion. Abstract model checking succeeds,
written GSTE(M,A → C), when A ν  C ν for every
valuation ν.
Theorem 4: If C is atemporal and does not contain disjunc-
tion then GSTE(M,A → C) implies M |= A → C.
Proof: Since every abstract GSTE operation is sound,
[ A ]ν ⊆ γ(A ν). For atemporal consequents without dis-
junction, abstract simulation is furthermore complete: [ C ]ν =
γ(C ν). Therefore A ν  C ν implies [ A ]ν ⊆ [ C ]ν
which in turn implies M |= A → C by Theorem 3.
V. EXPRESSIBILITY
Both the traditional specification notation of assertion
graphs [1] and that of compositional specification [5] express
the regular class of properties. This can be shown via the
constructions to and from regular automata, as described in
[4], [6].
For every assertion graph, we can directly construct an
equivalent GTL vector property. Our construction creates a
recursion variable Xe for each edge e in the assertion graph.
This is used to capture the traces satisfied up to and including
that edge, by any path from the initial vertex. To satisfy
an initial edge, a trace must simply satisfy the atemporal
antecedent on that edge, ant(e). Thus we have Xe = ant(e).
To satisfy any other edge e, a trace must satisfy ant(e) and
yesterday have satisfied some preceding edge of e. Therefore
Xe equals the disjunction over every edge e′ preceding e, of
ant(e)∧YXe′ . For every consequent of the graph, Ce on edge
e, we assert that Xe → Ce. The resulting property specifies
exactly the same behavior and model checking approach as
the original assertion graph.
This construction effectively encodes the assertion graph
GSTE algorithm explicitly into our logic. In the reverse
direction, any GTL vector property with bounded consequents
can also be re-written into an assertion graph form, via a
possible exponential blow-up from expanding the product
space that compositional GSTE reduces. Such GTL properties
are therefore equally as expressive as both traditional assertion
graphs and compositional GSTE specifications.
VI. REASONING RULES
The main benefit of using GTL over assertion graphs is
that its simple semantics provides a clean basis for reasoning.
This section demonstrates this claim by describing a range of
useful reasoning rules. It is important to realize that although
some of these rules may appear simplistic, they often have no
apparent counterpart for assertion graphs. They are therefore
important contributions for dealing with properties.
A. Equivalence Rules
First of all, we describe some fundamental rules for GTL
formulas that preserve semantic equality. These are of practical
use since they represent sound transformations of properties.
1) Boolean Connectives: Since ∧,∨, tt and ff follow the
standard definitions of propositional logic, they have the same
standard characteristics. The terms tt and ff behave as zeros
and ones as expected, and there are the usual rules for
commutativity and associativity, e.g. tt∧ f = f , f ∧ g = g ∧ f
and f ∧(g∧h) = (f ∧g)∧h . Negation on atomic propositions
behaves as expected: n ∧ ¬n = ff, n ∨ ¬n = tt.
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2) Fixed-points: As we have already shown, fixed-points
are unique and are the limit of their approximants from
below. Fixed-points are also subject to the standard unrolling:
µZ.f (Z) = f (µZ.f (Z)). From this it is easy to build up rules
for common temporal patterns, such as Pf = f ∨YPf . This
might, for example, allow us to case-split based on whether f
holds at the current point of time or not.
3) Yesterday: GTL is a linear logic, so Yesterday distributes
over the other logical connectives. For example, Yf ∧ Yg =
Y(f ∧ g) and u → Yf |Yg = Y(u → f | g). Notice that
Ytt = tt, since Ytt does satisfy traces of length one. This
may seem unusual, but it accurately represents our model of
GSTE when not every state has a pre-image.
4) Symbolic Constructs: The symbolic nature of GTL is
orthogonal to its other aspects. Therefore the logical operations
distribute over symbolic ones. For example, (Q→ f | g)∧h =
Q→ (g ∧h) | (f ∧h), (Yf )(u := Q) = Y(f (u := Q)). Rules
for introducing and removing variables allow us to control
whether property aspects are represented explicitly or symbol-
ically. For example, the rule f ∨ g = (∃u : u → f | g) allows
us to change the two explicit post-image calculations Yf ∨Yg
into the single symbolic post-image calculation given by
(∃u : Y(u → f | g)). The symbolic if-then-else also satisfies
standard rules such as (T → f | g) = f , (F → f | g) = g and
(Q→ f | f ) = f . Symbolic substitution is equivalent to textual
substitution on its operand: f (u := Q) = f [Q/u]. This rule
can be used to ‘flatten’ symbolic model checking into explicit
model checking, as the following example demonstrates.
Example: Suppose we would like to verify that a 4-
step clock generator signals clk when reset with signal r, and
every fourth time interval afterwards. We can model check this
behavior explicitly with the following property:
Count0 = r ∨ (¬r ∧ Y(¬r ∧ Y(¬r ∧ Y(¬r ∧ YCount0))))
Count0 → clk.
Model checking calculates the set of states where either a reset
occurs, or has last occurred a multiple of four time-steps ago.
Now suppose that we know that the timer is implemented
using a two-bit counter, and we would like to use a more
efficient symbolic model checking approach. The following
property finds the symbolic set of states in which the value of
the counter is u:
Count = ((u = 0) → r |ff) ∨ (¬r ∧ YCount(u := u − 1))
Count(u := 0) → clk.
It is not immediately obvious that the two properties are




= ((0 = 0) → r |ff) ∨ (¬r ∧ YCount(u := 0 − 1))
= r ∨ (¬r ∧ YCount[3/u])
= r ∨ (¬r ∧ Y(¬r ∧ YCount[2/u]))
= r ∨ (¬r ∧ Y(¬r ∧ Y(¬r ∧ YCount[1/u])))
= r ∨ (¬r ∧ Y(¬r ∧ Y(¬r ∧ Y(¬r ∧ YCount[0/u])))).
Now we can use the unique fixed-point theorem to deduce that
Count0 = Count[0/u].
B. Decomposition Rules
We will now consider rules that enable decomposition of
a property into multiple model checking runs. Recall that the
GTL property A → C is satisfied if and only if every model
trace that satisfies A also satisfies C. Therefore, for any circuit
model, the leads-to relation is transitive:
A→ B B → C
A→ C
This rule allows us to connect two GSTE simulations together.
Since GTL formulas are also monotonic with respect to for-
mula variables, transitivity induces generic substitution rules
that can be used to piece together branching simulations:
A1 → C1 A2 → C2
A1[A2/C2] → C1
A1 → C1 A2 → C2
A1 → C1[C2/A2] (1)
Properties can also be split based on the value of a symbolic
variable. For example, if we can verify a property for both
valuations of a particular variable, then the entire property
must hold:
A(u := T) → C(u := T) A(u := F) → C(u := F)
A → C
There are also more straight-forward rules for decomposition,
such as antecedent and consequent splitting:
A1 → C A2 → C
A1 ∨ A2 → C
A → C1 A → C2
A → C1 ∧ C2
We can also derive rules for higher-level temporal patterns. For
example, we can verify that some invariant I holds perpetually
after reset R, by first showing that the reset establishes the
invariant, and then that the invariant inductively holds:
R→ I YI → I
PR→ I
Example: To illustrate the use of one of these rules,
we will examine the decomposition of the verification of an
industrial memory design previously described in [6]. The
design consists of two blocks: a memory block for storing
incoming data, and a processing block that performs selection,
alignment and mask on the data being read.
Verification aims to show that if data D has been written
to address A, and not overwritten since, then if address A
is accessed with appropriate options, the correct selection,
alignment and mask of D is returned. The selection and
alignment options must be provided with the read request,
and the mask options provided one cycle later, when the read
completes. Introducing extra names to describe the simple
input predicates required, the property can be specified with
GTL as:
YY(no overwrite S write) ∧ Y(read ∧ sel align)
∧ mask → data correct. (2)
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The decomposition of this property approximately halves veri-
fication time by introducing an internal predicate, read result,
to assert that the data is correctly transmitted on the bus
between memory and processing blocks. The first stage of
verification checks that the memory correctly stores the data
and sends it on this bus:
Y(no overwrite S write) ∧ read → read result. (3)
The second stage verifies that if the processing block correctly
receives the data then it is processed correctly:
Y(read result ∧ sel align) ∧ mask → data correct. (4)
To justify such decomposition it is necessary to show that
(2) is implied by (3) and (4) together. Using only assertion
graphs, it is difficult to establish this. In fact, the approach in
[6] constructs a special monitor circuit and extra GSTE run
to check this implication. However, by using GTL properties,
the implication can easily be established with the application
of the antecedent substitution rule in (1): (2) is obtained by
substituting the antecedent of (3) for read result in (4).
C. Abstraction Refinement Rules
GTL is also effective for managing abstraction refinement
steps. Recall that properties not only express what is being
checked, but the shape of an antecedent formula also de-
scribes how to check it. Abstraction refinement corresponds to
semantic-preserving re-writes that change the model checking
direction. Since every atomic step of GSTE can be described
precisely using GTL, we have complete control over model
checking.
We will say that GTL formula f has an abstraction refine-
ment g , written f  g , if f and g are semantically equivalent
and the abstract simulation of g is more precise than the ab-
stract simulation of f , i.e.  f νσ   g νσ . Abstract simulation
is monotonic with respect to  , so abstraction rules can be
soundly applied to any sub-formula of an antecedent: f  g
implies h[f /Z]  h[g/Z].
There are two ways in which GSTE simulation can over-
approximate the image of an antecedent. Firstly, GSTE’s
abstract set representation introduces information loss due to
its approximation of disjunction and post-image calculation.
Secondly, as we have already discussed, set-based simulation
itself is not complete for formulas that express what we term
product reduction. We will consider rules for each of these
effects in turn.
1) Rules for Disjunction: Suppose f does not contain any
fixed-points, and model checking f (g ∨ h) → C fails due to
over-abstraction. If the loss of required information is caused
by this disjunction alone, then it must be that both f (g) → C
and f (h) → C would succeed individually. We therefore
have the option of simply repeating simulation f for both
disjuncts independently. By doing this, we effectively make
model checking more explicit. Such a refinement is captured
by distributing f over disjunction:
f (g ∨ h)  f (g) ∨ f (h).
(a ∧ ¬b) ∨ (¬a ∧ b) Y((a ∧ ¬b) ∨ (¬a ∧ b))
(a) Verification Fails
u→ (a ∧ ¬b) | (¬a ∧ b) Y(u→ (a ∧ ¬b) | (¬a ∧ b))
(b) Refinement Succeeds
Fig. 6. Symbolic disjunctive completion
This refinement works because it delays the stage at which
information is lost until later in the simulation. Since it in-
creases the number of simulation steps that occur during model
checking, it has a performance penalty. However, symbolic
representation can allow us to share the common elements
between two such repeated steps. We will term this technique
symbolic disjunctive completion due to the correspondence
with disjunctive completion in abstract interpretation theory
[14]. Symbolic disjunctive completion uses u → g | h to
represent g ∨ h , where u is existentially quantified at the top
level of simulation. The symbolic states can then capture node
dependencies that are otherwise lost:
f (g ∨ h)  ∃u : f (u→ g | h).
Example: Consider the XOR-gate with delayed inputs
shown in Fig. 6. We would like to verify that if the inputs
did not match in the preceding time step, then the output is
high. The obvious simulation Y((a∧¬b)∨ (¬a∧ b)), shown
in Fig. 6 (a), loses all information in the first time step. This
is because we are specifying a dependency between circuit
nodes that ternary vectors cannot capture. If we apply the rule
for symbolic disjunctive completion, then the variable captures
the required dependency, and the output can be demonstrated
to be high, as in Fig. 6 (b).
2) Rule for Post-Image Refinement: GSTE does not prop-
agate constraints backwards. This means that the post-image
operation can lose important information. A common tech-
nique to counter this effect is to split the simulation based on
a circuit node further back in the circuit. Such a split for node
n is captured by the following rule:
f  (n ∧ f ) ∨ (¬n ∧ f ).
Example: Any state that satisfies the constraints shown in
Fig. 1 (b) must have a post-image where both delay-elements
output low (the output of the OR-gate is low, so both inputs
must also be low). However, the post-image in Fig. 1 (c) does
not capture this constraint. If the verification is split in four,
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based on the values of the OR-gate inputs, then this constraint
is maintained. This rules out the impossible cases where the
OR-gate has a high input but low output.
3) Rule for Product Reduction: A GTL simulation can
be reduced by splitting it into two sub-simulations, whose
results are then conjunctively composed. This has the effect
of exploring a product property space by exploring each of
its quotients independently in turn. This decomposition is an
abstraction, since it ignores the interaction between the two
quotient simulations. The essence of such transformations is
captured by:
Yf ∧ Yg  Y(f ∧ g).
When applied over fixed-points, this rule can be used to
describe partial order reductions, as it allows interleaved events
to be simulated independently.
Example: Consider verifying a three-stage pipeline that
independently decrements its two binary inputs, a and b, then
adds them together. We can try to simulate the two inputs
independently, and combine the results at the final stage using:
(YY(a is u)) ∧ (YY(b is v)). Suppose this run fails due
to over-abstraction and we discover that, in fact, the addition
starts at the second pipeline stage. We refine the simulation
to: Y(Y(a is u) ∧ Y(b is v)), or even YY(a is u ∧ b is v).
These simulations are more complex, but may now maintain
enough information for verification to succeed.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper has presented a new temporal logic, generalized
trajectory logic, for describing runs of GSTE in a clean formal
setting. The logic is equally as expressive as GSTE assertion
graphs under their strong semantics, but is more amenable
to formal reasoning due to its textual and algebraic nature.
We have demonstrated this by describing simple rules for
important verification steps, that are otherwise lacking for
assertion graphs.
As well as easing verification efforts, we hope that this
method of specification opens the way for further formal
analysis of GSTE. We have shown that abstraction refinement
of GSTE simulations generally corresponds to simple distribu-
tive laws in their GTL descriptions. Might it be useful to
automatically apply such rules, so that property and abstraction
concerns can be separated? Can we use information about the
circuit layout to guide their application? Our reasoning rules
also allow quotients of the property to be easily transformed
back-and-forth between symbolic and explicit representations.
Which particular property aspects are better represented sym-
bolically?
Although GTL provides a sound logical basis for specifi-
cation, it still operates at a detailed level. It would be useful
to use GTL to connect GSTE to formalisms with richer types
and specification constructs. The logic itself might also be
extended to handle other GSTE techniques such as backwards
simulation, precise nodes [1] and liveness.
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Abstract—Symbolic trajectory evaluation (STE) is a model
checking technology based on symbolic simulation over a lattice
of abstract state sets. The STE algorithm operates over families
of these abstractions encoded by Boolean formulas, enabling ver-
ification with many different abstraction cases in a single model-
checking run. This provides a flexible way to achieve partitioned
data abstraction. It is usually called ‘symbolic indexing’ and
is widely used in memory verification, but has seen relatively
limited adoption elsewhere, primarily because users typically
have to create the right indexed family of abstractions manually.
This work provides the first known algorithm that automatically
computes these partitioned abstractions given a reference-model
specification. Our experimental results show that this approach
not only simplifies memory verification, but also enables handling
completely different designs fully automatically.
I. INTRODUCTION
Symbolic Trajectory Evaluation (STE) is a model checking
technology based on symbolic simulation over a lattice of
abstract state sets [1]. STE provides a combination of abstrac-
tion and algorithmic efficiency for verification of memories
and datapath-dominated designs, and has tackled numerous
difficult industrial verification problems [2]–[4].
In the abstraction lattice at the heart of STE, each circuit
node is assigned a value in the set {0, 1,X}, with ‘X’
representing an unknown or ‘don’t care’ value. An assignment
of such values to every circuit node is an abstraction of a set
of Boolean circuit states. It is abstract in the sense that it
ambiguously stands for any one of a family of Boolean state
sets, one for each replacement of every X by 0 or 1. The
collection of all such abstractions forms a lattice, ordered by
the amount of information about node values.
The STE model-checking algorithm uses three-valued cir-
cuit simulation [5] to compute a reachable abstract state-set in
this representation, comparing this to a specification written
in a weak linear-time temporal logic. The algorithm is space-
efficient because it operates over abstractions of sets of states;
any parts of the circuit function not relevant to the specification
get ‘abstracted away’ to X. Any correctness result verified in
this abstract model transfers over to the real, Boolean model of
circuit states. Formally, there is a Galois connection between
the three-valued model and the Boolean model of states [6].
On top of the abstraction lattice, STE provides a layer of
symbolic representation whereby whole families of abstrac-
tions may be checked simultaneously in one run of the model-
checker. The abstractions are indexed symbolically by Boolean
variables, and formulas of Boolean logic are computed to
represent the resulting families of reachable abstract state
sets. This mechanism, sometimes called ‘symbolic indexing’,
provides a flexible way to achieve partitioned data abstraction.
A typical example is a memory verification, in which an
n-element memory is verified with an indexed family of n
abstractions, one for each address at which some target data
might be located.
The abstractions in an indexed family can overlap in flex-
ible, though not quite arbitrary, ways. This representation
can also record interdependencies among node values, and
so greatly increases the expressive power of specifications
for STE. In implementations, the formulas in the symbolic
layer may be manipulated using BDDs or other (usually semi-
canonical) representations, and decided using SAT or BDDs.
This abstraction machinery is controlled by the way in
which a user writes properties for model checking. By careful
coding of the property, the user can guide the symbolic
simulation done during model-checking through the right
layers of the abstract state lattice to verify the property with
contained complexity. A good illustration of success is the
content-addressable memory verification done by Pandey and
colleagues [2], in which a careful encoding of properties gives
a logarithmic reduction in complexity.
Controlling abstraction manually in this way can be dif-
ficult, especially if there are assumptions about the operat-
ing environment of the verification. The property encoding
required for abstraction is often non-obvious and tricky to
devise. This paper describes an automatic approach to STE
abstraction. We present an algorithm that computes an indexed
family of abstractions from the specification to be verified.
The abstraction scheme is then encoded in the guards of
the verification property using the indexing transformation
algorithm of Melham and Jones [7]. The result is an automatic
abstraction method for STE, which requires little or no user
guidance. We illustrate the effectiveness of our method with
verifications of a memory, a CAM, and a simple scheduler.
II. ABSTRACTION IN STE
Verification properties in STE are called trajectory asser-
tions and have the form A⇒ C, where A and C are formulas
of a simple linear-time temporal logic. The intuition is that the
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antecedent formula A describes some initial conditions of the
circuit inputs and states, and the consequent C specifies the
values expected on circuit nodes as a response. The atomic
propositions in A and C take the form ‘P  n is 0’ or
‘P  n is 1’, where n is the name of a circuit node and
the guard P is a formula of propositional logic. The guard
determines when the proposition is asserted: if P is true,
then the node n must have the value 0 (or 1 respectively);
if P is false, then there is no such assertion and n can have
any value—including, for abstraction efficiency, the don’t care
value X. Antecedents and consequents are essentially just
conjunctions of these atomic propositions, possibly modified
by the next-time temporal operator N.
The guards in a trajectory assertion are all formulas of
propositional logic over some set of variables; different guards
can share variables, but not all the variables need appear in
every guard. For each assignment of truth-values to these
variables, the trajectory assertion collapses into a property
verifiable by three-valued simulation, with Xs on all circuit
nodes not forced to 0 or 1 by the antecedent or the circuit
itself. Sets of reachable states are approximated by abstractions
that assign a value in {0, 1,X} to each circuit node. Given a
trajectory assertion, STE simultaneously computes the family
of all such three-valued simulations, one for each satisfying
assignment to the variables in the guards.
Users control this partitioned abstraction mechanism by
appropriate selection of guards. The idea can be illustrated
by the following trivial example. Consider a unit-delay AND-
gate with three input nodes a, b, and c and output node o.
A verification that does not exploit the abstraction lattice is
achieved by running STE on this trajectory assertion:
t1  a is 0 and t1  a is 1 and
t2  b is 0 and t2  b is 1 and
t3  c is 0 and t3  c is 1
⇒
N(t1 ∨ t2 ∨ t3  o is 0 and t1 ∧ t2 ∧ t3  o is 1)
(1)
This is just symbolic Boolean simulation. The antecedent
attaches a distinct, unconstrained, propositional variable to
each input node. And the consequent asserts that the expected
Boolean function of these variables appears on the output.
Note that all Boolean variables in STE appear in the guards;
the constants a, b, and c are node names, not variables.
STE’s abstraction lattice lets us reduce the number of
variables needed to verify this gate. The key observation is
that if any one input is 0, then the output will be 0 regardless
of the other inputs. We can exploit this with Xs to introduce
abstraction in the model-checking run. For the AND gate, there
are four cases to check; we can enumerate or ‘index’ these with
two variables, say x1 and x2. We write the following:
x1 ∧ x2  a is 0 and
x1 ∧ x2  b is 0 and
x1 ∧ x2  c is 0 and
x1 ∧ x2  a is 1 and b is 1 and c is 1
⇒
N(x1 ∨ x2  o is 0 and x1 ∧ x2  o is 1)
(2)
Model-checking this with STE will simultaneously check four
cases, each with different but sometimes overlapping abstrac-
tions of the reachable states arising. Any property verified in
STE with a node set to X also holds when the node is either 0
or 1, so this assertion covers all input cases and is complete.
The advantage of this kind of abstraction is that it makes the
representation of sets of states more compact, so that BDD or
SAT computations in the model-checking are more tractable.
The reduction in the number of propositional variables can be
substantial in real applications.
A. Indexing Transformations
Melham and Jones [7] describe an algorithm by which
trajectory assertions can be transformed to introduce more
abstraction. Suppose A ⇒ C is an assertion. The algorithm
replaces the guards in A and C with new propositional
formulas over a set of fresh variables in such a way that if
the transformed assertion holds then so does A⇒ C.
The algorithm takes as input a relation that specifies the
abstraction scheme to be applied. For the three-input AND-
gate, one possible abstraction relation is
((x1 ∧ x2)→ t1) ∧ ((x1 ∧ x2)→ t2) ∧
((x1 ∧ x2)→ t3) ∧ ((x1 ∧ x2)→ (t1 ∧ t2 ∧ t3))
(3)
The variables x1 and x2 index the abstraction cases, and
the variables t1, t2, and t3 appear in the directly-formulated
Boolean trajectory assertion (1). Using this relation, the algo-
rithm will compute the encoded trajectory assertion (2).
The Melham-Jones algorithm works by taking certain
preimages of an assertion’s guards under the supplied abstrac-
tion relation. The relation takes the form R[X , T ], where T
is a set of target variables that occur in the guards of A⇒ C
(they need not be all the variables) and X is a set of fresh
indexing variables. For a given guard P , we define the weak
preimage PR and strong preimage PR by:
PR[X ] = ∃T . R[X , T ] ∧ P [T ]
PR[X ] = PR[X ] ∧ ¬∃T . R[X , T ] ∧ ¬P [T ]
where ∃T denotes existential quantification over all the vari-
ables in the set T . Intuitively, PR[X ] is true for all indices X
that allow P to hold, and PR[X ] is true for all indices X that
force P to hold. Given an assertion A ⇒ C, the algorithm
applies the strong preimage to the guards in A and the weak
preimage to the guards in C. This weakens the verification
assumptions A by introducing Xs, while maintaining the
strength of the verification requirements C.
It is a technical side-condition required for soundness of
the abstraction that the supplied relation satisfies the coverage
condition ∀T .∃X . R[X , T ]. This ensures all the target variable
values are indexed. Coverage is a bit more tricky when there
are environmental constraints on the verification [7].
The indexing algorithm can be used on specifications that
specify timing delays, such as the AND-gate above, as well
as purely combinational ones. There is no explicit represen-
tation of time in the indexing relation itself—sequential STE
specifications normally use distinct variables in the guards of
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input nodes for the different time points of interest, so these
are just different target variables in the indexing relation.
B. The Automatic Abstraction Method
The core of the method in this paper is an algorithm that
automatically computes abstractions for use with the indexing
transformation just described. The output of the algorithm is
an abstraction relation of the kind illustrated by (3), the AND-
gate relation of the previous section, but vastly more complex
and unintuitive for realistic examples. The practical benefit is
that a user does not have to invent the abstraction and manually
encode it into the trajectory assertion to be verified.
The algorithm takes as input a specification for the circuit
to be verified, in the form of a Boolean expression that states
the required I/O function. This specification is typically a
component of the STE assertion to be verified, so in principle
our method need not require anything beyond the manually-
written properties that any verification needs. (But see the
discussion of ‘symbolic constants’ below.) We work from
specifications rather than circuits because they give a clean ref-
erence model of the algorithm the circuit uses, unencumbered
by implementation detail [8]. Although the I/O specification
provided as input to our algorithm is purely combinational,
the resulting abstraction relation is applicable to sequential
circuits, for the reasons explained in the previous section.
The algorithm is presented in Sections III and IV, where
we also prove that the relations generated meet the required
coverage condition by construction. In Section V we then
describe several optimizations to the preimage calculations
done to transform trajectory assertions. Some of these exploit
the special form that our abstractions relations have because
of how they are generated. We prove the correctness of the
most complex of these optimizations.
The experimental results in Section VI show that our method
handles both embedded memories—the classic target for man-
ual symbolic indexing—and the much less intuitive example
of a scheduler. The paper concludes with some discussion of
related work and our plans for future extensions.
III. COMPUTING ABSTRACTION RELATIONS
The approach we take in computing an abstraction relation
is to use the structure of a specification function. Specifically,
we assume that we have been given a Boolean expression con-
structed using only two-input AND operators, NOT operators,
and named variables. We call this datatype a bexpr for short.
For the time being, we suppose the expression has a single
output and is tree-structured.
We introduce the algorithm by describing a simplified ver-
sion, so we can convey the basic idea without too much detail.
Consider the algorithm in Fig. 1. The function simple bp takes
a bexpr for the specification and two BDDs, h and l, that
represent the conditions under which the output should be
high or low, respectively. It computes a BDD representing
an abstraction relation by propagating conditions backwards
through the circuit. The index variables of this relation are
1. simple bp(e, h, l) =
2. if is VAR(e) then
3. t := bexpr2bdd(e)
4. return((h→ t) ∧ (l→ t));
5. elseif is NOT(e) then
6. return bp(strip NOT(e), l, h);
7. else // AND
8. x := fresh index var();
9. (e1, e2) := destruct AND(e)
10. r1 := simple bp(e1, h, l∧x);
11. r2 := simple bp(e2, h, l∧x);
12. return(r1 ∧ r2);
Fig. 1. Simple back-propagation algorithm.
generated in line 8 and occur in h and l. The target variables
originate from the bexpr and are introduced in line 3.
The algorithm is recursive over the structure of e, the
specification bexpr. In the base case, when the e is a variable,
the abstraction relation simply says that the target variable is
true whenever h holds and false whenever l holds. An invariant
of the algorithm is that h and l never both hold. For NOT
operations, we simply reverse h and l and continue. Finally,
for a two-input AND operator, more work is needed. Both
inputs must be high whenever h holds, so we simply pass h to
the recursive calls in lines 10 and 11. But there are two ways
l can be forced: either the first input or the second input has
to be low. This choice is captured by creating a fresh index
variable x. It is used to select which of the inputs are going
to be the decisive low signal. Note that we never require both











Fig. 2. Example circuit to illustrate our algorithm.
To illustrate the algorithm, consider the circuit in Fig. 2.
First assume we want to compute the abstraction relation for
the case the output is high. In other words, we want to compute
a family of abstract inputs that all yield an output of high and
that cover all such inputs. The resulting abstraction relation is
(x1 → a) ∧ (x1 → b) ∧ c ∧ d.
Intuitively, the index variable x1 decides whether a or b has to
be high, and both c and d must be high. Similarly, if we call
simple bp with h=F and l=T we get the abstraction relation
(x1 → a) ∧ (x1 → b) ∧ (x2x1 → c) ∧ (x2 x1 → d).
We can combine the above two cases by calling simple bp
with h=x0 and l=x0, where x0 is a fresh Boolean indexing
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variable. In this combined case, we get
(x3x0 → a) ∧ (x1x0 → a) ∧ (x3 x0 → b) ∧ (x1x0 → b) ∧
(x0 → c) ∧ (x2x1 x0 → c) ∧ (x0 → d) ∧ (x2 x1 x0 → d).
There are several shortcomings of this simple algorithm that
make it inefficient. First, it builds a monolithic Boolean ex-
pression for the abstraction relation. But a partitioned relation
is often more feasible and easier to use. Second, the algorithm
is very generous in using fresh Boolean variables. Third, by
recognizing only two-input AND gates, the algorithm will es-
sentially use a unary encoding, rather than a binary encoding.
And by recognizing only conjunctions, the algorithm uses
more Boolean variables than needed—for example, simply
recognizing XNOR gates can reduce the number of variables
by a factor of two. Finally, the algorithm is sometimes too
aggressive in computing the abstraction relation. It is quite
common that the user can select some signals not to be part
of the abstraction. Thus, the algorithm needs to be controlled
when such symbolic constants are present.
IV. IMPROVED ALGORITHM
In Fig. 3, we provide a much improved algorithm that
tackles all of the shortcomings of the simple algorithm.
1. bp(C, e, h, l, name) =
2. if freevars(e) ⊆ C OR is VAR(e) then
3. return {(bexpr2bdd(e), h, l)};
4. elseif is XNOR(e) then
5. (i1, i2) := sort inp args(C,e);
6. if freevars(i1) ⊆ C then
7. c := bexpr2bdd(i1);
8. return bp(C, i2, h c ∨ l c, h c ∨ l c, name);
9. else
10. {x1,x2} := get case exprs(name,2);
11. {n1,n2} := make unique names(name,2);
12. return( bp(C, i1, hx1 ∨ lx1, hx2 ∨ lx2, n1)∪
13. bp(C, i2, hx1 ∨ lx2, hx2 ∨ lx1, n2) );
14. elseif is NOT(e) then
15. return bp(C, strip NOT(e), l, h, name);
16. else // AND





19. res := if cis = ∅ then ∅ else {(c,h,F)};
20. cases := get case exprs(name,|oinps|);
21. if h ≡ F then
22. names := mk same names(name, |oinps|);
23. else
24. names := mk unique names(name, |oinps|);
25. foreach b ∈ oinps, s ∈ cases, n ∈ names
26. res := res ∪ bp(C, b, h, l∧s∧c, n);
27. return res;
Fig. 3. Main back-propagation algorithm.
The algorithm is recursive and takes a set of symbolic
constants C, a bexpr e, the high and low conditions h and l, and
a base name name used to create unique variables. It returns a
list of triples, where each triple consists of a Boolean function
f over the symbolic constants C and the generated indexing
variables X , and two Boolean functions denoting the cases in
which f should be high or low, respectively. In Section V we
will show how this format leads to a very efficient algorithm
for computing the preimage operations needed for STE.
In more detail, on line 2-3, we deal with the two cases
that the expression e only depends on variables in C or e is
a target variable. For either case, we create a singleton triple
representing the partial relation.
On line 4, we test whether the last bexpr represents an
XNOR gate or not. If yes, on line 5 we sort the two inputs
to the XNOR gate by their support so that if one input only
depends on variables in C, it will be the first input i1. If at least
one of the inputs depends only on variables in C, we do not
need to introduce any new indexing variables, but can simply
call bp recursively suitably modifying the h and l functions
given the value of the symbolic expression. If both inputs to
the XNOR depend on target variables, then on line 10-11 we
create two case expressions and two new base names. The
case expressions are simply xi and xi for some variable xi
created from the name argument. On lines 12 and 13 we then
call bp recursively on inputs i1 and i2, with suitable high and
low functions and distinct base names. Finally, the union of
the two sets of triples returned is formed.
On lines 14-15 we deal with the case when e is a NOT
expression. Here we simply call bp recursively switching h
and l.
Finally on lines 16-27 we deal with the case when the final
operator of e is an AND gate. On line 17, we traverse the
bexpr to find as large an AND gate as possible by calling the
routine find big ands. This routine not only finds all inputs
that are conjoined, it also separates the inputs into two groups:
the ones that only depend on variables in C and those that do
not. The conjunction of the first group is formed in line 18,
since they do not need indexing variables. Only a consistency
requirement, computed on line 19, is needed to make sure the
assignment of the indexing variables does not contradict the
value of this expression. Technically, we are only required to
add the implication h → c, but rather than having a separate
set of consistency requirements, we include the triple (c, h,F)
in the relation.
On line 20 we compute a set of mutually exclusive Boolean
expressions over some fresh indexing variables that will be
used to encode which of the inputs should be set to low. On
line 21, we deal with a common special case that allows us
to call bp recursively without new base names, thus greatly
increase the sharing of indexing variables. Finally, on lines
25 and 26 we call bp recursively on every input expression
modifying the low condition according to the case expressions.
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A. Coverage
Although the intuition behind the algorithm is fairly simple,
it is critical to ensure that the trajectory assertions after
abstraction verify all of the cases that were verified by the
original assertions. We guarantee this by proving coverage in
Theorem 1. Note that apart from indexing variables X we
also need to consider the symbolic constants C. Recall that X
are used to index different cases of assertions for T , while
the symbolic constants C basically introduce some additional,
temporary target variables. For coverage we hence show that
for every assignment of target variables and symbolic constants
we can find an indexing corresponding to it.
Theorem 1 (Coverage): Given a Boolean expression repre-
sented as a bexpr-tree e, let rl = bp(C, e, x0, x0, name) be the
result of the algorithm in Fig. 3, where name is chosen to
ensure that none of the generated variables are called x0. If
R[X , C, T ] =
∧
(ei,hi,li)∈rl
(hi → ei) ∧ (li → ei),
then ∀T .∀C.∃X . R[X , C, T ].
Proof: Let the target variables T and the symbolic
constants C be arbitrary, but fixed. Then we can simulate the
bexpr-tree. That is, we can determine all input and output
values of each constructor of e. In particular, the simulation
result of e and the values of all consequents en in the relation
R[X , C, T ] are known. By induction on the depth k of the
bexpr-tree e we show that there exists a variable assignment
for X such that
∀n. ((en = F)→ (hn = F)) ∧ ((en = T)→ (ln = F)) (4)
Then R[X , C, T ] = T as required.
Base case: The only bexpr-tree e of depth 0
is a single variable t. In this case the relation is
R[X , C, T ] = (x0 → t) ∧ (x0 → t). Property (4) is satisfied
by choosing x0 = t.
Inductive step: Suppose that for all bexpr-trees of depth ≤ k
there is a variable assignment such that (4) holds.
We examine the last constructor of the bexpr-tree e of depth
k + 1 and determine an assignment for the variables Y intro-
duced by the algorithm for that constructor. W.l.o.g. assume
the last constructor is an AND or a NOT that completes an
XNOR. In both cases assume at least one input depends on a
variable not in C—otherwise, no new indexing variables are
introduced and the induction hypothesis provides the required
variable assignment for X . We consider the two constructor
cases, AND and NOT, in I and II below.
I. Suppose the last constructor is AND. We analyse e further
to extract all consecutive AND constructors, resulting in a
multiple input AND of maximal size, which is achieved by
find big ands in line 17 of Fig. 3. We will now determine
a variable assignment as desired depending on the simulation
result of e. For this we split the inputs of the AND gate into
two groups: cis, which only depend on variables in C, and ij ,
which depend on some indexing variables.
Ia. First suppose cis = ∅. Further suppose the simu-
lation result of e is true. We choose x0 = T, and hence
the output conditions are he = T, le = F. Observe that all
inputs ij of the AND have to be true in the simulation and
∀j. hij = T, lij = F. Arbitrary values can be chosen for Y ,
they are only necessary for the case where e is false. Note
that the variables Y are never used at any other point in
the algorithm due to the use of new, unique base names. An
assignment for the remaining X is determined as follows: By
induction hypothesis there exists an assignment for the bexpr-
tree of each input ij . The algorithm guarantees that each input-
tree uses a unique set of variables by specifying a unique
base name for the variables. Hence the assignments for each
input tree, and our assignment for Y , can be merged to an
assignment as required.
Ib. Now suppose cis = ∅, but the simulation result of
e is false. We choose x0 = F, and hence he = F, le = T.
Observe that at least one input ij of the AND has to be
false in the simulation, w.l.o.g. i1 = F. The algorithm speci-
fies that hij = le = F and lij = casej [Y] ∧ le. We choose a
variable assignment for Y such that case1 = T and hence
casej = F ∀j = 1.
By induction hypothesis there exists a variable assignment
for the input tree of i1 as required. It does not include Y , so
the variable assignment can be merged with our assignment
to Y . Observe that for all other inputs hij = lij = F, j = 1.
But the algorithm forms new hin, lin using conjunction with
hout, lout only, so we can deduce that all h, l on the input
trees of ij , j = 1 will be false throughout, in particular at the
terminating points en included in the relation. This means that
all variable assignments, and in particular the one chosen for
i1, satisfy (4) trivially.
Ic. Next suppose cis = ∅ and c =
∧
ci∈cis
ci is false. Then
at least one of the concrete inputs is false, and accordingly
the simulation output is false. Hence we choose x0 = F and
receive he = F. The extra requirement he → c is therefore
trivially satisfied. Also notice that in this case we need not
force any other inputs to be low, i.e. lij = F for all j. So the
indexing variables Y can be chosen arbitrarily with the same
reasoning as in Ia.




Then the extra requirement he → c is trivially satisfied. If
the simulation output is true, we choose x0 = T and Y can
be chosen arbitrarily as seen in Ia. If the simulation output is
false, we choose x0 = F. Given that we know that the concrete
inputs are all true this means the indexing has to force one
of the remaining inputs to be false. As seen in Ib, w.l.o.g.
we choose Y such that case1 = T and use the induction
hypothesis to complete the variable assignment.
II. Now suppose the last constructor is a NOT that completes
an XNOR, where i1 and i2 are the two subtrees of e being
compared. This is detected by is XNOR in line 2 of Fig. 3.
Further assume that neither input only depends on C. Recall
that for XNORs the algorithm sets the input conditions hi1 =
y∧he∨y∧ le and li1 = y∧he∨y∧ le and hi2 = y∧he∨y∧ le
and li2 = y∧he∨y∧le using the output conditions and a single
indexing variable y solely introduced for that step. Intuitively,
the indexing variables x0 and y enumerate the four possible
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cases that can occur for the 2-bit XNOR. We now specify
which assignments correspond to the explicit instances.
Suppose the simulation result shows that i1 = F, i2 =
F, e = T. We choose x0 = T, and hence he = T, le = F.
By further choosing y = F we receive hi1 = hi2 = F and
li1 = li2 = T, which corresponds to the input values. By
induction hypothesis there exists an assignment for the bexpr-
tree i1 and i2. These two assignments and our assignment to x0
and y are merged and results in the full assignment required.
Notice that i1 and i2 use distinct base name for their variables
and never x0 or y, so no conflicts can occur.
The other three possible cases are similar. If simulation
result shows that i1 = T, i2 = T, e = T, we choose x0 = T
and y = T. If it is i1 = F, i2 = T, e = F, we choose x0 = F
and y = F. Finally, if i1 = T, i2 = F, e = F, then we choose
x0 = F and y = T.
B. DAGs and multiple outputs
In the previous we assumed that we are given a bexpr-tree.
The algorithm can be extended to handle DAGs as follows.
Every fanout point is marked with a new variable v and the
graph is cut at these points. The algorithm is then run for each
resulting tree with distinct variables to guarantee independence
of indexing variables. Observe that in some cases v will be
an output, and in others an initial input. The resulting triplets
are merged as follows.
Assume To is a set of triplets computed by the algorithm,
where the output was previously a fanout point v. W.l.o.g. let
vh and vl be two fresh, distinct variables used for h and l
respectively when running the algorithm.
Further assume that Ti is a set of triplets computed where
v is one of the initial inputs, i.e. v is a target variable. Let
(v, hv, lv) ∈ Ti be the triplet corresponding to v.
We then determine T ′o by substituting vh with hv and vl
with lv in every triplet of To. This disposes of the variables vh
and vl. Additionally, due to the fact that hv and lv are mutex,
contradicting assignments for vh and vl are eliminated. The
union of all Ti and T ′o for all cut points then represents the
set of all triplets needed for the desired relation.
This procedure is motivated by the fact that we want to
have the same value on every branch of a fanout. Coverage is
achieved with the same argument as before. The requirement
of using unique variables for each run guarantees that assign-
ments for the indexing variables can be chosen independently
and merged without conflicts.
Similarly, we can handle bexprs with multiple outputs.
We simply run the algorithm for each output independently.
For this we introduce a unique indexing variable xi0 for
each output and require unique base names namei. This
ensures independence of the results and allows us to form
the conjunction of the relations, where coverage follows as
before.
V. EFFICIENT PREIMAGE IMPLEMENTATION
The algorithm in Fig. 3 produces a partitioned abstraction
relation, which allows early existential quantification to be
used in the preimage computations explained in Section II-A.
We can, for example, use the technique described in [9]. But
we can do even better by exploiting the special form that our
relations have by virtue of how they are generated.
First, it is easy to show that the abstraction relation R[X , T ]
generated by our algorithm can be written as a conjunction
S [X ] ∧ T [X , T ], where S [X ] contains no target variables.
Terms in S [X ] are generated by line 3, when freevars(e) ⊆ C,
or by the consistency requirement in line 19 of Fig. 3. The
conjunct T [X , T ] has the form
∧
i
(hi [X ]→ ti) ∧ (li [X ]→ ti),
where ti ranges over the target variables T , and no target
variable occurs in any hi or li . We define Ti [X , ti ] to be
(hi [X ]→ ti)∧ (li [X ]→ ti), so that T [X , T ] =
∧
i
Ti [X , ti ].
The main theorem of this section shows how this structure
is exploited. We first introduce some notation. Given a guard
P , let F = freevars(P ) and let I be the set of indices i such
that ti ∈ F . Let R↓P =
∧
i∈I
Ti . Intuitively, R↓P denotes
the part of R that mentions the target variables in P . Note
that PR↓P = ∃F .R↓P ∧ P .
Theorem 2: Given a guard P and a relation R produced by
the algorithm in Fig. 3, define D = S ∧
∧
i









D ∧ P if freevars(P ) ∩ T = ∅
D ∧ li if P = ti
D ∧ hi if P = ti
D ∧ PR↓P otherwise
PR = D ∧ PR
Because D does not depend on the guard P , it can be
precomputed when R is created and used for all guards in
the trajectory assertion to be transformed. By building hash
tables that map ti to hi and li , the two middle cases can be
computed very quickly. The fourth case, seen only rarely in
practice, can be optimized using quantification scheduling.
The remainder of this section is devoted to proving
the above theorem. First, given a relation R, we define
dom(R)[X ] = ∃T . R[X , T ]. Intuitively, dom(R) holds for
all valuations of the indexing variables that represent used, or
consistent, indexing cases.
The following lemma states that dom(R) is equal to the
expression D used in Theorem 2.
Lemma 1: dom(R) = S ∧
∧
i
hi ∧ li .
Proof: By definition, dom(R) = ∃T .R. Using the known
shape of R, we expand this to ∃T .S ∧
∧
i
Ti . Since S does
not depend on the target variables T , and each Ti depends
only on target variable ti , we can push the quantifier inwards
to obtain S ∧
∧
i
∃ti .Ti . By eliminating the quantifier, this can
easily be shown to equal S ∧
∧
i
hi ∧ li .
The next lemma states that only the parts of a relation that
mention the target variables that occur in a guard need to be
included when computing the preimage.
Lemma 2: PR = dom(R) ∧ PR↓P .
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Proof: First, we express PR in a form that resembles the
goal. By definition, PR = ∃T .R∧P . Using the known shape
of R, this can be rewritten to ∃T .S ∧ (
∧
i
Ti) ∧ P . We then
partition the variables T into the ones that occur in P , U ,
and the rest of them, V , and also split the big conjunction






Ti) ∧ P .
Each Ti mentions only one target variable (namely ti ), and S
does not mention any target variables, so the quantifiers can
be pushed inwards: S ∧ (∃V.
∧
i ∈I
Ti) ∧ ∃U .(
∧
i∈I
Ti) ∧ P .
So PR = S ∧(∃V.
∧
i ∈I
Ti)∧PR↓P by the definition of R↓P .
Now consider the subformula ∃V.
∧
i ∈I
Ti . Again, each
Ti mentions only target variable ti , so the quantifier can be
pushed inwards to get
∧
i ∈I
∃ti .Ti . It is easy to show that






hi ∧ li . We use
this new equivalence to simplify the formula obtained earlier.
Hence, PR = S ∧ (
∧
i ∈I
hi ∧ li) ∧ PR↓P .
It remains to show S ∧ (
∧
i ∈I
hi ∧ li)∧PR↓P = dom(R)∧
PR↓P . We do this by proving implication in both directions.
Leftwards: According to Lemma 1, the right side can be
rewritten to S ∧ (
∧
i
hi ∧ li) ∧ PR↓P . This formula trivially
implies the left side, since the only difference is that the left
side contains fewer conjuncts.
Rightwards: Assume that S ∧ (
∧
i ∈I
hi ∧ li)∧PR↓P holds.
For a moment, we focus on the fact that the subformula PR↓P
holds, which, by definition, is equal to ∃U .(
∧
i∈I
Ti) ∧ P .




the quantifier inwards yielding
∧
i∈I
∃ti .Ti . This formula can
easily be shown to equal
∧
i∈I
hi ∧ li .
Combining this formula with the original assumption results
in S ∧ (
∧
i
hi ∧ li) ∧ PR↓P . By Lemma 1, this is equal to
dom(R) ∧ PR↓P , which concludes the proof.
Theorem 2 can now be established using Lemmas 1 and
2. It is easy to show that if a guard P contains no target
variables, then PR = PR = dom(R) ∧ P . This justifies the
first case of Theorem 2. For the second and third case of
Theorem 2, we only need to specialize Lemma 2 with P = tk
and P = tk. The fourth case follows immediately from the
lemmas. The identity PR = dom(R) ∧ PR is easily shown
using the definitions of the preimage operations.
One last observation allows us to improve the preim-
age calculations further. Notice that the expression D =
dom(R) = ∃T .R[X , T ] is present as a conjunct in every case.
As shown by Melham and Jones [7], the coverage condition
∀T .∃X . R[X , T ] must be supplied as an environmental con-
straint in the STE run. In other words, we are only interested
in cases where this constraint is true. Since the formula D
is implied by the constraint, D can safely be assumed to be
true, and hence removed from the formulas. This significantly
reduces the complexity of the preimage operations.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We illustrate the use of our algorithm on three classes of
circuits; two that are traditional targets for the use of symbolic
indexing and one that illustrates the power of our algorithm
in applying abstraction in more subtle ways. All results were
obtained with BDD-based STE in the Forte [3] environment










Fig. 4. High-level model of CAM.
Our first example is a traditional content-addressable mem-
ory (CAM), as illustrated in Fig. 4. The verification we are
interested in is the behavior of the hit signal. It should be
high iff there is an entry in the CAM with the same content
as the key being presented. The specification function we use
is the obvious one: try matching the key against each entry
and take the disjunction of the results to yield the hit value.





Fig. 5. Results for CAM verification.
We restricted the abstraction by declaring the key inputs to
be symbolic constants. With this formulation, in Fig. 5 we
show the time required for verifying a CAM of varying size
and number of entries. The time for running the verification
is split roughly in three equal parts: running the abstraction
algorithm, computing the preimages, and finally running the
STE verification. The results indicate that running time grows
linearly with the size of the CAM. Indeed, our algorithm
automatically generates the indexing suggested in [2], i.e., we
yield an indexing that previously had to be developed with
careful reasoning. It should be pointed out that this design
could not be verified for larger sizes without using symbolic
indexing: For BDD based verification, we ran out of memory;
for SAT based verification, the verification process timed out.
It is interesting to note that if we apply our algorithm to the
CAM specification but do not declare any symbolic constants,
we obtain a much finer grained symbolic indexing scheme.
For example, one case included in this finer indexing family
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covers the case in which bit i of the key is different from bit
i in every entry in the CAM. This input should lead to the hit
signal being low. Not only does this approach yield a symbolic
indexing scheme that is far less efficient, the STE verification
failed on our design due to over-abstraction. Effectively, we
obtained an X on the hit signal when we expected a 0. The
reason for this was that in our design the key input to the
CAM was protected by a (simulated) error correcting circuit.
This circuit needed all inputs to the key to be fully defined to
produce non-X outputs. In practice, it appears that such over-
abstractions are relatively easy to avoid, but more work in this






Fig. 6. High-level model of memory.
Our second example is a read operation for a memory,
which is abstractly shown in Fig. 6. The specification function
essentially consists of the natural sequence of “if read-address
is i then return the content of address i else try i + 1”.
In contrast, the implementation uses a decoder circuit, pre-
charged logic etc. to implement the read operation. Here,
we state that the read address should not be abstracted, but
kept fully symbolic. As can be seen in the graph in Fig. 7,
the run-time behaviour of the STE verification is exceedingly
good. A closer inspection of the symbolic indexing computed
reveals that it is virtually identical to the one suggested in [2].
Given that we did not need to provide any information except
stating that the address should be symbolic, this result clearly
demonstrates the efficiency and practicality of our approach.
Fig. 7. Results for memory read.
Our final example is a scheduler abstractly shown in Fig. 8.
Its functionality is to compute the address of the oldest entry
that is ready. Providing a specification function that actually
computes the oldest ready entry is fairly involved. However,








Fig. 8. High-level model of scheduler.
oldest ready is much easier. Thus we write the specification
as a relation in terms of the symbolic constants: address a and












In applying our algorithm, we state that a and o are symbolic
constants. In Fig. 9 we show data on the run-time behavior
of this verification effort, revealing that using this technique
realistically sized schedulers can be verified. It is worth
pointing out that trying to verify the same circuit without
symbolic indexing, i.e., with variables in every state holding
register and input, fails for circuits larger than 16 entries and
width of the age registers of at least 4. In other words, not even
a fairly trivial scheduler can be handled without abstraction. At
the same time, with the method of this paper, this verification
is completely straightforward and fully automatic.
Fig. 9. Results for scheduler verification.
VII. RELATED WORK
There is a rich and growing literature on automatic abstrac-
tion for model checking and verification. Some cornerstone
techniques are localization reduction [10], counterexample-
guided abstraction refinement [11], and predicate abstrac-
tion [12]. These and other methods have been extensively stud-
ied in the context of symbolic model-checking for hardware.
By contrast, the literature on automatic abstraction for STE or
GSTE is rather thin.
One notable exception is the work of Tzoref and Grum-
berg [13] on abstraction refinement for STE. This addresses
the problem of over-abstraction in STE that manifests itself
in symbolic simulation by a node carrying X where the
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consequent expects 0 or 1. This is common with manually-
formulated assertions, usually because some input variable
node has not been driven by the antecedent [8]. A heuristic
algorithm is presented in [13] that assigns fresh, distinct
Boolean variables to input nodes in a clever way targeted at
eliminating the Xs that make the model-checking run fail.
Roorda [14] presents a SAT-based method that assists
in manual abstraction refinement for STE. The algorithm
provides the user with hints for refining abstractions that
over-approximate circuit behaviour. For a given assertion and
circuit, Roorda’s algorithm finds a minimal set of extra circuit
inputs and an assignment of Booleans to them that will
eliminate Xs at relevant circuit outputs. The user can then
reformulate their assertion to drive these nodes with variables.
Both [13] and [14] are aimed at strengthening verification
properties by driving more inputs. This refines the abstraction
level of the specification to eliminate Xs, but in contrast
with our work, does not in itself introduce complex, indexed
families of abstractions.
Finally, our algorithm bears a resemblance to the D-
algorithm [15] and other automatic test pattern generation
methods. Both work backwards through a combinational cir-
cuit finding ways in which outputs might be forced high or
low.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The algorithm we presented in this paper is, to the best of
our knowledge, the first automatic abstraction algorithm for
STE that yields results equivalent to carefully hand-crafted
assertions. This has the potential to significantly increase the
use of this type of abstraction in STE-based verification.
Further improvement of our approach is planned. A fruitful
field for future research will be to examine how to best encode
the abstractions. That is, when should we reuse indexing
variables, and when should we introduce fresh ones? This
is particularly interesting when handling DAGs and multiple
outputs, and when examining SAT-based STE verification.
Some first results seem to indicate this type of abstraction does
not speed up SAT-based STE verification the same way that it
does BDD-based ones. Perhaps this is caused by an unsuitable
encoding, or some entirely new approach is needed. We intend
to investigate this issue much more thoroughly.
A second important research direction concentrates on how
to refine the abstraction our algorithm computes in case it over-
approximates the circuit function. In this paper, we introduced
a simple and somewhat crude solution by allowing users to
state that certain signals should not be abstracted. This is
a perfectly workable solution for many examples, but more
automatic abstraction refinement methods are needed to deploy
our approach more widely. Applying the algorithm presented
in [13], slightly modified so it can handle indexing, is one
promising option to consider.
Finally, another obvious extension will be to incorporate the
presented ideas into the GSTE algorithm [16]. We also intend
to apply our method to a much wider class of problems to
determine its strengths and weaknesses. We suspect this will
yield more insight into how to further enhance our approach.
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Abstract—We present a coverage analysis that can be used in
property-based verification. The analysis helps identifying ”for-
gotten cases”; scenarios where the property list under analysis
does not constrain a certain output at a certain point in time.
These scenarios can then be manually investigated, possibly lead-
ing to new, previously forgotten properties being added. As there
often exist cases in which outputs are not supposed to be specified,
we also provide means for the specificier to annotate properties in
order to control what cases are supposed to be underconstrained.
Two main differences with earlier proposed similar analyses
exist: The presented analysis is design-independent, and it makes
an explicit distinction between intentionally and unintentionally
underspecified behavior.
I. INTRODUCTION
In property-based verification, a natural question that often
arises is ’Have we specified enough properties?’
In simulation-based verification, there exist a myriad of
coverage notions, that indicate how much of the design has
been exercised during simulation. These notions can be used
in order to decide when we have simulated ”enough” (or rather
when we have not yet simulated enough!)
When combining simulation-based verification with
property-based verification, it is easy to see that such
coverage notions do not help at all in deciding if we have
actually specified enough properties. Two extreme cases help
pointing this out: (1) It is possible to specify no properties
at all, but still achieve a very high simulation coverage, (2)
It is possible to achieve 100% simulation coverage (by for
example exhaustive simulation or formal verification), but
still properties might be missing.
There exist a number of notions of coverage in formal
verification, where it is checked how much of the design under
verification was actually needed in the formal proof [15], [5],
[4], [6], [9]. One disadvantage of these methods is that they
include the actual design in the coverage analysis.
In general, most coverage notions (for any analysis) are an
over-approximation: When the stated coverage is high, it does
not neccessarily mean that the process at hand is finished, but
when coverage is low, it usually means that concrete cases
are missing. Therefore, when dealing with coverage in any
situation, it is a good idea to provide several, complementary
coverage notions. We would like to complement the arsenal
of existing coverage notions for formal properties with an
analysis that is design-independent. The reason for this is
three-fold:
• In a design-dependent analysis, the complexity of the
analysis becomes dependent on the complexity of the
design and the complexity of the properties. In a design-
independent analysis, the complexity of the analysis is
solely dependent on the properties, leading to a poten-
tially much cheaper analysis.
• A design-dependent analysis can only be performed after
the design has been completed. Moreover, the analysis
will have to be re-done every time the design changes. In
contrast, a design-independent analysis can start before
the design is completed. Thus, a design-independent
analysis fits in a design flow where properties and imple-
mentation evolve simultaneously in parallel. Properties
can be analyzed and refined while the design is being
worked on.
• Some property sets (for example specifications of indus-
try standards) are supposed to be general, reusable, and
thus design-independent. In this case it is vital that an
analysis of these properties is design-independent. Many
specifications are not strict, in the sense that they leave
certain behavior underspecified (for example exactly how
many clock cycles it takes until a ready signal is raised).
General specifications should be as general as possible.
The danger with using a design-dependent analysis is that
the specification gets tied too much to the actual decisions
that are made in the design at hand. At the same time, this
is a challenge that a design-independent analysis needs
to meet.
The idea of our analysis is simple: Given a list of safety
properties, and a set of output signals from the design, our
analysis checks if there exists a ”forgotten case”: a concrete
trace where there exists a point in time where a particular
output signal is not constrained by the properties. This trace
represents a situation that the specifier might not have thought
of when constructing the property list, and thus is a warning
that the property list is not complete.
The presented coverage analysis works for all typical spec-
ification logics in which safety properties can be expressed.
Here, we use a simple variant of LTL.
A. An Example
As a small example, consider a circuit with an input
req (for request) and an output ack (for acknowledge). A
specification of the circuit is that whenever a request is made,
an acknowledge should be made within two clock cycles. A
property stating this in LTL might look as follows:
(req ⇒ next (ack ∨ next ack))
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One might wonder is the above property is sufficient to specify
the output ack. The answer is no; there are a number of
”forgotten cases”.
For example, the property does not say what should hap-
pen when no request has been made. What the specifier
probably meant was that no acknowledge should be made
unless a request has been made; a circuit that always outputs
an acknowledge actually satisfies the above property. Our
analysis warns about this situation by providing the following
”forgotten case” – a concrete finite trace with an output that
is unconstrained at a certain point in time:
req 0 0
ack 0 ?
The question mark in the diagram indicates that no matter
the value of ack, the property is satisfied. After studying such
a forgotten case, the specifier can then refine the property list
in order to outlaw certain behavior, making the specification
more ”tight”. For example, a property like the following could
be added:
(¬req ∧ next ¬req ⇒ next (next ¬ack))
In other words, if no request has been made, then no acknowl-
edge should be given.
Another example of a forgotten case is that the property list
does not say that only one acknowledge should be given for
each request. Our analysis produces the following forgotten
case:
req 1 0 0
ack 0 1 ?
This means that, at the place of the question mark, we are
free to choose to acknowledge or not, without breaking any
of the two properties. Again, the specifier can go back to the
property list and decide if this should be allowed or not, by
refining the property list.
The idea is that the specifier gets feedback about the
property list, refines the list, gets more feedback, etc., until
the analysis stops complaining, in which case there are no
forgotten cases anymore.
B. Forgotten cases
One interesting question is of course what the definition of
a ”forgotten case” is. One strong viewpoint could be that the
property list should define the complete functional behavior of
the circuit at hand. We feel that this restriction is too strong
— many times the intention of a specification is to be general,
not to have to decide the exact behavior.
For example, in the above example specification, it is
unspecified when exactly the acknowledge should come, just
that it should come within two clock cycles. This certainly
does not completely specify the functional behavior of the
circuit. As we shall see later, it turns out to be important to
explicitly distinguish between intentionally and unintentionally
underspecified behavior.
So, the choice of what a forgotten case is, is not so easy. It
should be a balance between (1) providing useful information
back to the user, and at the same time (2) not complaining too
often.
The choice we have made in this paper is the following. A
forgotten case is represented by two traces, both satisfying the
property list at hand, but differing only at exactly one point
in time for exactly one output signal. Then, since both traces
satisfy the properties, this output is not constrained by the
properties at this point in time, and indicates a forgotten case.
In other words, a forgotten case occurs in the following
situation. Given an output x and a time point t, and given
a trace where the values of all other signals and the values
of all other points in time are known, and given that the list
of properties holds, it is still not possible to decide what the
value of x at time point t should be.
We discuss some alternative choices in section VII.
C. Contributions
The contributions of this paper are the following.
• We introduce the concept of ”forgotten case”, that given a
list of safety properties and an output signal, characterizes
a point in time where the properties do not constrain this
output.
• We present an analysis and implementation that finds
forgotten cases, or shows their absence. The analysis is
design-independent – the first of its kind as far as we
know.
• To increase the usefulness of the analysis, we introduce
the concept of ”freeness” of an output signal, that allows
a specifier to explicitly distinguish between intentionally
and unintentionally underspecified signals. We argue that
freeness is vital for design-independent analyses.
D. Organization
In section II, we formally present what we mean by a
forgotten case. In section III, we present a larger example,
that illustrates the usefulness of the analysis. In sections IV
and V, we use the example to illustrate why we need the
concept of freeness, and present an adaptation of the semantics
of forgotten case. In section VI, we show how we have
implemented our analysis. Section VII concludes.
II. SEMANTICS
In order to define more formally what a forgotten case is,
we need to know a little bit more about the semantics of our
properties. We use a simple variant of LTL in this paper, of
which we can describe the syntax in the following way:
φ, ψ ::= s | ¬φ | φ ∧ ψ | next φ | φ | ♦φ | ♦!φ
In the above, s is a signal name, ¬ and ∧ are standard
boolean operators (other operators can be implemented in
terms of these), next is the next operator, and  and ♦ are the
always and eventually operators. Finally, we also will use the
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perhaps not so standard ”eventually, exactly once” operator ♦!
in section VI.
To give semantics to the above syntax, we introduce the
concept of sequence σ : N×Signal → B, which is a function
from natural numbers and signal names to boolean values. The
relation |= relates sequences and formulas in the following
(standard) way:
σ |= s iff. σ(0, s) = 1
σ |= ¬φ iff. σ |= φ
σ |= φ ∧ ψ iff. σ |= φ and σ |= ψ
σ |= next φ iff. σ1 |= φ
σ |= φ iff. ∀k. σk |= φ
σ |= ♦φ iff. ∃k. σk |= φ
σ |= ♦!φ iff. ∃!k. σk |= φ
In the above, we write σk for the sequence σ shifted by k
time steps; σk(t, s) = σ(t + k, s). We use the quantifier ∃!
which means ”there exists a unique”.
We should point out here that the main ideas in the paper
can easily be adopted to other logics that are more complicated
(for example Accellera’s PSL [2]).
A safety property is a formula which only has finite counter
examples. In other words, for a safety property φ, if we have
σ |= φ for some σ, then there always exists a k such that for
all sequences σ′ which agree with σ on the first k points in
time (i.e. σ′(i, s) = σ(i, s) for all 0 ≤ i ≤ k), σ′ is also a
counter example, i.e. σ′ |= φ.
A. Forgotten Cases
Given a property φ, and an output signal s. A forgotten case
for the output signal s is a pair of sequences (σ, σ′) such that:
• σ |= φ and σ′ |= φ
• for all signals s′ which are not s, ∀t. σ(t, s′) = σ′(t, s′)
• ∃!t. σ(t, s) = σ′(t, s)
In other words, both σ and σ′ satisfy the property φ, but differ
at only exactly one point in time, and only for the signal s.
Because of the large overlap between the sequences σ and
σ′ we usually depict a forgotten case as one sequence, with a
question mark at the place of the difference point.
A forgotten case for a list of properties φi is simply a
forgotten case for the conjunction of all φi.
The next section tries to motivate forgotten cases by means
of a larger example.
III. A LARGER EXAMPLE: A FIFO
Consider the following specification of a simple FIFO,
depicted in Fig. 1. The input signals are get, put and a vector
in, and the output signals are err and vectors fst and num. For
simplicity, we specify that putting takes priority over getting.
When we try to put something in a full FIFO, or get something
from an empty FIFO, the signal err becomes 1 for one clock
cycle. The output fst always indicates the first element of the
FIFO, and the output num indicates the number of elements










Fig. 1. A simple FIFO interface
An initial attempt to create a list of safety properties
formalizing the above description might look as follows.
(put = 1 ∧ num = n ⇒ next err = 1)
(put = 1 ∧ num < n ⇒ next num = num + 1
∧ next err = 0)
(put = 1 ∧ num = 0 ⇒ next fst = in)
(put = 1 ∧ 0 < num < n ⇒ next fst = fst)
(get = 1 ∧ put = 0 ∧ num = 0 ⇒ next err = 1)
(get = 1 ∧ put = 0 ∧ 0 < num ⇒ next num = num − 1
∧ next err = 0)
We can now analyze this list of properties using the pro-
posed analysis, in order to discover forgotten cases in our
specification. Note that we are only analyzing the list of
properties, not the design. At this stage, having the design
ready for formal verification is not necessary.
When we ask the analysis about the property coverage of
output err, it immediately replies that err is not constrained







No matter what the value of the ? in the trace, the property
list is still fulfilled. Indeed we should have added a property
err = 0 at time 0!
After this, the analysis still complains; err is unconstrained







And indeed, we should have added a property that says that
errors do not occur when we do not try to change the contents
of the FIFO:
(get = 0 ∧ put = 0 ⇒ next err = 0).
Now, the analysis stops complaining about err.
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Next, we analyze the output num. We find out that num is







This counter example leads to us adding the property num =
0 at time 0. Next, the analysis complains about num being







This is easily fixed by adding the property:
((get = 0 ∧ put = 0) ⇒ next num = num).








In other words, when an error occurs, it is not specified
what should happen with num. We fix this by adapting the
last property we added thus:
((get = 0 ∧ put = 0) ∨ next err = 1 ⇒ next num = num).
Finally, the analysis stops complaining about the output
num.
IV. FREE SIGNALS
Dealing with the third output signal, fst, there appear to be
two problems. Firstly, it is not always the case that we want to
specify what the value of a signal is in all cases. For example,
when the FIFO is empty, we would like to leave fst unspecified,
since there is no first value in the FIFO. At the moment, the
analysis would simply always complain about this, making it
rather useless.
Secondly, sometimes it is hard or impossible to completely
formally specify the exact behavior of a particular signal in
a temporal logic, and as a specifier one wants to be able to
take the pragmatic decision of not specifying the behaviour
completely. Again, the analysis would immediately find holes
in the specification, holes which have deliberatly been put
there. In the case of the signal fst, formally specifying the
exact FIFO behavior for general n is impossible in a limited
logic like LTL.
One solution to this problem is simply not to use the analysis
on the output fst. This has an obvious drawback, namely that
we will not be able to find real forgotten cases, as opposed
to the intended forgotten cases that we already know about.
Instead, we would like to have a more fine-grained choice
than the choice between either fully specifying a signal, or
not checking coverage for that signal at all.
So, we would like to argue for another solution, namely one
where the specifier explicitly indicates in what cases an output
is allowed to be underconstrained. We therefore introduce a
new construct free s to the specification logic, that can be used
to express that the output s is allowed to be unconstrained. As
a logical construct, free s is simply true, but to the analysis,
it is a way to suppress complaints about the signal s.
For example, our analysis complains about the output fst
being unconstrained in the beginning, when the FIFO is empty.
This can be remedied by adding the following property:
(num = 0 ⇒ free fst).
The above property explicitly expresses the unconstrained-
ness of fst in the case when num = 0. Its effect is that this
case is not complained about anymore.
A misunderstanding that easily arises when being presented
with free for the first time is to think that adding a property
specifying that free s should be true means that the properties
should hold for any value of s. This is not what free means,
and would actually make the logic non-monotonic! Instead,
free s should be interpreted as ”the signal s is allowed to
take on more than one value here”, and it does not logically
constrain the value of s at all. It is simply a way of saying
to the analysis, ”yes, I know s can have multiple values in
this case, but I decide that this is OK”. In the next section,
the semantics of free, and its relation to forgotten cases, is
specified more formally.
After adding the above property, our analysis complains
about the output fst being unconstrained when we put two
elements in the FIFO, and get an element out once1:
get 0 0 1 0
put 1 1 0 0
in 17 5 0 0
num 0 1 2 1
fst 0 17 17 ?
err 0 0 0 0
And indeed, we have not said anything about this particular
case. This actually is the simplest situation where it matters if
the circuit implements a FIFO or something else, like a LIFO.
If the specifier decides not to specify the exact FIFO behavior,
this can be expressed by adding next free fst to the right-hand
side of the last property:
1The actual counter example that was generated was slightly edited for
presentational reasons.
142
(get = 1 ∧ put = 0 ∧ 0 < num ⇒ next num = num − 1
∧ next err = 0
∧ next free fst)
In other words, when we remove an element from the FIFO,
we are not quite sure what the new first element is going to
be.
Even now, our analysis still reports a forgotten case, namely







We solve this by adding next fst = fst to the right-hand side
of the second property we added when we analyzed num:
((get = 0 ∧ put = 0) ∨ next err = 1 ⇒ next num = num
∧ next fst = fst).
After adding this property, the analysis stops complaining.
Note that, without free, our only option would have been
to not analyze the output fst at all, which would have meant
not finding the last forgotten case, which turned out to be a
”real” forgotten case.
The final, refined, property list now looks as follows.
err = 0 ∧ num = 0
(put = 1 ∧ num = n ⇒ next err = 1)
(put = 1 ∧ num < n ⇒ next num = num + 1
∧ next err = 0)
(put = 1 ∧ num = 0 ⇒ next fst = in)
(put = 1 ∧ 0 < num < n ⇒ next fst = fst)
(get = 1 ∧ put = 0 ∧ num = 0 ⇒ next err = 1)
(get = 1 ∧ put = 0 ∧ 0 < num ⇒ next num = num − 1
∧ next err = 0
∧ next free fst)
(get = 0 ∧ put = 0 ⇒ next err = 0)
((get = 0 ∧ put = 0) ∨ next err = 1 ⇒ next num = num
∧ next fst = fst)
(num = 0 ⇒ free fst)
The reader can compare this list with the list given at the
beginning of section III.
V. SEMANTICS OF FREE SIGNALS
With the introduction of the new construct free, we need
to adapt our semantics accordingly. First, we add free to the
syntax:
φ, ψ ::= . . . | free s
Note that free can only be used on signal names, not on
formulas in general.
To give semantics to free, we first slightly adapt the concept
of sequence; a sequence σ now also determines the value of
every free s. Let FreeSignal be the set {free s | s ∈ Signal}.
Then, σ : N × (Signal ∪ FreeSignal) → B. We adapt the
relation |= in the following way:
σ |= free s iff. σ(0, free s) = 1
We adapt the notion of forgotten case in the following way.
Given a property φ, and an output signal s, a forgotten case
for the output signal s is a pair of sequences (σ, σ′) such that:
• σ |= φ and σ′ |= φ
• for all signals s′ which are not s, ∀t. σ(t, s′) = σ′(t, s′)
• ∃!t. σ(t, s) = σ′(t, s) and σ(t, free s) = 0
In other words, σ and σ′ differ at exactly one point in time,
and only for the signal s, and free s has to be 0 at that point
in time. Thus, if free s has the value 1 at a point in time, then
there can not be a forgotten case that makes s different at that
point in time.
A final remark we can make here is that the addition of
the free construct is possible in any logic that resembles LTL.
One alternative way to deal with free is to introduce a special
new signal free s for every signal s. Then, the syntax does
not have to change, and the semantics of the logic does not
change either. The only part that changes is the definition of
forgotten case.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION
Given a property list and an output signal s, our analysis
either finds a forgotten case for s, or shows that no forgot-
ten case exists. The implementation of the analysis is quite
straightforward. The question that the analysis answers is:
Given a property list, and a specific output s, do there exist
two sequences σ1 and σ2 that both satisfy the properties, and
that have exactly the same values for all signals at all points
in time, except for exactly 1 point in time, where the value of
x differs?
A. General implementation
Let us assume that we have access to a model checker
for the logic at hand. Any model checker will do – in our
implementation, we used SMV [11].
Let us first present the analysis without the involvement
of the free operator. Suppose the property list is the formula
φ. We make two copies of φ, namely φ(s) and φ(s′); in the
second copy we have replaced all occurrences of s by a fresh
signal s′. Then, we ask the model checker to find a sequence
that satisfies the following formula:
φ(s) ∧ φ(s′) ∧ ♦!(s = s′)
The operator ♦! can be implemented by either adding a little
bit of circuitry, or by expressing it in terms of the standard
LTL until operator, for example by setting ♦!a = ¬a U (a ∧
next ¬a).
It is easy to see that a sequence satisfying the above formula
corresponds exactly to a forgotten case. If no such sequence
exist, then there are no forgotten cases.
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B. Using free signals
When free signals are involved, we again make two copies
of φ, namely φ(s, free s) and φ(s′, free s). Again, we replace
s by s′ (but we do not have to replace free s by free s′ because
free s′ does not affect the definition of forgotten case).
We then ask the model checker to find a sequence satisfying
the following formula. We have replaced free s by a fresh
signal free s, because the model checker does not know of
the construct free.
(φ(s, free s) ∧ φ(s′, free s) ∧ ♦!(¬free s ∧ s = s′)
Again, a sequence satisfying the above formula corresponds
exactly to a forgotten case, and if no such sequence exist, then
there are no forgotten cases.
C. Implementation using observers
We have also implemented the analysis in our Lava frame-
work [7]. In Lava, safety properties are specified using a safety
property observer. A safety property observer is sometimes
also called ”monitor circuit” or ”checker circuit”; a circuit that
has as inputs all signals appearing in the properties, and that
has only one output ”OK”, that is always high if and only if the
properties hold. Observers can be constructed automatically
for formulas in many logics [13], [14], [1]. The concept of
safety property observer makes it possible to use different
specification logics in the same framework.
The following implementation technique can be used for any
specification logic whose formulas can be translated into safety
property observers. We start by building the safety property
observer belonging to the property list [12].
Then, we build a circuit using two copies of the observer,
one observer that monitors all signals and the output s, and
one observer that monitors the same signals, but instead of s
monitors a new fresh signal s′. We denote the output of the
first observer by OK(s, free s), and the output of the second
observer by OK(s′, free s).)
We then ask the model checker to find a trace that satisfies:
(OK(s, free s)) ∧ (OK(s′, free s)) ∧ ♦!(¬free s∧s = s′)
The size of the analyzed circuit is linear in the size of
the property observer. The model checking problems that are
produced by the above process very seldom pose a challenge
to standard LTL model checkers.
VII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
There are basically three reasons for not fully specifying the
behaviour of all output signals: (1) The output is supposed to
be underconstrained in the specification; (2) By choice, the
specifier has decided to leave the output underconstrained; (3)
The specifier has forgotten a case. We argue for an analysis
that can discover the 3rd case, by forcing the specifier to
explicity document in the property list if cases (1) or (2)
are meant. We believe that it is a Good Thing to explicitly
distinguish between cases that have been forgotten by the
specifier and cases that are supposed to be underconstrained.
We believe that this leads to specifications of higher quality,
which in turns leads to more dependable verification results.
Lastly, the analysis can be used in both simulation-based and
formal property verification.
We would like to constrast property-based verifica-
tion against reference-model-based verification. In reference-
model-based verification (applicable also to equivalance
checking), the specification of a circuit consists of a reference
model, which often is implemented in a higher-level formalism
than the actual circuit. In this case, the model provides in
principle a complete specification of the circuit, since the
model specifies for each situation (perhaps modulo details such
as time-based refinements and such) what the behavior of the
circuit should be.
In property-based verification, the advantage is a more
incremental, compositional way of specifying what a circuit
is supposed to do. One can start with some simple properties
(perhaps reused from property libraries), and adding more and
more desired behavior by means of more properties. While
this has many advantages, the drawback is that it is hard
to know when to stop. The contribution of this paper is to
alleviate this problem by providing an automatic means of
suggesting what properties could possibly be missing, and
by forcing the specifier to decide whether certain missing
behaviors intentionally should be left underspecified or not.
The analysis is complementary to other property analyses such
as vacuity checking [10], [3].
A. Results
We have applied the presented analysis to a variety of
different types of designs: Two different types of arbiters, three
different types of FIFOs (sizes: 32 16-bit entries), one ALU
(16-bit integers), a floating-point adder (32-bit), a memory
controller, and a CAM (128 entries). In all cases, we started
with a property list designed by ourselves, and in all cases we
found at least one forgotten case, which lead to the addition
or adaptation of a property. All property lists were in the end
deemed OK by the analysis (i.e. the analysis did not find any
forgotten cases anymore). (To be honest, it is hard to quantify
what this means since we also added free statements about
some signals.)
The analysis usually completes in a few seconds, sometimes
up to a minute. In one case, the case for the ALU, we had to
”cheat”. The specification contained a reference to multipli-
cation. Our model checker could unfortunately not really deal
with the multiplier that was contained in the property observer.
Instead, we replaced multiplication by another, easier function,
for the sake of the analysis. This was not really satisfactory,
but it was obvious to us that this would not change the result
of the analysis.
B. Related work
Much work has been done on coverage analyses that are
performed post-formal verification, such as [15], [5], [4], [6],
[9]. These analyses involve the design as well, and often
analyze what happened during the actual formal verification
process. Our analyses complements these by (1) providing an
144
analysis that is design-independent, and (2) provides concrete
traces indicating forgotten cases rather than (for example)
points in the design that are not needed in the formal proof.
Cockler et al. [5] mention the idea of don’t cares in measuring
coverage, something akin to our free.
The work that comes closest to what we present here is
the work by Große et al. [9]. They also find a concrete
trace where a signal differs at a particular point in time. Two
main differences exist between their work and ours: (1) Their
analysis is design-dependent, and (2) their analysis only works
for a verification environment where bounded model checking
is used. Their concept of coverage is thus defined up to a
certain bound.
Das et al. [8] present a design-independent analysis for
property-based verification with a similar goal in mind as ours.
Using a stuck-at 0/1 fault model for inputs and outputs, they
calculate a measure that expresses how well such faults are
covered by a given property list.
C. Future work
Our definition of what a forgotten case is, is currently a very
simple one, but also quite restricted. We plan to investigate
variants of the choice we made. Two relaxations come to
mind: (A) the two sequences of a forgotten cases can differ
at multiple points in time for the analyzed signal s, (B) the
two sequences of a forgotten cases can differ for multiple
output signals at multiple points in time. It is easy to see
that definition (B) is the ”most general” one. It is also clear
that definition (A) will lead to more complaints than the
analysis presented in the paper, and definition (B) to even more
complaints. Our initial experiments here show that loosening
the definition of forgotten case easily leads to a situation where
the analysis complains too often – there are many cases where
the analysis complains, but where the specifier neither feels
that the analysis has pointed out a useful case, nor knows how
to refine the property list to make the complaint disappear. This
is an issue that needs further investigation.
Other future work is to investigate the similarities between
Große et al. [9] and our work. We have already started to
develop a framework where their ideas (comparing variants of
the circuit with the specification) and our ideas (comparing a
variant of the specification with the specification itself) can be
both expressed.
Finally, we need to investigate if the analysis can be
extended to non-safety properties. This seems a trivial task
at first, but some details need to be resolved before this can
be done.
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Abstract—We introduce and study trigger querying. Given a
model M and a temporal behavior ϕ, trigger querying is the
problem of finding the set of scenarios that trigger ϕ in M . That
is, if a computation of M has a prefix that follows the scenario,
then its suffix satisfies ϕ. Trigger querying enables one to find,
for example, given a program with a function f , the scenarios
that lead to calling f with some parameter value, or to find, given
a hardware design with signal err, the scenarios after which the
signal err ought to be eventually raised.
We formalize trigger querying using the temporal operator
→ (triggers), which is the most useful operator in modern
industrial specification languages. A regular expression r triggers
an LTL formula ϕ in a system M , denoted M |= r → ϕ, if for
every computation π of M and index i ≥ 0, if the prefix of π up
to position i is a word in the language of r, then the suffix of
π from position i satisfies ϕ. The solution to the trigger query
M |=? → ϕ is the maximal regular expression that triggers ϕ
in M . Trigger querying is useful for studying systems, and it
significantly extends the practicality of traditional query checking
[6]. Indeed, in traditional query checking, solutions are restricted
to propositional assertions about states of the systems, whereas
in our setting the solutions are temporal scenarios.
We show that the solution to a trigger query M |=? → ϕ is
regular, and can be computed in polynomial space. Unfortunately,
the polynomial-space complexity is in the size of M . Conse-
quently, we also study partial trigger querying, which returns
a (non empty) subset of the solution, and is more feasible. Other
extensions we study are observable trigger querying, where the
partial solution has to refer only to a subset of the atomic
propositions, constrained trigger querying, where in addition to
M and ϕ, the user provides a regular constraint c and the
solution is the set of scenarios respecting c that trigger ϕ in M ,
and relevant trigger querying, which excludes vacuous triggers —
scenarios that are not induced by a prefix of a computation of
M . Trigger querying can be viewed as the problem of finding
sufficient conditions for a behavior ϕ in M . We also consider
the dual problem, of finding necessary conditions to ϕ, and show
that it can be solved in space complexity that is only logarithmic
in M .
I. INTRODUCTION
The field of formal verification developed from the need
to verify that a system satisfies its specification. Since its
conception, the field has enjoyed great progress in the de-
velopment of practical tools and better understanding of the
problems and models related to formal verification. One of the
concepts that has emerged in the context of formal verification
is that of model exploration. The idea, as first noted by
Chan in [6], is that, in practice, model checking is often
used for understanding the system rather than for verifying
its correctness.
Chan suggested to formalize model exploration by means
of query checking. The input to the query-checking problem
is a model M and a query ϕ, where a query is a temporal-
logic formula in which some proposition is replaced by the
place-holder “?” (e.g., AG?). A solution to the query is a
propositional assertion that, when it replaces the place-holder,
results in a formula that is satisfied in M . For example, if the
query is AG?, then the set of solutions include all assertions
ψ for which M |= AGψ. A query checker should return the
strongest solutions to the query (strongest in the sense that
they are not implied by other solutions).1 The work of Chan
was followed by further work on query checking, studying its
complexity, cases in which only a single strongest solution
exists, the case of multiple (possibly related) place-holders,
and more [4], [8], [15], [7].
We believe that model exploration, and in particular query
checking, is a very natural and interesting task. Query check-
ing suffers, however, from a serious shortcoming: The result
of a query check is a propositional assertion. Thus, query
checking is restricted to questions regarding one point in
time, whereas most interesting questions about systems involve
scenarios that develop over time.
Consider, for example, a programmer trying to understand
the code of some computer program. In particular, the pro-
grammer is interested in situations in which some function is
called with some parameter value. The actual state in which
the function is called is by far less interesting than the scenario
that has lead to it. Query checking does not enable us to reveal
such scenarios.
In this work we introduce and study trigger querying, which
addresses the shortcoming described above. Given a model M
and a temporal behavior ϕ, trigger querying is the problem of
finding the set of scenarios that trigger ϕ in M . That is, the
set of scenarios such that if a computation of M has a prefix
that follows a scenario in the set, then its suffix satisfies ϕ.
We formalize trigger querying using the temporal operator
→ (triggers). The trigger operator was introduced in SUGAR
(the precursor of PSL [3], called suffix implication there). We
use the name trigger suggested in ForSpec [1] as it is more
indicative of the operator meaning. System Verilog Assertions
(SVA) [17] is another popular industrial specification formal-
ism in which the operator triggers plays an important role.
Consider a system M with a set AP of atomic propositions.
A word w over the alphabet 2AP triggers an LTL formula ϕ in
1Note that a query may not only have several solutions, but may also have
several strongest solutions.
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the system M , denoted M |= w → ϕ, if for every computation
π of M , if w is a prefix of π, then the suffix of π from position
|w| satisfies ϕ (note that there is an “overlap” and the |w|-th
letter of π participates both in the prefix w and in the suffix
satisfying ϕ.) The solution to the trigger query M |=? → ϕ
is the set of words w that trigger ϕ in M . Since, as we show,
the solution is regular, trigger-querying algorithms return the
solution by means of a regular expression or an automaton on
finite words.
Let us consider an example. Assume that M models a
hardware design with a signal err that is raised whenever
an error occurs. We might be interested in characterizing the
scenarios after which the signal err is raised. This is, exactly
the set of scenarios that trigger err — the solution to the trigger
query M |=? → err. It may also be the case that we are really
interested in characterizing the scenarios after which err aught
to be raised. The difference is that now we are interested in
“crossing the point of no return”; that is, the point from which
err would eventually (possibly in the distant future) be raised.
The set of such scenarios are the solution to the trigger query
M |=? → F err.
Another way to see the importance of the extension of
query checking from a propositional to a temporal setting is
to go back to the context of model checking. It is widely
acknowledged that if a bug is found, it should be reported with
a temporal counter example. Indeed, counter examples allow
the user to see the bug in context and to understand what has
caused the bug and how to fix it. This corresponds to the model
explorer need to see full scenarios rather than states. Getting
from a query checker the propositional assertions that are the
solutions to the query ? → F err (or even to G(? → F err)) is
much less informative than getting the full scenarios that lead
to err. 2
We solve trigger querying and show that the problem is tight
for polynomial space. Unlike LTL model-checking, whose
complexity is also polynomial space, here the polynomial-
space complexity is not only in the length of the specification
but also in the size of the system. Consequently, we consider
a more feasible version of trigger querying. The idea is that
when the user cannot get a complete characterization of the
scenarios triggering a behavior, he may still be interested in
getting examples of words triggering the behavior. In partial
trigger querying, the algorithm returns a subset of the solution
to the trigger query (unless the complete solution is empty,
the subset should not be empty). The complexity demands
of partial trigger querying are indeed lower than these of
trigger querying. Specifically, the complexity in the system
is nondeterministic polynomial time rather than polynomial
space. Beyond the lower complexity, partial trigger querying
can be implemented symbolically, and we describe BDD-based
and SAT-based algorithms for solving trigger querying.
In addition to trigger querying as presented above, we
2Note that temporal querying cannot be reduced to a search for counter
examples. For example, the solution to M |=? → Xerr is the set of words
w such that all the computations of M that start with w would reach err in
their next cycle. On the other hand, the counterexamples to M |= G¬Xerr
are words w such that there is a computation of M that starts with w and
reaches err in its next cycle; such words w do not necessarily trigger Xerr.
introduce and study several natural variants of the problem.
First, suppose that a finite word w cannot be generated by the
system M (i.e., it is not a prefix of a computation of M ).
Then, w satisfies the query M |=? → ϕ in a vacuous way,
as indeed, every computation of M that has w as a prefix
continues to a suffix satisfying ϕ. A user, however, is rarely
interested in seeing such vacuous triggers. In relevant trigger
querying, we exclude vacuous triggers, and the solution to a
relevant trigger query is restricted to words generated by the
system.
The next variant we consider is constrained trigger query-
ing. Model exploration is usually not a specific question to
which there is a definite answer but rather an open-ended
activity. Accordingly, trigger querying does not consist of a
single query but rather it is an interactive dialog between the
user and the trigger-query tool. A natural course of events is
one in which the user refines the trigger queries in order to
find scenarios that not only trigger the behavior in question,
but also satisfy some constraints. For example, the user may
search for scenarios that trigger F err and in which the signal
ack is never raised. In a constrained trigger query, the user
provides, in addition to the system M and the behavior ϕ, also
a regular expression c serving as a constraint for the possible
solutions. In the above example, c = (¬ack)∗. The solution
for a constrained trigger query is the set of words that trigger
ϕ in M and satisfy the constraint c.
Another variant is that of observable trigger querying. In
many cases, the user would like to get a solution that depends
only on a subset of the atomic propositions. For example, the
user may wonder whether the environment can control the
input signal req in a way that triggers the signal err, and if so,
how. Technically, this corresponds to asking whether there is a
word w over the alphabet 2{req} such that all words over 2AP
that agree with w on the assignment to req trigger err. Thus,
in addition to M and ϕ, the input to dominant trigger querying
contains a set O ⊆ AP of observable atomic propositions, and
the solution is a set of words over 2O.
The last variant of trigger querying we consider (in fact, it
is more dual than variant) is the problem of finding necessary
conditions. Recall that a word w triggers a behavior ϕ in M if
all the computations of M with prefix w continue to a suffix
that satisfies ϕ. Thus, a word triggering ϕ can be viewed
as a sufficient condition for ϕ to happen in M , and trigger
querying can be viewed as the problem of finding the set of
sufficient conditions. Dually, a set of necessary conditions for
ϕ to happen in M is a set N ⊆ (2AP )∗ such that for every
computation π of M and position i > 0, if the suffix of π
from position i satisfies ϕ, then the prefix of π up to position
i is in N . As with traditional query checking, ϕ may have
several sets of necessary conditions, and we are interesting in
the strongest one, where strongest here means minimal in the
language-containment partial order. Unlike traditional query
checking, we show that a unique strongest necessary condition
always exists. We also show that finding necessary conditions
is computationally easier than finding sufficient solutions (i.e.,
trigger querying), and is only polynomial in the size of M .
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II. PRELIMINARIES
A word over an alphabet Σ is a sequence of letters from Σ.
A word may be finite or infinite. We denote by Σ∗ (Σω) the set
of finite (resp. infinite) words over Σ. Also, Σ∞ = Σ∗ ∪ Σω .
For an infinite word w = w0w1w2 . . . and natural numbers
i ≤ j we denote by w[i..j] the finite word wiwi+1 . . . wj and
denote by wi the infinite word wiwi+1 . . ..
A language is a set of words. For a language L ⊆ Σ∞, we
denote by pref(L) the set of prefixes of words in L. That is,
pref(L) = {u ∈ Σ∗ | ∃v ∈ Σ∞ such that uv ∈ L}. For a
finite word w ∈ Σ∗ and a regular expression r over Σ, we use
w |= r to indicate that w ∈ L(r).
A Kripke structure is a quintuple M = 〈AP,Q,Q0, R, L〉,
where AP is a set of atomic propositions, Q is a set of
states, Q0 ⊆ Q is a set of initial states, R ⊆ Q × Q is a
transition relation, and L : Q → 2AP is a labelling function
that labels each state with the set of atomic propositions that
hold in it. We assume that the transition relation is total; i.e.,
for every state q there exists at least one state q′ such that
R(q, q′). A sequence of states q0, q1 . . . is a computation of
M if q0 ∈ Q0 and for every i ≥ 0, we have R(qi, qi+1).
Unless we note otherwise, the computation is infinite. Each
computation q0, q1 . . . induces the word L(q0)L(q1) . . . over
the alphabet 2AP . The set of words induced by computations
of M is called the language of M and is denoted by L(M).
Note that L(M) ⊆ (2AP )ω .
For an LTL formula ϕ, a Kripke structure M , and a set of
states S, we use M,S |= ϕ to indicate that all the states in
S satisfy ϕ. That is, all the computations that start in states
in S satisfy ϕ. When S = S0, we write M |= ϕ. Also, when
S = {s} is a singleton, we write M, s |= ϕ.
The specification language PSL [9] introduces the suffix-
implication operator, denoted → . Similar operators exist in
other modern specification formalisms such as the operator
TRIGGERS in ForSpec [1] and in SVA (in fact, in SVA the
trigger operator is the only temporal operator) [17]. The syntax
of suffix implication is as follows. Let AP be the set of atomic
propositions. For a regular expression r over the alphabet 2AP
and an LTL formula ϕ over AP , the expression r → ϕ is in
PSL.3 The semantics of suffix implication is that an infinite
word w ∈ (2AP )ω satisfies r → ϕ iff for every i ≥ 0, if
w[0..i] |= r then wi |= ϕ. Note the overlap in the i-th letter,
which appears both in w[0..i] and in wi. Note also that the
semantics ignores empty prefixes of w. For a Kripke structure
M , a regular expression r, and an LTL formula ϕ, we say
that r triggers ϕ in M , denoted M |= r → ϕ, if all words in
L(M) satisfy r → ϕ.
III. TRIGGER QUERYING
For a Kripke structure M and an LTL formula ϕ, trigger
querying deals with question of the type “for which words
w ∈ Σ∗, it holds that M |= w → ϕ”. We denote this
instance of trigger querying by M |=? → ϕ. The solution
3In PSL, the regular expression r is not defined directly over the alphabet
2AP , but rather over the alphabet of Boolean expressions over 2AP . In our
setting, r would be the output of trigger querying, and it is natural to return
it as a regular expression over the alphabet 2AP .
of the trigger query M |=? → ϕ is the language of words
that trigger ϕ in M ; i.e. L = {w ∈ Σ∗ | M |= w → ϕ}.
While the solution language L may be infinite, the finiteness
of M implies that L is always regular. We therefore restrict
our attention to regular expressions (or finite automata) as
representations of the solution language. Thus, a solution to the
trigger query M |=? → ϕ is a regular expression r for which
L(r) = {w ∈ Σ∗ | M |= w → ϕ}. Note that the solution r
is the maximal (in terms of language containment) regular
expression that satisfies M |= r → ϕ.
Remark 1: The definition of trigger querying is not as
useful as it first seems because of a technical subtlety: A word
w ∈ Σ∗ that is not a finite computation of M is a vacuous
solution to the trigger query M |=? → ϕ for any formula ϕ.
Vacuous solutions are rarely interesting to users and are still
members in the solution we define. In Section V-A, we define
relevant trigger querying, which excludes such solutions. As
discussed there, relevant trigger querying is technically very
similar to trigger querying, in the sense that the algorithms
and results about one variant carry on to the other one with
minor changes.
As a first step toward solving trigger querying, we provide
an alternative characterization for the set of words w that
satisfy M |= w → ϕ. Consider a word w = w0 . . . wn ∈ Σ∗,
and a finite computation s = s0 . . . , sn of M . We say that
s induces w iff for every i ∈ {0, . . . , n}, it holds that
L(si) = wi. Note that a word w may be induced by several
finite computations. We denote the set of finite computations
that induce w by induce(w). Also, we denote by δ(w) the set
of states s for which there exists a finite computation ending
in s that induces w. Formally, δ(w) = {sn ∈ Q | ∃s0 . . . sn ∈
induce(w)}.
Lemma 2: For a Kripke structure M and an LTL formula
ϕ, it holds that M |= w → ϕ iff M, δ(w) |= ϕ.
Proof: Assume first that M, δ(w) |= ϕ. Thus, every
computation starting in a state in δ(w) satisfies ϕ. Therefore,
since every prefix of a computation of M that induces w ends
in δ(w), we get that M |= w → ϕ.
For the other direction, assume that M |= w → ϕ. If
δ(w) = ∅ then M, ∅ |= ϕ vacuously. Otherwise, consider a
state s ∈ δ(w). We show that M, s |= ϕ. Since s ∈ δ(w),
there exists a finite computation π = s0s1 . . . sn of M
such that s = sn and π induces w. Assume, by way of
contradiction, that M, s |= ϕ. Then, there exists a computation
s, s1s2 . . . that does not satisfy ϕ. Consider the computation
c = s0s1 . . . sn−1ss1s2 . . . of M . By the above, c |= w → ϕ,
contradicting the assumption that M |= w r→ ϕ.
The alternative characterization allows us to reduce trigger
querying to global model checking of ϕ on M .
Theorem 3: Trigger querying can be solved in polynomial
space, and is PSPACE-hard.4
Proof: Let M = 〈AP,Q,Q0, R, L〉 and let ϕM = {s ∈
Q | M, s |= ϕ} denote the set of states s for which M, s |= ϕ.
Computing ϕM is the global model-checking problem for
LTL, and is known to be in PSPACE [16].
4Trigger querying is not a decision problem and therefore cannot be
PSPACE-complete.
148
By Lemma 2, the solution to the trigger query M |=? → ϕ
is the language L = {w ∈ Σ∗ | δ(w) ⊆ ϕM}. We construct
a deterministic finite automaton A such that L(A) = L.
Finding a regular expression equivalent to A can be done using
standard methods.
Intuitively, we would like to “transform M into an au-
tomaton” and then apply the subset construction setting the
accepting states to be nonempty subsets of ϕM . In an
automaton, the alphabet is on the transitions, whereas in a
Kripke structure, it is on the states. We move the label of a
state to the transitions into the state, which makes it easier to
deal with the overlap between the prefix and the suffix in the
definition of the trigger operator.
We define A = 〈Σ, 2Q ∪ {qin}, {qin}, ρ, F 〉, where qin is a
new state, and ρ and F are defined as follows:
• The transition relation ρ is defined for every σ ∈ 2AP
as follows. First, for the state qin, we define ρ(qin, σ) =
{s | s ∈ Q0 and L(s) = σ}. Then, for a state S ∈ 2Q,
we define ρ(S, σ) =
⋃
q∈S{s | R(q, s) and L(s) = σ}.
• The set F of accepting states is the collection of subsets
of ϕM . Thus, F = {S ⊆ Q | S ⊆ ϕM}.
It is not hard to prove by an induction on the length of w that
L(A) contains only words w such that δ(w) ⊆ ϕM . Hence,
by Lemma 2, L(A) is the solution to M |=? → ϕ.
We turn now to the lower bound. PSPACE-hardness follows
from the PSPACE hardness of LTL model checking. Indeed,
for every Kripke structure M and LTL formula ϕ, we have
that M |= ϕ iff the solution to the trigger query M |=? → ϕ
contains 2AP (that is, all words of length 1). Unfortunately,
the situation for trigger querying is worse as the complexity
of the upper bound above is polynomial space in the size of
M and not only in the length of ϕ. Accordingly, we now
prove that the structure complexity of trigger querying, that is,
the complexity in terms of the Kripke structure, assuming the
formula is of a fixed length, is PSPACE-hard.
The proof is by a reduction from universality of nonde-
terministic automata on finite words (NFA, for short), which
is known to be PSPACE-hard [14]. Given an NFA A, we
construct a Kripke structure M and a formula ϕ of a fixed
length, such that for every word w ∈ Σ∗, it holds that
M |= w → ϕ iff w ∈ L(A). Thus, a solution to the trigger
query M |=? → ϕ is an automaton that complements the
language of A. Since the length of ϕ is fixed, the PSPACE-
hardness that follows is indeed for the structure complexity.
Let A = 〈2AP , Q,Q0, ρ, F 〉. To avoid vacuous solutions, we
assume that A has a run on every finite word (if this is not the
case, we can add a rejecting sink). Intuitively, we introduce
a new atomic proposition a, and construct M such that for
every word w ∈ Σ∗, the word w · aω ∈ L(M) iff w ∈ L(A).
Thus, M |= w → X¬a iff w ∈ L(A).
In the NFA A, the alphabet is on the transitions, whereas
in the Kripke structure M , the alphabet is on the states.
We construct M such that each state of it is associated
with a state of A and the letter A is about to read. Thus,
a run q0q1 . . . qn of A on w1w2 . . . wn corresponds to the
computation 〈q0, w1〉〈q1, w2〉 . . . 〈qn−1, wn〉 of M . In addition
to the states associated with A’s states and letters, M contains
a special state qa, labelled {a}, corresponding to acceptance
in A. Formally, M = 〈AP ∪ {a}, S, S0, R, L〉, where
• S = (Q× Σ) ∪ {qa} where qa is a new state.
• S0 = Q0 × Σ.
• R = {(〈q, σ〉, 〈q′, σ′〉) | q′ ∈ ρ(q, σ)} ∪
{(〈q, σ〉, qa) | ρ(q, σ) ∩ F = ∅} ∪ { (qa, qa)}.
• L(〈q, σ〉) = σ and L(qa) = {a}.
For n > 0, it is not hard to prove, by an induction
on n, that 〈q0, w1〉〈q1, w2〉 . . . 〈qn−1, wn〉 ∈ pref(L(M)) iff
q0q1 . . . qn−1 is a run of A on w1 . . . wn−1. Therefore, w·aω ∈
L(M) iff w ∈ L(A). It follows that M |= w → X¬a iff
w ∈ L(A) as desired.
Remark 4: A note for readers familiar with alternating
automata: Modulo the technical issue of the alphabet being
on the transitions vs. the states, the automaton A is simply
M when viewed as a universal automaton with ϕM being
the set of accepting states. The construction described in the
proof translates this automaton to a deterministic one.
IV. PARTIAL SOLUTIONS FOR TRIGGER QUERYING
As shown in Section III, the complexity of solving trigger
querying is polynomial space in the size of the system.
Unfortunately, such complexity might prove infeasible for
many practical systems. Therefore, practical considerations
lead us to search for partial yet more efficient solutions.
A reasonable approach is to search for subsets of the solu-
tion to a trigger query. The motivation for such an approach
is that a user that is unable to get a complete characterisation
of the words that trigger a behavior is usually still interested
in specific scenarios that trigger the behavior.
A partial solution to a trigger query M |=? → ϕ is a
subset of the solution to the trigger query. We allow the
subset to be empty only if the complete solution is empty.
Also, as in the case of complete solutions, we restrict at-
tention to regular subsets. Formally, a partial solution to the
trigger query M |=? → ϕ is a regular expression r such
that L(r) ⊆ {w ∈ Σ∗ | M |= w → ϕ} and L(r) = ∅ iff
{w ∈ Σ∗ | M |= w → ϕ} = ∅.
The search of partial solutions may take various forms.
A natural possibility is to search for a single word as a
partial solution to a trigger query. It follows from the proof of
Theorem 3, however, that the system complexity of deciding
whether the solution to a trigger query is not empty is
already PSPACE-hard. We therefore move to the next natural
possibility, which is to search for a single word of a given
bounded length. If such a bound is given in binary, however,
the structure complexity of the problem remains PSPACE-
hard.5 An algorithm that searches for a single word in the
solution is interesting if it also outputs the word. It seems
natural, therefore, to consider the case in which the length
bound is given in unary. Accordingly, partial trigger querying
gets as input a structure M , a fixed formula ϕ, and a length
5This follows from the hardness proof in Theorem 3. There, given an NFA
A, we can reduce the problem of deciding the universality of A to trigger
querying. It is not hard to see that a A is universal iff it accepts all words
of length exponential in its size. Therefore, if we allow exponential bounds
(whose binary encoding is polynomial), the hardness proof carries over to the
partial-solution case.
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bound n, given in unary, and decides whether there exists a
word w of length at most n such that M |= w → ϕ.
Theorem 5: Partial trigger querying is NP-complete.
Proof: For the upper bound, we show that we can check,
given a word w, whether M |= w → ϕ in time polynomial in
M and the length of w (although not necessarily polynomial
in ϕ). Recall that M |= w → ϕ iff δ(w) ⊆ ϕM . Computing
both ϕM and δ(w) can be done in time polynomial in M
and the length of w. Thus, the decision problem is in NP.
We proceed to prove the lower bound by a reduction from
the following NP-complete problem [12]: given a directed
graph G = (V,E) and two vertices s, t ∈ V , are there two
vertex-disjoint paths, one from s to t and one from t to s (the
only vertices that appear in both paths are s and t).
For clarity of the presentation, we first present the reduction
to relevant trigger querying, in which the solution contains
only non-vacuous triggers (see Remark 1). We will later
comment on the technical adjustment to the general case.
Consider a graph G = (V,E), and two vertices s, t ∈ V .
Let n = |V |. Note that if two vertex-disjoint paths from s
to t and back exist, then two such paths of length at most n
exist. We therefore restrict our attention to paths of length at
most n. To simplify things further, we add an edge from t
to itself (if it does not exist). Then, we can also assume that
the paths are of the same length, as otherwise we can pad the
shorter path with t’s. Finally, we assume that each state in G
has a successor (otherwise, we can add a sink to which all
dead-ends go).
We intend to construct a Kripke structure M and a formula
ϕ such that the solution to M |=? → ϕ contains a word of
length at most n if there exist two vertex-disjoint paths from s
to t and back, and is empty otherwise. Let Σ = (V ×V )∪{p}.
For simplicity, we assume that the atomic propositions of M
encode letters in Σ. A finite computation of M that does not
reach a state labelled p encode two sequences of vertices in
G. For example, the word (x1, y1) . . . (xk, yk) encodes the two
sequences of vertices x1 . . . , xk and y1, . . . , yk. We define the
transitions of M so that the projection of a finite computation
on the first element encodes a path from s in G, while the
projection on the second element encodes a path from t. For
both elements the path may be followed by a p∗ suffix. In
addition, the following would hold.
1) If w ∈ Σ∗ encodes two vertex-disjoint paths from s
to t and back, then for all infinite suffixes v for which
wv ∈ L(M), the first letter of v is p.
2) If w ∈ Σ∗ does not encode two vertex-disjoint paths
from s to t and back, then there exists an infinite suffix
v whose first letter is not p and wv ∈ L(M).
If we succeed in constructing M as above, then for every
word w ∈ Σ∗, we have that w is a non-vacuous solution to
M |=? → Xp iff w encodes two vertex-disjoint paths from s
to t and back. Thus, setting ϕ = Xp, we are done.
We now proceed to define M in detail. In order to know
whether the two paths that correspond to a finite computation
of M are vertex-disjoint, M chooses nondeterministically one
vertex from each path and records it. If the first path reaches t
and the second path reaches s, then M compares the recorded
vertices. If the recorded vertices differ, M enters a sink state
labelled p. If, on the other hand, the recorded vertices are
the same, M continues to visit states that are not labelled by
p. Note that when the paths are vertex-disjoint, the recorded
vertices must be different. On the other hand, when the two
paths are not vertex-disjoint, and share a vertex v, then there
is a computation of M that generates these paths and chooses
to record the vertex v for both paths.
The states of M are tuples in V × V × (V ∪ {⊥}) ×
(V ∪ {⊥}) (as well as the special sink state sp). In the state
〈v1, v2, x1, x2〉, the values v1 and v2 stand for the current
vertices in the first and second paths, and the values x1
and x2 stand for the recorded vertices from these paths. The
symbol ⊥ stands for “no vertex is recorded yet”. A state
〈v1, v2, x1, x2〉 is labelled by atomic propositions encoding the
letter 〈v1, v2〉. The state sp is used to generate the pω suffixes
and is labelled by p. The state 〈s, t,⊥,⊥〉 is the single initial
state. The transition relation makes sure that a computation of
M generates only sequences of pairs that correspond to paths
in G. In addition, if the third (resp. fourth) element of a state
is ⊥, then a nondeterministic choice is made whether to record
the current vertex v of the first (resp. second) path, which is
done by replacing ⊥ with v. If the third (resp. forth) element
is not ⊥, then it retains its value. Finally, if a vertex of the
type 〈t, s, x1, x2〉 is reached and x1 = x2 (or x1 equals x2 but
both equal s, t, or ⊥) then a transition to sp is taken.
Formally, M = 〈AP, S, S0, R, L〉, where AP , S, S0, and
L are defined above. Before defining R, we introduce the
following notation. For v ∈ V and x ∈ V ∪{⊥}, we denote by
rec(v, x) the set {v,⊥} if x = ⊥ and the set {x} if x = ⊥. We
proceed to define R (we define it as a function R : S → 2S):
• R(sp) = {sp}.
• For states of the type 〈t, s, x1, x2〉 in which x1 = x2, or
x1 = x2 but x1 ∈ {s, t,⊥}, set R(〈t, s, x1, x2〉) = {sp}.
• For all other states, R(〈v1, v2, x1, x2〉) =
{ 〈v′1, v′2, x′1, x′2〉 | E(v1, v′1), E(v2, v′2), x′1 ∈
rec(v1, x1), x
′
2 ∈ rec(v2, x2) }.
It is not hard to prove that for every word w ∈ Σ∗, we have that
w is a non-vacuous solution to M |=? → Xp iff w encodes
two vertex-disjoint paths from s to t and back. Note that the
reduction is polynomial in the size of G, and that ϕ is fixed.
Since words w in the solution to M |=? → Xp may be
vacuous solutions, the reduction shows that relevant trigger
query is NP-hard. In order to prove NP-hardness for trigger
querying, we modify M so that M |=? → Xp would not have
vacuous solutions. For that, we have to modify M to a Kripke
structure M ′ such that pref(M ′) = Σ∗. We should make sure
that the non-vacuous solutions to M |=? → Xp continue to
trigger Xp in M ′. Thus, reading such a solution, we must
move to sp. We do this by defining M ′ to subsume M in
such a way that for every word w ∈ Σ∗, if w ∈ L(M), then
the set of computations that induce w in M ′ is equal to the set
of computations that induce it in M . Thus, M ′ only generates
new words but does not add ways to generate words that are
already in L(M). It is not hard to define M ′ by adding to M
a component that generate Σ∗ and to which computations get
whenever they get stuck in M .
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A. Practical considerations
We suggest two symbolic methods for searching for partial
solutions to a trigger query. Both methods consider a bound
n > 0 on the length of words in the solution. First, a BDD-
based method that computes all words of length n in the
solution. Second, a SAT-based method that searches for a
single word of length n in the solution.6 For reasons explained
below, we recommend the BDD-based method.
Let Σ = 2AP . The main task of the BDD procedure
is to compute the set {〈w1, . . . , wn, s〉 ∈ Σn × S | s ∈
δ(w1 . . . wn)}. For this purpose, we need BDD variables to
represent letters and states. 7 We encode the transition relation
as a set R ⊆ S×Σ×S where 〈s, σ, s′〉 ∈ R if s′ is a successor
of s and L(s′) = σ.
We use two vectors of BDD variables s and s′, encoding
states. Intuitively, s encodes current states and s′ succes-
sor states. In addition, we use n vectors of BDD variables
w1, . . . , wn encoding letters. We also use another vector of
BDD variables σ encoding letters. In fact, the variables in σ are
not necessary but the presentation is clearer with σ. We assume
that the algorithm has access to BDDs for the set ϕM (s),
the initial set S0(s), and the transition relation R(s, σ, s′). We
also need a BDD B(s, σ) for the set {〈s, L(s)〉 | s ∈ S}.
The function UNTAG gets a BDD with s′ variables and
no s variables and replaces all the s′ variables with the
corresponding s variables. Similarly, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
the function i-TAG gets a BDD with with σ variables and
no wi variables and replaces all the σ variables with the
corresponding wi variables.
We describe the algorithm in Figure IV-A below.
Algorithm 1: BDD based algorithm
X ← S0;1
X ← X ∩ 1-TAG(B);2
for i = 2 to n do3
X ← UNTAG(∃s X ∩ i-TAG(R));4
end5
Y ← ∃s (X ∩ ¬ϕM );6
Z ← ¬Y ;7
return Z;8
Intuitively, in lines 1 – 5, the algorithm computes, in the
BDD X , the set {〈 w1, . . . , wi, s〉 | s ∈ δ( w1, . . . , wi)}, for the
i’s between 1 to n. Thus, after line 5, the BDD X contains
exactly all tuples {〈w1, . . . , wn, s〉 | s ∈ δ(w1 . . . wn)}.
Accordingly, in line 6, the algorithm computes all the words
w1 . . . wn for which δ(w1 . . . wn) ⊆ ϕM , namely words
that do not trigger ϕ. Finally, in line 7, the latter set is
complemented resulting in the set of all words that do trigger
ϕ, i.e, the solution to M |=? → ϕ.
As the NP-complete complexity for partial trigger querying
suggests, it is also possible to apply a SAT solver in order
6It is not hard to adapt the algorithms to words of length at most n. We
present the versions for length exactly n since they are technically simpler.
7In real applications, both states and letters are subsets of the atomic
propositions (an assignment to the atomic propositions induces a state, labelled
by the letter that corresponds to the observable atomic propositions that are
valid in the state). Our solution is general and does not assume such a relation
between letters and states.
to find partial solutions. The formula to be considered can
be built along the following lines: Let X be a vector of
variables representing a set of states of M . Let X ′ be another
such vector, and let σ be a vector of variables represent-
ing a letter. We denote by ψR( X,σ, X ′) a formula that
is true iff X ′ represents the set of states that are succes-
sors of a state in X and whose labelling is σ. Formally,
X ′ = {q′ ∈ S | ∃q ∈ X such that R(q, q′) and L(q′) = σ}.
Let ψϕ( X) be a formula that is true iff X represents a set that
is contained in ϕM . Finally, let ψI( X) be a formula that is
true iff X represents the set S0. The formula to be fed into
the SAT solver is ψI( X0)∧
∧n
i=1 ψR(
Xi−1, wi, Xi)∧ψϕ( Xn),
where X0, . . . , Xn and w1, . . . , wn are (vectors of) free vari-
ables.
A satisfying assignment assigns values to the (vectors of)
variables w1 . . . wn and X0, . . . , Xn. It is not hard to see that
the values assigned to w1 . . . wn encode a word that is partial
solution for the trigger query, and that the values assigned to
X0, . . . Xn encode the sets δ( w1), δ( w1 w2), . . . δ( w1 . . . wn).
Note that unlike the case in bounded model checking, the
suggested algorithm uses as many variables as are states in
the structure M (rather than in the symbolic representation of
M ). The technical need for so many variables arise from the
need to consider all the elements of a set of states (encoded
in the Xi’s), and it occurs in other (already well challenged)
contexts of bounded model checking, e.g., when evaluating
the diameter of a model.
V. VARIANTS OF TRIGGER QUERYING
In this section we present several natural variants of trigger
querying.
A. Relevant trigger querying
As noted in Remark 1, the definition of trigger querying
allows the solution to contain vacuous solutions, namely
words that are not induced by finite computations of M .
Vacuous solutions are rarely interesting to users. In this section
we define relevant trigger querying, which excludes vacuous
solutions. We show that the algorithms and results we describe
for trigger querying apply, with minor modifications, to the
relevant case.
For a Kripke structure M , a word w ∈ Σ∗, and an LTL
formula ϕ, the word w relevantly triggers ϕ in M , denoted
M |= w r→ ϕ, if w triggers ϕ in M and w is induced by a
finite computation of M . The solution to the relevant trigger
query M |=? r→ ϕ is the set of words that relevantly trigger
ϕ in M (i.e., {w ∈ Σ∗ | M |= w r→ ϕ}).
Remark 6: Note that our notion of vacuity does not co-
incide with the notion of vacuity in the context of model
checking of trigger formulas [5]: when ϕM = Q (for
example, when ϕ = true), the regular expression r does not
affect the satisfaction of r → ϕ in M . In such cases, all finite
computations of M are non-vacuous solutions according to
our definition. It is easy to adjust our solutions to a definition
that would cause all solutions to be vacuous in such cases.
Solving relevant trigger querying is very similar to solving
trigger querying. It is not hard to see that a word w ∈ Σ∗ is
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induced by a finite computation of a Kripke structure M , iff
δ(w) = ∅. Thus, the “relevant counterpart” of Lemma 2 is as
follows.
Lemma 7: For a Kripke structure M and an LTL formula
ϕ, it holds that M |= w r→ ϕ iff δ(w) = ∅ and M, δ(w) |= ϕ.
It follows that the construction of A in the proof of Theo-
rem 3 is valid also for the case of relevant trigger querying,
except that we have to remove the empty set from F . The
lower bound proofs are also easy to adjust for the relevant
case. Hence, we can conclude with the following.
Theorem 8: Trigger querying can be solved in polynomial
space, and is PSPACE-hard.
B. Constrained trigger querying
Trigger querying typically does not consist of a single query
but rather it is an interactive dialog between the user and
the trigger-query tool. A natural course of events is one in
which the user refines the trigger queries in order to find
scenarios that not only trigger the behavior in question, but
also satisfy some constraints. For example, the user may search
for scenarios that trigger F err and in which the signal ack is
never raised. In a constrained trigger query, the user provides,
in addition to the system M and the behavior ϕ, also a regular
expression c serving as a mask for the possible solutions. In the
above example, c = (¬ack)∗. The solution for a constrained
trigger query is the set of words that trigger ϕ in M and satisfy
the constraint c.
Trigger querying can be viewed as a special case of con-
strained trigger querying with c = true. Also, solving a con-
strained trigger query can proceed by solving the trigger query
and intersecting the solution with the constraint language L(c)
(the intersection can be implemented as intersection of finite
automata). Hence, we have the following.
Theorem 9: Constrained trigger querying can be solved in
polynomial space and is PSPACE-hard.
Constrained trigger querying is of special interest when
combined with partial trigger querying. Note that in the
unconstrained case, it is possible to solve the trigger query and
only then intersect the solution with the constraint. In partial
trigger querying, such a course of action may lead to an empty
set of partial solutions although the set of solutions that satisfy
the constraint is not empty. Therefore, the constraint must
be taken into account during the search for partial solutions
(rather than after it). In practice, it is not hard to modify the
algorithms suggested in Subsection IV-A to take the constraint
c into account while searching for a partial solution.
Note that relevant trigger querying can be viewed as a spe-
cial case of constrained trigger querying — one in which the
constraint is the set of words induced by a finite computation
of the Kripke structure. Nevertheless, the direct algorithms for
relevant trigger querying are simpler than these that follow
from this view.
C. Observable trigger querying
In many cases, the user would like to get a solution to a
trigger query that depends only on a subset of the atomic
propositions. For example, the user may wonder whether
the environment can control the input signal req in a way
that triggers the signal err, and if so, how. Technically, this
corresponds to asking whether there is a word w over the
alphabet 2{req} such that all words over 2AP that agree with
w on the assignment to req trigger err.
Formally, for a word w over 2AP and a set O ⊆ AP ,
let w|O be the word over 2O obtained from w by pro-
jecting its letters on O. Then, for a word w′ ∈ 2O, let
wide(w′, AP \O) = {w : w|O = w′} be the set of words over
2AP obtained from w′ by extending its letters to AP . The input
to observable trigger querying contains, in addition to M and
ϕ, also a set O ⊆ AP of observable atomic propositions,
The solution to the observable trigger query M |=? → ϕ
with a set O of observable atomic propositions is the set
{w′ : M |= w → ϕ for all w ∈ wide(w′, AP \O)}.
Note that the observable atomic propositions are “observ-
able to the query”. Thus, unlike the standard interpretation
of observable and non-observable atomic propositions, here
the idea is not to hide internal signals, but rather to restrict
attention to the atomic propositions in terms of which we want
the solution to the trigger query to be expressed. Often, these
propositions would be related to implementation details or
other internal signals that are considered non-observable in
the standard context.
Theorem 10: Observable trigger querying can be solved in
polynomial space and is PSPACE-hard.
Proof: For the upper bound, we modify the construction
of the NFA A described in the proof of Theorem 3 as follows.
The modification is only in the definition of ρ, which now
assumes the alphabet 2O. For a letter σ ∈ 2O, we define
ρ(qin, σ) = {s | s ∈ Q0 and L(s) ∩ O = σ}, and for a
state S ∈ 2Q, we define ρ(S, σ) = ⋃q∈S{s | R(q, s) and
L(s) ∩ O = σ}. Thus, the states in the successor states have
to agree with σ on the atomic propositions in O, and all other
atomic propositions are ignored. It is not hard to prove that
w ∈ 2O is accepted by the modified NFA iff all the words in
wide(w,AP \O) are accepted by A.
Since trigger querying can be viewed as a special case
of observable trigger querying (with O = AP ), PSPACE-
hardness follows from PSPACE-hardness of trigger querying.
Remark 11: A note for readers familiar with alternating au-
tomata and Remark 4. Recall that the automaton A constructed
in the proof of Theorem 3 is M when viewed as a univer-
sal automaton. For nondeterministic automata, the existential
projection of an automaton over the alphabet Σ1 × Σ2 to an
automaton over the alphabet Σ1 can be easily done by ignoring
the Σ2 component in the transitions. For universal automata,
existential projection involves an exponential blow up, but
universal projection is easy. This is why the transition to
observable trigger querying, which corresponds to a universal
projection of the solution, does not make the problem more
complex.
D. Necessary conditions
Recall that a word w triggers a behavior ϕ in M if all
the computations of M with prefix w continue to a suffix
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that satisfies ϕ. Thus, a word triggering ϕ can be viewed as a
sufficient condition for ϕ to happen in M , and trigger querying
can be viewed as the problem of finding the set of sufficient
conditions. In this section, we study the dual problem, namely
finding the set of necessary conditions for ϕ to happen in M .
A necessary condition to ϕ in M is a regular expression r
such that for every computation π of M and for every i ≥ 0,
if πi |= ϕ, then π[0..i] |= r. It is easy to see that ϕ may have
several necessary conditions in M (in fact, Σ∗ is alway a
necessary condition). The necessary conditions, however, are
(partially) ordered by language containment. We say that a
necessary condition r is stronger than a necessary condition
r′, if L(r) ⊆ L(r′).
We show that there always exists a unique strongest inter-
esting necessary condition. Let G ⊆ S denote the set of states
from which there is a computation that satisfies ϕ. Formally,
G = {s ∈ S | M, s |= ¬ϕ}. Let r be a regular expression
for the set of words w ∈ Σ∗ for which there exists a finite
computation of M that induces w and ends in G. Formally,
L(r) = {w ∈ Σ∗ | δ(w) ∩G = ∅}.
For every computation π of M and for every i ≥ 0, if
πi |= ϕ, then, by the definition of G, it must be that π[0..i] ∈
L(r). Hence, r is a necessary condition. We prove that for
every necessary condition r′, we have L(r) ⊆ L(r′), thus
r is the strongest necessary condition. Let r′ be a necessary
condition. Consider a word w ∈ L(r). Let π and i be such
that w is induced by π[0..i]. Let s be the last state in π[0..i].
Since s is in G, there exists some computation πs of M that
starts in s and satisfies ϕ. The concatenation of π[0..i − 1]
and πs is a computation of M whose suffix from position i
satisfies ϕ. Since r′ is a necessary condition, it must be that
π[0..i] ∈ L(r′).
Theorem 12: Finding the strongest necessary condition is
PSPACE-complete. The structure complexity of the problem is
nondeterministic logarithmic space.
Proof: We start with the upper bounds. The set G above
can be computed by solving the global LTL model-checking
problem (G = Q \ ¬ϕM ). An NFA for the strongest neces-
sary condition can be obtained from M be moving the labels
from the states to the transitions into the state (a new initial
state should be added), and defining G as the set of accepting
states. Since global LTL model-checking is in PSPACE and
its structure complexity is NLOGSPACE, we are done. The
lower bound also follows from LTL model checking: Checking
whether M |= ϕ can be reduced to checking whether there is
an initial state in the set {s ∈ S | M, s |= ϕ}, thus, it is
reducible to finding the strongest necessary condition for ¬ϕ,
in a Kripke structure that is obtained from M by marking the
initial states with a special atomic proposition.
VI. DISCUSSION
We introduced and studied trigger querying — a model-
exploration problem in which one searches for the set of
scenarios that trigger a behavior in a system.
Algorithms and modelling techniques originally developed
for formal verification have turned out to be useful in other
areas. This includes, for example, modelling and reasoning
about biological systems [11], [10], business processes [13],
and AI plans [2]. We believe that the application of trigger
querying in these areas is very natural. Indeed, the type of
questions one cares about in these areas are of the form “which
scenarios trigger an action of a particular cell / an activation
of some item in a contract / an action of the robot’s arm.”
Finally, our work here can be viewed as a first step
towards a general temporal-query checking methodology, in
which the “?” place-holder may be replaced by a temporal
behavior rather than a propositional assertion. It looks like
the most appropriate replacement for “?” are temporal events
of a bounded duration, and the most convenient way to
specify them are regular expressions, as done here. Also,
triggers seem to capture a large fraction of the natural model-
exploration questions interesting in practice. This, together
with the popularity of the triggers operator in industrial setting
has convinced us to restrict attention to trigger querying. At
any rate, the ideas introduced here for trigger querying are
useful in the general case.
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Abstract—Bus and interconnect protocols contain a few core
operations (such as read and write transfers) whose behaviors
interleave to form complex executions. Specifications of the core
operations should be flexible enough that simple composition
operators suffice for capturing most interleavings, even in the
presence of common hardware issues such as glitches. Oliveira
and Hu proposed a form of pipelined regular expressions to
specify atomic protocol compositions, but they abstracted away
clocking and glitches. This paper uses the AMBA-2 specification
to argue that a loosely-synchronized form of regular expressions
handles such timing subtleties while retaining the simplicity of
Oliveira and Hu’s pipelined compositions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Last year, we attempted to formalize portions of the AMBA-
2 interface specification for on-chip data transfers [1]. AMBA-
2 uses timing diagrams extensively to present its protocols.
Having worked on formalizing timing diagrams for many
years [2], our goal was to explore whether formal diagrams
were suitable for capturing such a complex specification. The
experience was highly instructive: while formalized timing
diagrams (ours or Amla et al’s [3]) could capture the individual
diagrams in the specification, they were too concrete to capture
the abstract compositional protocols underlying the diagrams.
Oliviera and Hu’s pipelined regular expressions [4] avoid some
the diagrams’ shortcomings, but overconstrain timing issues
that the diagrams support naturally. This paper describes our
early-stage efforts to identify specification language constructs
that capture the structure of AMBA-2 while drawing on the best
features of both timing diagrams and pipelined regular expres-
sions. As (readable) diagrams are generally more restrictive
semantically than text, this exploratory work extends textual
regular expressions. Finding a readable diagrammatic notation
that supports the constructs we identify is an interesting
problem for future work.
II. THE STRUCTURE OF BUS SPECIFICATIONS
Figure 1 reproduces several AMBA-2 diagrams. The first row
(document figures 5-9 and 5-11) shows basic read and write
transfers, the second (document figure 5-12) shows a burst
sequence of write transfers, and the third (document figure 5-
13) shows an interleaved sequence of read and write transfers.
The latter two diagrams are pipelined compositions of the
first two. A good formalization of this specification would
explicitly capture the basic transfers and exploit composition
operators to derive the complex behaviors. A closer look at the
diagrams reveals several issues that a formal rendering must
address to achieve this goal:
1) Pipelining is required, as seen in the overlapping in-
stances of the write protocol in diagram 5-12.
2) The number of clock cycles between events must be al-
lowed to vary between the basic and complex diagrams;
clock specifications in the basic diagram may indicate
alignment with edges rather than cycle counts.
3) The values on signals may differ when a basic protocol
appears in composition. The basic write diagram (5-
11) ends with PSEL low, but the burst diagram (5-12)
preserves the prior high value across adjacent transfers.
4) Names equate values across signals in the diagrams.
5) Glitches and regions of potential signal instability
(shown shaded) must be captured and can vary in length.
Other diagrams (not shown here) refine the basic protocols
with error handling and other features. The observations in
this paper are necessary, but not sufficient, for those cases.
Regular expressions are common for modeling protocols. As
Oliveira and Hu argue [4], however, defining an interleaved
sequence of protocols as a standard regular expression is
problematic because such sequences capture parallel execu-
tions which vastly complicate the expressions. Furthermore,
such expressions fail to reuse the specifications of the basic
protocols. Their elegant proposal was to introduce a variant
of the concatenation operator (denoted @ instead of ;) to
indicate the point in a regular expression at which a parallel
execution could begin. For example, the expression a;b@c
allows a new instance of the expression (starting from a)
to begin concurrently with c (as the first term after the
@ operator). With this notation, they can cleanly specify
pipelined compositions of protocols whose steps execute in
fixed numbers of cycles.
When the number of cycles between protocol steps is not
fixed, however, the regular expressions show a key limitation.
Consider the HADDR, HWDATA, and HREADY signals from the
basic write protocol (5-11). Associating each character in an
expression with a clock cycle, we could capture these as
HADDR = Addr1 ; dc∗
HWDATA = dc ; Data1 ; dc∗
HREADY = H ;H ; dc∗
(where dc stands for “don’t care” and H for “high”). These
specifications, however, are too rigid to capture the instances
of write transfers in the burst sequence (diagram 5-12). The
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Fig. 1. Diagrams from the AMBA-2 specification [1] (pages 5-14 – 5-18) showing single read and write transfers (top), burst sequence of writes (middle),
and sequence of read and write transfers (bottom). The lower two diagrams consist of pipelined instances (compositions) of the behaviors in the two diagrams
in the top row. The figure numbers listed under the diagrams are from the original specification; we refer to the original numbers in the rest of the paper.
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regular expressions require the Data value on HWDATA to
occur in the next clock cycle after the Addr value on HADDR,
but that does not happen for Addr3/Data3. Each of Addr3 and
Data3 may also extend beyond the single clock cycle shown
in the basic diagram. This suggests not equating clock cycles
with steps in the regular expression. In similar vein, the regular
expression for HREADY contains two cycles at high value,
with the first synchronized with Addr1. In the burst diagram,
the HREADY high value for Addr2 occurs simultaneously with
Addr3 on HADDR (due to pipelining), and only lasts a single
clock cycle. Rewriting the regular expression for HREADY
to expect only a single high value would address the latter
problem, but not the synchronization problem.
As these examples illustrate, the synchronization implicit in
regular expressions running concurrently is fundamentally lim-
iting for protocols in which relative position of terms matters
more than precise cycle counts. Regular expressions naturally
capture individual signals, but their composition needs to be
more nuanced. Modeling potential glitches exacerbates the
limitations of regular expressions. A combination of pipelined
regular expressions with the more flexible alignment of events
natural in timing diagrams seems promising. Specifically, we
decouple concatenation from clocking using synchronization
and ordering constraints inspired by timing diagrams to relate
atomic expressions across regular expressions. The resulting
combination of inter-signal and cross-signal specification, ex-
emplified by timing diagrams, inspires our term “two dimen-
sional regular expressions”.
III. 2D REGULAR EXPRESSIONS
We develop our 2D regular expression from the ground
up, working with the diagrams in figure 1. The basic read
protocol (diagram 5-9) suggests the atomic terms needed to
capture signals: high and low bit values (seen on HREADY),
denoted H and L, respectively; named bus values (such as
Addr1 on HADDR), denoted by variable names; unnamed but
stable values (on HADDR after T2 and HREADY after T4),
denoted by sd (for “stable but don’t care”) and potentially
unstable values (the shaded areas on all signals), denoted by
uv (for “unstable value”). We use the standard operators of ; for
concatenation, + for choice, and * for iteration, plus Oliveira
and Hu’s @ for pipelined concatenation. The diagrams we
have studied so far rarely, if ever, nest uses of the * operator,
so the expressions for signals tend to be relatively simple.
Using these atomic terms, the HADDR signal in the read
diagram appears to correspond to
sd ; uv ; Addr1 @ uv ; sd ; uv ; sd ; uv ; sd.
This expression expects three (potentially distinct) stable bus
values to occur on HADDR after Addr1 appears. Furthermore,
the corresponding Data1 value on HRDATA is expected after
two of those stable values have appeared. In the read/write
transfer sequence (diagram 5-13), the second transfer (starting
with Addr2) is a read transfer and should be consistent with
this expression. There, Data2 occurs after only one uv value
on HADDR. The proposed HADDR expression is therefore
overly specific relative to how the transfer gets instantiated
in sequence. The essence of the problem is that the basic
read protocol must specify the potential for unstable values,
whereas the semantics of regular expressions requires the
unstable period to occur. To retain flexibility for composition,
then, the regular expressions for a signal should capture
only required behavior, leaving optional behavior to auxiliary
annotations. We accordingly eliminate the uv values from the
regular expression. For flexibility, we also exploit * to avoid
fixing the number of stable regions that will follow Addr1. The
resulting specification of HADDR is sd ; Addr1 @sd∗. Figure 2
shows the full expression for the basic read diagram, and is
explained in the rest of this section.
While our treatment of HADDR suggests that uv values
should never appear in the regular expressions for signals,
PRDATA shows an example where uv is appropriate. On
PRDATA, the long period of instability is a standard part of the
protocol, and should be included in the regular expression. We
capture PRDATA as sd ; uv ; Data1 ; sd. The decision of whether
or not to model a shaded region as uv depends on whether the
depicted period of instability will necessarily occur.
The protocols require certain atomic terms to happen either
concurrently or in particular orders. In the core read protocol
(diagram 5-9), Data1 appears on HRDATA after the rising
transition on HREADY, and the fall of HREADY aligns with the
end of when Data1 is stable. The following two annotations
capture this, where STi denotes the ith concatenation operator
(; or @) in signal S (counting from 1):
Order(HREADYT 3, HRDATAT 1)
Event(HREADYT 4, HRDATAT 2)
These have the obvious semantics: Event requires its argu-
ments to be concurrent and Order requires the second term
to occur strictly after the first. Optional numeric arguments
to Order give lower and upper bounds on the time between
the events. Additional Event specifications align portions of
HADDR, HWRITE, and HREADY as shown in figure 2.
This leaves handling the potentially unstable regions
(glitches) in the signals. The unstable regions omitted from
HADDR occur around transitions. The regular expressions
defining the signals suggest that transitions consume no mea-
surable time: expression H;Addr1 has Addr1 stable in the time
unit immediately following H. To support glitches, we must
relax this. Our transitions have distinct start and end times
that may be separated by more than one unit of time. Often,
the fact that transitions may take time is more important than
the amount of time that they take. Annotation GlitchTrans(STi)
indicates that the ith transition on signal S may take multi-
ple units of time. Unlike the Event and Order annotations,
GlitchTrans annotations may be ignored (desirable for analyses
that abstract away timing): each GlitchTrans extends the set of
traces that satisfy the expression, whereas the other annotations
restrict the set of satisfying traces.
The read diagram contains two additional pieces of informa-
tion about glitches: many glitch regions span the same period
of time, and that period lies within the high clock period (the
unnamed signal at the top of the diagram). Event annotations
156
HADDR = sd ; Addr1 @ sd∗ [* allows multiple transfers]
HWRITE = sd ; L @ sd∗
HRDATA = sd∗ ; Data1 @ sd
HREADY = sd ; H ; L ; H @ sd
Event(HADDRT 1, HWRITET 1, HREADYT 1)
Event(HADDRT 2, HWRITET 2, HREADYT 2)
Event(HRDATAT 2, HREADYT 4)
Event(HRDATAT 1− f irst , HREADYT 3− f irst)
Order(HRDATAT 1, HREADYT 3−last)
ClockSignal(CLK)
GlitchTrans(HREADYT1)
Constrain(HADDRT 1− f irst , HADDRT 1−last , CLK = H)
[similar constraints for remaining glitch regions]
Fig. 2. 2D regular expression for the basic read transfer protocol (AMBA
diagram 5-9). The ClockSignal annotation indicates that the named signal
oscillates between high and low values as a clock is expected to do.
align the endpoints of glitch regions (STi− f irst and STi−last
refer to the start and end times of the ith transition on signal
S). Containing these regions within positive clock periods is
harder with the annotations given so far. Order constraints
require naming the clock transitions, which is difficult since
the number of clock cycles used in a composed transaction
may vary. Instead, we introduce an annotation Constrain(e1, e2,
s = v) that requires signal s to hold value v between events e1
and e2. An example appears in figure 2. An Order annotation
on the start and end times could bound glitch durations.
This discussion of glitches, events, and order constraints
potentially masks the more substantive points about using
regular expressions to effectively model the AMBA-2 protocols
compositionally. The protocols as shown in the diagrams cap-
ture different information at different granularities of clocking:
the glitch regions fall between the clock cycles governing the
logical heart of the protocols. Multiple clocking granularities
are also useful for capturing the essence of high-level signal
behaviors: a value that spans only one clock cycle in the basic
protocol diagram may span several in a composed sequence,
while corresponding to a single logical concept in the protocol.
Other AMBA protocols (such as multi-address burst commands
from a bus master [AMBA-2 figure 3-6, not shown]) contain
signals whose values change upon events in other signals.
Decoupling clocking from the notion of time implicit in the
regular expressions seems essential to handling these problems
cleanly; some system of synchronization and ordering con-
straints is needed to make up the difference. Various notations
suffice, from explicit Event and Order constraints on all related
pairs to statements that assign signals to clocks and rely on
the usual concurrent semantics of regular expressions. The
differences are syntactic and irrelevant for this paper.
IV. PERSPECTIVE AND DISCUSSION
This paper describes the early stages of a project to formal-
ize interface specifications while capturing the relationships
between their constituent protocols. AMBA-2 develops its pro-
tocols iteratively, refining basic behaviors through successive
sections of the document. Using the framework outlined here,
AMBA-2 figures 5-12 and 5-13 are instances of the protocols
shown in figures 5-9 and 5-11; only the latter two (the basic
protocols) must be specified explicitly. We are trying to iden-
tify composition constructs that enable this sort of reuse across
the entire specification without sacrificing readability or ease
of abstraction for different analysis tasks. Two principles have
emerged from our work so far: basic protocol specifications
must treat clocking and signal values sufficiently abstractly
to support pipelined composition, and clocking overall must
be decoupled from concatenation to enable specification at
different levels of time abstraction.
Pipelined regular expressions make it feasible to use regular
expression-like notation for some protocol compositions, but
lack the fine-grained timing control needed to composition-
ally specify AMBA-2. Timing diagrams handle multiple time
granularities well, but can be a bit too concrete in the face of
arbitrary * operators and cross-signal constraints that depend
on sequences of events. We could add a pipelining notation
to timing diagrams to handle the examples in this paper,
but that would be premature. Other AMBA-2 protocols that
extend the core operators (such as those for error handling)
demand different composition operators. We want to identify
these operators before choosing a notation. Aspect-oriented
programming [5] offers composition operators for fine-grained
behavior extensions that are promising for the additional
protocols. Balancing the rich information structure of the
diagrams while retaining sufficient abstraction and readability
is an important area for future work.
We are also applying our constructs to AXI, HyperTransport,
and the OVL assertion language (also specified largely dia-
grammatically). The latter effort is promising, but the former
two lack the explicit iterative development style of AMBA-
2. We are presenting this work as a short paper in hopes
of gaining early insight into what determines the high-level
structure of an interface protocol specification, and what kinds
of high-level structures lead to designer-friendly specifications.
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Abstract—This paper defines a quantitative metric of the
completeness of a formal specification. A “good” (formal) spec-
ification is already needed in the beginning of the development
process to prevent cost-intensive corrections of errors found
in the late phases of a design process. A quantitative analysis
method is presented to evaluate whether a specification is
“good”. The method considers only the formal specification,
an implementation (design) is not necessary. Thus, an analysis
of a specification can be directly done. The properties of the
specification are transformed into a normal form to calculate the
metric. Experimental results of the analysis method are given,
e. g., metrics for specifications of the AMBA AHB bus.
I. INTRODUCTION
As digital circuits become larger, more complex and safety
critical, the demand for error-free designs has increased dra-
matically. A “good” specification is already needed in the be-
ginning of the development process in order to avoid the most
cost-intensive corrections of errors found in the late phases of
a design process. In property-based design, properties written
in a formal property language like PSL [1] or some temporal
logic are used as a specification. Properties can be employed
even in the very early design phases to generate hardware-
prototypes (Cando-Objects [2], [3]). To evaluate whether a
specification is “good” or not, an analysis method is needed.
On the one hand, one wants to know if there are enough
properties to specify the intended behavior completely. For this
purpose, it is useful to know to which degree the outputs of
a system are specified. A specification is typically incomplete
in the early design phases, so making a difference between
“an output is completely specified” and “an output is never
mentioned” is important. If, on the other hand, a design is not
available the properties may be inconsistent, i.e., contradicting
one another. During the later verification process only one of
the contradicting properties can be satisfied which might not
be obvious in the early specification process.
In the field of simulation, it has been state of the art for
more than ten years to employ several kinds of coverage
analyses. These consider, for example, code coverage [4] or
transition coverage [5] to evaluate the exhaustiveness of test
suites. However, these techniques cannot be directly applied
to the domain of formal verification.
This paper defines a quantitative metric of the completeness
of a specification used for formal verification. The presented
method considers only the specification, an implementation is
not needed.
II. RELATED WORK
Among the first to discuss completeness of the formal verfi-
cation process were Katz et al. [6]. They define completeness
of a specification with respect to a given implementation.
Hoskote et al. propose an approach for a metric in model
checking [7]. The algorithm measures coverage with respect
to an observed signal in an implementaion. The transfer of
the traditional metrics from simulation-based verification to
formal verification with respect to a given design is described
in [8].
Große et al. propose an approach to find specification holes
in a property-set [9]. The method is useful and efficient in
some situations, but has some serious drawbacks: It works
only with a design and only one gap can be shown at a time,
making it impossible to obtain an overview of the specification
status.
In [10] K. Claessen introduces a method to analyze the
coverage of safety property lists. An observer is generated
from a list of properties. The outputs of two identical observers
are compared during a model checking process. The method
fulfills one of our goals, because no design is needed for the
analysis, but only a single gap can be identified at each step.
The coverage of RTL properties against higher level archi-
tectural properties or high-level fault models is discussed in
[11] and [12]. These methods cannot tell anything about one
property-set itself or about an overall verification status in form
of a metric.
As a summary, there are already several metrics for formal
verification, but all need a design to work on. A quantitative
measure of specification completeness regardless of a design
is still needed.
III. COVERAGE, COMPLETENESS AND CONSISTENCY
In simulation-based verification several coverage metrics
exist (see e.g. [4], [5], [8]). However, the term coverage
cannot be simply adopted for formal verification. In formal
verification a specification is always verified for the complete
model. Thus, the question is not ‘what part of the design
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is covered’,but ‘is all relevant functionality included in the
specification’. Hence, we use the term completeness instead.
We propose a completeness analysis that calculates a degree
of determination of the signals involved in the specification.
Since many specification languages are property-based, we
will assume that a specification is composed of properties.
A signal is fully determined, if for each input and internal
state combination one specific value is assigned to the signal
by the set of properties.
Properties can generally be divided into two groups: One of
them restricts a signal bit to ’0’ in a certain situation, another
restricts it to ’1’. These two groups are very similar to the
drivers of a CMOS circuit:The PMOS net v1 forces the output
to a ’1’ if active while the NMOS net v0 will connect the
output to the ’0’. This analogy motivates the further procedure.
In a well-defined CMOS circuit
v0 = ¬v1 (1)
is always valid.
Generally, the determination-function and the consistency-
function of a CMOS circuit are given by:
determination = v0 ∨ v1 (2)
consistency = v0 ∧ v1 (3)
If the determination-function is equal to ’1’ then the output is
fully determined (complete). In any other case it is partially
determined or not determined at all. The complement of the
determination-function characterizes all situations in which the
output is undetermined. The consistency-function must always
be ’0’, otherwise the circuit is inconsistent. All situations
for which the drivers are inconsistent are identified by the
consistency-function.
The determination-function and the consistency-function
can be directly adopted for the analysis of formal property-sets
if the properties are in the following form:
P0 : v0 =⇒ ¬signal (4)
P1 : v1 =⇒ signal (5)
IV. DEFINITION OF THE COMPLETENESS METRIC
A measurement of the degree of signal determination can
be derived from the zero-function v0 and the one-function v1
of every bit of every output and signal.
Definition: If the determination-function of a signal is ’1’
then the signal is completely determined. In any other case, the
following metric gives the percentage of determined situations:




where n is the number of variables in the support and
#minterms is the number of satisfying assignments to all
variables of the determination-function, respectively.
If the consistency-function is not ’0’, then inconsistencies
have been found. A metric for a consistency degree does not
make sense, because even a single situation which leads to
the assignment of contradictory values to one signal must be
corrected.
V. NORMALIZATION
Obviously, most specifications do not write properties in
a form as described above. We therefore have developed a
method to transform many arbitrarily written properties into a
normal form. We assume that the set of properties consists of
safety properties of the form AG(P ), where P is of the form
P : A(Itmin, ...Itmax, Stmin, ...Stmax, Otmin, ...Otmax)
=⇒ C(Itmin, ...Itmax, Stmin, ...Stmax, Otmin, ...Otmax)
(7)
The assumption A and the commitment C may contain input
signals (I), internal state signals (S) and output signals (O)
at different timepoints of a finite time-window tmin...tmax.
tmin is the earliest timepoint and tmax the latest timepoint
used in the property.
The properties are transformed into an appropriate represen-
tation by means of a multi-step normalization process adopted
from [2] for the creation of so-called Cando-Objects.
In a first step, all signals with references to timepoints
less than tmax are transferred to the left hand side of the
implication. Afterwards only signals at timepoint tmax are
on the right side (Eq. (8)). This is the intuitive form of a
causal specification: the past and the present imply the future.
P : A(Itmin, ...Itmax−1, Stmin, ...Stmax−1,
Otmin, ...Otmax−1) =⇒ C(Itmax, Stmax, Otmax) (8)
The properties are now in the same normal form as de-
scribed in [2]. The commitment of a property may consist of
an arbitrary boolean expression involving input, internal and
output signals. For the calculation of the v0’s and v1’s it is
furthermore necessary to have an equivalent set of properties
with exactly one output (or internal state) signal in each com-
mitment. The commitment of a property is first transformed
into a conjunctive normal form (CNF). Then the property is
split up into a number of properties with the same original
assumption using each clause as a separate commitment. For
instance,
A =⇒ Clause1 ∧ Clause2
will be transformed into
A =⇒ Clause1 and A =⇒ Clause2.
At this point of the normalization process, the commitments
of all properties consist of a single clause only. This clause
in turn is always a disjunction of literals. In a last step, the
disjunctions are removed as shown in the following example:
A =⇒ S1 ∨ S2
will be transformed to
A ∧ ¬S2 =⇒ S1 and A ∧ ¬S1 =⇒ S2.
This transformation might generate properties which have
an input signal as a commitment. Such properties are elimi-
nated since it is not possible to force an input signal to a value.
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Now the commitments of all properties refer to only one single
internal or a single output signal at the latest timepoint tmax.
P : A(Itmin, ...Itmax, Stmin, ...Stmax, Otmin, ...Otmax)
=⇒ C(Stmax/Otmax) (9)
This normalized property-set will be used for the calculation
of the determination-function needed to obtain the metric and
for the calculation of the consistency-function.
VI. CALCULATION OF THE ZERO- AND ONE-FUNCTIONS
The normalized set of properties contains both properties
with a positive commitment, which forces a signal to ’1’, and
properties with a negative commitment, forcing a signal to ’0’.
To build a signal’s zero-function v0, all assumptions forcing
the signal to ’0’ are disjoint. Likewise, the one-function v1
of a signal is the disjunction of the properties that force the
signal to ’1’.
For example, the properties
A1 =⇒ ¬S1 and A2 =⇒ ¬S1
A3 =⇒ S1 and A4 =⇒ S1
result in v0 = A1 ∨A2 and v1 = A3 ∨A4 for the signal S1.
The assumptions now describe all situations, in which a
signal is forced to a certain value. Thus, the disjunction
v0 ∨ v1 (determination-function) represents all situations in
which a signal has a defined value. In these cases the signal
is determined.
VII. PROPERTY DEPENDENCIES
As shown in the section before, the v0’s and v1’s are
calculated by building the sum of all assumptions. The nor-
malization process might generate properties with assumptions
referencing internal or output signals at tmax (see Eq. (9)).
These signals are currently analyzed for determination. An
assumption which references such a signal cannot be simply
added to v0 or v1 because the status of determination of
this assumption is unclear. The following example is used to
illustrate the problem:
P : true =⇒ a ≡ b
The outputs a and b obviously do not have a defined value.
The normalization of this property leads to the four properties
P1 : a =⇒ b and P2 : ¬a =⇒ ¬b
P3 : b =⇒ a and P4 : ¬b =⇒ ¬a.
If the fact, that the outputs a and b are not determined, was
neglected during the calculation of the v0’s and v1’s the result
would be 100% determination of both a and b. This would
contradict both signal’s degree of freedom as specified by the
original property.
In such a case, an output can only be used in the assumption
of a property if that output is at least partially determined by
additional properties.
A property dependency graph as shown in Fig. 1 is used
















Fig. 1. Dependency Graph of the AEC
TABLE I
AEC PROPERTIES (ORIGINAL)
P1: ¬errort+1 =⇒ ¬correct itt+1 ∧ ¬reject itt+1
P2: ¬errort ∧ errort+1 ∧ ¬multiplet+1 =⇒ correct itt+1
P3: true =⇒ ¬correct itt+1 ∨ ¬reject itt+1
P4: errort ∧ errort+1 ∧ ¬multiplet+1 =⇒ reject itt+1
P5: errort+1 ∧multiplet+1 =⇒ reject itt+1
internal signals) depend on the properties. A directed edge
exists from property Pi to node x iff x occurs as a literal in
the commitment of Pi. Vice versa, a directed edge exists from
node x to property Pi iff x is in the support of the assumption
part of Pi.
As a consequence of such dependencies the calculation of
the v0’s and v1’s is organized as an iterative process. At
first all determined assumptions (with only inputs and signals
from tmin...t) are added to the corresponding v0’s and v1’s.
This may partially determine some outputs which are used
to further determine the assumptions of other outputs. If all
completeness information has been propagated, the v0’s and
v1’s do not change any more. Then a fixed point is reached
and the algorithm is completed. The metric for each output
and interal signal is calculated according to Eq. (6).
VIII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We analyzed several property-sets to validate the described
method. The first component was an ATM error controller
(AEC) already used in [13] for coverage analyses. The AEC
is a small circuit that can easily be formally specified. The
system is small enough so that our property-set completeness
analysis can be presented in full detail. Later some more
results of larger, more significant property-sets will be given.
The AEC has two inputs (error and multiple) which tell the
controller whether an ATM cell has an error and whether mul-
tiple errors have occured. The outputs (reject it and correct it)
signal if an error can and should be corrected or if the ATM
cell should be rejected. This system is formally described by
five properties (see Tab. I). The properties shown in Tab. II
are the same properties but after the normalization procedure
described in Section V. The conjunctive (p1) and disjunctive
(p3) right hand sides of the implications are now split. Every
right hand side of the normalized properties references only a
single signal which in this case is always an output.
Fig. 1 shows the corresponding dependency graph of the
normalized AEC properties and the two outputs. The prop-
erties p4 and p5 depend not only on inputs and signals at




P1: ¬errort+1 =⇒ ¬correct itt+1
P2: ¬errort+1 =⇒ ¬reject itt+1
P3: ¬errort ∧ errort+1 ∧ ¬multiplet+1 =⇒ correct itt+1
P4: correct itt+1 =⇒ ¬reject itt+1
P5: reject itt+1 =⇒ ¬correct itt+1
P6: errort ∧ errort+1 ∧ ¬multiplet+1 =⇒ reject itt+1
P7: errort+1 ∧multiplet+1 =⇒ reject itt+1
TABLE III
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS (OVERVIEW)
Component Prop. normal. Prop. Analysis Time
ATM Error Controller 5 7 0.1 s
AMBA Slave 8 497 0.69 s
AMBA Master 20 3290 7.3 s
t + 1 = tmax. The two properties cannot contribute to the
v0’s and v1’s of the two outputs in the first iteration. After
their (partial) determinations have been calculated, the v0’s
and v1’s of the outputs can be used in later iterations.
When all v0’s and v1’s are built, the determination-function
v0 ∨ v1 is calculated to obtain the degree of determination
of each output. The consistency-function v0 ∧ v1 may show
potential inconsistencies. For the AEC no inconsistencies are
found and the two outputs are completely determined.
As more advanced systems we analyzed specifications of the
master and the slave components of the AMBA AHB protocol
[14]. Both components were not completely specified. Tab.
III gives the analysis time and the number of original and
normalized properties. The degree of determination of each
output and internal signal is given in Tab. IV. As the two
AMBA AHB property-sets are only protocol specifications and
do not contain any information about the actual implementa-
tion and environment, some signals have a very low degree
of determination. For instance, the data outputs of the two
components get their values from the environment, and are not
defined by the protocol compliance. In addition, some features
like protected control via hprot are not supported.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have introduced a completeness analysis
method for formal property-sets. The calculated metric quan-
titatively describes the degree of determination of the output
signals and internal signals mentioned in a specification. The
completeness metric is derived only from the properties itself,
and gives an overall view of the status of a specification. The
property normalization process presented allows to analyze
arbitrarily written properties.
If the analysis approves the completeness of the formal
specification then this does not mean that the specification
is perfect. It only proves, that all outputs of the design are
determined, i.e., having a defined value in every possible
situation. If the formal properties do not adhere to an original
informal specification, then even the full determination does
not lead to an error-free specification. This must be considered
when interpreting the completeness metric.
TABLE IV
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS (DETAILED)
Component Signal Output / Determination
Internal
Signal
AEC reject it out 100%
correct it out 100%
AMBA Slave act master(3..0) int 100%
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Abstract— Model checking can be aided by inductive in-
variants, small local properties that can be proved by simple
induction. We present a way to automatically extract inductive
invariants from a design and then prove them. The set of
candidate invariants is broad, expensive to prove, and many
invariants can be shown to not be helpful to model checking. In
this work, we develop a new method for systematically exploring
the space of candidate inductive invariants, which allows us to
find and prove invariants that are few in number and immediately
help the problem at hand. This method is applied to interpolation
where invariants are used to refute an error trace and help
discard spurious counterexamples.
I. INTRODUCTION
Formal model checking of safety properties in a sequential
machine is often intractable. In practice, prior knowledge
about the design and/or property being checked greatly reduces
verification time. Often, this knowledge is all that makes
formal verification practical.
Frequently this prior knowledge comes in the form of hints
from the designer, but it is difficult to identify helpful hints,
and there is a real danger of either expressing hints that do
not help or that are not true. Extraneous hints may slow down
the verification tool by consuming valuable resources; all hints
must be proved to verify that the designer did not err, possibly
increasing the complexity of the overall problem.
An ideal solution would be to automatically extract useful
hints from the design. Such a method should focus only on
those hints that immediately help the verification and whose
proof is simple. This paper proposes a method to do exactly
that.
We focus on simple design properties called inductive in-
variants. These are properties that hold in every reachable state
and can be proved by simple induction, temporal induction
using only a 1-step (current state, next state) model. Often
a verification tool can be assisted by the knowledge that a
small set of states in the design is unreachable. For example,
if an abstraction reaches a bad state, we would like to know
if any state on the error trace is unreachable. If there exists an
inductive invariant that demonstrates this unreachability, then
the counterexample is spurious, and there is no need to refine
the model.
To harness this idea, we have built a tool that is able to
show that a single, user-specified state is unreachable. It does
this by finding and proving inductive invariants. If for some
reason it is unable to complete the proof of the invariants, it
will find and prove other, secondary invariants that enable the
first proof to proceed. This method gives a hierarchy of proofs
that when complete will yield a set of inductive invariants {P}
with the following properties:
•
∧




p∈{P} p can be proved with simple induction
This paper provides the theory behind this invariant gen-
eration method and explores how specific inductive invariants
can help interpolation, a method for unbounded verification of
safety properties.
II. RELATED WORK
An excellent background on formal verification can be
found in [1], and [2] is a good overview of modern unbounded
verification techniques. [3] describes the status of formal
verification inside IBM. It describes the problem of extraneous
hints and specifications in the following phrase: ”person-
months spent developing formal specs, merely to choke [the]
FV tool.” The above papers establish the basics and identify
one of the key problems.
This paper will discuss a specific verification algorithm
called interpolation. This method, originally proposed by
McMillan in [4], is fast and compares favorably to other
techniques [5], and thus it was chosen for study in this work.
This paper builds on our previous work [6] in which
Boolean implications between design nodes are discovered
through random simulation and proven with simple induction.
The method was inspired by techniques proposed by van Eijk
in [7]. Bjesse proposes a way to strengthen simple induction in
[8]. We will strengthen simple induction in a different manner.
Finally, this work was motivated by Wedler [9] who dis-
cusses using implications between design nodes to form induc-
tive invariants. He also attempts to strengthen simple induction
in a manner similar to Bjesse. However, that work is limited
in scope (1-hot machines), while our work is more general
and provides a solid theoretical foundation.
III. APPLICATIONS OF INDUCTIVE INVARIANTS
Inductive invariants are useful in many applications. Here
we examine two such applications: simple induction and
interpolation. By exploring these applications, we can expose
some of their weaknesses and motivate the need for inductive
invariants.
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Fig. 1. The shaded states are unreachable but will make an inductive proof
of p impossible.
A. Simple Induction
Simple induction is a method of proving that a property
holds for all reachable states. It is easy to formulate and
often executes quickly. It is an incomplete method but can
be strengthened by the introduction of inductive invariants.
First, we define some basic notation. If S is a state and p a
property then S |= p shall mean that S satisfies the property
p. No guarantees are made for other states. We also refer to
states XS as any state that can be reached from S in one state
transition. In general, XS is not unique.
In simple induction, a property p is proven in a two step
process:
Base Case: Show ∀ initial states i, that i |= p.
Inductive Step: Show ∀S s.t. S |= p, ∀XS, that XS |= p
This is typically implemented by unrolling the transition
relation and then formulating a SAT problem to check both
conditions of the proof.
The technique is incomplete since there are properties that
hold in every reachable state which simple induction will
fail to prove. For example, Figure 1 shows a state transition
graph on which a proof of p will fail. The shaded states are
unreachable, but because of these unreachable states ∃S and
XS such that S |= p and XS 6|= p. The inductive step fails.
Algorithm 1 Modified simple induction.
1: // Let p be the property to be proved.
2: if ∃ initial state i, i 6|= p then return “falsified”
3: if ∃ possibly reachable S, XS s.t. S |= p, XS 6|= p then
4: if can prove S or XS unreachable then // Section IV




To prove p in Figure 1, we may try k-step induction as
described in [8], but in [6] we found this to be a very expensive
solution. Instead, suppose we are able to find an inductive
invariant that shows that either S or XS is unreachable. If
known-unreachable states are disallowed from entering the in-
ductive step (with an extra constraint on the SAT solver), then
simple induction will be able to prove p. This is demonstrated
in Algorithm 1 where the standard simple induction algorithm
is improved by the addition of lines 4 and 5. What is needed





Fig. 2. Interpolation has erroneously reached a bad state.
can demonstrate the unreachability of S or XS. Such a tool
is described in this paper.
B. Interpolation
Interpolation is a method that has been found useful for
unbounded verification of safety properties. It works by using
an over-approximation to the image operation. By applying
this image operator iteratively starting from the initial state,
either a fixed point is reached or a bad state is encountered.
If a fixed point is reached, it is an over-approximation to the
set of reachable states such that no bad states are contained in
this approximation. The design is verified.
If an approximate image contains a bad state, interpolation
may have found a counterexample. However there is in general
no way to know if this is a real counterexample or a spurious
one. Take for example Figure 2. Two image operations are
applied to the initial state I , and a bad state B is found
in the second image. The shaded region represents the over-
approximation inherent in the image operation, and the white
shows the true image of the reachable states. We do not know
which states of the image lie in the over-approximation, nor
do we know if the over-approximated states are reachable. In
Figure 2 we have the error trace I →S→B, but if either S
or B lie in the over-approximation and is not truly reachable
then the counterexample is spurious.
Algorithm 2 Modified interpolation.
1: // Let p be the property to be proved.
2: set parameters for over-approximate image operator
3: {S} := I
4: while (1) do
5: {S}′ := {S}∪ approxImage({S})
6: if {S}′ == {S} then return “verified”
7: if ∃ a bad state “near” {S} then
8: if {S} == I then return “falsified”
9: if can prove s unreachable then // See Section IV
10: record new invariants, goto 7 // See Section IV-D
11: tighten over-approximation parameters, goto 3
12: end if
13: {S} := {S}′
14: end while
Unless specific conditions are met (line 8 of Algorithm
166
2), the interpolation algorithm has no way of knowing if
a counterexample is spurious or true. Therefore, it discards
all work up to that point and begins anew with a tighter
approximation to the image operator. This restart is costly,
and it is a major hot-spot in the performance of the algorithm.
In this work, we have augmented interpolation to call our
invariant finding tool as shown in Algorithm 2. On lines 9
and 10, it will find specific inductive invariants that imply
that a state along the error trace is unreachable. If invariants
are found, the error trace must be spurious, and interpolation
is free to proceed without the costly restart on line 11.
IV. THE PROOF GRAPH
This section describes the basics of our tool to automatically
find and prove useful inductive invariants. A graph structure
called the proof graph is the core of our method.
A. Basic Definitions
The proof graph is a bipartite directed graph with the
following node types:
• States in the sequential design. In practice this is a cube
of states, but to simplify this discussion, consider only
a single state. This constraint will be relaxed in Section
V-C.
• Sets of candidate properties. These properties are yet
to be proved, but if we can prove them then they are
invariants. In this discussion, consider the properties to
be chosen from a specific domain. More details on the
implemented domain (implications) and details on how
to find candidate properties will be given later in Section
V-B.
The root of the graph is a single state node. This corresponds
to the user-specified state that should be proved unreachable.
This root node comes from an outside source – in this work
it is a state along the error trace in interpolation. The leaves,
i.e. the nodes without outgoing edges, are property sets.
The meaning of the graph lies in its connectivity, specifically
in the meanings of edges from states to properties and from
properties to states. Being a bipartite graph, there are no other
edge types.
Definition 1 (Edges to Properties): Let a directed edge
from a state S to a set of properties {P} mean that:
∀ p ∈ {P}, S 6|= p
That is, all properties {P} fail to hold in S.
The properties {P} may or may not hold in all reachable
states, but if any such p ∈ {P} can be proved then S is
unreachable. We refer to {P} as a set of covering properties
for S.
Theorem 1 (Proving a State Unreachable): Let a property
p fail in a state S (S 6|= p). If p is proved to hold in every
reachable state then S is unreachable.
Therefore the structure S→{P} provides a method to show
S unreachable.
Definition 2 (Edges to States): Let a directed edge from a
set of properties {P} to a state S mean that:
∀ p ∈ {P}, ∃ a successor state XS
such that (p |= S) ∧ (p 6|= XS)
That is, all properties hold in S but fail in a successor state
of S.
In the structure {P} → S, S is the reason that the
inductive proof of {P} was not successful. In fact, S is the
counterexample to the inductive hypothesis of the proof.
Proving S to be unreachable is a necessary but not sufficient
condition for proving a p ∈ {P}. Clearly, the proof of p ∈ {P}
cannot succeed if S may be reachable. Conversely, if S is
known to be unreachable, we have no evidence that a proof of
p ∈ {P} will fail. However, another counterexample S′ may
exist.
B. An Example
Figure 3 shows an example of a proof graph and how it
might evolve over time as our algorithm is run. A sample
execution is given here.
1) Suppose interpolation reaches a bad state and S0 is a
state on the error trace. We would like to show that S0
is unreachable. (See Section III-B.)
2) Our tool is called to prove that S0 is unreachable.
We set S0 to be the root of our graph, and through
simulation we generate the covering properties {P0}. In
this simulation, we select properties that appear to hold
in every reachable state but fail in S0. This gives us
Graph (1) in Figure 3. (See Section V-B.)
3) We attempt to prove the properties {P0} by simple
induction. Suppose that this proof fails, and there are
three counterexamples S1, S2, and S3 in the inductive
hypothesis. Each counterexample is responsible for dis-
proving a subset of {P0}, and the proof technique as
implemented in [6] will result in these subsets being
pair-wise disjoint. We therefore split {P0} into {P01},
{P02}, and {P03} such that:
• {P01} ∩ {P02} = ∅, {P01} ∩ {P03} = ∅,
{P02} ∩ {P03} = ∅
• {P01} ∪ {P02} ∪ {P03} = {P0}
• ∀ j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, Sj causes the inductive proof of
{P0j} to fail.
Recording this information in the proof graph gives
us Graph (2) in the figure. The existence of these
counterexamples does not imply that the properties {P}
are not true but instead that we need more invariants to
prove them. (See Sections III-A and IV-E.)
4) Next, cover S1, S2, and S3 with properties, giving us
{P1}, {P2}, and {P3} respectively. These properties
provide a way to show that the new states are unreach-
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Fig. 3. Sample evolution of a proof graph over time.
5) By simulating each new state, we can check to see if
it might be responsible for a future failure to prove
any of the property sets. Suppose we find that S1 is
a counterexample in the inductive proof of every p2 ∈
{P2}. This induces the edge {P2}→S1, and the result
is Graph (3) in the figure. (See Section V-D.)
6) We attempt to prove the properties {P3}. Suppose we
find at least one property to be true for all reachable
states. Now S3 is known to be unreachable, and it can
be removed from the proof graph. This gives Graph 4.
(See Section IV-D.)
7) Attempt the proof of {P03} again. This proof was first
attempted in Step 3, but now the reason that the original
proof failed, S3, is gone and we may re-attempt the
proof. Suppose that this time we find that at least one
property holds for all reachable states. This implies that
S0, the root node, is unreachable. At this point, we
have achieved our objective and we may return the new
invariants to the calling routine, interpolation in this
case. (See Section IV-F.)
C. Selecting Which Properties to Prove
The proof graph in general contains several property set
nodes, and the tool must pick one single node to attempt as
the next proof. Selecting that node is fairly simple once some
basic properties of the proof graph are explored.
Theorem 2 (Proofs on Leaves Only): Given the sets of
properties {P0} and {P1}, a state S, and the graph structure
{P0} → S → {P1}. If no p1 ∈ {P1} are proved to hold in
every reachable state then ∀ p0 ∈ {P0}, it is not possible to
prove p0 by simple induction.
Proof: If ∃ p1 ∈ {P1} that has been proved, then
that would be a guarantee that S is unreachable. However,
because no such proved properties exist, the reachability of
S is unknown. To be conservative, we must allow S to be
a counterexample in the inductive step of the proof of the
properties {P0}. Therefore, the proof will fail ∀ p0 ∈ {P0}.
The above theorem defines an order in which the proofs
must be attempted. Specifically, if a property node has an
outgoing edge to a state then any proof attempt is in vain. In
a chain of the graph, only the leaves (nodes without outgoing
edges) may be considered as proof candidates. The situation
is a bit more complex for a cycle however.
Theorem 3 (Cycles in The Graph): Suppose there are
property sets {P0}, . . . , {Pn}, unique states S0, . . . , Sn, and
the cyclic graph structure {P0}→S0 →· · ·→ {Pn}→Sn →
{P0}.
If ∃ j ∈ {0, . . . , n} such that ∀ pj ∈ {Pj}, pj cannot
be proved by simple induction
then ∀ k ∈ {0, . . . , n}, ∀ pk ∈ {Pk}, pk cannot be proved
by simple induction
Proof: The failure to prove {Pj} results in not being
able to prove {P(j−1 mod n)} by Theorem 2. This establishes
a base case of the inductive proof of this theorem.
Now let k ∈ {0, . . . , n} and suppose {P(k+1 mod n)}
cannot be proved. By Theorem 2, {Pk} cannot be proved.
Theorem 3 is now proved by induction.
Theorem 3 says that in a cycle with n property set nodes,
we must attempt to prove the union of all the property sets at
the same time. This simple induction will either successfully
prove ≥ n properties or 0 properties because if any properties
hold for all reachable states then at least one property in each
set must be true.
Cycles must be treated differently from leaves in that the
union of the cycle nodes must be proved simultaneously.
However, this can be generalized as illustrated in the following
example:
1) Suppose the current proof graph is that shown in Graph
(1) of Figure 4.
2) Suppose we find that S0 can act as the counterexample in
















Fig. 4. A cycle has developed in the proof graph.
a cycle in the graph as shown in Graph (2).
3) Now create a new leaf node {P2} = {P0} ∪ {P1} and
insert it into the proof graph. This records the following
information:
• Both {P0} and {P1} must be proved at the same
time.
• A successful proof will imply that both S0 and S1
are unreachable.
The updated proof graph is shown in Graph (3).
If cycles are abstracted as illustrated in Figure 4 then a proof
of the union of the property sets in the cycle is equivalent to a
proof of the new leaf node. After this generalization is made,
only the leaves in the proof graph are eligible for an inductive
proof.
Suppose a proof graph has multiple leaves, and one leaf
must be selected for the simple induction prover. The unique
leaf to be given to the induction engine is selected as follows:
• Let d(·) denote the distance from the root node to a
property set node. That is, d({P}) is the number of
edges in the shortest directed path from the root node
to {P}. Given this metric, the property set {P} which
minimizes d({P}) should be selected because it requires
fewer inductive proofs to achieve the overall goal, to
prove that the root node is unreachable.
• Ties should be broken by selecting the {P} with the
greatest cardinality. In the absence of other information
about the design, this property set has the greatest chance
of having at least one property successfully proved.
D. Upon a Successful Proof
Suppose a property set {P} in the proof graph has been
selected, given to the simple induction prover, and a property
p ∈ {P} has been proved. This proof is independent from any
assumptions, and the proved property is guaranteed to hold for
all reachable states. The property is therefore used to simplify
all future problems, both simple induction and interpolation.
Enforcement of the property can be accomplished by the
addition of constraint clauses in each respective SAT instance.
This extra clause is maintained throughout the remainder of the
execution, effectively utilizing the new invariant in all future
problems.
This successful proof also allows the proof graph to be
pruned. Theorem 1 implies that all state node parents of {P}
are now known to be unreachable. These can be removed
from the proof graph, along with any dangling nodes that
result. This can create new property set leaves in the graph,
enabling the proofs of some property sets to be re-attempted.
This happened in Step 6 of the example shown in Section
IV-B.
E. Upon an Unsuccessful Proof
Suppose in attempting to prove {P}, the simple induction
engine fails to prove any of the properties. From Section III-A
we know that we can help simple induction by proving that
the counterexample state that satisfies the inductive hypothesis
is unreachable.
In failing to prove a set of properties, simple induction will
produce a set of counterexamples {S0, S1, . . . , Sn}. In this
case, for each p ∈ {P}, ∃Sj such that Sj is the reason the
inductive proof of p failed.
To accurately record the relationship between the properties
{P} and the states {S0, S1, . . . , Sn}, {P} must be split into
n subsets, one for each of {S0, S1, . . . , Sn}. We modify the
proof graph by splitting {P}, adding {S0, S1, . . . , Sn} along
with edges to demonstrate the failed proofs, and lastly we find
covering properties {Pj} for each new Sj . This is illustrated
in Steps 3 and 4 of the example in Section IV-B.
One may view each new structure Sj→{Pj} as a subgraph
rooted at Sj , the state that the induction engine wants to have
shown unreachable. In this way, proving unreachable states for
use in the simple induction solver is a sub-problem in the task
of proving unreachable states for interpolation.
F. Termination Conditions
The above process describes a proof graph that grows
as counterexamples are discovered in inductive proofs and
shrinks as properties are successfully proved. The proof graph
oscillates in size until one of two termination conditions are
satisfied:
• If we run out of proof candidates, the overall proof is
impossible. This can happen if at some point there are
no more leaves in the proof tree. In practice, this means
that either the root state node being proved unreachable
was in fact reachable or our candidate properties did not
provide sufficient information to show this. Absence of
leaves is not a guarantee that the root state is reachable.
• If a covering property of the root node is proven to hold
for all reachable states then the proof graph algorithm
will remove the root from the graph. If the root has been
deleted, we can conclude that the root has been proven
unreachable and we may stop.
V. ADVANCED DETAILS
This section is concerned with advanced details in a prac-
tical implementation of the method described above. Many
details in the previous sections were left abstract, and here we
provide the level of detail necessary to implement the proof
graph algorithm.
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Algorithm 3 The proof graph algorithm.
1: // Let S0 be the state to prove unreachable
2: root := S0
3: cover root with properties
4: while (1) do
5: if (root == ∅) then return “root unreachable”
6: if (no leaves) then return “root may be reachable”
7: {P} := selectBestLeaf()
8: (proved, {S}) := simpleInductionProve({P})
9: if proved then
10: delete parents of {P}
11: else
12: for all counterexamples s ∈ {S} do
13: make new proof graph node for s
14: cover s with a new set of properties {P}
15: Simulate S, try to break proofs of all property sets




A. Choosing a Property Domain
The proof graph derivation makes use of sets of properties,
but the domain of these properties to this point has not been
specified. Although an implementation is free to use any
domain, ours uses Boolean implications between gates. These
were explored in [6]. Similarly, we allow implications to exist
between any pair of gates in the design (not limited to the
latches). However, we make the restriction that both gates are
selected from the same time frame.
Implications were selected because they are expressive and
easy to prove. They are much more numerous than alternatives
such as node equivalences, yet are more manageable than
relations between three nodes. Thus, they are a good trade-
off between algorithmic efficiency and expressiveness.
Note that the use of implications as the property domain
makes our implementation incomplete. For certain designs, ∃








That is, implications cannot resolve all pairs of states and so
would be unable to demonstrate that exactly one of {S1, S2}
is reachable because any set of implications would either be
satisfied by both states or fail in both states.
B. Selecting Covering Properties
In the proof graph algorithm, we often need to find the
covering properties {P} for a state S that have a high
probability of holding in all reachable states yet fail to hold in
S. Implications are easy to check with random simulation, and
we use simulation extensively to derive covering properties.
Because covering properties will need to be found for many
states over the execution of the proof graph algorithm, it
is advantageous to pre-compute a set of implications that
have a high probability of holding in all reachable states.
We refer to these as candidate properties. By constraining
random simulation to only simulate reachable states, a set
of likely implications can be extracted from a design. This
set of implications can be refined through a mix of more
random simulation and bounded model checking. In practice,
after adequate tuning of the simulation and bounded model
checking, this candidate set was of a manageable size for all
the benchmarks examined in this paper. See the column “cand.
props.” in Table I below.
Using the candidate properties, the covering properties for
any particular state S can be easily derived. The design is
simulated using S as the input vector, and the candidate
properties that fail in this simulation are selected as the
covering properties for S.
C. State Cubes
Section IV described a proof graph where state nodes con-
sisted of exactly one state in the design. In an implementation
this can be relaxed. Instead of being a single state, suppose that
a state node represents a cube of states. Whenever possible, a
state can be expanded to a cube of states that serves the same
purpose, either breaking a simple induction proof, or leading
interpolation to an error state. The covering properties can be
selected such that any property failing in any state covered by
the cube is considered.
Introducing state cubes changes the proof graph theory
slightly by introducing a special type of graph cycle.
Claim 1: Let {P} be a set of properties and S a state cube
(with > 1 minterms). If there is S→{P}→S then the proof
of {P} is impossible.
This new condition must be checked in the code, and in
practice occurs quite frequently. This is another source of
graph compression because the property sets that are impos-
sible to prove can be deleted.
D. Handling the Large Number of Counterexamples
Inductively proving a set of properties {P} can lead to a
large number of counterexamples. This can lead to a blowup
in the size of the proof graph, but a few tricks can help to
make the size of the proof graph manageable.
Counterexample Cubes: The inductive hypothesis of an in-
ductive proof is checked by forming a combinational
circuit with a single output that is 1 if and only if
the inductive hypothesis is violated for a given set of
properties {P}. For every satisfying assignment found
for this circuit, we can expand the assignment into a cube
by simply discarding primary inputs not appearing on a
controlling path in the circuit. This expanded cube is able
to violate the inductive hypothesis for a larger subset of
{P} because in practice the counterexamples found are
usually clustered. By using counterexample cubes, the
total number of counterexamples found is reduced.
Proof Graph Bounding: In the proof graph, the primary goal
is to prove the root state to be unreachable. To do
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TABLE I
PERFORMANCE ON A SAMPLING OF HARD ACADEMIC PROBLEMS
Design Properties Standard Interpolation Interpolation + Proof Graph
Design And Gates Latches Prop. Type MB Sec. Refines MB Sec. Refines Cand. Props. Props. Proved
cmu dme1 B 236 61 Unknown 2484 7200 5 2487 7200 5 390 0
cmu dme2 B 296 63 Unknown 2507 7200 7 2674 7200 7 604 0
eijk S1423 S 902 159 True 2481 7200 1 139 77.93 0 10078 2400
eijk S208 S 109 22 True 2451 7200 4 38 60.62 0 1668 454
eijk S208c S 111 23 True 2469 7200 7 30 59.04 0 1864 660
eijk S382 S 230 57 True 2480 7200 5 228 102.17 0 23144 4176
eijk S420 S 243 50 True 2500 7200 7 148 191.27 0 11000 2250
eijk S444 S 240 57 True 2491 7200 5 224 507.37 0 38530 28972
eijk S838 S 480 106 True 2570 7200 2 1199 370.63 0 152734 27308
eijk bs1512 S 866 158 Unknown 2471 7200 0 2475 7200 0 46108 60
eijk bs3271 S 1841 305 Unknown 1822 7200 1 2514 7200 1 6544 772
irst dme4 B 593 124 Unknown 2515 7200 4 2558 7200 4 1894 0
irst dme5 B 790 165 Unknown 2562 7200 5 528 7200 4 16590 0
irst dme6 B 1181 245 Unknown 2564 7200 5 440 7200 0 126850 0
nusmv brp B 375 52 Unknown 2467 7200 1 805 7200 1 9140 1128
nusmv queue B 1310 84 True 2459 7200 1 95 151.78 0 3690 480
nusmv reactor 6 C 903 76 True 2478 7200 7 52 140.66 0 6228 482
vis bakery E 284 25 Unknown 2454 7200 3 2582 7203.06 5 4018 626
this, only one path of successful proofs leading back to
the root node is needed. This means that most of the
counterexamples appearing in the proof graph are not
needed to show that the root state is unreachable. Har-
nessing this idea, the implementation bounds the number
of counterexample nodes appearing in the proof graph. If
adding a new counterexample would cause the number of
counterexample nodes to exceed this bound then the new
counterexample is ignored. By using a sufficiently high
counterexample node bound we can dramatically reduce
the size of the proof graph and minimally impact the
invariants found by our algorithm.
Simulated Inductive Proofs: Often a counterexample en-
countered previously can serve to break the inductive
proof of a newly derived set of covering properties. Sim-
ilarly, new counterexamples from the simple induction
engine can often serve to break the proof of many sets of
covering properties, more than just what the induction
engine is currently processing. To detect these cases,
random simulation is used to determine if a specific
counterexample can satisfy the inductive hypothesis of
a specific set of covering properties. This encourages
re-use of old counterexamples rather than forcing new
counterexamples to be derived, and in practice it works
quite well. For an example, see Step 5 of Section IV-B.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
For this work, we implemented two C++ plugins for the
ABC Logic Synthesis and Verification System [10]. The first
plugin implements the interpolation algorithm as described in
[4], and the second plugin implements the invariant discovery
method proposed in this paper. The plugins are interfaced as
described in Algorithm 2 to provide inductive invariants for
aiding interpolation.
We experimented with a suite of 154 academic designs that
had been annotated with safety properties [12]. The designs
ranged in size from 10 to 689 latches. After the designs
were combinationally synthesized into And-Inverter Graphs,
they had between 43 and 3716 And nodes. Each design
in this benchmark suite contains a single safety property,
which include 95 true properties, 34 false properties, and 25
properties of unknown nature.
The technique described in this paper can greatly speed-up
model checking, but also it imposes some overhead to find
and prove inductive invariants. The algorithm is best suited
to run as an option in a verification package that can be
invoked after more conventional methods have been exhausted.
To emulate this type of flow, we attempted to verify all 154
benchmarks with standard interpolation. 132 finished in less
than 10 minutes, and 18 failed to verify in 2 hours. It is on
these 18 that we then applied our method.
Table I shows these 18 benchmarks on which interpolation
times-out after 2 hours. As discussed in Section III-B, the
most expensive part of the interpolation algorithm is the model
refinement. The number of refinements done in the standard
interpolation algorithm is shown in the table, and in some
cases this number is quite high.
If specific inductive invariants can be found, then refinement
can be avoided. In the last part of the table, we show the
statistics for an implementation of interpolation that utilizes
the proof graph. Whenever interpolation reaches a bad state,
it will find and prove appropriate inductive invariants. In half
of the designs, proving a small number of properties was
sufficient to allow all model refinement steps to be skipped.
Runtime was dramatically improved in those cases, and the
inductive invariants proved to be the difference between a
time-out and a successful verification run.
Interestingly, no false properties are present in Table I. The
technique presented here favors true properties because for
these, any trace into a bad state must contain unreachable
states and so there is an opportunity to find invariants to
cover those states. With a falsifiable property, the error trace
will only contain reachable states and the proof graph method































Fig. 5. Performance On A Sampling of Hard Industrial Problems
unreachable. Consequently, if there are indeed false properties
in this subset of the benchmark suite, these probably appear
as time-out cases.
Further experimentation was done using 43 industrial de-
signs. Each contains multiple properties which are to be proven
one-by-one. These designs were chosen because they are the
hardest available, each having runtimes in excess of 8 minutes
when processed with standard interpolation.
Figure 5 shows a scatter plot comparison of standard
interpolation versus interpolation aided with the proof graph.
Each verification run was given a time-out of 30 minutes, and
the proof graph successfully prevented 5 of the designs from
exceeding the time limit. Even on designs that did not time-out
with standard interpolation, using the proof graph significantly
helped the runtime.
Future work will include trying this technique on more
industrial benchmarks, specifically ones that are harder for
standard interpolation.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper outlined a method to automatically extract and
prove inductive invariants. These invariants are used to show
that a single, application-specified state is unreachable, and
in this way only invariants that are immediately helpful to
the problem at hand are found. This is accomplished by use
of the proof graph, a structure whose theory and application
were thoroughly explored here.
The proof graph shows that there is a fine relationship
between different properties of a design. Some can be in-
dependently proved by simple induction. Others require that
disjoint sets of properties be proved in a particular order.
Some properties can only be proved in conjunction with other
properties. Proving local properties with simple induction was
also explored in our previous work [6], but this work provides
us with a more complete understanding of this proof process.
Specifically, the proof graph is an effective tool to capture all
of the dependencies between the inductive proofs of different
property sets.
This technique was applied to the interpolation algorithm,
and the feasibility of modifying this algorithm to request
and utilize specific invariants was demonstrated. It should be
possible to incorporate our proof graph algorithm into any tool
that needs specific invariants, and thus the methods presented
in this work could have widespread application.
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Checking Safety by Inductive Generalization of
Counterexamples to Induction





Abstract—Scaling verification to large circuits requires some
form of abstraction relative to the asserted property. We describe
a safety analysis of finite-state systems that generalizes from
counterexamples to the inductiveness of the safety specification
to inductive invariants. It thus abstracts the system’s state space
relative to the property. The analysis either strengthens a safety
specification to be inductive or discovers a counterexample to
its correctness. The analysis is easily made parallel. We provide
experimental data showing how the analysis time decreases with
the number of processes on several hard problems.
I. INTRODUCTION
We describe a safety analysis for finite-state systems that
incrementally strengthens a correct specification to be induc-
tive. Each iteration of the analysis chooses a counterexample
to the inductiveness of the specification: a state that explains
why the specification is not yet inductive. It then generalizes
from the assumption that this state is unreachable to an
inductive invariant that proves that many states, including the
counterexample to induction, are unreachable. Thus, through
directed invariant generation, it accomplishes an abstraction of
the state space of the system relative to the specification.
The main idea of our analysis is the following. Suppose
the given safety property is not inductive. Then there exists a
counterexample to induction (CTI): a state that can lead to a
violation of the property. The analysis attempts to generate a
single inductive invariant in the form of a clause that eliminates
this state and many other states as well. If it succeeds, the
generated inductive clause strengthens the property. Otherwise,
the given property is extended to assert that the CTI state is
also unreachable. After many iterations of this process, either
the incrementally strengthened property becomes inductive
or a counterexample trace is found. Section III presents the
analysis in detail, and Section VII discusses the analysis more
generally.
The application of induction as the basis for generalization
is the distinguishing feature of this analysis. From one CTI,
the analysis generalizes to an inductive clause that proves that
many states are unreachable: the CTI state itself, all the states
This research was supported in part by NSF grants CCR-01-21403, CCR-
02-20134, CCR-02-09237, CNS-0411363, and CCF-0430102, by ARO grant
DAAD19-01-1-0723, and by NAVY/ONR contract N00014-03-1-0939. The
first author was additionally supported by a Sang Samuel Wang Stanford
Graduate Fellowship.
that can reach it, and many other states that cannot reach it.
This generalization beyond the states that can reach the CTI
contrasts with standard preimage computation.
The success of our approach depends on two points. First,
we require a fast method of generating inductive clauses. We
address this challenge in Section IV. Second, small inductive
clauses must exist in practice. The empirical evidence of
Section V suggests that they do. In Section VI, we discuss
related techniques and the potential for hybrid approaches.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Propositional Logic
Let us review a few useful notations and definitions of
propositional logic. A literal  is a propositional variable x
or its negation ¬x. A clause c is a disjunction of literals.
The size |c| of clause c is its number of literals. A subclause
d  c is a disjunction of a subset of literals of c. A formula in
conjunctive normal form (CNF) is a conjunction of clauses.
We write ϕ[x] to indicate that the formula ϕ has variables
x = {x1, . . . , xn}. An assignment s associates a truth value
{true, false} with each variable xi of x. ϕ[s] is the truth value
of ϕ on assignment s, and s is a satisfying assignment of ϕ
if ϕ[s] is true. A partial assignment t need not assign values
to every variable.
Finally, a formula ϕ implies a formula ψ if every satisfying
assignment (that assigns a truth value to every variable of ϕ
and ψ) of ϕ also satisfies ψ. In this case, we say that the
implication ϕ ⇒ ψ holds. The implication ϕ ⇒ ψ holds iff
(if and only if) the formula ϕ ∧ ¬ψ is unsatisfiable.
B. Transition Systems
We model finite-state systems as Boolean transition systems.
Definition 1 (Boolean Transition System) A Boolean tran-
sition system S : 〈x, θ, ρ〉 has three components:
• a set of propositional variables x = {x1, . . . , xn}, which
hold the state of the system;
• an initial condition, a propositional formula θ[x], which
describes in which states the system can start;
• and a transition relation, a propositional formula ρ[x, x′],
which describes how the system evolves in each step of
execution.
Seventh International Conference on Formal Methods in Computer-Aided Design
0-7695-3023-0/07 $25.00 © 2007 IEEE
DOI 10.1109/.15
173
In ρ[x, x′], primed variables x′ represent the values of the
variables x in the next state.
The semantics of a finite-state system are given by its set
of computations.
Definition 2 (State & Computation) A state s of Boolean
transition system S is an assignment of the variables x. A
computation σ : s0, s1, s2, . . . is a sequence of states such that
• s0 satisfies the initial condition: θ[s0] is true;
• and for each i ≥ 0, si and si+1 are related by ρ:
ρ[si, si+1] is true.
A state of S is reachable if it is in some computation of
S. We are interested in determining for a given system S and
formula ϕ if every reachable state of S satisfies ϕ. If so, then
ϕ is S-invariant, or is an invariant of S. If not, then there
exists a computation with some state s that falsifies ϕ; the
prefix of the computation up to s is a counterexample trace.
Rather than examining each of the possibly infinitely many
computations of S, however, we apply induction to determine
if ϕ is S-invariant.
Definition 3 (Inductive Invariant) A formula ϕ is S-
inductive if
• it holds initially: θ ⇒ ϕ, (initiation)
• and it is preserved by ρ: ϕ ∧ ρ⇒ ϕ′. (consecution)
In the latter formula, ϕ′ abbreviates ϕ[x′]: each variable is
replaced by its corresponding primed variable.
A formula ϕ is S-inductive relative to a S-inductive formula
ψ if θ ⇒ ϕ as before, and ψ ∧ ϕ ∧ ρ⇒ ϕ′.
The two implications — the base case and the inductive
case, respectively — are the verification conditions for S and
ϕ. When S is obvious from the context, we omit it from S-
inductive and S-invariant.
III. FINITE-STATE INDUCTIVE STRENGTHENING
Given transition system S : 〈x, θ, ρ〉 and specification for-
mula Π, is Π S-invariant? Proving that Π is inductive answers
the question affirmatively. However, Π is often invariant yet
not inductive. A standard approach in this case is to find
a formula χ such that Π ∧ χ is inductive; χ is called a
strengthening assertion [1]. There are many approaches to
finding a strengthening assertion for finite-state systems (see
Section VI). We describe an approach based on generating
many clauses, each of which is inductive relative to the
previously-generated clauses.
A. Inductive Clauses
First, let us consider how to find a single clause that is
inductive relative to some formula ψ. Later, we show how to
chain the discovery of such clauses together to decide whether
a system S meets its specification Π. Our presentation is self-
contained but follows the ideas of abstract interpretation [2].
Consider an arbitrary clause c that need not be inductive. It
induces the subclause lattice Lc : 〈2c,,,〉 in which
• the elements 2c are the subclauses of c;
• the elements are ordered by the subclause relation :
in particular, the top element is c itself, and the bottom
element is the formula false (“false”);
• the join operator  is simply disjunction;
• the meet operator  is defined as follows: c1  c2 is the
disjunction of the literals common to c1 and c2.
Lc is complete; by the Knaster-Tarski theorem [3], [4], every
monotone function on Lc has a least and a greatest fixpoint.
Consider the monotone nonincreasing function down(Lc, d)
that, given the subclause lattice Lc and the clause d ∈ 2c,
returns the (unique) largest subclause e  d such that the
implication ψ∧e∧ρ⇒ d′ holds. In other words, it returns the
best under-approximation in Lc to the weakest precondition
of d. If the greatest fixpoint c̄ of down(Lc, c) satisfies the
implication θ ⇒ c̄ of initiation, then it is the largest subclause
of c that is inductive relative to ψ. Section IV-A describes how
to find c̄ with a number of satisfiability queries linear in |c|.
Large inductive clauses are undesirable, however, because
they provide less information than smaller clauses: they are
satisfied by more states. We want to find a minimal inductive
subclause of c, an inductive subclause that does not itself
contain any strict subclause that is inductive. Therefore, we ex-
amine the least fixpoint of a monotone nondecreasing function
on inductive subclause lattices, which are lattices whose top
elements are inductive. Constructing an inductive subclause
lattice requires first computing the greatest fixpoint of down
on a larger subclause lattice.
To that end, consider the (nondeterministic) function
implicate(ϕ, c) that, given formula ϕ and clause c, returns
a minimal subclause d  c such that ϕ ⇒ d if such a
clause exists, and returns 
 (“true”) otherwise. This minimal
subclause d is known as a prime implicate [5], [6]. There
can be exponentially many such minimal subclauses since the
CNF representation of a formula can be exponentially large.
But there may not be any prime implicate if ϕ ⇒ c. Section
IV-B presents an optimal implementation of implicate.
Using implicate, we can find a subclause of c that best
approximates θ: b : implicate(θ, c). Consider the subclause
sublattice Lb,c of Lc that has top element c and bottom element
b. Consider also the operation up(Lb,c, d) that, for element
d of Lb,c, returns a minimal subclause e  c such that the
implication ψ∧ d∧ ρ ⇒ e′ holds. In other words, it computes
e′ : implicate(ψ∧d∧ρ, c′), a best over-approximation in Lb,c
of the strongest postcondition of d.
The operation up is a function on Lb,c — it maps an
element of Lb,c to an element of Lb,c — precisely when the
top element c is inductive. In this case, its least fixpoint c̄ is an
inductive subclause of c that is small in practice. However, it
is not necessarily a minimal inductive subclause, as different
deterministic instantiations of implicate result in different least
fixpoints, some of which may be strict subclauses of others.
Now for a given clause c, compute the greatest fixpoint
of down on Lc to discover inductive clause c̄ and its corre-
sponding inductive sublattice Lc̄. Compute b : implicate(θ, c)
to identify the inductive sublattice Lb,c̄ whose bottom element
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over-approximates θ. Finally, compute the least fixpoint of up
on Lb,c̄ to find a small inductive subclause d̄ of c. In practice,
d̄ is small but need not be minimal.
A brute-force recursive technique finds a minimal inductive
subclause. First apply the procedure described above to c to
find d̄. Then recursively treat each immediate strict subclause
of d̄, of which there are |d̄|. A clause d̄ is a minimal inductive
subclause of c precisely when each of these recursive calls
fails to find an inductive strict subclause of d̄. We call this
procedure MIC(S, ψ, c). It returns a minimal subclause of c
that is S-inductive relative to ψ, or 
 if no such clause exists.
B. FSIS: Generalizing from Counterexamples to Induction
Having developed the algorithm MIC to discover a minimal
inductive subclause of a given clause c, the remaining consid-
eration is which clause c to provide it. We use negations of
counterexamples to induction (CTIs): Π-states that can lead
to ¬Π-states. This choice guides MIC to discover inductive
clauses that are relevant for proving that Π is S-invariant,
implicitly abstracting the state-space of S relative to Π. Hence,
rather than finding a CNF representation of the exact set
of reachable states of S, we expect to find a much smaller
formula χ such that Π∧χ is inductive and represents a larger
set of states that all satisfy Π.
Suppose that χ is a conjunction of previously-generated
clauses that are S-inductive relative to Π, but Π ∧ χ is not
S-inductive. Why is Π ∧ χ not inductive? One possibility is
that initiation fails: the formula θ ∧ ¬Π is satisfied by some
state s. In this case, Π is not S-invariant.
Another possibility is that consecution fails: the formula
Π∧χ∧ρ∧¬Π′ is satisfied by some pair of states (s, s′). That
is, it is possible for S to transition from state s, which satisfies
Π ∧ χ, to state s′, which satisfies ¬Π′ and thus violates the
specification Π. State s is a CTI.
Since s is an assignment of truth values to variables of S, it
can be viewed as a conjunction of literals: if s assigns xi to be
true, the conjunction contains xi; if s assigns xi to be false,
the conjunction contains ¬xi. Call this conjunction ŝ. Now,
noticing that ¬ŝ is a clause, compute MIC(S, Π ∧ χ, ¬ŝ).
If MIC returns 
 because ŝ does not contain a subclause that
is inductive relative to Π ∧ χ, then update Π to indicate that
proving that state s is unreachable is a subgoal of proving the
invariance of the original Π: Π := Π ∧ ¬ŝ. Otherwise, MIC
returns c̄, an inductive generalization of ¬ŝ: c̄ is inductive
relative to Π ∧ χ and excludes state s and many other states.
Update χ accordingly: χ := χ ∧ c.
Eventually, either Π grows so that θ ∧ ¬Π is satisfiable,
disproving the specification, or Π∧ χ becomes inductive. For
χ is always inductive relative to Π; and if the formula Π ∧
χ∧ ρ∧¬Π′ is unsatisfiable, then Π is inductive relative to χ.
Which states does an inductive generalization of ¬ŝ ex-
clude? It clearly excludes state s. It also excludes all states that
can reach s, for it would not be inductive otherwise. However,
even the largest inductive subclause of ¬ŝ excludes all states
that can reach s, while MIC discovers significantly smaller
inductive subclauses in practice. Hence, MIC generalizes the
argument that s and those states that can reach s are unreach-
able to prove that many other states are also unreachable.
This generalization contrasts with methods that compute the
preimage of a CTI [7]–[9].
This analysis is naturally made parallel. By simply using
a randomized decision procedure to obtain the CTIs, each
process is likely to analyze a different part of the state-space.
Processes need only communicate discovered inductive clauses
and — depending on implementation choices (see Section V)
— CTIs that do not yield inductive clauses.
We call this procedure FSIS(S,Π), for finite-state inductive
strengthening. It returns an inductive strengthening of Π if Π is
S-invariant; otherwise, it extracts from the subgoals conjoined
to Π a counterexample trace.
C. One-Step Cone of Influence
One need not consider a full assignment s as a CTI.
Computing a one-step cone of influence (COI) — the variables
that can possibly impact the truth value of Π in the next state
— yields a partial assignment t that describes a set of states,
rather than just a single state s, that can lead to a violation
of Π. Applying MIC to the resulting clause ¬t̂ focuses it on
excluding all of these states, rather than proving that just the
state s is unreachable for a reason that is unrelated to why the
other states are unreachable.
IV. ALGORITHMS
This section develops the algorithms introduced in Section
III-A to discover minimal inductive subclauses.
A. Computing the Largest Inductive Subclause
Recall that the monotone nonincreasing function
down(Lc, d) computes the largest subclause e  d such that
the implication ψ ∧ e ∧ ρ ⇒ d′ holds. A straightforward
method of computing the greatest fixpoint of down in Lc
— which iteratively computes under-approximations to the
weakest precondition — can require Ω(|c|2) satisfiability
queries. For systems with many variables, this quadratic cost
is prohibitively expensive.
We describe a method that requires a linear number of
queries. Consider checking if the implication ψ ∧ c ∧ ρ ⇒ c′
holds. If it does, and if the implication θ ⇒ c of initiation also
holds, then c is inductive relative to ψ. If it does not, then the
formula ψ∧c∧ρ∧¬c′ is satisfied by some assignment (s, s′) to
the unprimed and primed variables. Let ŝ be the conjunction
of literals corresponding to s; and let ¬t̂ be the best over-
approximation to ¬ŝ in Lc, which is the largest clause with
literals common to c and ¬ŝ. Then compute the new clause
d : c¬t̂. In other words, d has the literals common to c and
¬ŝ. Now recurse on d.
If at any point during the computation, initiation does not
hold, then report failure.
This algorithm, which we call LIC(Lc, c), computes the
largest inductive subclause of the given clause c.
Proposition 1 (Largest Inductive Subclause) The fixpoint
of the iteration sequence computed by LIC(Lc, c) is the
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largest subclause of c that satisfies consecution. If it also
satisfies initiation, then it is the largest inductive subclause
of c. Finding it requires solving at most O(|c|) satisfiability
queries.
Proof: Let the computed sequence be c0 = c, c1, . . . , ck,
where the fixpoint ck satisfies consecution. Notice that for
each i > 0, ci  ci−1 by construction. Suppose that e  c
also satisfies consecution, yet it is not a subclause of ck. We
derive a contradiction.
Consider position i at which e  ci but e  ci+1; such a
position must occur by the existence of e. Now partition ci
into two clauses, e ∨ f ; f contains the literals of ci that are
not literals of e. Since consecution does not yet hold for ci,
the formula ψ ∧ (e ∨ f) ∧ ρ ∧ ¬(e′ ∨ f ′) is satisfiable. Case
splitting, one of the following two formulae is satisfiable:
ψ ∧ e ∧ ρ ∧ ¬e′ ∧ ¬f ′ (1)
ψ ∧ ¬e ∧ f ∧ ρ ∧ ¬e′ ∧ ¬f ′ (2)
Formula (1) is unsatisfiable because e satisfies consecution
by assumption. Therefore, formula (2) is satisfied by some
assignment (s, s′). Now, because ¬e[s] evaluates to true, we
know that e  ¬ŝ (where ŝ is the conjunction of literals
corresponding to assignment s); but then e  ci+1 = ci  ¬ŝ,
a contradiction.
The linear bound on the number of satisfiability queries
follows from the observation that each iteration (other than
the final one) must drop at least one literal of c.
We thus have an algorithm for computing the largest induc-
tive subclause of a given clause with only a linear number of
satisfiability queries.
In practice, during one execution of MIC, the clauses that
are found not to contain inductive clauses should be cached
to preclude the future exploration of its subclauses.
B. Computing Prime Implicates
Recall that the monotone nondecreasing function up(Lc, d)
computes a minimal subclause e  c such that the implication
ψ ∧ d ∧ ρ ⇒ e′ holds. As explained in Section III-A, the
crucial part of implementing up is implementing an algorithm
for finding minimal implicates: implicate(ϕ, c) should return
a minimal subclause of c such that ϕ ⇒ c holds, or 
 if no
such subclause exists. We focus on implicate in this section.
In fact, we consider a more general problem. Consider a
set of objects S and a predicate p : 2S → {true, false} that is
monotone on S: if p(S0) is true and S0 ⊆ S1 ⊆ S, then also
p(S1) is true. We assume that p(S) is true; this assumption
can be checked with one preliminary query. The problem is
to find a minimal subset S̄ ⊆ S that satisfies p: p(S̄).
The correspondence between this general problem and
implicate(ϕ, c) is direct: let S be the set of literals of c and
p be the predicate that is true for S0 ⊆ S precisely when
ϕ⇒ ∨S0, where
∨
S0 is the disjunction of the literals of S0.
A straightforward and well-known algorithm for finding a
minimal satisfying subset of S requires a linear number of
queries to p. Drop an element of the given set. If the remaining
let rec min p S0 = function
| [] → S0
| h :: t → if p(S0 ∪ t)
then min p S0 t
else min p (h :: S0) t
let minimal p S = min p [] S
Fig. 1. Linear-time minimal
let rec split (, r) = function
| [] → (, r)
| h :: [] → (h :: , r)
| h1 :: h2 :: t → split (h1 :: , h2 :: r) t
let split S0 = split ([], []) S0
let rec min p sup S0 =
if |S0| = 1
then S0
else let 0, r0 = split S0 in
if p(sup ∪ 0)
then min p sup 0
else if p(sup ∪ r0)
then min p sup r0
else let  = min p (sup ∪ r0) 0 in
let r = min p (sup ∪ ) r0 in
 ∪ r
let minimal p S = min p [] S
Fig. 2. Optimal minimal
set satisfies p, recurse on it; otherwise, recurse on the given
set, remembering never to drop that element again.
Figure 1 describes this algorithm precisely using an
O’Caml-like language. It treats sets as lists. S0 contains the
required elements of S that have already been examined; if
there are not any remaining elements, return S0. Otherwise,
the remaining elements consist of h :: t — a distinguished
element h (the “head”) and the other elements t (the “tail”).
If p(S0∪t) is true, h is unnecessary; otherwise, it is necessary,
so add it to S0. We provide these details to prepare the reader
to understand an algorithm that makes the optimal number of
queries to p.
We can do exponentially better than always making a linear
number of queries to p. Suppose we are given two disjoint sets,
the “support” set sup and the set S0, such that p(sup ∪ S0)
holds but p(sup) does not hold. We want to find a minimal
subset S̄ ⊆ S0 such that p(sup ∪ S̄) holds. If S0 has just
one element, then that one element is definitely necessary, so
return it. Otherwise, split S0 into two disjoint subsets 0 and r0
with roughly half the elements each (see Figure 2 for a precise
description of split). Now if p(sup ∪ 0) is true, immediately
recurse on 0, using sup again as the support set. If not, but
p(sup∪r0) is true, then recurse on r0, using sup again as the
support set.
The interesting case occurs when neither p(sup ∪ 0) nor
p(sup∪r0) hold: in this case, elements are required from both
0 and r0. First, recurse on 0 using sup∪r0 as the support set.
The returned set  is a minimal subset of 0 that is necessary
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@pre p(sup ∪ S0) ∧ ¬p(sup)
@post V ⊆ S0 ∧ p(sup ∪ V )
∧ ∀e ∈ V. ¬p(sup ∪ V \ {e})
let rec min p sup S0 =
Fig. 3. Annotated prototype of min, where V is the return value
for p(sup∪∪r0) to hold. Second, recurse on r0 using sup∪
(note: , not 0) as the support set. The returned set r is a
minimal subset of r0 that is necessary for p(sup ∪  ∪ r) to
hold. Finally, return  ∪ r, which is a minimal subset of S0
for p(sup ∪  ∪ r) to hold.
Figure 2 gives a precise definition of this algorithm. To find
a minimal subset of S that satisfies p, min is initially called
with an empty support set ([]) and S.
Theorem 1 (Correct) Suppose that S is nonempty, p(S) is
true, and p(∅) is false.
1) min p [] S terminates.
2) Let S̄ = min p [] S. Then p(S̄) is true, and for each
e ∈ S̄, p(S̄ \ {e}) is false.
Proof: The first claim is easy to prove: each level of
recursion operates on a finite nonempty set that is smaller
than the set in the calling context.
For the second claim, we make an inductive argument of
correctness. We prove first that p(S̄) is true. We then prove
that for each e ∈ S̄, p(S̄ \ {e}) is false. To prove these
claims, we prove that five assertions are inductive for min.
These assertions are summarized as function preconditions and
function postconditions of min in Figure 3. Throughout the
proof, let V = min p sup S0 be the return value.
For the first part of the second claim, we establish the
following invariants:
1) p(sup ∪ S0)
2) p(sup ∪ V )
Invariant (1) is a function precondition of min; invariant
(2) is a function postcondition of min. Hence, the inductive
argument for (1) establishes that it always holds upon entry
to min, while the inductive argument for (2) establishes that
it always holds upon return of min.
Invariants (1) and (2) are proved simultaneously. For the
base case of (1), note that p(∅ ∪ S) = p(S), which is true by
assumption. For the inductive case, consider that p(sup ∪ 0)
and p(sup∪r0) are checked before the first two recursive calls;
that sup ∪ r0 ∪ 0 = sup ∪S0 for the third recursive call; and
that p(sup ∪ r0 ∪ ) is true by invariant (2).
For the base case of invariant (2), we know at the first
return of min that p(sup ∪ S0) from invariant (1), and V =
S0. For the inductive case, consider that (2) holds at the next
two returns by the inductive hypothesis; and that at the fourth
return, p(sup ∪ ∪ r) holds by the inductive hypothesis of the
prior line.
In the first call to min in minimal, sup = ∅; hence, p(S̄) =
p(∅ ∪ S̄) = true by invariant (2).
To prove that S̄ is minimal (that for each e ∈ S̄, p(S̄ \ {e})
is false) for the second part of the second claim, consider the
following invariants:
3) V ⊆ S0
4) ¬p(sup)
5) ¬p(sup ∪ V \ {e}) for e ∈ V
Invariant (4) is a function precondition, and invariants (3) and
(5) are function postconditions.
For invariant (3), note for the base case that the first return
of min returns V = S0 itself; that the next two returns hold
by inductive hypothesis; that  ⊆ 0 and r ⊆ r0 by inductive
hypothesis; and, thus, that V =  ∪ r ⊆ 0 ∪ r0 = S0.
For the base case of invariant (4), consider that ¬p(∅) by
assumption. For the inductive case, consider that the first two
recursive calls have the same sup as in the calling context
and thus (4) holds by inductive hypothesis; that at the third
recursive call, ¬p(sup ∪ r0); and that at the fourth recursive
call, ¬p(sup∪0) and, from (3), that  ⊆ 0, so that ¬p(sup∪)
follows from monotonicity of p.
For the base case of invariant (5), consider that at the first
return, ¬p(sup) by invariant (4). Hence, the one element of
S0 is necessary. The next two returns hold by the inductive
hypothesis. For the final return, we know by the inductive
hypothesis that ¬p(sup ∪  ∪ r \ {e}) for e ∈ r; hence, all
of r is necessary. Additionally, from the inductive hypothesis,
¬p(sup ∪ r0 ∪  \ {e}) for e ∈ , and ¬p(sup ∪ r0 ∪  \ {e})
implies that ¬p(sup ∪ r ∪  \ {e}) by monotonicity of p and
because r ⊆ r0 by invariant (3); hence, all of  is necessary.
In the first call to min at minimal, sup = ∅ and V = S̄;
hence, ¬p(S̄ \ {e}) for e ∈ S̄ from invariant (5).
Theorem 2 (Upper Bound) Let S̄ = min p [] S. Discovering
S̄ requires making O
(
(|S̄| − 1) + |S̄| lg |S||S̄|
)
queries to p.
Proof: Suppose that |S̄| = 2k and |S| = n2k for
some k, n > 0. Each element of S̄ induces one divergence
at some level in the recursion. At worst, these divergences
occur evenly distributed at the beginning, inducing |S̄| separate
binary searches over sets of size |S||S̄| . Hence, |S̄| − 1 calls
to min diverge, while |S̄| lg |S||S̄| calls behave like in a binary
search. Noting that each call results in at most two queries
to p, we have the claimed upper bound in this special case,
which is also an upper bound for the general case. (Adding
sufficient “dummy” elements to construct the special case does
not change the asymptotic bound.)
For studying the lower bound on the complexity of the
problem, suppose that S has precisely one minimal satisfying
subset.
Theorem 3 (Lower Bound) Any algorithm for determin-
ing the minimal satisfying subset S̄ of S must make
Ω
(






Proof: For the linear component, |S̄|, consider deciding
whether S̄ is indeed minimal. Since all that is known is that p
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let rec min f sup S0 =
if |S0| = 1
then (sup, S0)
else let 0, r0 = split S0 in
let v, C = f(sup ∪ 0) in
if v
then min f (sup ∩ C) (0 ∩ C)
else let v, C = f(sup ∪ r0) in
if v
then min f (sup ∩C) (r0 ∩ C)
else let C,  = min f (sup ∪ r0) 0 in
let sup = sup ∩C in
let r0 = r0 ∩ C in
let C, r = min f (sup ∪ ) r0 in
(sup ∩ C, ( ∩ C) ∪ r)
let minimal f S =
let , S0 = min f [] S in S0
Fig. 4. Optimal minimal with additional information
is monotone over S, the information that p(S0) is false does
not reveal any information about p(S1) when S1 \ S0 = ∅.
Therefore, p must be queried for each of the |S̄| immediate
strict subsets of S̄.
For the other component, consider that any algorithm must
be able to distinguish among C(|S|, |S̄|) = |S|!|S̄|!(|S|−|S̄|)!
possible results using only queries to p. Thus, the height of a
decision tree must be at least lgC(|S|, |S̄|). Using Stirling’s
approximation,
lg |S|!|S̄|!(|S|−|S̄|)! ≥ lg |S|! − lg |S̄|! − lg(|S| − |S̄|)!














Hence, the algorithm is in some sense optimal. However, a
set can have a number of minimal subsets exponential in its
size. In this situation, the lower bound analysis does not apply.
In practice, one can often glean more information when
executing the predicate p than just whether it is satisfied by the
given set. For example, a decision procedure for propositional
satisfiability (a “SAT solver”) can return an unsatisfiable core.
Hence, if ψ ⇒ c holds (ψ∧¬c is unsatisfiable), the procedure
might return a subclause d  c such that ψ ⇒ d also holds.
However, d need not be minimal. The algorithm of Figure 4
incorporates this extra information. Rather than a predicate p,
it accepts a function f that returns two values: f(S) returns
the same truth value as p(S); and if p(S) is true, it also returns
a subset S0  S such that p(S0) holds. This subset is used
to prune sets appropriately. Additionally, min returns both the




We implemented our analysis in O’Caml. We discuss im-
portant elements of our implementation.
1) SAT Solver: We instrumented Z-Chaff version
“2004.11.15 Simplified” [10] to return original unit clauses
that are leaves of the implication graph to aid in computing
minimal implicates. We also refined its memory usage to allow
tens of thousands of incremental calls. For parallel executions,
we tuned Z-chaff to randomize some of its choices.
Conversion to CNF is minimized by caching the CNF
version of the transition system within the SAT solver. Also,
multiple versions of the transition relation are stored; each
version corresponds to a particular slicing of the relation
according to the one-step cone of influence.
2) Depth-First Search: Our implementation takes a depth-
first approach: if it fails to find an inductive clause excluding
a CTI, it focuses on this subgoal before again considering the
rest of the given property.
3) Parallel Algorithm: Each process works mostly indepen-
dently, relying on the randomness of the SAT solver to focus
on different regions of the possible state space of the system.
Upon discovery of an inductive clause, a process reports it
to a central server and receives all other inductive clauses
discovered by other processes since its last report. Because of
the depth-first treatment of counterexample states, a process
can report that a clause is inductive under the assumption that
subgoal states are unreachable. If this assumption is incorrect,
the process eventually discovers a counterexample trace. Oth-
erwise, it eventually justifies this assumption with additional
inductive clauses. However, other processes may finish before
receiving these additional clauses. Hence, because only the last
process to terminate receives all clauses, it is the only process
that is guaranteed to have an inductive strengthening of the
safety property.
B. Benchmarks
1) PicoJava II Set: We applied our analysis to the PicoJava
II microprocessor benchmark set, previously studied in [11]–
[13]. Each benchmark asserts a safety property about the
instruction cache unit (ICU) — which manages the instruction
cache, prefetches instructions, and partially decodes instruc-
tions — but includes the implementation of both the ICU
and the instruction folding unit (IFU), which parses the byte
stream from the instruction queue into instructions and divides
them into groups for execution within a cycle. Including the
IFU increases the number of variables in the cone-of-influence
(COI) and complicates the combinatorial logic. Hence, for
example, a static COI analysis is unhelpful. Of the 20 bench-
marks, proof-based abstraction solved 18 [11] (it exhausted
the available 512MB of memory on problems PJ17 and PJ18),
and interpolation-based model checking solved 19 [12], [13],
each within their allotted times of 1000 seconds on 930MHz
machines.
2) VIS Set: The second set of benchmarks are from the
VIS distribution [14]. We applied the analysis to several valid
properties of models that are difficult for standard k-induction
(although easy for standard BDD-based model checking) [9].
k-induction with strengthening fails on PETERSON and HEAP
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TABLE I
RESULTS FOR ONE PROCESS
Name COI Clauses SAT queries Time Mem (MB)
PJ2 306 6 (2) 202 (64) 38s (3s) 212 (9)
PJ3 306 6 (3) 201 (78) 37s (3s) 213 (9)
PJ5 88 159 (27) 12K (3.4K) 30s (9s) 50 (3)
PJ6 318 414 (85) 32K (7.5K) 1h30m (22m) 589 (39)
PJ7 67 63 (9) 4K (1K) 10s (2s) 41 (3)
PJ8 90 70 (8) 3.5K (.8K) 13s (3s) 43 (3)
PJ9 46 27 (5) 1K (.2K) 4s (1s) 35 (2)
PJ10 54 6 (3) 213 (110) 6s (1s) 48 (1)
PJ13 352 8 (6) 234 (149) 2m45s (1m9s) 379 (15)
PJ15 353 145 (68) 6K (3.5K) 30m (17m) 493 (79)
PJ16 290 241 (186) 18K (22K) 50m (1h10m) 539 (96)
PJ17 211 1.2K (153) 337K (51K) 16h20m (3h) 1250 (110)
PJ18 143 740 (152) 91K (23K) 2h40m (50m) 673 (83)
PJ19 52 83 (11) 4K (.4K) 11m (5m) 237 (31)
PC1 93 7 (4) 170 (105) 2m48s (1m) 360 (12)
PC2 91 3 (0) 42 (1) 51s (4s) 335 (1)
PC5 91 3 (0) 42 (1) 53s (4s) 335 (1)
PC6 91 9 (4) 229 (109) 3m25s (1m18s) 377 (13)
PC10 91 21 (10) 598 (260) 5m35s (1m47s) 370 (8)
HEAP 30 2.6K (237) 58K (60K) 4h20m (45m) 330 (25)
PET 16 4 (0) 140 (11) 2s (0s) 44 (0)




















Fig. 5. Time for multiple processes
within 1800 seconds; but BDD-based model checking requires
at most a few seconds for each [9].
C. Results
Table I reports results for executing one process on one
processor of a 4×1.8GHz computer with 8GB of available
memory. The analysis ran 16 times on each benchmark: Table I
reports the number of variables in the cone of influence and the
mean and standard deviation (in format mean (std. dev.)) for
the number of discovered clauses, the number of SAT queries
made, the required time, and the peak memory usage. Results
are reported only for the nontrivial benchmarks: properties of
benchmarks 0, 1, 4, 11, 12, and 14 of the PicoJava II set
and benchmarks 3, 4, 7, 8, and 9 of the VIS PPC60x 2 set
are inductive. The PicoJava II benchmarks are labeled PJx;
the others are VIS benchmarks. All 20 of the PicoJava II
benchmarks were solved; three required more than one hour.
Figure 5 reports results as a log-log plot for analyzing
PicoJava II benchmarks 6, 17, and 18 and VIS benchmark
HEAP with multiple processes on a cluster of computers with
4×1.8GHz processors and 8GB of memory. Results for one
processor are the means from Table I. Times for 32 processes
are as follows: PJ6, 8m; PJ17, 70m; PJ18, 9m; and HEAP, 6m.
PJ17 completed in 50m with 60 processes. All benchmarks
completed within one hour with some number of processes.
The plot suggests that time decreases roughly linearly with
more processes, but only HEAP trades processes for time
almost perfectly, possibly because it requires the most clauses.
Suboptimal scaling results from generating redundant clauses.
VI. RELATED WORK
A. Qualitative Comparisons
We compare the characteristics of several safety analyses:
bounded model checking (BMC) [15], interpolation-based
model checking (IMC) [12], [13], k-induction (kI) [7]–[9],
[16], [17], predicate abstraction with refinement (CEGAR)
[18], [19], and our analysis (FSIS). These analyses are fun-
damentally based on computing an inductive set that excludes
all error states; they consider the property to prove during
the computation; and they use a SAT solver as the main
computational resource.
We now consider their differences.
1) Abstraction: IMC and CEGAR compute successively
finer approximations to the transition relation. Each approxi-
mation causes a certain set of states to be deemed reachable.
When this set includes an error state, IMC increments the k
associated with its postcondition operator, solving larger BMC
problems, while CEGAR learns a separating predicate. In con-
trast, BMC, kI, and FSIS operate on the full transition relation.
kI strengthens by requiring counterexamples to induction to
be ever longer paths. FSIS generalizes from CTIs to inductive
clauses to exclude portions of the state space.
2) Use of SAT Solver: BMC, IMC, and kI pose relatively
few but difficult SAT problems in which the transition relation
is unrolled many times. CEGAR and FSIS pose many simple
SAT problems in which the transition relation is not unrolled.
3) Intermediate Results: Each major iteration of IMC and
CEGAR produces an inductive set that is informative even
when it is not strong enough to prove the property. Each
successive iteration of FSIS produces a stronger formula that
excludes states that cannot be reached without previously vio-
lating the property. Intermediate iterations of BMC and kI are
not useful, although exceptions include forms of strengthening,
which we discuss in greater depth below [7]–[9], [17].
4) Parallelizable: Only FSIS is natural to make parallel.
The difficulty of subproblems grows with successive iterations
in BMC, IMC, and kI so that parallelizing across iterations is
not useful. Each iteration of CEGAR depends on previously
learned predicates. For these analyses, parallelization must be
implemented at a lower level, perhaps in the SAT solver.
Differences suggest ways to combine techniques. For ex-
ample, the key methods of FSIS and kI can be combined, and
FSIS can serve as the model checker for CEGAR.
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B. Other Related Work
Blocking clauses are used in SAT-based unbounded model
checking [5]. Their discovery is refined to produce prime
blocking clauses, requiring at worst as many SAT calls as
literals [6]. Our minimal algorithm requires asymptotically
fewer SAT calls. A similar algorithm has been proposed in
a different context [20], but it handles only sets containing
precisely one minimal satisfying subset.
Strengthening based on under-approximating the states that
can reach a violating state s is applied in the context of
k-induction [7]–[9], [17]. Quantifier-elimination [7], ATPG-
based computation of the n-level preimage of s [8], and
SAT-based preimage computation [9] are used to perform the
strengthening. Inductive generalization can eliminate exponen-
tially more states than preimage-based approaches.
VII. DISCUSSION
Let us consider the methods of this paper more generally.
The fundamental idea is to generalize from counterexamples to
induction (CTIs) to simple inductive invariants. Together, the
set of simple inductive invariants strengthens the specification
to be inductive. Limiting the form of invariants controls
computational costs, while using CTIs focuses the analysis on
the safety specification. The structure of the analysis allows a
parallel implementation.
Two questions are immediate. What are the CTIs? What
is the abstract domain for invariant generation? When the
invariant generation is based on propagation, as in this paper,
these questions are linked: the abstract domain should be
conjunctive with respect to the CTI so that the best over-
approximation to the CTI in the domain is sufficiently precise.
For example, in FSIS, the CTIs are (partial) states that
can lead to violations of the given property; and the domain
consists of clauses of system variables. Clauses are conjunctive
with respect to states like CTIs that ought to be unreachable.
We thus start with Π and conjoin invariant clauses to exclude
error states until CTIs no longer exist.
As another example, consider the dual analysis in which the
set of reachable states is grown until it is inductive without
including any ¬Π-states. Now, the CTIs are (partial) states
that are reachable in one step from the currently reachable
set; and the abstract domain is cubes, which are conjunctions
of literals. Hence, the invariant cubes are combined through
disjunction to grow the reachable set. Each round of invariant
generation discovers a minimal inductive subcube of the cube
defined by the CTI that includes only Π-states.
In another application, we explored inductive generalization
from CTIs to affine inequalities [21]. In the domain of the
analysis, invariant generation is not based on propagation.
Once the form of the CTI and the abstract domain are
fixed, one desires to find a greatest inductive generalization
to each CTI. Standard techniques suggest how to perform one
direction of propagation in the abstract domain [2]. However,
the other direction must suffer from the nondeterminism
inherent in over- (under-) approximating in a disjunctive (con-
junctive) domain, so that a greatest inductive generalization
to the CTI need not be unique. For example, implicate
is nondeterministic; and in the dual analysis, computing a
best implicant is nondeterministic. The function minimal of
Section IV-B is a general operator for performing forward
(backward) propagation in disjunctive (conjunctive) domains.
This general perspective on the ideas of this paper suggests
further work in the form of exploring other domains. Addi-
tionally, we intend to combine the method with k-induction.
Finally, our analysis is motivated by a classically deductive
approach to verification [1]. We are exploring analyses for
other classes of temporal properties that are also motivated by
classically deductive techniques.
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Abstract— We present a formulation of retiming to minimize 
the number of registers in a design by iterating a maximum 
network flow problem. The retiming returned will be the 
optimum one, which involves the minimum amount of register 
movement. Existing methods solve this problem as an instance of 
minimum-cost network flow, an asymptotically and practically 
more difficult problem than maximum flow. Furthermore, 
because all flows are unitary, the problem can be simplified to 
binary marking. Our algorithm has a worst-case bound of 
O(R2E), where R is the number of registers and E the number of 
pair-wise connections. We demonstrate on a set of circuits that 
our formulation is 5x faster than minimum-cost-based methods.  
 
Index Terms—Retiming, Sequential Verification, State 
Minimization, Maximum Flow. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ETIMING [13] moves registers over combinational nodes 
in a logic network, preserving output functionality and 
logic structure. Retiming can target a number of objectives: (i) 
minimize the delay of the circuit (min-delay), (ii) minimize the 
number of registers under a delay constraint (constrained min-
register), or (iii) minimize the number of registers 
(unconstrained min-register). Numerous approaches have 
been proposed to achieve these goals [13]-[18], with most of 
the emphasis on the first two objectives.  
In this paper, we focus on unconstrained min-register 
retiming, which has several applications in logic synthesis and 
verification. In synthesis, minimizing the number of registers 
can save area and power or be used to ameliorate local 
congestion. Even if delay constraints are ignored, often any 
timing violations can be corrected with logic sizing, 
combinational resynthesis, or intentional clock skewing [8]. In 
verification, min-register retiming minimizes the number of 
state variables [12], which reduces the size of the sequential 
verification problem and has been demonstrated to reduce the 
overall difficulty [3]. This may be critical for proof 
completion. 
Although retiming problems are traditionally expressed as 
general linear programs, they can be solved efficiently as 
minimum-cost network circulation problems using suitable 
algorithms. Instead, we propose a retiming method that is 
based on iterated binary maximum network flow, which is a 
computationally easier problem to solve. The number of 
iterations required appears to be quite small in practice. 
Because the result of each iteration is strictly better than the 
previous one, the computation can be bounded and still result 
in an improvement. It was found experimentally that the first 
iteration accounts on average for 90% of the total reduction in 
the number of registers. This can be used to trade quality for 
runtime when a problem is large or when fast computation is 
critical. 
To support these claims, we provide experimental results on 
moderately-sized industrial benchmarks and a few larger 
artificial ones. They demonstrate the efficiency of the new 
algorithm: the optimum result can be generated for circuits 
with more than a million gates in less than a minute and much 
faster than using existing methods. On pre-optimized 
benchmark circuits, the average reduction in register count 
was 11%, ranging between 0% and 63%. 
An important feature of our algorithm is that it always 
returns the minimum-register retiming that is closest to the 
current position of the registers. If a register in the input 
circuit cannot be retimed to minimize the total register count, 
it is not touched. This simplifies the computation of the initial 
states and minimizes the total perturbation.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the 
background information and existing approaches to minimum-
area retiming. Section III describes the new algorithm. Section 
IV reports experimental results. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A circuit is modeled as a directed graph G=<V,E> whose 
vertices V correspond to logic gates and directed edges E 
correspond to wires connecting the gates, decomposed into 
pair-wise connections from gate outputs to inputs. The 
circuit’s external connections are represented by additional 
primary input (PI) and primary output (PO) vertices. The 
terms network, graph, and circuit are used interchangeably in 
this paper. 
A node has zero or more fan-ins, i.e. nodes that are driving 
this node, and zero or more fan-outs, i.e. nodes driven by this 
node. The transitive fan-out of a vertex v is a subset of all 
nodes of the network reachable through the fan-out edges from 
v, captured by the function TFO(v): V→2V. 
A combinational frame of the circuit is comprised of the 
acyclic network between the register outputs / PIs and register 
inputs / POs. An example of this is illustrated in Figure 1; the 
inputs (the register outputs) lie on the left, and the outputs (the 
register inputs) on the right. The registers are duplicated for 
the ease of illustration. 
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The problem of retiming is to relocate the registers in a 
circuit to optimize some circuit characteristic while preserving 
output functionality (and optionally meeting some additional 
constraints). The repositioning is captured by a retiming lag 
function r(v):V → Z  that describes the number of registers 
moved backward over each combinational node. There are 
several formulations of the retiming problem, but for the 
purposes of this paper, we utilize the linear program (LP) in 
Equations 1-2 from [13]. wi(e) is the initial number of registers 
present on edge e. 
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The dual of this LP is a minimum-cost network circulation 
problem and can be solved efficiently using specialized 
algorithms. Using the method described by Goldberg [9], the 





 )log()2(log VCEVVEO  worst-case time, where C is the 
maximum cost on any edge. The number of vertices and edges 
in the corresponding network problem is proportional to the 
size of the combinational circuit. 
After a retiming has been determined, an equivalent set of 
initial values must be computed for the registers. If no such 
initial state exists, the particular retiming must be rejected or 
the circuit otherwise altered. We discuss consequences for this 
computation but refer to [19] for its details. 
III. MIN-REG RETIMING ALGORITHM 
We introduce an algorithm for optimum unconstrained 
minimum-register retiming that is based on an iterative 
maximum network flow problem. This is motivated by the 
observation that computing the maximum flow through a 
network is an asymptotically and practically easier problem 
than determining the minimum-cost circulation. Our algorithm 
requires repeated iteration, but for practical circuits, the 
number of iterations is typically quite small. 
A. Single Iteration 
The core of the algorithm consists of minimizing the 
number of registers within a single combinational frame. Let 
us consider only the paths through the combinational logic that 
lie between two registers (thus temporarily ignoring the 
primary inputs and outputs). The current position of the 
registers clearly forms a complete cut through the network, 
immediately at its inputs. The width of the cut is the initial 
number of registers. 
Consider retiming the registers in the forward direction 
through the circuit. As the registers are retimed over the 
combinational nodes, the corresponding cut moves forward 
through the network and may grow or shrink in width as 
registers are replicated and/or shared as dictated by the graph 
structure. In the initial circuit, it is evident that any path in the 
combined graph passes through exactly one register, and any 
valid retiming must preserve this property. If this were not the 
case, the latency of that path would be altered and the 
sequential behavior of the circuit changed. 
The problem of minimizing the number of registers by 
retiming them to new positions within the scope of the 
combinational frame is equivalent to finding a minimum width 
cut. This is the dual of the maximum network flow problem, 
for which efficient solutions exist. To construct the flow 
problem, the flow source is connected to all register outputs, 
and the register inputs are connected to the flow sink. For 
now, the capacity of all edges is assumed to be one.  
Solving the general maximum flow problem using the 





 )2log( EVVEO  in the worst case. Alternatively, the 
classical augmenting-path-based methods (e.g. [6]) are 
bounded by the maximum length of an augmenting path times 
the maximum flow, U: O(UE). Because the flow constraints in 
our problem are of unit capacity, the width of the input to the 
graph establishes a worst-case bound of O(RE), where R is the 
initial number of registers. The worst-case bound on the 
maximum flow problem using either the preflow- or 
augmenting-path-based algorithm is therefore asymptotically 
faster than the best known bound on the minimum-cost flow 
problem on an identical graph structure. 
Once the maximum flow has been established, we have 
available the residual graph that describes the remaining edge 
capacities with respect to this flow. The residual graph is used 
to generate a corresponding minimum cut. Via duality, the 
width of this minimum cut is exactly the volume of the 
maximum flow and the flow through the saturated edges 
crossing the cut. To determine its location, the vertices in the 
network are partitioned into two sets: S, those that are 
reachable in the residual graph with additional flow from the 
source, and R, those that are not. Generating this partition is 
O(E) in the worst case. The partition must be complete cut, 
because there can exist no additional flow path from the 
source to the sink if the maximum has already been assigned. 
For every edge u v→  such that ( ) ( )u S v R∈ ∧ ∈ , a register 
must be placed on the output of the gate associated with u. The 
registers are removed from their current locations and placed 
Fig. 1. An example of the flow problem for a small circuit. The combinational 
elements are light grey; the initial positions of the registers lie to the left, and 
their inputs are replicated on the right. This is also an example of a network 
where the minimum-cut in the directed graph is not a valid retiming: the graph 
can be completely cut with exactly two registers (at the outputs of c1 and c4), 
but this results in a path (R3→R1’) with altered sequential latency. 
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on the graphs edges that cross the minimum cut. 
There may exist multiple cuts of minimum width, but this 
method always generates the one that is unambiguously 
closest to the source node. This results in the minimal 
movement of the registers, simplifying the initial state 
computation and minimizing the design perturbation. 
However, as stated, this procedure may generate an illegal 
retiming. A cut in a directed graph only guarantees that all 
paths in the graph are cut at least once. This is a necessary but 
not sufficient condition for the cut to be a valid retiming. We 
seek the minimum cut in the graph such that all paths are 
crossed exactly once. Figure 1 illustrates an example of this 
problem. The network flow problem must be altered to 
eliminate the possibility that a path is crossed more than once.  
Reverse edges with unbounded capacity are added in the 
direction opposite to the constrained edges in the original 
network. These additional paths may increase the maximum 
flow (and therefore the size of the minimum cut) but guarantee 
that the resulting minimum cut will correspond to a legal 
retiming. For a path in the original graph to cross the finite-
width cut more than once from S R→ , there must be at least 
one edge that crosses from R S→ . If the unbounded reverse 
edges are also present, this would imply an infinite-capacity 
edge from S R→ , thus violating the finite cut-width 
assumption and ensuring that such a cut will not be generated. 
It is also needed to account for the sharing of registers at 
nodes with multiple fan-outs. This requires another simple 
modification to the network flow problem. Each circuit node 
is decomposed into two vertices: a receiver of all of the former 
fan-in arcs and an emitter of all of the former fan-out arcs. The 
flow constraints are removed from these edges, and a single 
edge with a unit flow constraint is inserted from the receiver to 
the emitter. Then, to model fan-out (as opposed to fan-in) 
sharing, the reverse edges are connected between adjacent 
receivers. As described above, the unconstrained edges can 
not participate in the minimum cut; only the internal edge is 
available to make a unit contribution to the cut-width. Each 
node will therefore require at most one register regardless of 
its fan-out degree. This idea can also be extended to model 
fan-in sharing as in [1]. 
The final network for computing the maximum flow 
computation is depicted in Figure 2.  
The unitary flow constraints can also be used to simplify the 
implementation of the maximum flow solver such that the 
flow network of Figure 2 need not be explicitly built. Both the 
preflow- and augmenting-path-based techniques can be 
performed directly on the original circuit with binary marking. 
Because the flows on the non-unit arcs are unconstrained, they 
need only be implicitly maintained with predecessor pointers. 
 In summary, a single iteration of our retiming algorithm 
involves computing the maximum flow through the 
combinational frame, identifying the unique topologically 
closest minimum cut, and moving the register boundary to the 
new location. 
 
B.  Primary Inputs and Outputs 
The primary inputs and outputs (PIOs) can be treated in 
different ways, depending on the application. The allowed 
locations of the minimum cut and the subsequent 
insertion/removal of registers can be adjusted to either fix or 
selectively alter the sequential behavior of the circuit.  
In synthesis, the relative latencies at all of the PIOs is 
assumed to be invariant. In verification applications, it is not 
necessary to preserve the synchronization of the inputs and 
outputs. It may be desirable to borrow or loan registers to the 
environment individually for each PIO if the result is a net 
decrease in the total register count.  
To allow register borrowing, the external connections 
should be left dangling. Registers will be donated to the 
environment if the minimum cut extends past the dangling 
primary outputs (POs); conversely, registers will be borrowed 
if the minimum cut appears in the transitive fan-out region of 
the dangling primary inputs (PIs). The inclusion of this region 
introduces additional flow paths and allows additional 
possibilities for minimizing the total register count. 
To disallow desynchronization with the environment, a host 
node and normalization can be employed, or alternatively, the 
flow problem suitably modified: the POs are connected to the 
sink and the transitive fan-out of the PIs is blocked from 
participating in the minimum cut. All paths through the 
combinational network that originate from a PI have a 
sequential latency that must remain at zero; inserting a register 
anywhere in the TFO({PIs}) would alter this. To exclude this 
Fig. 2. The circuit hypergraph around node N in (i) is expanded to form the
digraph network flow problem (ii) to compute a valid forward retiming with 
maximal fan-out sharing. Each of the gates in (i) is replaced with a pair of 
dark grey nodes in (ii) and the flow arcs as illustrated. The capacity of each 




region, one of two methods can be used: (i) temporarily 
redirecting to the sink all edges e=(u,v) where v∈TFO({PIs}), 
or (ii) replacing the constrained flow arcs in this fan-out cone 
with unconstrained ones, thus preventing these nodes from 
participating in the minimum cut. Both methods restrict the 
insertion or deletion of registers in the invalid region. 
Disallowing desynchronization during verification may be 
motivated by the need to control complexity.  Because register 
borrowing requires the initial values of the new registers to be 
constrained to those reachable in the original circuit, it is 
necessary to construct additional combinational logic for 
computing the initial state. If the size of this logic grows 
undesirably large, register borrowing can be turned off at any 
point for any individual inputs or outputs. 
C. Multiple Iterations 
This section describes how to compute the globally 
optimum min-register retiming by iteratively applying the 
maximum-flow algorithm of Section III.B.  
Thus far, we have only considered the forward retiming of 
registers in the circuit. It is sufficient to consider only one 
direction if the circuit is strongly connected (i.e. through the 
use of a host node and normalization). However, in general, 
the optimum minimum-register retiming requires both forward 
and backward moves. The procedure for a single iteration of 
backward retiming is essentially identical, except that it 
computes the maximum flow from the register inputs 
(sources) to the primary inputs and register outputs (sinks). 
The overall algorithm consists of two iterative phases: 
forward and backward. The procedure is outlined in Algorithm 
1. In each phase, the single-frame optimization is repeated 
until the number of registers reaches a fix-point. In terms of 
the retiming lag function, each node’s lag is either unchanged 
or changed by one in each iteration.  
At no point during retiming is it necessary to unroll the 
circuit or alter the combinational logic; only the registers are 
moved by extracting them from their initial positions and 
inserting them in the their final ones. This modification does 
change the definition of the combinational frame and the 
connections to the flow source and sink.  
The ordering of the two phases (forward and backward) 
doesn’t affect the number of registers in the result, but we 
chose to perform forward retiming first because the path of 
moves towards the min-register retiming is in general not 
unique. This approach reduces the amount of logic that has to 
be retimed in the backward direction, thereby reducing the 
difficulty of computing a new initial state [19].  
D. Proof of Correctness 
Given a normalized retiming lag function r(v): V → Z 0,+, 
consider unrolling the sequential circuit by n cycles, where 
max ( )
V
n  r v
∀
> . This corresponds to stacking multiple 
combination frames, as illustrated in Figure 3.  
The positions of the registers of the reference cycle after 
any retiming r(v) can be expressed as a cut C in the edges of 
this unrolled circuit. The elements of C are the retimed register 
positions. The unretimed cut, Cinit, (such that r(v)=0) lies at the 
base of the unrolled circuit. The size of this cut, |C|, is the 
number registers post-retiming, or equivalently, the number of 
combinational nodes with some fan-out crossing the cut. 
A cut C is a valid retiming if every path through the 
combinational network passes through it exactly once. This 
implies for any two registers R1, R2∈C that R1∩TFO(R2)=∅ 
and vice versa. If this were not the case, additional latency 
would be introduced and the functionality of the circuit would 
be altered. 
Consider an optimal minimum register retiming and its 
corresponding cut Cmin. While there exist many such cuts, 
assume Cmin to be the one that lies strictly forward of the initial 
register positions is topologically closest to Cinit. It can be 
shown with Lemma 1 that there is one unambiguously closest 
cut. 
ALGORITHM 1: UNCONSTRAINED MIN-REGISTER RETIMING
 
 1  while(improvement) {  // forward 
 2    init forward retiming flow network 
 3    mark PI restricted locations 
 4    compute maximum flow 
 5    derive nearest minimum cut 
 6    move registers to cut  
 7  } 
 8  while(improvement) { // backward 
 9    init backward retiming flow network 
10    mark PO restricted locations 
11    compute maximum flow 
12    derive nearest minimum cut 
13    move registers to cut  
14  } 
15  compute initial states 
 
 
Fig. 3. The circuit in (i) is unrolled three times into (ii). Each copy comprises 
a combinational frame, the first of which is dark gray. The inter-frame register 
boundaries are labeled with the corresponding frame number. The globally 
minimum width retiming cut of the registers in the reference frame R0 is 
illustrated by the bold line. Because the minimum width retiming cut stretches 
across multiple frames, its computation would therefore require multiple 
iterations of our algorithm. 
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Theorem 1: Upon termination of our algorithm, the 
resulting cut is exactly Cmin. 
Proof. Our algorithm iteratively computes the nearest cut of 
minimum width reachable within one combinational frame 
and terminates when there is no change in the result. Let the 
resulting cut after iteration i be Ci. The cut Ci at termination 
will be identical to Cmin if the following two conditions are 
met. 
Condition 1. No register in Ci lies topologically forward of 
any register in Cmin. 
Condition 2. After each iteration, |Ci+1|<|Ci| unless Ci=Cmin. 
 
Lemma 1. Let Ci and Cj be two valid retiming cuts, and     
{si, ti} and {sj, tj} be a partitioning of each: 
( ) ( )s t C s t∪ = ∧ ∩ = ∅ . Also for any path p, 
( )i jp s p s∩ ⇔ ∩  and ( )i jp t p t∩ ⇔ ∩ . If this is the case, 
the cuts {si, tj} and {sj, ti} are also valid retimings. 
One example of such a partitioning is induced by 
topological order.  If the points of intersection of the cuts with 
a path p are Ri∈Ci and Rj∈Cj, we can assign the registers to s 
if TFO( )j iR R∈ , and t otherwise.  The s sets will include the 
registers that are topologically closer in Ci than Cj; the t sets 
will include the registers that are in both sets or topologically 
closer in Cj than Ci. 
If a given p crosses Ci at Ri∈si, it may not cross any other 
register in ti (from the definition of a partition).  It also may 
not contain any register in tj (from the definition of the sets).  
The cut {si, tj} has no more than one register on any path.  
If a p does not intersect si, then we know that it must cross 
at some Ri∈ti (from the definition of a partition).  It also must 
then intersect some register in tj (from the definition of the 
sets). The cut {si, tj} has at least one register on any path. 
Therefore, {si, tj} is crossed by every path exactly once and 
is a valid retiming.  Similarly for {sj, ti}. 
 
 Proof of Condition 1. Consider a cut Ci that violates 
Condition 1. Let {si, ti} be a partition of Ci and {smin, tmin} be a 
partition of Cmin such that si is the subset of registers in Ci that 
lie topologically forward of the subset smin of the registers in 
Cmin. This is illustrated in Figure 4. By Lemma 1, we know 
that both {si, tmin} and {smin, ti} are valid cuts.  
Because a single iteration returns the closest cut of 
minimum width within a frame, this Ci={si, ti} must be strictly 
smaller than the closer {smin,ti}. This implies that |si|<|smin| and 
that min min min min{ , } { , }is  t s t C< = . This contradicts the 
assumption that Cmin is optimal, and condition 1 must be true.  
Observation 1. Retiming by an entire combinational frame 
does not change any of the register positions in the resulting 
circuit and also represents a valid retiming cut. Because a 
register is moved over every combinational node, the retiming 
lag function is universally incremented. The number of 
registers on a particular edge is a relative quantity, and the 
result is structurally identical to the original. 
 
Proof of Condition 2. We can use the minimum cut to 
generate a cut that is strictly smaller than Ci and reachable 
within a combinational frame. Consider the cut Cmin’ that is 
generated from Cmin via Observation 1 such that its deepest 
point is reachable within the combinational frame of Ci. Some 
of the retiming lags may be negative. Let {si, ti} be a partition 
of Ci and {smin, tmin} be a partition of Cmin’ such that smin are the 
deepest registers in Cmin’ that lie topologically forward of the 
subset si of the registers in Ci. smin≠∅ if Ci ≠Cmin. Via Lemma 
1, both {si, tmin} and {smin, ti} are valid cuts. 
We know that |smin|<|si|, otherwise there would be implied 
the existence of a topologically closer cut |{si, tmin}|≤Cmin. 
Therefore, the cut {smin, ti} is strictly smaller than Ci and is 
reachable within one combinational frame and would be 
returned by a single iteration of the algorithm.  Note that this 
doesn’t imply that there aren’t other smaller cuts, only that 
there must exist at least one that is strictly smaller. Therefore, 
Condition 2 must also be true.  ■ 
E. Complexity Analysis 
 As described in Section III.A, the complexity of computing 
the minimum cut in each iteration of our algorithm is O(RE). 
The maximum number of iterations can also be bounded by R 
via Condition 2 in the above proof. The total worst-case 
runtime is therefore O(R2E). While this is strictly non-
comparable to the best known bound for the equivalent 
minimum-cost network flow problem [9], the results in 
Section IV indicate that the average runtimes are smaller for 
the considered circuits. 
For the set of benchmarks that we examined, the number of 
iterations required was small: the average was 2.7 with a 
maximum of 15. Figure 5 illustrates the fraction of the total 
 


































register reduction that was contributed by each iteration. 
Almost all of the reduction in the number of registers occurs 
after the first iteration in either direction. The number of 
iterations can be bounded to a small constant to fix the total 
worst-case runtime to O(RE). 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
We applied the proposed algorithm to a suite of gate-level 
circuits derived from public-domain hardware designs [11]. 
Altera tools were used to extract and optimize the logic 
networks. This optimization may have already included 
reductions in the number of registers. These were then 
minimally preprocessed by the ABC logic synthesis package 
[2] as follows: the original hierarchical designs were (a) 
flattened, (b) structurally hashed and (c) algebraically 
balanced. From the set of 63 benchmarks, we removed one 
combinational circuit and 19 circuits whose initial register 
count was already minimum, leaving 43 circuits shown in 
Table I. 
Our algorithm was implemented in C++. The maximum 
network flow problem was internally solved using the HIPR 
package available at [10] and described in [4]. 
TABLE I: MINIMUM REGISTER RETIMING RESULTS ON REAL BENCHMARKS 
 Original Circuit Min-Delay Retiming Min-Register Retiming 
Name |AIG | A D A D T F-iter B-iter A D T 
barrel16a 397 37 11 124 4 0.02 1 0 32 11 <0.01 
barrel16 357 37 10 85 4 0.01 1 0 32 11 <0.01 
barrel32 902 70 12 166 5 0.03 1 0 64 13 <0.01 
barrel64 2333 135 14 422 5 0.06 1 0 128 14 <0.01 
mux32_16bit 1851 533 9 873 4 0.05 1 1 505 11 0.01 
mux64_16bit 3743 1046 13 1460 5 0.12 1 0 991 13 0.01 
mux8_128bit 3717 1155 7 2297 3 0.18 1 1 1029 8 <0.01 
mux8_64bit 1861 579 7 1145 3 0.07 1 1 517 8 <0.01 
nut_000 1262 326 58 393 27 0.05 1 2 312 60 <0.01 
nut_001 3179 484 93 558 57 0.08 2 2 435 109 0.03 
nut_002 873 212 24 232 10 0.02 2 2 158 25 <0.01 
nut_003 1861 265 37 304 24 0.04 3 1 228 46 0.01 
nut_004 713 185 13 213 6 0.02 2 2 164 15 <0.01 
oc_aes_core_inv 11177 669 25 669 25 0.25 1 1 658 25 0.04 
oc_aes_core 8732 402 24 402 24 0.14 1 1 394 24 <0.01 
oc_aquarius 23109 1477 207 1575 200 0.81 1 0 1473 206 0.08 
oc_ata_ocidec1 1601 269 14 275 11 0.02 1 0 268 14 <0.01 
oc_ata_ocidec2 1813 303 14 310 11 0.02 1 1 293 14 <0.01 
oc_ata_ocidec3 3957 594 14 599 13 0.06 1 1 562 19 <0.01 
oc_ata_vhd_3 3933 594 14 599 13 0.06 1 1 568 14 <0.01 
oc_ata_v 838 157 14 169 10 0.02 1 0 156 14 <0.01 
oc_cfft_1024x12 9498 1051 61 1672 26 0.91 12 1 704 346 0.70 
oc_cordic_p2r 8430 719 55 975 45 0.26 1 0 718 55 0.01 
oc_dct_slow 879 178 32 207 14 0.03 0 1 176 32 <0.01 
oc_des_perf_opt 21281 1976 15 4656 14 1.27 15 0 1015 233 1.18 
oc_fpu 16115 659 2661 1578 543 30.65 2 0 247 2712 0.12 
oc_hdlc 2221 426 14 426 13 0.03 1 3 375 17 <0.01 
oc_minirisc 1918 289 36 290 33 0.03 2 1 253 39 0.01 
oc_oc8051 10315 754 92 757 87 0.19 1 1 743 92 0.01 
oc_pci 10426 1354 46 1405 26 0.39 1 1 1308 46 0.02 
oc_rtc 1093 114 41 114 29 0.02 1 0 86 41 <0.01 
oc_sdram 860 112 13 109 12 0.02 1 0 109 12 <0.01 
oc_simple_fm_rec 2300 226 66 276 40 0.05 0 1 223 75 <0.01 
oc_vga_lcd 9086 1108 35 1126 25 0.24 2 1 1078 35 0.02 
oc_video_dct 36465 3549 60 8525 16 12.84 1 1 2305 73 0.30 
oc_video_huff_dec 1591 61 21 65 18 0.02 0 1 60 22 <0.01 
oc_video_huff_enc 1720 59 19 90 13 0.02 1 0 47 32 <0.01 
oc_wb_dma 15026 1775 19 1794 17 0.45 1 1 1751 34 0.08 
os_blowfish 9806 891 79 906 61 0.30 1 0 827 78 <0.01 
os_sdram16 1156 147 23 162 17 0.02 1 0 144 23 <0.01 
radar12 38058 3875 110 3991 56 3.71 2 3 3754 110 0.21 
radar20 75149 6001 110 6363 56 6.92 2 1 5364 110 1.34 
uoft_raytracer 145960 13079 237 16974 208 23.70 3 2 11610 537 3.76 
AVERAGE  1.0 1.0 1.41 0.66    0.89 1.56  
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Table I is divided into three groups of columns, each 
describing the characteristics of a particular retiming. The first 
section of Table I shows the statistics about the circuit with the 
registers in their initial positions. The second section describes 
the results of an incremental heuristic min-delay retiming 
algorithm [18] implemented in ABC to provide perspective on 
the area/delay tradeoffs. The third set of columns shows the 
results produced by the proposed min-register retiming 
algorithm. 
The following notation is used in the table. Columns labeled 
“A” refer to the number of registers in the network (area). 
Columns labeled “D” refer to the number of nodes on the 
longest combinational path. Columns labeled “T” refer to the 
cumulative runtime of the flow computations in seconds 
measured on 2.0Ghz Pentium Xeon. For the minimum register 
retiming algorithms, the number of forward and backward 
iterations that are required before the fix-point is reached are 
also listed (“F-iter” and “B-iter”, respectively). 
Because these benchmarks are only of moderate size, a set 
of larger artificial circuits was created by combining the 
benchmarks in Table I. These are described in Table II. As the 
number of retiming iterations required appears to be 
independent of the circuit size—probably because the 
maximum latency around any loop or from input to output is 
fairly size independent—the circuits “large1” and “large2” 
were constructed via parallel composition to preserve this 
property. The 2 and 4 million gate circuits, “larger5” and 
“larger6”, were generated similarly. In contrast, the two 
circuits “deep3” and “deep4” were built by random division 
and serial composition. 
In Table II, the results of our iterative maximum-flow-based 
algorithm are compared against a single minimum-cost-flow-
based implementation as described by [4]. The latest CS2 
package from [10] was used as the solver. In every case, the 
iterative maximum-flow-based implementation required less 
time to complete; on average, it was 5x faster. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper presented an application of a simplified 
maximum flow computation to the problem of minimizing the 
number of registers after retiming. The presented method is 
very simple, straight-forward to implement, fast, memory 
efficient, and scalable for large industrial circuits. Potential 
applications of the method include sequential synthesis and 
verification. 
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Abstract— The concept of applying partial fencing to logic 
built-in self test (LBIST) hardware structures for the purpose of 
using partially good chips is well known in the chip design 
industry. Deceptively difficult though is the task of verifying that 
any particular implementation of partial fencing logic actually 
provides the desired behavior of blocking down-stream impact of 
all signals from fenced interfaces, and also ensuring that the 
partial fencing does not inadvertently preclude any common logic 
from being fully tested.  
In this paper we discuss a case study for a verification method 
which exploits the power of formal verification to prove that any 
given partial fencing design satisfies all behavioral expectations. 
We describe the details of the verification method and discuss the 
benefits of using this approach versus using traditional 
simulation methods. We also discuss the testbenches created as 
part of applying this new method. Furthermore, we discuss the 
formal verification algorithms that were employed during 
application of the method along with the tuning that was done to 
enable efficient completion of the verification tasks at hand.   
 
 
Index Terms— fencing, formal verification, self test 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ogic Built-In Self Test (LBIST) [1],[2] is an inherent part 
of today's chip design and fabrication process. With the 
increasing density of chip die, it's now routine to 
implement multiple self contained units, cores or even systems 
within a single physical chip boundary. The most prominent 
example in the industry is multiple processor cores on a single 
CPU chip [3]. Such an example is shown in Figure 1. The so-
called  common logic in the figure comprises elements shared 
by the cores such as cache and logic for maintaining system 
coherency. With chips of this nature, running LBIST on the 
entire chip is adequate to ascertain whether the whole die is 
functional. However, to enable the use of a partially good 
chip[4] (such as a case where one or more cores are damaged 
and all the damage is contained within the boundaries of the 
damaged cores), the design must implement the concept of 
partial LBIST [5] fencing. 
Partial LBIST fencing allows for self contained areas of a 
chip to be electrically isolated from the remainder of the chip 
in cases where such areas are damaged. In this manner, a 
procedure is employed such that if the LBIST of the entire 
chip indicates damage, then partial fences can be used to 
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electrically quarantine the affected regions.  The partial LBIST 
signatures will be repeatable assuming that the remainder of 
the chip is functional and that the partial fencing is properly 
implemented. 
 
                  
                         Fig. 1.  Multiple core chip with common logic. 
 
Since the risk exists that the interfaces connecting the 
damaged regions to the remainder of the chip are electrically 
unpredictable, it is imperative that the partial fencing be 
implemented correctly. Otherwise, a single missing fencing 
gate on an interface signal could result in unpredictable 
signatures. This would in turn result in perfectly usable partial 
good chips being discarded in the fabrication process. 
There are several challenges in developing a robust and 
easy to use methodology for verifying partial LBIST fencing. 
The methodology has to scale to be applied on multiple-core 
chips with hundreds of millions of gates. This places 
restrictions on the tools that can be used and the algorithms 
that can be applied. Moreover, the methodology should not 
depend on having knowledge of the specific LBIST sequences 
used on the chip. Finally, the methodology should eliminate 
the need for verification engineers to spend significant time 
writing drivers and assertions, yet provide full coverage of the 
design to be tested.  
The need for scalability, portability, and full coverage make 
traditional approaches like simulation [6] unattractive for the 
purpose of verifying partial LBIST fencing. It has already 
been shown that proper combination of formal and semi-
formal algorithms can enable large-scale pervasive logic 
verification [7] using formal reasoning. Note however that 
prior work in this area does not  cover verification of partial 
fencing. With these motivating factors in mind, a new and 
vastly superior methodology was developed and applied to an 
IBM z-Series multi-core chip, The description and results of 
this new approach are discussed here as we present a highly 
automated, scalable, reusable, and flexible methodology that 
performs functional formal verification using sequential 
equivalence checking to verify partial LBIST fencing.  
Formal Verification of Partial Good Self-Test 
Fencing Structures 
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II. METHOD CONCEPTS 
A. Verification using Sequential Equivalence Checking 
We selected the IBM semi-formal and formal verification 
tool SixthSense [8] as our primary tool for verification. It has 
already been shown that SixthSense is highly scalable with 
ability to verify designs with more than 100,000 state elements 
in the cone of influence.  SixthSense provides various ways to 
abstract the design, including blackboxing, which is essential 
to enable application of our methodology on chip-level 
models. Moreover, SixthSense provides a wide variety of 
transformation algorithms for iterative simplification as well 
as verification algorithms for falsification and proofs. 
To ensure portability and a high degree of automation, our 
methodology uses sequential equivalence checking [9] to 
perform verification of partial LBIST fencing. The verification 
objective is to ensure that all interface signals from the 
damaged portions of the chip are properly fenced.  To set up 
the sequential equivalence checking run, we first develop two 
models of the design.  Model 1 includes the original design 
with all the fence and interface signals driven to an inactive 
state. Model 2 includes the original design with all fence 
signals driven to an active state and all interface signals driven 
to non-deterministic values. In a typical sequential 
equivalence checking run, the outputs of the two designs are 
checked for equivalence. Since we needed to ensure that 
partial LBIST fencing worked properly, we configured the 
equivalence checking run to check the Multiple Input 
Signature Registers (MISR) [2] within the LBIST portion of 
the design for equivalence.  In effect, the MISR is the output 
of LBIST as it contains the resulting signature from self-test. 
There are several advantages in using sequential equivalence 
checking for partial LBIST verification.  First of all, no 
dedicated manual effort is required to create the model or 
write assertions.  Secondly, there is no need for complex 
drivers representing input assumptions.  Third, it ensures 
portability ; the only project specific items are identification of 
interface and fence signals and the MISR registers for 
checking equivalence. Finally, equivalence checking 
algorithms may be tuned for high scalability [11]. 
B. False Failures due to Scan Chain Inversions 
It is important to understand that if inversions in any of the 
latches comprising any of the MISR scan chains are allowed, 
then it is possible for the equivalence check described earlier 
to produce false failures. Figure 2 illustrates one example of 
how this could occur. 
  
                                        
 
          Fig. 2.  Example of scan chain inversion using master-slave latches 
 
The shaded inverter in the scan path will have the effect of 
causing a “0” from the first latch to be received as a “1” on the 
scan input of the second latch. Since the Model 1 mode of 
operation is such that all fence and interface signals are driven 
to an inactive state (i.e. a logical “0” assuming positive active 
logic), this means that a “1” received by the second latch will 
subsequently be propagated into the MISR. However, since 
the same MISR bit is guaranteed to be “0” in Model 2 due to 
the fact that the fence bit is always active in Model 2, the two 
models would therefore not be equivalent. The mismatch is 
not the result of an improperly implemented fence, but is due 
solely to the scan-chain inversion. Note that this type of 
mismatch can occur only when the system is in scan mode, 
thus causing the multiplexer in Figure 2 to select scan signal S 
instead of data signal D.  
In the design used in this case study, the design under test 
(DUT) contained no scan chain inversions. Nonetheless, the 
general method described here is equipped to handle scan 
chain inversions. This can be done for example by using a 
scan-chain traversal program to identify all inverting latches in 
the scan chain and then creating a scan input override list that 
would be used by SixthSense to ensure that the scan inputs to 
all the inverting latches are always driven to an inactive state. 
Note that by overriding scan inputs, the potential exists to 
mask bugs in the implementation of the partial LBIST fencing 
logic. To avoid such problems, we propose to make use of 
ternary (0,1,X)-logic [10].  More specifically, prior to 
executing any scan input overrides, we drive X values to all 
interface signals and make use of SixthSense in ternary mode 
to check whether it is possible to bleed  X states  into  the 
Model 2 MISR. If such bleeding exists, the design bug(s) 
causing the bleeding must first be fixed before proceeding to 
override any scan inputs. 
C. Over fencing 
The intended use of partial fences is to ensure that interface 
signals from partial good interfaces do not bleed into MISRs.  
This is illustrated in the upper portion of Figure 3 where the  
AND gate in the top of the figure serves to block the interface  
signal from being propagated downstream into sequential 
logic and the MISR. However, in an improperly implemented 
design, it is possible for over fencing to exist such that a fence 
signal also blocks common logic from impacting downstream 
logic. Figure 3 shows such an over fencing situation where the 
same fence signal that is used to properly block the partial 
good interface signal is also used to block common logic  (via 
the AND gate in the bottom of the figure).   
       
              
 
                      Fig. 3.. Over fencing scenario.  
 
The result of over fencing is that it prevents self-test of 
common logic, thus allowing for the possibility that any 
hardware faults that might exist in common logic will go 
undetected. So, although MISR signatures would be repeatable 
in circumstances where there is over fencing, the overall self-























would not easily be found using traditional validation methods 
like simulation, but would be quickly found using the 
equivalence check based verification method used in this case 
study.  Note that if a design contains over fencing bugs, the 
ternary check  for X-state propagation described earlier is not 
sufficient to detect this. 
III. METHOD DESCRIPTION 
A. Method Steps 
The method steps are as follows.  Since there were no scan  
chain inversions in the design used for our case study, Steps 4, 
6, and 7 were not required.  Nonetheless, all steps for the 
general method are documented here for completeness. 
 
1. Identify all partial good interfaces for the design whose 
partial fencing structure is to be verified. Referring to 
Fig. 1, the chosen interfaces would be the signals 
connecting the cores to the common logic. For every 
interface that connects a partial good component with 
common logic, identify the various control, address and 
data signals, along with their associated fence signals. 
2. Create a wrapper whose inputs and outputs are the 
previously identified partial good interface signals. The 
wrapper schematic includes all common logic design 
components, and excludes all partial good components.  
3. Create Model 1 and Model 2 drivers. The Model 1 
driver forces all fence and interface signals to an 
inactive state. The Model 2 driver forces all fence 
signals to an active state and the interface signals are 
permitted to assume non-deterministic values.   
4. Write an explicit assertion which checks for the 
propagation of X-states into the Model 2 MISR.  Note 
that this assertion is only meaningful for Model 2 
because the partial good interface signals in Model 1 
are always inactive and thus are never driven with “X” 
values. 
5. Execute the equivalence check to test that the Model 1 
MISR is equivalent to the Model 2 MISR. In parallel, 
execute checking of the Model 2 X-state assertion. If 
no failures occur and there are no scan chain 
inversions, verification is complete. If failures occur 
with no scan chain inversions, the failures are design 
problems. If there are scan chain inversions, follow 
Steps 6 and 7 below to circumvent possible false 
failures. False failures are indicated by the presence of 
an equivalence check fail but no fail on the Model 2 X-
state assertion.  
6. Generate a list of inverted latches in the scan chain and 
force scan inputs to these latches to the inactive state. 
7. Rebuild models and rerun the equivalence check. Any 
remaining failures are design problems. If no failures 
occur, verification is complete.  
As mentioned already, Step 4 is not required if there 
are no scan chain inversions in the design. However, it 
is worthwhile to note here that in addition to the built-
in  equivalence checking of outputs or selected internal 
signals, the SixthSense equivalence check mode also 
provides the ability for users to implement and test 
customized assertions  on either model. Exploiting this 
capability provides the method with a means to handle  
potentially false failures that can be produced from the 
equivalence check when there are scan chain inversions 
since any failures on the Model 2 X-state assertion are 
accepted to be design problems and must be rectified.  
B. Advantages of the Method 
There are several benefits to using the above-described 
method as compared to traditional simulation based 
approaches.  These benefits include: 
• Proof of Correctness - Our method proves no missing 
fences and no over fencing.  Since it is not practical to 
exhaustively exercise all combinations of inputs and 
internal states via simulation in most real world 
designs, this precludes the possibility of obtaining 
proofs for the verification properties of interest using 
simulation. 
• Scalability - Verification complexity using our method 
does not increase significantly with complexity or size 
of the DUT.  Unlike simulation, the cost to setup and 
execute this method is not influenced greatly by the 
size of the design. This case study shows that 
application of the method to composite models with 
more than a million latches is indeed realizable and 
practical. Attempting to verify the design in this case 
study using simulation would have consumed 
considerably more time and would have been 
inherently incomplete.  
• No knowledge of LBIST sequences required – 
Despite the fact that the LBIST sequences used in 
actual hardware are generally complex sequences that 
require scanning, our method obviates the need to 
develop complex drivers as well as the need to manage 
and update drivers if and when LBIST sequences 
change. In contrast, simulation often poses the need for 
one to develop relatively complex testbenches in order 
to avoid driving invalid input vector combinations and 
to ensure “interesting” and “corner case” scenarios are 
tested.  By using this formal verification based method, 
all possible combinations of inputs allowed by the 
testbench are automatically covered.   
• Setup is very easy - Once the fence signals and partial 
good interfaces have been identified (per Step 1 of the 
method), the verification setup can be auto-generated 
using scripts.  
• No need for complex assertions:  – Equivalence 
checking mode is already built into the SixthSense tool, 
so there is no need to write explicit assertions to verify 
correctness. The single explicit assertion to check for 
X-state propagation in Model 2 is trivial to implement.  
• Method supports any partial good self test structure 
– The process for creating the composite testbench is 
the same regardless of design implementation details. 
Even though it is possible for designs that contain scan 
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chain inversions to initially produce false failures, such 
failures are easily identified and subsequently filtered 
out of the final verification results. 
IV. VERIFICATION RESULTS 
The proposed verification methodology was applied to an 
IBM z-Series multi-core chip. Due to the hierarchical nature 
of the design that was verified, the verification was carried out 
in two parts – one part at the unit level, and the other part at 
the chip level. At the unit level, there were two processor 
cores sharing common logic. At the chip level, there were two 
units instantiated on the chip with another set of common 
logic being shared by these two instances.  To verify the 
partial LBIST fencing, one only needs to analyze the common 
logic shared at the unit and chip levels.  Before we built our 
models, we abstracted all the irrelevant logic using 
blackboxing. Our application of the methodology was highly 
successful as we were able to identify a total of 6 design bugs. 
After these bugs were fixed, we were able to prove that partial 
LBIST fencing worked properly. Table 1 summarizes the 
major verification metrics for each of the two models tested. 
 
TABLE  1 
VERIFICATION SUMMARY 
 Verification Metric  Core Level Model Chip Level Model 
# Inputs (thousands) 6.1  41 
# Gates (millions) 2 24 
# Registers (millions) 2.1  2.8  
Run Time 639 sec 1654  sec  
Peak Memory Usage 6.8 GB 16.7 GB 
# Design Bugs Found 2 4 
V. TUNING  THE VERIFICATION RUNS 
Our two primary challenges when tuning the SixthSense 
sequential equivalence checking algorithms for verification of 
partial LBIST fencing were to 1) find bugs in the design as 
fast as possible and  2), efficiently complete proofs of 
correctness. To address both challenges we used the EQV 
engine, a sequential redundancy removal engine that uses an 
assume-then-prove paradigm to identify and merge gates that 
are sequentially redundant [11]. The first step is to guess 
redundant gates using a variety of techniques such as semi-
formal analysis, structural analysis, name comparisons, etc.  A 
speculative merge of the redundancy candidates is then 
performed to create the model to be equivalence checked (the 
“assume” step). Finally, proof analysis is performed on the 
speculatively-reduced model to attempt to validate the 
correctness of redundancy candidates (the “proof” step). 
It is well known that SAT-based bounded model checking 
(BMC) is one of the best approaches for falsification.  
However, we quickly realized that for the sizes of the designs 
we were interested in verifying, SAT-based BMC quickly runs 
out of steam.  We decided to follow the approach of [11] and 
applied SAT-based BMC on the speculatively-reduced model 
for falsification.  Speculative-merging enabled deeper BMC 
and we found all the bugs in the design using this approach. 
However,  LBIST sequences are very long and typically take 
hundreds of cycles to update the MISRs making it  practically 
impossible to develop a good level of confidence about the 
design given a few hundred cycles of BMC.  This makes it 
imperative that proofs of correctness be obtained. 
The wide variety of synergistic transformation and 
verification algorithms available in SixthSense were very 
useful in validating the correctness of redundancy candidates ; 
Localization in particular was found to be very effective.  The 
SixthSense feature that proved most useful is the ability to 
identify causal redundancy assumptions that make proofs 
difficult. This is a powerful feature as it enabled the 
verification engineers to identify certain constraints that the 
design must satisfy to prove the validity of the causal 
redundancy assumptions. By adding assertions to check for the 
satisfaction of the constraints, we were able to figure out 
illegal driving of  certain signals in the design and fine-tune 
the driver accordingly. Note that the only other way we could 
have found the illegal driving would be through falsification 
showing that the MISRs differ. Due to the large fail depth, 
even BMC on the speculatively-merged model was not 
successful.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The application of our partial fencing verification approach 
to an IBM z-Series multi-core chip provides solid evidence of 
ease of use, scalability, and flexibility of the methodology. Six 
design problems were found and resolved prior to initial chip 
release. These problems would have almost certainly not been 
found via simulation, and would have hampered the ability to 
reliably identify and use partial good chips in real systems.  
We therefore advocate not only the continued use of this 
methodology going forward, but also strongly encourage the 
continued exploration and application of formal verification to 
other non-trivial verification tasks . 
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The ever-growing complexity of Intel® CPUs, together with 
shortened time-to-market requirements, poses significant 
challenges for pre-silicon logic verification. To address the 
increasing verification gap, major improvements to 
verification practices are required. In Merom, the Intel® 
Core™2 Duo microprocessor, we integrated Formal 
Verification (FV) with Dynamic Verification (DV) such that 
FV was also practiced by non-FV experts and replaced 
some traditional, simulation-based verification activities. 
This led to both higher productivity and better quality 
compared to previous projects. In this paper we report on 
the integration we used, including two examples, results, 
and future directions. 
1. Introduction 
Formal verification (FV) is widely known as an 
effective verification method, and has been successfully 
applied to a wide variety of designs, including software [3], 
and in  particular in the verification of several 
microprocessors [4]. In most cases, FV is performed by FV 
experts separately from traditional simulation-based 
dynamic verification (DV), providing full proofs for areas 
of high risk [1][7][8]. FV has proven able to find extreme 
corner-case bugs, and it provides a high degree of 
confidence that such bugs do not exist. Nevertheless, 
typically FV has been applied only to a small fraction of the 
design. There are several reasons for this. First, FV is costly 
when done in addition to other simulation-based activities. 
In order to apply FV on a wide scale, a project needs a large 
FV team. This leads to the next problem, that of finding 
experienced FV engineers who can carry out complex 
proofs in a reasonable amount of time. Next is the relatively 
limited capacity of FV tools, which typically cannot handle 
large designs such as the functional units of an industrial 
microprocessor.  
In this paper we present our experience in the effective 
utilization of FV techniques in the verification of Merom, 
the Intel® Core™2 Duo microprocessor. We integrated FV 
and DV by providing DV engineers with basic skills and 
user-friendly tools to perform FV tasks and by replacing 
simulation-based activities such as coverage or stress with 
FV. DV engineers, in addition to FV engineers, owned the 
identification, specification and implementation of FV tasks 
in their areas of responsibility. This approach overcame 
some of the problems mentioned above. First, typically the 
verification engineer is familiar with the design. Second, 
the verification engineer executes both FV and DV and can 
identify what is covered by each activity. Finally, there is 
more flexibility in assigning engineers to FV tasks. This 
approach tightly linked FV with DV and reduced overall 
verification costs while achieving high-quality results. One 
example presented in this paper, in which the results 
exceeded our expectations, is the execution cluster (EXE), 
where all arithmetic operations are implemented. By 
checking every possible combination of inputs on 
thousands of micro-operations (uops), we achieved full 
data-path verification of nearly the entire cluster. These 
results are the direct outcome of the FV/DV approach, as 
EXE DV engineers used FV and completely dropped 
functional coverage and other simulation-based techniques. 
This paper is organized as follows: we start with a 
review of related work, then we describe the FV/DV 
approach and provide examples of its application to a real-
life microprocessor, and finally we describe lessons learned 
and future challenges. 
 
2. The FV/DV Approach 
The elements of the FV/DV approach are: deciding 
where to apply FV (based on the limitations of simulation); 
having joint test plans; replacing simulation activities with 
FV; having verification engineers from the simulation 
teams also applying FV; establishing (by FV experts) FV 
environments for verification engineers to use; having joint 
checking; tool integration. In this section, we elaborate on 
several key elements. 
Deciding Where to Apply FV. The verification teams 
identify areas where simulation is less efficient - typically 
designs with a large data space or areas with low 
controllability in simulation. FV experts help examine 
whether FV can be applied efficiently to these areas by 
running feasibility checks. These feasibility checks include 
identifying the main properties to be verified, examining 
the size and complexity of the interface, adding basic 
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assumptions such as the behavior of clock and reset, and 
running several witnesses in order to estimate the maximum 
bound that the BMC (Bounded Model Checking) tools can 
reach on this design.  
Effect on Simulation. The next element, which enables 
shifting DV resources to FV activities and improves the FV 
return on investment, is the effect of FV on DV. For every 
design under test, one decides if FV should completely 
replace DV, replace DV stress or coverage activities, or 
complement DV. Because DV coverage activities usually 
require a considerable effort (writing and reaching coverage 
goals), replacing them with FV increases the FV return on 
investment. However, it is not always possible to fully 
eliminate DV activities in favor of FV, as FV often covers 
only part of the design. When FV is applied to a block, it 
can replace DV activities that are targeted in checking that 
block. For example, if FV is verifying an Adder unit, there 
is no need to cover different data scenarios in DV. On the 
other hand, if DV coverage effort is applied to a specific 
unit only for making sure that the overall system exhibits 
interesting behaviors, FV should not replace it. While the 
decision to drop simulation activities is easier when a full 
FV proof is in place, it can also be made in the case of 
bounded proofs when the confidence level obtained from 
these is sufficient.  
Running FV by Verification Engineers. The next 
element of the FV/DV approach is having FV performed 
not only by FV experts, but also by verification engineers. 
In some cases, FV activities can be performed entirely by 
the verification engineer, technically supported by the FV 
team. In other cases, the verification activity is divided 
between the FV expert and the verification engineer. In the 
latter case, the FV expert establishes a formal environment 
and the verification engineer develops the specifications 
(FV checkers) within this environment. This method of 
dividing FV between the FV expert and the verification 
engineer is especially useful when FV skills are required to 
establish a working environment in which specifications 
can then be written in a straightforward manner. In the 
previous section we listed several advantages to performing 
FV activity in the DV verification teams, but of course, 
there are also disadvantages. FV  tools are sometimes more 
difficult to use and require a different mindset than 
simulation. Some proofs require decomposition, induction, 
or abstraction, which require FV expertise. Therefore, when 
assigning an engineer to an FV task, one should consider 
how complex the design is vs. how complex the proof is 
expected to be.  
Joint Checking. The next element is joint checking for 
simulation and FV. This is mainly achieved through the use 
of RTL assertions [20] which run both in FV and in 
simulation flows. All assertions and assumptions 
(environment restrictions) used by the FV proofs are also 
used as checkers in simulation. In addition, FV checkers re-
use assertions or synthesizable reference models that have 
been developed for simulation.  
 
3. Application of the FV/DV Approach to the 
Intel® Core™ 2 Duo Microprocessor  
The strategic decision to integrate FV and simulation in 
the verification of the Intel® Core™2 Duo microprocessor 
was taken in the early planning stages. Rather than have FV 
be orthogonal to simulation activities, we decided to 
incorporate FV as yet another logic verification capability, 
following the approach described in the previous section. 
We now present the results of applying this to two 
examples: the execution cluster (hereafter referred to as 
EXE) and the Micro-Instruction Sequencer unit (hereafter 
referred to as MS). EXE consists of all the arithmetic and 
logic units, and FV was performed using symbolic 
trajectory evaluation (which is a form of symbolic 
simulation) [9], under Intel’s FORTE system [10], in a joint 
effort between the formal and EXE verification teams. The 
FV of the MS unit was carried out using BMC [5] with 
specs in the ForSpec language [2] by a verification engineer 
from the simulation-based team. The results in both 
examples exceeded our expectations, and were a direct 
consequence  of the FV-DV approach. 
A. FV of the Entire EXE Cluster   
The EXE (ALU of the Microprocessor) cluster work 
was divided such that an FV expert developed the Cluster 
Formal Environment (hereafter referred to as CFE) 
platform and the EXE verification engineers formally 
verified their specifications in this platform. Although 
symbolic simulation is different than standard simulation, it 
is similar conceptually and is therefore rather natural for 
verification engineers. The major difference between a 
standard RTL simulator and a symbolic one is that the latter 
runs all possible traces together and does not need concrete 
tests as stimuli. A symbolic simulator computes the value of 
circuit nodes (e.g., outputs) at given time-ticks as a function 
of the inputs. To use symbolic simulation, one has to 
provide symbolic stimuli. After the simulator computes the 
function of the circuit, one has to compare the results 
against the desired output (also expressed as a function of 
the inputs). If the functions match, we conclude that the 
circuit meets the specification. In case of a mismatch, one 
has to debug and analyze whether the problem is in the 
specification or in the circuit.  
The EXE cluster consists of several relatively 
independent units which perform the different arithmetic 
and logic operations. This made it possible for the FV 
expert to develop a symbolic simulation framework driving 
the units one by one, placing symbolic input variables on 
the cluster interface and coping with capacity problems. 
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When an operation in a specific unit has been simulated, 
inputs of the remaining units were driven by X’s, indicating 
don’t care values. Propagating X’s is much cheaper for the 
symbolic simulator, and hence it was able to simulate the 
entire EXE cluster. It would have been impossible to 
simulate the entire cluster symbolically without driving one 
unit at a time and abstracting all other units with don’t care 
values.  
The verification unit owners helped the FV expert build 
the portion of their unit in the CFE and performed the 
verification by writing and running FV checkers for micro-
instructions (uops) in their units. These checkers were 
developed by the EXE verification engineers in FL 
(Functional interpreted programming Language). This 
language enables one to write functions operating on 
symbolic arguments. Learning FL is not trivial, but 
nevertheless the engineers were able to code simple 
specifications within a couple of weeks, and managed to 
capture all required specifications. 
EXE FV activity was carried out in the second half of 
the project, whereas standard simulation was used earlier 
for basic testing. In this stage (the second half of the 
project) we performed full verification, reached all corner 
cases, and acquired the confidence level required for tape-
out. The EXE engineers used FV as the main verification 
tool for this stage instead of the massive coverage work 
which was used in previous projects. They gradually 
expanded their FV activities until it had been performed on 
all units, formally verifying the vast majority of all EXE 
micro-operations. We should note that several highly 
complex proofs, such as the divider, were carried out 
separately by FV experts. 
  
FIGURE 1: ARITHMETIC UNITS VERIFIED BY CLUSTER ENGINEERS IN 
THE CLUSTER FV ENVIRONMENT DEVELOPED BY THE FV TEAM 
Overall, results exceeded our expectations. By checking 
every possible combination of inputs on thousands of uops, 
we achieved full datapath verification of nearly the entire 
cluster. Overall, 98% of the uops were verified, far above 
any CPU verification project at Intel. These results are the 
direct outcome of the strategic FV/DV approach whereby 
EXE DVers wrote FV specifications and ran FV using 
symbolic simulation. We strongly believe that these DV 
engineers, who had no previous background in FV, 
achieved a much higher quality of verification using FV 
than they had in previous projects using DV with a similar 
effort.  
B.  FV as the Main Verification Tool for the MS Unit 
The FV of the MS unit is yet another example of the 
advantages of FV over simulation-based verification. Here 
FV completely replaced planned DV tasks (test plan 
writing, test writing, coverage, etc). The MS unit holds a 
ROM of micro-instructions (a.k.a. uops) which it sequences 
as part of the translation of IA instructions into sequences 
of uops. This is done using fairly complex code that needs 
to support all the combinations of uops that may co-exist in 
the ROM under all possible events. The large testing space 
exists only partially in any given realization of the ROM, 
while verification needs to completely verify the hardware 
for any possible realization. It was well understood that 
traditional DV would fall short of high-quality verification. 
Yet we identified that the unit meets the FV BMC criteria.  
The first FV model was developed by the cluster 
verification team within about 3 months, and targeted the 
dependencies between neighboring uops and between uops 
and events. A reference model for the MS unit was 
developed in ForSpec. It modeled the entire functionality of 
the unit under normal operation, excluding some specifics 
such as counters that could not fit into the FV tools. A 
higher abstraction level reduced the chance of errors and 
made the reference model robust and insensitive to non-
functional micro-architecture changes. All the assumptions 
of the FV model were checked  in simulation. Another 
month was required to complete 18 properties covering the 
complete external behavior of the MS unit under all 
possible combinations of uops and external events. The 
model held approximately 1400 state variables, and BMC 
runs reached a bound of about 40 clock phases. It was 
analyzed and confirmed that all possible sequences within 
the MS unit can be reached within 28 phases, including the 
reset sequence. Indeed, all the bugs found by the FV model 
were below this bound. Therefore, a bound of 40 phases 
was confirmed as sufficient for any applicable scenario in 
the MS unit.  
Almost all the logic in the MS unit was verified solely 
using FV, and the functionality that was formally verified 
was completely dropped from the simulation-based space. 
No planned DV effort was carried out in the MS unit except 
for the testing of one certain type of instruction for which 



















model. Not a single test was written, and no coverage 
monitor was coded. In summary, FV detected 18 RTL bugs, 
including several high quality bugs which most likely 
would have escaped any simulation activity and would 
reach silicon. In the MS unit, FV was used as the main 
verification tool, providing superior quality and saving the 
considerable amount of effort it would have taken to 
develop a comparable DV environment. Once FV was 
complete it was used by the designers as a means of 
preventing any further bugs from being introduced into the 
RTL model. 
C.  Additional Results  
FV was successfully used as part of the verification of a 
dozen modules in the Intel® Core™2 Duo microprocessor, 
consuming overall almost 10% of the effort invested in 
verification. Overall, 75% of the proofs developed impacted 
simulation activities, mainly by replacing functional 
coverage activities. Almost half the proofs were done by 
FV engineers, and the rest by verification engineers in the 
DV verification teams.  
 
4. Conclusions and Recommendations 
We applied a new approach for using FV in the 
verification of the Intel® Core™2 Duo microprocessor, in 
which FV became an integral part of the verification 
capabilities. We incorporated FV as yet another logic 
verification capability and enabled many of the FV 
activities to be performed by engineers from the verification 
teams. They used bounded model checking for most proofs, 
but also made use of symbolic model checking and 
symbolic simulation. In most areas, results exceeded our 
expectations. In the EXE cluster, in which all arithmetic 
and logic operations are implemented, we achieved full 
datapath verification of nearly the entire cluster by checking 
every possible combination of inputs on thousands of 
micro-operations (uops). EXE verification engineers used 
FV in a formal environment developed by an FV expert, 
and completely dropped functional coverage.  
In the MS unit, FV took over simulation completely. 
Almost the whole unit was modeled in ForSpec and BMC 
fully covered all possible scenarios. Once it became 
available, the FV model found a whole range of bugs, some 
of which could not be practically found by simulation. In 
both examples, FV activities were performed by engineers 
from the verification teams who were not FV experts, and 
FV provided a significantly higher level of confidence for a 
significantly lower effort compared to the simulation-based 
activities they replaced. 
The Intel® Core™2 Duo microprocessor was the first 
microprocessor project in Intel to deploy such integration 
between simulation and FV. We believe that this approach 
provides a means of utilizing verification resources more 
effectively. We will strengthen the FV/DV approach in our 
next generation microprocessor project. We have taken 
additional steps to further integrate these two activities, 
mainly via major simplifications of the tool user interface, a 
new assertion- based verification (ABV) methodology that 
facilitates the deployment of FV proofs, and broader 
expertise in the use of FV within the verification team. We 
plan to make more extensive use of FV for bug-hunting in 
the early stages of the project. 
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Circuit Level Verification of a High-Speed Toggle
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Abstract—As VLSI fabrication technology progresses to 65nm
feature sizes and smaller, transistors no longer operate as
ideal switches. This motivates verifying digital circuits using
continuous models. This paper presents the verification of the
high-speed, toggle flip-flop proposed by Yuan and Svensson [1].
Our approach builds on the projection based methods originally
proposed by Greenstreet and Mitchell [2], [3]. While they were
only able to demonstrate their approach with two- and three-
dimensional systems, we apply projection based analysis to a
seven-dimensional model for the flip-flop. We believe that this is
the largest verification to date of a digital circuit using non-linear
circuit-level models.
In this paper, we describe how we overcame problems of
numerical errors and instability associated with the original
projection based methods. In particular, we present a novel
linear-program solver and new methods for constructing accurate
linear approximations of non-linear dynamics. We use the toggle
flip-flop as an example and consider how these methods could
be extended to verify a standard cell library for digital design.
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep-submicron technologies simultaneously confront de-
signers with transistor behaviors that require circuit-level mod-
els to produce working designs and with integration densities
that require working at high-levels of abstraction. Due to
leakage currents, small transistors do not operate as the ideal
switches that have been the foundation of synthesis and switch-
level simulation tools for the past twenty years. Other deep-
submicron challenges include crosstalk, power-supply noise,
and random parameter variations. Current design tools do
not provide a satisfactory way of dealing with these issues.
Typically, coarse approximations or heuristics are used to
validate designs, an approach that simultaneously sacrifices
performance and fails to guarantee working silicon. Formal
methods can help address these challenges by verifying proper
behaviors at low-levels of abstraction and ensuring that the
abstractions of these low-level behaviors to higher levels of
abstraction are sound.
A circuit with a continuous model has an uncountably
infinite state space, typically Rd where d is the number of
nodes in the circuit. Furthermore, the non-linear differential
equations that describe circuit behavior do not have closed
form solutions; thus, purely symbolic methods are unlikely
to succeed for circuit-level verification. To address these
problems, tractable approximation methods are needed. To
ensure soundness, these approximations must over approxi-
mate the reachable space. While such approximation-based
techniques cannot be complete, we want the approximations to
be accurate enough that the verification method can be applied
to real designs. Finally, the reachability computations must be
sufficiently efficient as to enable the verification of real designs
in a tolerable amount of time.
The current work builds upon the projection based methods
for a tool called “Coho” originally proposed in [2], [3].
Coho represents a region in Rd by its projection onto two-
dimensional subspaces. The intuition behind this approach
is that the input/output behaviors of digital circuits can be
captured by these projections that correspond to pairs of
causally related variables.
The framework presented in [2], [3] was only applied to
simple two- and three-dimensional models due to numerical
conditioning problems that often occurred in solving the
linear-programs that were used when calculating the reachable
space. We present our solution to these numerical problems.
We also describe places where the original formulation for
Coho resulted in large over approximations and present re-
finements that enable much more accurate calculations.
We apply our modified version of Coho to the verification
of a toggle flip-flop that was originally presented by Yuan
and Svensson [1]. This toggle is a relatively simple circuit
consisting of nine transistors and seven nodes. This makes it
similar in size to many cells in a typical library for standard
cell design. For example, if a design has a critical timing
path that cannot be satisfied by gate sizing or local logical
changes, a designer might identify a custom logic function
that could be implemented to achieve an acceptable delay.
In current design flows, adding a cell to the library is an
arduous task, in large part due to the large number of circuit
simulations that must be manually run and checked; the time
required to perform such simulations is often unacceptable
for the project schedule. Thus, a design team in this situation
can be forced to either make large architectural changes or to
lower performance targets. Having verified the toggle, we can
realistically hope to verify cells that a designer wants to add
to a cell library. Similar opportunities to improve the design
flow arise when trying to satisfy cross-talk requirements, when
using dynamic or highly-skewed logic gates, when integrating
self-timed circuits in a synchronous design, etc.
The toggle is an attractive first example for circuit-level
verification because it has an interesting sequential behavior
that we can specify very precisely in both discrete and con-
tinuous formulations. It exhibits a critical race which places
demands on the accuracy of the approximations made by any
reachability tool. Finally, with seven nodes, it presents an op-
portunity to verify discrete properties of a seven-dimensional,
non-linear system. We are not aware of any previous examples
of verifying digital circuit behaviour from non-linear circuit
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models for circuits of more than four nodes.
II. RELATED WORK
The problem of verifying systems with a combination of
discrete and continuous models has been a focus of the hybrid
systems research in the past ten years. This section first
examines prior work in verifying circuits and hybrid systems
and then examines the prior work on Coho upon which our
current research is built.
A. Verification of Hybrid Systems
One of the earliest tools for verifying hybrid systems was
HyTech [4], [5]. Based on linear hybrid automata [6], HyTech
models continuous variables as piecewise linear functions
of time. While non-linear systems can be approximated by
piecewise linear ones [7], the number of pieces required to
obtain a given degree of accuracy grows exponentially with the
dimensionality of the system, exacerbating the high complex-
ity of the model-checking algorithm. Even with the simplistic
assumptions that each variable evolves as a piecewise linear
function of time, nearly all properties of linear hybrid automata
are undecidable [8], [9]. Thus, heuristics and approximation
methods are required for verifying real circuits.
The ideas in HyTech have been extended recently by Frehse
in the implementation PHAVer [10]. PHAVer uses arbitrary
precision integer and rational arithmetic to avoid problems of
numerical overflow that limited HyTech. Furthermore, PHAVer
uses the Parma Polyhedra Library [11]. PHAVer has verified
larger problems than HyTech could including a non-linear,
tunnel-diode oscillator circuit and a VCO [12]. We are not
aware of any applications of PHAVer to digital circuit designs.
The d/dt tool [13] performs reachability analysis of con-
tinuous or hybrid systems modeled by linear differential in-
clusions of the form of dx/dt = Ax + Bu, where u is an
external input taking values in a bounded convex polyhedron.
d/dt represents the reachable sets as non-convex orthogonal
polyhedra [14], i.e. finite unions of full-dimensional, fixed
size hyper-rectangles, and approximates the reachable state
using numerical integration and polyhedral approximation. To
the best of our knowledge, all examples computed with d/dt
have been low, dimensional, with two- or three-dimensions,
which we believe reflects the high-complexity of representing
the reachable space as an explicit set of hypercubes. Earlier,
Kurshan and McMillan [15] used a similar approach, for the
verification of a simple arbiter, a four-dimensional, non-linear
problem.
CheckMate [16] is a Matlab based tool for modeling, sim-
ulating and verifying properties of a class of hybrid systems:
threshold-event-driven hybrid systems. Checkmate can model
systems with non-linear dynamics by computing a convex
polyhedral approximation of the reachable region. Checkmate
has recently been used to verify simple circuits including a
tunnel-diode oscillator and a Sigma-Delta modulator [17], both
modeled with three-dimensional state spaces. As with PHAVer,
we are not aware of any applications of Checkmate to digital
circuit designs or to circuits with higher dimensional models.
B. Coho
Coho represents reachable sets with projectagons. A pro-
jectagon is the high dimensional (and potentially nonconvex)
bounded polytope formed by the intersection of a collection
of prisms. Each prism is unbounded in all but two dimensions,
and in those two dimensions the cross-section of the prism is
a bounded polygon. The projection polygons are not required
to be convex; thus, non-convex, high-dimensional objects can
be represented by projectagons. The high-dimensional object
represented by a projectagon is the set of all points that satisfy
the constraints of each projection. As an example, Figure 1
shows how a three-dimensional object (the “anvil”) can be















Fig. 1. A Three-Dimensional “Projectagon”
The basic ideas behind Coho’s reachability analysis are
straightforward. We require that the time derivatives for the
state variables are finite and therefore that trajectories are
continuous. This, the extremal trajectories emanate from the
faces of the projectagon. At each time step in its reachability
analysis, Coho derives a convex polytope that contains all
points within a preset distance of the current projectagon.
Coho then derives bounds on the time derivatives of the state
variables within this polytope, and uses these to determine
a time step size for which all trajectories are guaranteed to
remain in the polytope. Coho then moves each face according
to its maximum outward derivative to obtain a projectagon that
contains the reachable space at the end of the time step. We
describe these steps in greater detail below.
Let P0 denote the projectagon for the reachable space at the
beginning of a time step, and let λ be a positive real.‘ To derive
a convex polytope that contains all points within distance λ
of P0, we observe that the convex-hull of a projectagon is
contained in the projectagon obtained from the convex hulls
of each of the projection polygons. Thus, Coho computes the
hulls of these two dimensional polygons. Coho then moves all
edges of these hulls outward by λ. These bloated hulls are the
projection polygons of a projectagon that contains all points
that are within distance λ of the original projectagon. We call
this bloated version of the original projectagon Pbloat . Coho
represents Pbloat as a linear program.
Faces of the projectagon correspond to edges of the pro-
jection polygons. Thus, the version of Coho described in [3]
operated on one projection polygon edge at a time. We
describe this approach here and describe our refinement of
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this method in Section IV-C. For each polygon edge, Coho
constructs an oriented rectangle that contains all points within
distance λ of the edge. The intersection of the prism for
this rectangle with Pbloat contains all points within distance
λ of the current face. We call this region Pbloat , and Coho
represents it with a linear program.
Coho then calls the user supplied circuit model with Pbloat .
The model returns a matrix A, vectors b, and positive vector
u such that
Av + b− u ≤ v̇ ≤ Av + b+ u (1)
for any point v ∈ Pbloat . Based on this linearized model and
the linear program Pbloat , Coho constructs a linear program for
all points reachable from the face at the end of the time step.
Coho then projects the feasible region of this linear program
back onto the basis variables for the polygon edge associated
with the face to obtain the time advanced edge. Details are
given in [3].
We now focus on those aspects of the Coho algorithm
that we had to modify in order to successfully verify the
toggle. The modifications that we made should be applicable to
other circuit and hybrid systems verification problems as well.
First, Coho makes extensive use of linear programs (LPs).
Earlier experience with Coho showed that these LPs were often
highly ill-conditioned, causing off-the-shelf linear program
solvers such as Matlab’s linprog and a direct implementation
of Simplex to fail. In Section IV-A, we describe our robust
linear program solver for the LPs that arise in Coho. Second,
Coho was originally implemented with uniform bloats for all
variables. We found that this led to both large error bounds
when linearizing the circuit model and to Coho taking very
small time steps. Section IV-B describes how we modified
Coho to use different bloat amounts for different variables.
Each time a projection polygon edge is advanced, a new
polygon is produced. The union of these “edge polygons”
forms the boundary of the projection polygon at the end of
the time step. This process can lead to a rapid increase in the
number of projection polygon edges. Section IV-C describes
how the original Coho simplified the projection polygons at
each step to control this blow-up. In the same section, we
present our modifications to the original algorithm to reduce
the amount of over approximation at critical phases of the
verification.
III. THE YUAN-SVENSSON TOGGLE
Figure 2 shows the toggle circuit from [1]. Transistors are
labeled with their shape factors and the capacitor on the q
output represents a load equivalent to the gate capacitance of
transistors with the a total shape factor of 36; this is the load
that the toggle places on its clock input. We use this load to
verify that the output of one toggle can drive the clock input
of another to implement a ripple counter.
The operation of this circuit can be understood by using a
simple switch model starting from a state where the φ input
is low. In this case, y is driven high, z is floating, and x is
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Fig. 3. State Transition Diagram for the Toggle
diagram for the toggle starting from the state where z is high
when φ is low – the other case, with z high, is reached on
step 2 of the figure. Note that from step 2 to 3 in the figure,
all three of x, y and z change values. This is a critical race
for the toggle. We further note that if the rise or fall times for
φ are too large, the toggle will fail.
To specify the desired continuous behavior of the toggle
circuit, we use the Brockett annulus construction [18] shown
in Figure 4. When a variable is in region 1, its value is
constrained but its derivative may be either positive or nega-
tive. Thus, region 1 of the annulus specifies a logically low
signal: it may vary in a small interval around the nominal
value for low signals. When the variable leaves region 1, it
must be increasing; therefore, it enters region 2. Because the
derivative of the variable is positive in region 2, it makes a
monotonic transition leading to region 3. Regions 3 and 4
are analogous to regions 1 and 2 corresponding to logically
high and monotonically falling signals respectively. Because
transitions through regions 2 and 4 are monotonic, traversals
of these regions are distinct events. This provides a topological
basis for discrete behaviors. Furthermore, the horizontal radii
of the annulus define the maximum and minimum high and
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Fig. 4. Brockett’s Annulus
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figure 4). The maximum and minimum rise time for the signal
correspond to trajectories along the upper-inner and upper-
outer boundaries of the annulus respectively. Likewise, the
lower-inner and lower-outer boundaries of the annulus specify
the maximum and minimum fall times.
Note that a signal may remain in regions 1 or 3 arbitrarily
long. This is essential when verifying the toggle where we
must show that the output satisfies the constraints assumed of
the input, even though the period of the output is twice that
of the input. In addition to the constraints captured by the
geometry of the annulus, we add constraints as in [19] for the
minimum time that φ must remain in region 1 before entering
region 2, and likewise for region 3. This construction allows
a large class of input signals to be described in a simple and
natural manner.
We specify the behavior of the toggle as a safety property. In
particular, we use Coho to find an invariant subset of Rd such
that all trajectories in this set have a period twice that of the
clock signal. This notion can be formalized using a Poincaré
section [20]. Let φ be the continuous signal corresponding to
Φ, and let c be some constant with V0h < c < V1l. Consider
the intersection of the invariant set with the φ = c hyperplane.
These intersections form a Poincaré map [20]. We verify that
these intersections form four disjoint regions (two for rising
φ crossing c, and two falling crossings), All trajectories must
visit these four regions in the same order. Thus, the φ = c
plane partitions the invariant set of the continuous model into
four, disjoint regions that map to the four discrete states of the
discrete model.
Toggle elements can be composed to form a ripple-counter
if there is an output variable such that for all trajectories in the
manifold, the value and derivative of this variable satisfy the
constraints of the input ring. It must also be shown that this
output satisfies the minimum high and low time constraints.
Section V shows that the toggle circuit satisfies all of these
properties.
IV. MAKING COHO WORK
A. Solving LPs in Coho
Coho makes extensive use of linear programs (LPs), and the
original version of Coho was hindered because these LPs are
occasionally extremely ill-conditioned. The LPs in Coho have
constraints that correspond to the convex hulls of projection
polygons. These LPs are naturally written with the form
min
x
cTx s.t. Ax ≤ b (2)
where each row of A has at most two non-zero elements. We




−bTπ s.t. ATπ = c (3)
Note that AT has at most two non-zero elements in any
column. In [21], Laza presented a linear-time algorithm for
solving the linear systems that arise when applying the
Simplex algorithm to the dual of a Coho LP. With Laza’s
algorithm, the tableau entries are computed from the original
data at each pivot step; the only data carried forward from one
pivot to the next is the original LP and the set of columns in
the basis. By avoiding the rank-one updates of the tableau from
the traditional formulation of Simplex, Laza’s approach avoids
error propagation from one pivot step to the next. His linear-
time linear system solver makes this approach as efficient as
traditional Simplex.
We implemented Laza’s approach and included an arbitrary
precision rational arithmetic package. Most computations are
performed using interval arithmetic, and the arbitrary preci-
sion package is used for highly ill-conditioned bases and to
verify the final solution. Our implementation has eliminated
numerical stability problems from the LP solver. As an added
benefit, our LP solver is guaranteed to find the exact optimum
for the linear program in all cases. This guarantee allowed us
to simplify many other parts of the Coho code.
B. Better Bloating
In the original formulation of Coho, the projection polygons
were bloated equally in all directions to form the bloated
convex hull that contained the trajectories for a time step.
When verifying the toggle, we found that this resulted in large
over approximations. Depending on the circuit state, some
variables will have much larger time derivatives than others.
If the state is bloated by the same amount for all variables,
then the model will be evaluated with a much larger region
than needed for the slow moving variables, and this causes
the error term in the linear approximation of the model to be
large.
We solved this problem by linearizing the models twice at
each time step. The first phase is performed as in the original
version of Coho, but we also keep track of the maximum
magnitude of the derivative for each variable. At the end of the
first phase, our new version computes the size of the allowed
time-step. It also computes the bloat amount needed for each
variable. In the second phase, faces are moved forward in time.
In our new version, we linearize the model again for each
face based on the per-variable bloat amounts computed from
the first phase. This change enabled a dramatic reduction in
the magnitude of the error terms in the linearizations of the
model.
(b) Replace two convex vertices with one.(a) Remove a concave vertex.
Fig. 5. Simplifying Projection Polygons
C. Simplifying Projection Polygons
At the end of each time step, Coho reduces the number
of projection polygon vertices to keep their sizes tractable.
As shown in Figure 5(a), Coho can simply delete convex
vertices to produce an approximation of the original polygon.
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Figure 5(b) shows the replacement of two consecutive, convex
vertices with a single vertex, again producing an over approx-
imation. Simplification serves two purposes. First it keeps the
number of constraints in the LP for the bloated convex hull
of the projectagon small. Second, it reduces the number of
projectagon faces (i.e. projection polygon edges) that need to
be advanced at each time step. These are separable concerns.
Our new version of Coho computes the convex hull of each
polygon and simplifies it using the simplification shown in
Figure 5(b) to control the number of constraints in the LP
for the bloated convex hull, Pbloat . Then, we modified Coho
to advance convex sequences of edges. Coho constructs LPs
for these sequences and moves them forward in a single step.
Of course, we still need to limit the growth of the number
of polygon edges. The new Coho eliminates concave vertices
as shown in Figure 5(a). Furthermore, once Coho identifies
a convex sequence of vertices to advance, it can eliminate
vertices as shown in Figure 5(b). Because we only have the
extra edges for a single projection polygon at a time, we can
maintain a much more detailed representation of the polygon
without greatly increasing the time for the computation.
V. VERIFYING THE TOGGLE
The verification that we present of the toggle resembles
an earlier verification result presented in [19]. There are two
significant differences in our approach and the earlier work.
Most significantly, we include nodes xx, yy and zz in our
model. This results in a seven-dimensional state space rather
than the four-dimensional model used in [19]. Second, we
model the drain-source currents of the transistors based on
tabulated data obtained from HSPICE thus our results are
based on the BSIM-3 models for the TSMC 180nm process.
In [19], a simple, first-order, long-channel, MOSFET model
was used for transistor current. Using a realistic model forced
us to address other real-world issues, most notable of which
was the leakage currents of the transistors. Thus, we added
“keepers” to nodes x, y and z. While such practicalities can
seem like a nuisance from a formal verification perspective,
they show that our approach is solidly connected to the issues
that challenge circuit designers for deep submicron processes.
We started our verification by simulating the toggle using
a circuit simulation package that we have developed for use
in Matlab. This approach had two advantages. First, we were
able to informally validate our design before embarking on the
more time-intensive effort of formal verification. Second, we
modified the simulator to generate the linearized models with
error bounds as required by Coho. Thus, we used the same
circuit description for simulation and verification.
Our specification for the toggle requires it to have an
invariant set that has twice the period of the input clock, φ.
Accordingly, our reachability calculation is carried out for two
periods of φ. We break each of these periods into the two
phases: one for the rising transition of φ and the time that
φ is high; and the other for the falling transition and low
time. This partitioning had two advantages. First, we estimate
a bounding hyper-rectangle for the end of each phase based
on the simulation results. With these estimates, we divide the
task of verifying the toggle into four separate proof obligations
where each obligation is of the form:
Assume that the circuit state is in hyper-rectangle
Yi at the end of phase i.
Show that the circuit state will be in hyper-rectangle
Yi+1 at the end of phase i+ 1.
By showing that the last phase leads to a hyper-rectangle that
is contained in the initial hyper-rectangle of the initial phase,
we establish that the reachable set that we have computed is
invariant. Second, by separating the proof obligations, we can
work on them in parallel. This was critical. Our current version
of Coho is a prototype, and it is quite slow. It takes about a
day to complete the reachability analysis for a single phase.
Parallel computation allowed us to complete the verification,
debug the model, and address issues of over approximation in
a reasonably timely manner.
A. Modeling the Circuit
We model transistors as voltage controlled current sources,
and all capacitors as having fixed values with one terminal
connected to ground. For transistor j, let idsj(vs, vg, vd) be
the current that flows from the drain to the source when
the voltages on the source, gate and drain are vs, vg and
vd respectively. We obtained our ids functions by tabulating
data on a 0.01 volt grid for (vs, vg, vd) ∈ [−0.3, 2.25]3 for
transistors in the TSMC 180nm, 1.8 volt, bulk CMOS process.
We ignore gate leakage which is negligible in the 180nm
process.
By Kirchoff’s current law, the total current flowing out
of each node through the capacitors connected to the node
must equal the total current flowing into the node through the
transistors. The current through a capacitor is cv̇ where c is
the capacitance of the capacitor and v̇ is the time derivative
of the voltage across the capacitor. This yields:
V̇ = C−1M ids(V ) (4)
where V is the vector of node voltages (one element for each
node of the circuit); ids(V ) is the vector of drain-to-source
currents (one element for each transistor); M maps transistors
to nodes with M(i, j) = 1 if the source of transistor j is
connected to node i, M(i, j) = −1 if the drain of transistor
j is connected to node i, and M(i, j) = 0 otherwise. C is
the matrix of inter-node capacitances. Because we model all
capacitances as being fixed and to ground, C is fixed and
diagonal.
Equation 4 is the basis for our circuit modeling. To create a
linear model as in Equation 1, it suffices to linearize ids . Here,
we’ll present our initial approach. Given a linear program that
contains the bloated face for which Coho needs a model, we
obtain upper and lower bounds for vs, vg and vd. We then
compute a linear regression on the points in this bounding
box using tables of precomputed sums. Noting that the ids
function has exactly one inflection, (along the vs = vd plane)
enables efficient computation of the worst-case errors of the
least-squares model. We then adjust the constant term from the
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linear-regression to balance the positive and negative worst-
case errors. We now have
(C−1 M Aids)V + (C
−1 M Aids)bids − (C
−1 M Aids)uids
≤ V̇
≤ (C−1 M Aids)V + (C−1 M Aids)bids + (C−1 M Aids)uids
(5)
where Aids is computed from the linear regression and bids
and uids are determined by the error analysis.
This model is simple, efficient to compute and worked
fairly well for the toggle example. Section V-B describes some
specific situations where the error term from this model was
too large to complete the verification of the toggle and how
we refined the model to achieve a successful verification.
Finally, we need a model for the input signal, φ, which
is specified as satisfying a Brockett annulus. We obtained
a candidate annulus by simulating the toggle with inputs of
varying amplitude and frequency and observing the Brockett
annulus satisfied by the toggle’s output. We described this
annulus by giving polygons for the inner and outer rings.
Figure 6 shows the annulus that we used. We set the minimum
low and high times for φ to 0.5ns. The circuit model uses
the LP for the current bloated face to obtain bounds on φ.
The model computes the center path for φ in this interval,
computes the minimum, least-squares approximation of this
path, and finds the worst-case errors for this approximation.
B. The Reachability Computation
As described above, we divided the reachability computa-
tion into four phases according to the four state transitions
shown in Figure 3. Table I summarizes this analysis. We
start each phase with the projectagon for the starting hyper-
rectangle and note the bounding hyper-rectangle of the projec-
tagon for the reachable region at the end of each phase. Note
that the starting hyper-rectangle for each phase contains the
ending hyper-rectangle of the previous phase, and the starting
hyper-rectangle for the phase 1 contains the ending hyper-
rectangle for phase 4. Thus, we’ve established an invariant
set. Furthermore, the hyperrectangles for the four phases are
pairwise disjoint. Thus, this invariant set has a period of two
with respect to the clock input, φ.
Table I also lists the projection polygons that we used for
each phase. These were chosen with two considerations. First,
we chose projections that corresponded to logical dependen-
cies between changing signals. Thus, in the first phase when z
changes, we include z vs. zz and z vs. x (because the falling
edge of z enables a rising edge of x). Second, we included
at least one polygon for each variable to bound the resulting
projectagon in all dimensions.
We now describe the verification of each of these phases in
greater detail.
Phase 1: (φ = 0, x = 0, y = 1, z = 1) → (φ = 1, x =
0, y = 1, z = 0): In this phase, φ makes a low-to-high
transition, and z goes from high-to-low. This phase starts with
φ = 0.2 volts at which point φ is already in region 2 of
the Brockett annulus. This ensures that φ̇ is strictly positive.
This phase includes the rising transition of φ (region 2 of the
annulus) and the time that φ is high (region 3). We compute
the union of the reachable regions for all times starting once φ
has been high for the minimum required time. When this union
computation reaches a fixpoint, we have the reachable set for
the end of this phase. In the next phase, φ will enter region
4 of the Brockett annulus. We over approximate the annulus
by lowering the minimum high value for φ to 1.6 volts (from
1.65) during this phase of the verification. This allows us to
use a starting value of 1.6 volts for φ in the next phase which
will ensure that φ̇ is strictly negative.
The linear model for φ̇ has large errors if the interval
for φ is too large. Thus, we “sliced” the space into regions
corresponding to 0.1 volt wide intervals for φ. Consider the
scenario when Coho is working on a slice with φ ∈ [lo, hi ]
and let P0 be the projectagon at the end of a time step.
Coho divides the P0 into a portion, Plo , with φ ≤ hi and
a portion, Phi with φ ≥ hi . To obtain Plo , Coho intersects
each projection polygon that includes φ in its basis with the
φ ≤ hi half-plane. Projection polygons in other bases are left
unchanged. This ensures that Plo ⊆ P0 ∩ {u |uφ ≤ lo}. Coho
computes Phi for the timestep in the same manner. Because
φ̇ > 0 when φ is in region 2 of the Brockett ring, Coho will
eventually reach a time step when Plo is empty.
For each projection polygon basis, Coho computes the union
of the polygons that it computed for this baseis for Phi to
obtain the projection polygon that it will use for that basis in
the next slice of φ. It is straightforward to show that the union
of two projectagons is contained in the projectagon obtained
from the union of their projection polygons. Occasionally, the
polygons for two consecutive time steps will be disjoint – this
can occur when the projectagon barely crosses into the φ ≥ hi
half-space. In this case, Coho uses the bounding box of the
union as a simple, over approximation.
The transistor model from Section V-A can produce large
error bounds that include currents that flow against the drain-
to-source voltage. These non-physical behaviours allowed by
the model caused Coho to fail to verify the toggle. It is simple
to show that the circuit model has an invariant that all node
voltages are between 0 volts (i.e. ground) and 1.8 volts (i.e.
Vdd) and that xx ≥ x, yy ≤ y and zz ≤ z. We modified Coho
to allow the user-supplied model to provide such invariants.
With these user-supplied invariants, Coho successfully com-
puted the tight bounds on the reachable region at the end of
the phase described above.
Phase 2: (φ = 1, x = 0, y = 1, z = 0) → (φ =
0, x = 1, y = 1, z = 0): In this phase, φ makes a high-to-
low transition, and x goes from low-to-high. The verification
proceeded in the same manner as for Phase 1.
Phase 3: (φ = 0, x = 1, y = 1, z = 0) → (φ = 1, x =
0, y = 0, z = 1): In this phase, φ goes from low-to-high,
and all three of x, y, and z change their values, in the order
y ↓ → z ↑ → x ↓. This was the most challenging phase to
verify. As seen in Table I, we used ten projection polygons
for this phase instead of six as were used in the other phases.
The greatest challenge arose because z can start its rising
transition while y is still falling. To show that output, q of the
204
Start and end hyper-rectangle for each phase
Phase φ x y z xx yy zz
1, start 0.2 [0.000, 0.100] [1.700, 1.800] [1.700, 1.800] [0.000, 1.0] [0.000, 0.100] [0.000, 0.100]
1, end 1.6 [0.000, 0.002] [1.790, 1.800] [0.000, 0.014] [1.788, 1.8] [0.000, 0.004] [0.000, 0.001]
2, start 1.6 [0.000, 0.100] [1.700, 1.800] [0.000, 0.100] [1.700, 1.8] [0.000, 0.100] [0.000, 0.100]
2, end 0.2 [1.795, 1.800] [1.758, 1.800] [0.000, 0.043] [1.795, 1.8] [1.152, 1.736] [0.000, 0.003]
3, start 0.2 [1.750, 1.800] [1.750, 1.800] [0.000, 0.050] [1.750, 1.8] [0.800, 1.800] [0.000, 0.040]
3, end 1.6 [0.000, 0.001] [0.000, 0.005] [1.703, 1.800] [1.785, 1.8] [0.000, 0.002] [0.843, 1.740]
4, start 1.6 [0.000, 0.100] [0.000, 0.100] [1.700, 1.800] [1.700, 1.8] [0.000, 0.100] [0.800, 1.800]
4, end 0.2 [0.000, 0.100] [1.700, 1.800] [1.700, 1.800] [0.000, 1.0] [0.000, 0.100] [0.000, 0.100]
Projection Polygons for each phase
Phase Polygons
1 x vs. xx, x vs. z, z vs. zz, z vs. xx, φ vs. y, φ vs. yy
2 x vs. xx, x vs. y, x vs. yy, y vs. yy, φ vs. z, φ vs. zz
3 x vs. xx, x vs. y, x vs. yy, y vs. yy, y vs. z, y vs. zz, z vs. zz, z vs. z, z vs. xx, φ vs. z
4 x vs. xx, y vs. yy, y vs. z, y vs. zz, z vs. zz, φ vs. z
TABLE I
REACHABILITY SUMMARY
toggle satisfies the same Brockett annulus as used for φ (see
Section V-C), the transitions of z need to have relatively small
rise and fall times. The time derivative of z depends on the
values of φ, y, z and zz. We found that once φ was high (i.e.
greater than 1.6 volts), it was helpful to slice on the value of
y. We used 0.1 volt wide slides for y as it fell from 1.3 volts
to 0.1 volts. We sliced z in the same manner but found that it
was unnecessary to slice x.
For z to make its rising transition, zz must also rise.
Otherwise, the current through the transistor between z and
zz can dominate the current through the pull-up transistor for
z. We found it surprisingly challenging to show that zz rises
at an acceptable rate. The problem occurs when both z and zz
have wide bounds including values close to ground for each.
With wide bounds, the error term for the current through the
transistor between z and zz can be large. At one extreme of
this error bound, the current from z to zz is negative which
keeps the lower bound for zz at ground. At the other extreme,
the current form z to zz is large and positive which keeps z
from rising.
We solved the negative current problem by adding a transis-
tor model that simply determines the minimum and maximum
drain-to-source current for the region around the current face.
While this model has a large error-term, it never predicts
a current of the wrong sign. We modified Coho to each
compute forward time step twice: first using the least-squares
current models and then using the min/max models. Coho
then computes the intersection of the two projectagons that it
obtains. Because each of the projectagons contains the actual
reachable space, their intersection does as well. This preserves
the soundness of Coho while significantly reducing the errors.
Finally, we introduced the improvements in the bloat cal-
culation described in Section IV-B and polygon simplification
described in Section IV-C. With these changes, we were able to
verify this phase (and all four phases) of the toggle’s operation.
Phase 4: (φ = 1, x = 0, y = 0, z = 1) → (φ =
0, x = 0, y = 1, z = 1): In this phase, φ makes a high-to-






















Fig. 6. The Brockett Annulus for q and q̇
low transition, and y goes from low-to-high. The verification
proceeded in the same manner as for Phases 1 and 2.
C. Verifying the Output Brockett Annulus
Thus far, we have ignored the q output of the toggle in
our analysis – we simply included a load on z equal to
the gate capacitance of transistors that drive q. We verified
the operation of the inverter separately. To do so, we first
constructed the Brockett annulus for the z output.
At each time step of the verification described above, we
determined the reachable combinations of z and ż. We note
that ż is negative monotonic in z and positive monotonic in zz.
Thus, the extremal values of z vs. ż occur on the boundary
of the z vs. zz projection. For each edge of the z vs. zz
projection, Coho computes the linearized circuit model and
uses this model to find the reachable combinations of z and ż.
From these, we constructed a Brockett annulus that is satisfied
by z and ż.
We then perform a separate reachability analysis for the
output inverter. The input to this circuit is modeled by the
Brockett annulus derived above, and we compute the reachable
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region of q vs. q̇ as described above for z. Figure 6 shows the
result; q clearly satisfies the constraints that we used for φ.
Thus, these toggles can be composed to form an arbitarily
large ripple-counter as desired.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have implemented a working version of the Coho algo-
rithm for performing reachability analysis of circuits modeled
by non-linear differential equations. We used Coho to verify
a toggle flip-flop using a model that exposed all seven nodes
of the circuit and used accurate (vendor provided BSIM-3)
transistor models. We believe that our verification of a seven-
dimensional, non-linear system is the largest such verification
to date and shows the feasibility of using formal methods to
verify digital designs at the circuit level.
Coho is slow, and our immediate work will be to address
issues of performance. We are aware of obvious opportunities
for improving the performance including more efficient algo-
rithms for some of the critical operations, and re-implementing
critical pieces of code in C instead of the current Matlab
and Java implementation. Furthermore, there is abundant par-
allelism available in Coho, as each edge of each projection
polygon can be processed independently during each time step.
The multithreading capabilities of the Java part of the code
should make this parallelism readily accessible and we will
explore parallel implementations. We note that the memory
requirements for Coho are relatively modest, and unlike many
reachability tools, we don’t expect memory to be a critical
limitation in the near future.
In the process of verifying the toggle, we have iden-
tified numerous places where the over approximations of
our models and algorithms could be reduced at a relatively
low computational cost. We will explore these refinements.
This should enable the verification of more complex circuits.
While climbing up the ladder to higher-dimensional models
is challenging, we note that it is also very rewarding. The
fraction of interesting cell designs that can be modeled grows
rapidly with dimension, and we expect that a tool that could
verify circuits with ten to fifteen nodes would be adequate for
most cells in a cell-library or specialized logic functions in a
full-custom design. Once cells are verified with specifications
that allow compositional reasoning, more traditional tools for
discrete equivalence and model checking could be used to
verify larger designs.
This first demonstration of verifying a circuit with a de-
tailed, non-linear circuit model was far from automatic. Signif-
icant human expertise was required in using Coho, improving
the reachability algorithms, modeling the circuits, and writing
the specification. This is typical for the first demonstration of
a new verification technology. We expect that as we improve
Coho and apply it to a wider range of examples, we will also
develop a more automated verification flow that will allow
these verification techniques to be used by typical circuit
designers.
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Abstract—Analog and mixed signal (AMS) designs are impor-
tant integrated circuits that are usually needed at the interface be-
tween the electronic system and the real world. Recently, several
formal techniques have been introduced for AMS verification.
In this paper, we propose a difference equations based bounded
model checking approach for AMS systems. We define model
checking using a combined system of difference equations for
both the analog and digital parts, where the state space explo-
ration algorithm is handled with Taylor approximations over
interval domains. We illustrate our approach on the verification
of several AMS designs including ∆Σ modulator and oscillator
circuits.
I. INTRODUCTION
Analog and mixed signal (AMS) designs are important
integrated circuits used at the interface between an electronic
system and its real world. Several computer aided design
tools for AMS systems have been developed to overcome
challenges in the design process of such designs. Simulation
based verification approaches are usually applied to check that
an AMS design is robust with respect to different types of
inaccuracies. However, with circuits growing in complexity,
simulation is not enough to validate complex properties. Actu-
ally, it is reported that in recent chips about 50% of errors that
implied redesign are due to errors in analog or mixed portions
[19]. Therefore, introducing new verification methodologies
for these systems is growing in importance.
Boosted by previous successes in the verification of corner
cases in digital designs, formal methods became a serious
candidate for the verification of AMS systems. In fact, they
promise a complete verification and a high level of confidence.
Usually, one is interested in global properties connected to the
dynamic behavior of the AMS systems. For example, we might
be interested in reachability properties, like “can we reach
from the initial state a state where a certain condition holds?”
or “will the circuit oscillate for giving parameters?”. Unfortu-
nately, a direct application of formal methods on AMS systems
is very difficult. Unlike digital designs, the functionality of
AMS systems is defined in terms of continuous quantities
and in terms of continuous time, as they deal usually with
factors like voltage level, signal noise and current leakage,
in addition to higher order physical effects when designing in
deep submicron. In fact, while the behavior of AMS systems is
generally modeled using differential equations over continuous
quantities, formal methods, however, are defined using models
based on discrete events and automata. Today, an important
gap remains in linking these two mathematical approaches.
Most research efforts concentrate on how to abstract dif-
ferential equations in order to be adopted inside automata
based algorithms. In this paper, we propose an alternative
approach, based on bounded model checking [5] for AMS
systems modeled in terms of recurrence equations. Discrete
and continuous time based analog systems are described
using ordinary differential equations or difference equations,
respectively, while the digital parts of the AMS design are
described using event based models. We then define a model
checking method using a combined system of difference equa-
tions for both the analog and digital parts, where state space
exploration algorithms are handled with Taylor approximations
over interval domains. Such modeling allows the computation
over continuous quantities while avoiding the unsoundness
inherent in the numerical Taylor approximation. We illustrate
the proposed method on the verification of a variety of designs
including a ∆Σ modulator design and oscillator circuits.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II,
we give an overview of the proposed methodology, followed
by system model description in Section III. Interval based
analysis and Taylor models are described in Section IV. The
verification algorithm along with symbolic simulation are then
presented in Section V. Experimental results are shown in
Section VI, and finally, in Section VII, we present related work
before we conclude the paper with Section VIII.
II. PROPOSED METHODOLOGY
The principle of bounded model checking (BMC) is the
search for a counter-example of the property checked against
the model for a bounded k steps. If such counter-example
is found or a fixpoint is reached, the verification task is
achieved, else the number of steps can be increased for further
verification.
An AMS system is a hybrid system composed in general
of a digital part described using logical primitives and an
analog part which can be described directly using recurrence
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Fig. 1. Overview of the AMS Verification Methodology
equations or a set of differential equations. We propose to con-
vert differential equations into an equivalent set of recurrence
equations using the Taylor approximation method. Therefore
the recurrence model gives the possibility to handle continuous
behaviors like that of current and voltages, but in discrete time
intervals, which cover a non-trivial class of mixed behaviors.
The properties are temporal relations between signals of the
system and are described using a basic subset of Linear
Temporal Logic (LTL).
The proposed methodology is composed of two steps as
shown in Figure 1. In the first step, the AMS description and
LTL property of interest are input to a symbolic simulator
that performs a set of transformations by rewriting rules in
order to obtain a mathematical representation called System
of Generalized Recurrence Equations (SRE) (to be described
later). These are recurrence relations that give a description of
the property of interest in terms of the system equations. The
next step is to prove the properties using a verification engine
that performs bounded model checking over interval Taylor
model forms. The interval Taylor model form is a combined
symbolic numerical representation of the system equations
using polynomials and interval terms that ensure enclosure
of the reachable states, hence providing a sound abstraction
of the reachable sets.
We have implemented this verification algorithm using the
computer algebra system Mathematica, which provides special
functions for symbolic simplification, manipulation and proof
of algebraic relations.
III. AMS DESIGN MODELING
Different formalisms have been proposed for modeling
systems with combination of discrete and continuous (hybrid)
behavior, for instance, hybrid automata [14]. Such formalisms
have been applied for AMS modeling. In this paper, we
propose to use a generalization of recurrence equations to
model different aspects of the AMS designs; mainly the
continuous and discrete time behaviors.
A. Systems of Recurrence Equations
The notion of recurrence equation was extended in [1]
to describe digital circuits using what is called generalized
If-formula. Such formalization was found practical in
modeling hybrid systems like discrete-time AMS design
[2]. In the remaining of this paper, we will show how such
recurrence equations can be suitable under certain conditions
for modeling continuous-time AMS systems, hence allowing
a unified modeling framework for discrete and continuous
time AMS designs.
Definition 1: Generalized If-formula
In the context of symbolic expressions, the generalized
If-formula is a class of expressions that extend recurrence
equations to describe digital systems. Let K be a numerical
domain (N, Z, Q, R or B), a generalized If-formula is one
of the following:
• A variable xi(n) ∈ x(n), with i ∈ {1, . . . , d}, n ∈ N and
x(n) = {x1(n), . . . , xd(n)}.
• A constant C ∈ K
• Any arithmetic operation ⋄ ∈ {+,−,÷,×} between
variables xi(n) ∈ K
• A logical formula: any expression constructed using
a set of variables xi(n) ∈ B and logical operators:
not, and, or, xor, nor, . . ., etc.
• A comparison formula: any expression constructed using
a set of xi(n) ∈ K and comparison operator α ∈ {=, 6=
, <,≤, >,≥}.
• An expression IF (X,Y, Z), where X is a logical formula
or a comparison formula and Y,Z are any generalized
If-formula. Here, IF (x, y, z) : B × K × K −→ K
satisfies the axioms:
(1) IF (True,X, Y ) = X
(2) IF (False,X, Y ) = Y
Definition 2: A System of Recurrence Equations (SRE)
Consider a set of variables xi(n) ∈ K, i ∈ {1, . . . , d}, n ∈ N,
an SRE is a system consisting of a set of equations of the
form:
xi(n) = fi(xj(n − γ)), (j, γ) ∈ εi,∀n ∈ Z
where fi(xj(n− γ)) is a generalized If-formula. The set
εi is a finite non-empty subset of 1, . . . , d×N. The integer γ
is called the delay.
Example 1: Figure 2 shows a first-order ∆Σ modulator of
one-bit with two quantization levels, +1V and −1V. Consider
the constraint that the quantizer (input signal y(n)) should be
between −2V and +2V in order to not be overloaded. The
SRE of the ∆Σ is then described as:
y(n) = y(n − 1) + u(n) − v(n − 1)








Fig. 2. First-order ∆Σ Modulator
B. Taylor Approximation
A large class of AMS and analog designs have continuous
time behavior, usually described using a system of ordinary
differential equations (ODE). Unfortunately, a closed form
solution is generally not available for ODE systems and
discrete approximate models are used. One basic idea is to
use the approximation x[tk+1] = f(x[tk]) + Rm of the ODE
ẋ = f(x) as truncated Taylor series for x(t), expanded about
time instant tk, with a remainder term Rm.
Theorem 1: Taylor Approximation. Suppose a function f :
R
d → R over states vector x ∈ Rd is m + 1 time partially
differentiable on the interval [a, b]. Assume x0 ∈ [a, b], such
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In general, to obtain an approximate solution of the ODE
system, we consider a sequence of discrete time points
t0, t1, . . . , tm for which the solution is approximated, with
hi = ti+1 − ti. If the solution x(t) of an ODE system
ẋ = f(x) is a function which is p + 1 times continuously
differentiable on the open interval (ti..ti+1), then, from the
Taylor approximation theorem, we have:











with h = ti+1−ti and ξ = [ti, ti+1] and ∀k ∈ [1, p+1].x
(k) =
f (k−1)(x(t), t), where the vector function f is composed by
d elementary functions fq(x1, . . . , xd), q ∈ {1, . . . , d}, such
that:
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Such representation allows giving an approximate
polynomial description of the behavior of an ODE system
using generalized SRE. To preserve the inherited behavior
of the actual solution, the remainder term should not be
discarded and instead bounds must be specified. We use
interval arithmetic methods to obtain such bounds. Interval
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Fig. 3. Switched Analog Circuit
behavior of the system as will be shown later on.
Example 2: Consider the analog circuit in Figure 3, com-
posed of a network of passive components (capacitors and
conductances), along with non-linear current sources and
two switches. The switches can be designed using CMOS
transistors working in saturation mode as shown in the figure.
This circuit exhibits an oscillatory behavior when the initial
capacitor voltages are within a specified range, based on the
switches positions. The voltages across the capacitors can be
described using ODEs as follows:
{
˙vc1 = vc2 or ˙vc1 = vc2 + v
3
c2
˙vc2 = −vc1 + v
3
c1 or ˙vc2 = −vc1 + (1/2)v
3
c1
Suppose that we specify the switching conditions as
Cond1 = Cond2 := vc1(n − 1) ≤ vc2(n − 1)
For illustration purposes and for clarity, we use Taylor approx-
imation limited to order 2 to obtain the corresponding SREs:
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vc2(n − 1) + Rm4[ fvc1, fvc2])
where Rmi[ṽc1, ṽc2] are the Taylor approximation remainders,
i = {1, . . . , 4} and h is the time step.
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IV. INTERVAL ANALYSIS
Interval domains are numerical domains that enclose the
original states of a system of equations at each discrete
step [20]. Algorithms supporting such numerical domains
are used to produce bounded envelopes for the reachable
states not only at some discrete time points but also for all
continuous ranges of intermediate states between any two
consecutive time discrete points. These algorithms, generally
known as validated methods, are an attractive tool to use in
the verification of the behavior of systems with uncertainty on
the design parameters or initial conditions. The fact that the
generated bounds provide a sound abstraction for the reachable
states, makes it attractive to be used with formal verification
techniques. The basic interval arithmetics is defined as follows:
Let I1 = [a, b] and I2 = [a
′, b′] be two real intervals
(bounded and closed), the basic arithmetic operations on
intervals are defined by:
I1ΦI2 = {r1Φr2|r1 ∈ I1 ∧ r2 ∈ I2}
with Φ ∈ {+,−,×, /} except that I1/I2 is not defined if
0 ∈ I2 [20].
In addition, other elementary functions can be included as
basic interval arithmetic operators. For example, exp may be
defined as exp([a, b]) = [exp(a), exp(b)].
The guarantee that the real solutions for a given function
are enclosed by the interval representation is formalized by
the following property.
Definition 3: Inclusion Function.[20] Let f : Rd → R be
a continuous function, then F : Id → I is an interval extension
(inclusion function) of f if
{f(x1, . . . , xd)|x1 ∈ X1, . . . , xd ∈ Xd} ⊆ F (X1, . . . , Xd)
where I is the interval domain and Xi ∈ I, i ∈ {1, . . . , d}.
Inclusion functions have the property to be inclusion mono-
tonic (i.e., XI ⊆ YI → F (XI) ⊆ F (YI)), hence allowing the
checking of fixpoints.
Unfortunately, due to the over-approximation nature of
interval analysis, a quick divergence in the reachability calcu-
lation may happen. This is mainly due to the following issues
[20]:
• The dependency problem which is the lack of interval
arithmetic to identify different occurrences of the same
variable. For example, x−x = 0 holds for each x ∈ [1, 2],
but X − X for X = [1, 2] yields [−1, 1].
• The wrapping effect which appears when the results
of a computation are overestimated when enclosed into
intervals, hence leading to error accumulation at each
time step.
To overcome the above mentioned drawbacks of interval
computation, Taylor model arithmetics were developed
recently by Berz et. al [3], [18] as an interval extension to
Taylor approximations allowing the non-linear approximation
of system reachable states using non-convex enclosure sets.
Formally, a Taylor model Tf := pn(x) + I for a given
function f consists of a multivariate polynomial pr(x) of
order r in d variables, and a remainder interval I , which
encloses Lagrange remainder of the Taylor approximation.
Hence, the Taylor model arithmetics use interval computation
to obtain reliable enclosures not only for the error term but
also for every term of the series, allowing the computation
of an over-approximation of the solution function at each
time point. In addition, symbolic simplifications are applied
at each step, hence reducing the interval calculations
and consequently delaying divergence problems, usually,
associated with interval based techniques.
Definition 4: Taylor Model Tf := (Pr,f , Ir,f ) is
called a Taylor model of order r of a function f ⇔
∀x ∈ X : f(x) ∈ Pr,f (x−x0)+ Ir,f , where X is an interval,
Pr,f (x − x0) is a Taylor approximation polynomial of order
r around the point x0. An interval Ir,f is called a remainder
bound of order r of f on X ⇔ ∀x ∈ X : Rr,f (x−x0) ∈ Ir,f .
The basic arithmetic rules on Taylor models are defined as
follows [3], [18]:
• Addition: Tr,f+g := Tr,f +Tr,g , (Pr,f +Pr,g, Ir,f +Ir,g)
• Scalar multiplication: Tr,αf = αTr,f , (αPr,f , αIr,f ),
(α ∈ R)
• Multiplication: Tr,fg , Tr,fTr,g := (Pr,fg, Ir,fg)
with:
– Pr,fPr,g = Pr,fg + Pe
– Pe ∈ IPe
– Pr,f ∈ IPr,f
– Pr,g ∈ IPr,g
– Ir,fg := IPe + IPr,f Ir,g + Ir,f (IPr,g + Ir,g)
Based on the above rules, the Taylor model method extends
mathematical operations and functions to Taylor models
such that the inclusion relationships are preserved. This is
demonstrated by the following theorem:
Theorem 2: [18] Let f : Rd → R be a continuous function,
and f ∈ T , where T is the Taylor model of f , then T ⊆ F ,
where F is the inclusion function of f . Moreover, for two
functions f1 ∈ T1 and f2 ∈ T2, we have (f1 + f2) ∈ TS and
(f1.f2) ∈ TP , where TS and TP are Taylor models for the
sum and product of T1 and T2, respectively.
In practice, the evaluation of a function is transformed to
symbolically computing the Taylor polynomial pr(x) of the
function, which will be propagated throughout the evaluation
steps, thus hardly affected by the dependency problem or
the wrapping effect. Only the interval remainder term and
polynomial terms of orders higher than r, which are usually
small, are bounded using intervals as described by the rules
mentioned above and are processed according to the rules
of interval arithmetic. This will be demonstrated by the
following example:
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Example 3: In non-linear analog circuits, voltages and cur-
rents can be described using analytic functions. For example,
in a BJT transistor [10], the collector current is described
as iC = ISe
VBE
VT (1 + VCE
VA
), with VCE is the output voltage
of a differential stage. In such case, VCE = tanh(y) + K,
where K is an arbitrary voltage. Consider the Taylor models
T1 and T2 of the functions e
x, and tanh(y), respectively,
where x = VBE
VT
, the multiplication extanh(y) can be done
using Taylor model arithmetic of two Taylor models of order




[−0.11, 0.11] and T2(y) := y−
y3
3
+ [−0.108, 0.108]. It holds
that:


























+ xy + y+














+ xy + y + [−0.62, 0.54]
In order to deal with the discrete part of the AMS design,
as a generalization of the inclusion function, interval analysis
provides efficient and safe methods for checking truth values
of Boolean propositions over intervals by using the notion of
inclusion test.
Definition 5: Inclusion Test. Given a constraint c : Rd →
B, we define CI : I
d → BI to be an inclusion test of
c, with an interval domain defined with three values set;
BI = {0, 1, [0, 1]}, where 0 stands for false, 1 for true and
[0, 1] for indeterminate, iff:
{c(x1, . . . , xd)|x1 ∈ X1, . . . , xd ∈ Xd} ⊆ CI(X1, . . . , Xd)
where Xi ∈ I, i ∈ {1, . . . , d}.
Inclusion test can be used during the verification algorithm
to prove whether the reachable interval states satisfy a given
property, or not. We define the inclusion test as follows:
CI(X) = 1 ⇒ ∀x ∈ X, c(x) = 1 and CI(X) = 0 ⇒ ∀x ∈
X, c(x) = 0. For instance, given a set of reachable interval
states and a property predicate, we remove the states that do
not satisfy
1 ∈ CI(X1, . . . , Xn)
Therefore, if CI(X1, . . . , Xn) = ∅, then we have a guarantee
that the property is not satisfied.
Let xI = [a, b] and yI = [a
′, b′] be two real intervals
(bounded and closed), a set of the main logical rules that
define the inclusion test is given as follows:
xI ≤
ι yI = 1 ⇔ b ≤ a
′
xI ∈
ι yI = 1 ⇔ xI ∈ yI
⇔ a ≥ a′ and b ≤ b′
Example 4: Consider the switching condition in the circuit
of Figure 3 defined as Cond1 := vc1(n − 1) ≤ vc2(n − 1),
then we have the following:
(vc1(n − 1) := [1, 3]) ≤ (vc2(n − 1) := [3, 5]) = 1
(vc1(n − 1) := [1, 3]) ≤ (vc2(n − 1) := [2, 5]) = [0, 1]
V. INTERVAL BASED BOUNDED MODEL CHECKING
In this section, we present bounded model checking (BMC)
algorithm to support AMS designs. We explore a solution
relying on symbolic and interval computational methods. Our
BMC approach is based on modeling the transition function as
SREs over the Taylor models forms. We proceed on the SREs
traces using a time step ~ which implies that our answer is
relative to a limited time interval. For recurrence equations, we
have ~ = 1. For differential equations, we approximate them
using Taylor model with ~ ∈ R, ensuring the accumulated
error due to ~-approximation is confined in the Interval part
of the Taylor model. We consider properties specified in a LTL
like language.
In the remaining of this section we will describe the
symbolic simulation, and the property checking algorithm of
the proposed methodology.
A. The Symbolic Simulation Algorithm
The generation of the SREs and the evaluation of Taylor
model forms rely on rewriting rules based on the symbolic
simulation algorithm developed in [1] for digital systems and
extended for discrete-time AMS designs in [2]. The symbolic
simulation algorithm ReplaceRepeated(Expr,R) shown in
Algorithm 1 is based on rewriting by repetitive substitution,
which applies recursively a set of rewriting of rules R on an
expression Expr until a fixpoint is reached.
Algorithm 1 ReplaceRepeated(Expr,R)
1: Expr = expr
2: repeat
3: Exprt = ReplaceList(Expr,R)
4: Expr = Exprt
5: until FP (Exprt, R)
ReplaceList(Expr, R): The substitution function ReplaceList
takes as arguments an expression Expr and a list of
substitution rules R = {R1, R2, . . . , Rn}. It applies each rule
sequentially on the expression.
FP(Expr, R): A substitution fixpoint FP (Expr,R) is ob-
tained, if:
ReplaceList(expr, R) ≡ ReplaceList(ReplaceList(expr, R), R)
211
The correctness of this rewriting algorithm as well as the
proof of termination and confluence of the rewriting system is
discussed in [1].
Depending on the type of expressions, we distinguish the
following kinds of rewriting rules over Boolean and Real
domains:
• Polynomial symbolic expressions: RMath for the simpli-
fication of polynomial expressions (Rn[x]).
• Logical symbolic expressions: RLogic for the simplifica-
tion of Boolean expressions and to eliminate obvious ones
like (and(a, a) → a) and (not(not(a)) → a).
• If-formula expressions: RIF for the simplification of
computations over If-formulae. The definition and
properties of the IF function, like reduction and distri-
bution, are used.
– IF Reduction: IF (x, y, y) → y
– IF Distribution: f(A1, . . . , IF (x, y, z), . . . , An) →
IF (x, f(A1, . . . , y, . . . , An), f(A1, . . . , z, . . . , An))
For example a + IF (x > 0, b, a) → IF (x > 0, b +
a, a + a)
For Taylor model generation and evaluation over intervals,
we used the following rules which where developed based on
the properties described in Section IV
• Taylor expressions: RTlr are rules intended for the sim-
plification of Taylor model expressions (Tr,f ).
• Interval expressions: RInt are rules intended for the
simplification of interval expressions.
• Interval-Logical symbolic expressions: RInt−Logic are
rules intended for the simplification of Boolean expres-
sions over intervals.
B. Temporal Properties
We use an LTL like syntax to represent the properties.
The syntax is composed of formulae P (n) defined recursively
and built using Boolean expressions over atomic propositions
with temporal operators: eventually F and always G. To
describe properties on analog signals like current and voltages,
atomic propositions encode predicates (inequalities) over reals;
p(n) ∼ c, where p(n) is a polynomial over the state variables,
∼∈ {<,≤, >,≥,=, 6=}, c ∈ R. As in traditional BMC, we
define temporal operators regarding a bounded time step k.
Always operator G: GP (n) specifies that a property P (n)
holds in the current time step of a given path iff the property
and the operand hold at the current state and all previous states.
Iteratively, we write:





Eventually operator F: FP (n) specifies that a property
holds at the current state or at a previous state. Iteratively,
we write:





In fact, the inverse of the property (¬P ) under verification
is used in the BMC algorithm. When a satisfying valuation is
returned by the solver, it is interpreted as a counterexample
of length k and the property P is proved satisfied (¬P
is satisfied). However, if the problem is determined to be
unsatisfiable, the solver produces a proof (of unsatisfiability)
of the fact that there are no counterexamples of length k.
C. Verification Algorithm
The bounded forward reachability algorithm starts at the
initial states and at each step computes the image, which
is the set of reachable interval states. This procedure is
continued until either the property is falsified in some state
or no new states are encountered. We define the interval
based transition system denoting the behavior of the system
as follows:
Definition 6: Interval based state machine. An Interval
based state machine is a tuple TI = (SI , SI,0,→Tf ), where
SI is the interval state space, SI,0 ⊆ SI is the set of initial
interval states, →Tf⊆ SI×SI is a relation defined using Taylor
model forms Tf and capturing the abstract transition between
interval states such that:
{s →Tf s
′|∃a ∈ s,∃b ∈ s′ : b = f(a) and f ∈ Tf}
where a, b ∈ Rd, s, s′ ∈ SI , f = {f1, . . . , fd},
T = {Tf1 , . . . , Tfd} with fi : R
d → R is a continuous
function, i ∈ {1, . . . , d} and fi ∈ Tfi , where Tfi is the Taylor
model of fi.
Bounded model checking over interval domains is then
defined as follows:
Definition 7: BMC Given a natural number k ≥ 0, an
interval based state machine (SI , SI,0,→Tf ) as defined above,
and a property Prop, we say that property Prop is verified
for k steps if:
∀s ∈ Rk(S0) : s |= Prop
where S0 is the set of initial states.
The different steps for checking safety properties is shown
in Algorithm 2. The system equations and the (negated)
property ¬Prop[n] to be verified are given, with the
equations initialized are provided. The loop in lines (1-13)
describes the verification procedure for Nmax time steps. At
each step n, we use an evaluation over the Taylor model
forms (line 2) to check whether the property is satisfied or
not (line 3). If ¬Prop[n] is satisfied then a counterexample
is generated (line 10), if not, then check for fixpoint (line 5),
otherwise update the reachable states (line 12) and go to the
next time step verification.
SRE(A, r): Given an AMS system (A) and an order r,
SRE(A, r) returns the generalized SREs by applying the
symbolic rules described earlier. For the case of a continuous
function, the Taylor approximation of order r is applied to
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Algorithm 2 Safety Verification
Require: x[n] := SRE(A, r)
Require: ¬Prop[n]
Require: R0 = S0
1: for n = 1 to Nmax do
2: Tot,x[n] := TM Form(x[n], ot)
3: if Prop Check(¬Prop[n], Tot,x[n]) == False then
4: if Reach[Tot,x[n]] ⊆ R
n−1 then







12: Rn−1 = Update Reach(Rn−2, Reach[Tot,x[n−1]])
13: end for
generate the SREs.
TM Form(x[n],ot): Given a set of SREs, TM Form returns
the corresponding Taylor model with order ot at the specified
time step. Such model will be checked against properties for
satisfaction using Prop Check
Prop Check: Given the Taylor model forms representing the
transition function and the property ¬Prop(), apply algebraic
decision procedures to check for satisfiability. The safety
verification at a given step n can be defined with the following
formula:
Prop Check , x[n] = Tot,x[n](x[n − 1], ~) ∧ ¬Prop(x[n])
Reach[Tot,x[n]]: Given the Taylor model form at an arbitrary
time step, Reach evaluates the reachable states at according
to the following definition:
Definition 8: 1-Step Reachable states. The set of reachable
states in 1 step from a given set of states Sk ⊆ I
d, is denoted
by R1(Sk) and is defined as:
R1(Sk) , {s
′ ∈ Sk+1|∃s ∈ Sk :
−→
F 1(s) = s
′}
where Sk+1 ⊆ I
d,
−→
F = (F1, . . . , Fd), with Fi : I
d → I is
an interval evaluation of Taylor model form of the function
fi : R
d → R, i ∈ {1, . . . , d}.
Update Reach(R1, R2): The function returns the union of
the states in the sets R1 and R2 according to the following
definition:
Definition 9: The set of reachable states in less than k steps
(0 < l < k), from a given set of S0 of states, is denoted by












Fig. 4. Oscillation Behavior for Circuit in Example 2
For instance, in Algorithm 2 (line 12) we have Rn−2 =
R<n−1(S0) and Reach[Tot,x[n−1]] = R1(sn−1)
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We have applied the verification algorithm on the analog cir-
cuit described in Example 2 and a third-order ∆Σ modulator.
For the analog circuit, we checked the oscillation property for
given set of initial voltages and for all switching conditions.
We formally describe the oscillation property as:
Prop1 : G((p1 ⇒ Fp2) ∧ (p2 ⇒ Fp1))
where p1 = ¬p2 := Vc1 < Vc2. For instance, when the analog
circuit is described by ˙vc1 = vc2 and ˙vc2 = −vc1 + v
3
c1,
the reachable states for the oscillation behavior are shown in
Figure 4, bounded by the corresponding Taylor model. We
also checked several safety properties, e.g.,
Prop2 : G(−0.5 < Vc1 < 0.5) ∧ (−0.5 < Vc2 < 0.5)
and
Prop3 : G(−1 < Vc2 < 1)







a → [−0.03, 0.03] b → [−0.03, 0.03]
h → 0.01







a → [−0.03, 0.03] b → [−0.03, 0.03]
h → 0.01
x[0] = 1 + a y[0] = 0.2 + b
The verification results for 2 possible switching cases of
this circuit (we refer to as circuit 1 and circuit 2) are shown
in Table I. For the first set of initial conditions, we find that
the circuit is behaving in accordance with the properties,
hence the properties are satisfied. For the second set of
initial conditions, the safety properties Prop2 and Prop3 are
violated while divergence prevent us to check whether the
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circuits are oscillating or not 1.
Table II shows the verification results for a third-order ∆Σ
modulator 2. A ∆Σ modulator is said to be stable if the
integrator output remains bounded under a bounded input
signal, thus avoiding that the quantizer in the modulator
becomes overloaded which leads to instability. The stability
properties is written as: P (k) := G(−1 < x3(k) < 1),
where x3 is the input to the quantizer. For a first set of initial
constraints, the modulator loses stability after 5 time steps.
For the second, set of constraints the modulator was proved
stable for 45 time steps.
TABLE II
VERIFICATION RESULTS FOR 3rd ORDER ∆Σ MODULATOR
Initial Property Evaluation CPU time
Constraints for n = 0 to Nmax Cycles Used
Initial constraints 1 Nmax = 15 3.89 sec
n = 0 to 5 True
n > 5 False
Initial constraints 2 Nmax = 45 120.8 sec
True
VII. RELATED WORK
We can identify two classes of verification techniques
for AMS designs, namely state exploration methods (e.g.,
reachability analysis) and algebraic methods (e.g., constraint
solving). Common to the proposed state based methods is
the necessity of the explicit computation of either exact or
approximate reachable sets corresponding to the continuous
dynamics, hence deducing properties about the properties of
the design under verification. In the constraint based methods,
the AMS design is described by a set of equations (algebraic or
difference equations) along with a set of constraints. Algebraic
and logical rules are then applied to check whether the system
satisfies such constraints or not.
For instance, model checking and reachability analysis were
proposed for validating AMS designs over a range of parame-
ter values and a set of possible input signals. Several methods
for approximating reachable sets for continuous dynamics
have been proposed in the open literature. They rely on the
discretization of the continuous state space by using over-
approximating domains like polyhedra and intervals. In [15],
the authors construct a finite-state discrete abstraction of elec-
tronic circuits by partitioning the continuous state space into
fixed size hypercubes and computed the reachability relations
between these cubes using numerical techniques. In [11], the
authors tried to overcome the expensive computational method
in [15], by combining discretization and projection techniques
of the state space, hence reducing its dimension. While the
approach in [11] is less precise due to the use of projection
techniques, it is still sound. Variant approaches of the latter
analysis were proposed. For instance, the model checking
1The experiments were performed on Intel Core2 1900 MHz processor and
2GB of RAM
2Details about the design can be found in [22]
tools d/dt [6], Checkmate [9] and PHaver [8] were adapted
and used in the verification of a biquad low-pass filter [6], a
tunnel diode oscillator and a ∆Σ modulator [9], and voltage
controlled oscillators [8]. In [13], the authors used intervals
to construct the abstract state space, while used heuristics
to identify possible transition between adjacent regions, main
difference with [15], is that they allow variable sized regions.
Petri nets based models and algorithms have been developed
also for the reachability analysis of AMS designs in [17], [16].
The AMS verification we present in this paper is in the same
spirit as the above mentioned works in terms of requirement
for state exploration. However, we can identify two distinct
points. First, we rely on a recurrence equation form as a
way to model the design rather than automata, which provide
us with more compact representation. Second, we apply the
verification over Taylor model forms which provide tight
bounds for the reachable states by using non-convex over
approximation. In addition, Taylor models allow the symbolic
representation of the reachable states using polynomials terms,
therefore minimizing the risk of state explosion.
In [12], the author proposed an approach for specifying
and reasoning about digital systems that are described at
the analog level of abstraction. The approach relies upon
specifying the behaviors of analog components by piecewise-
linear predicates on voltages and currents. Theorem proving
and constraint based methods are then used to check for
the implication relation between the implementation and the
specification. In [7], the authors developed a bounded model
checking prototype tool (Property-Checker) for the verification
of the static behavior of AMS designs. The basic idea is
based on validity checking of first-order formulae over a finite
interval of time. In [7], the authors trade-off accuracy with
efficiency by basing the analysis on rational numbers rather
than real numbers, however affecting the soundness of the
verification. In addition to the loose approximations in [12],
[7], the verification is only possible for static behavior.
In [2], [23], the authors propose an induction verification
approach for AMS designs using symbolic methods. The
procedure is iterative in the sense that if the proof is obtained,
then the property is verified. Otherwise, generated counterex-
amples are analyzed and constraints refinement is applied
and verification is repeated until the property is verified or
a concrete counterexample is identified. Such methodology is
limited for AMS systems that can be described using discrete
time models, while our approach consider continuous time
systems. More details about the application of formal methods
to the verification of AMS designs can be found in [24].
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have defined a bounded model checking
approach for AMS systems modeled in terms of combination
between SRE and differential equations. We have proposed a
semi-symbolic modeling of the state space using the principle
of Taylor models which provide a way for representing a com-
bination of representation using a combination of polynomials




Circuit & BMC Verification CPU & Memory
Properties for k = 0 to Nmax Steps Used
Circuit 1 (Parameters 1) Nmax = 700 107.39 sec
Oscillation Property Proved True 7.93 MB
Prop2 Proved True
Prop3 Proved True
Circuit 1 (Parameters 2) Nmax = 700 108.41 sec
Oscillation Property Not Verified (Divergence) 7.14 MB
Prop2 Proved False at k = 18
Prop3 Proved False at k = 18
Circuit 2 (Parameters 1) Nmax = 1200 583.75 sec
Oscillation Property Proved True 51.15 MB
Prop2 Proved True
Prop3 Proved True
Circuit 2 (Parameters 2) Nmax = 1200 584.05 sec
Oscillation Property Not Verified (Divergence) 50.60 MB
Prop2 Proved False at k = 4
Prop3 Proved False at k = 9
the fact, that the polynomial representation helps slowing the
divergence due to the over-approximated intervals, meanwhile,
the interval part provides an important abstraction to handle
the continuous behavior.
We have developed and implemented this arithmetic as
a set of simplification rules a the bounded model checking
algorithm. Experimental results have proven the feasibility
and the utility of the approach. However, the method is still
limited in terms of capacity. In fact, we have implemented our
methodology using standard libraries for symbolic computa-
tion available in Mathematica.
Future research directions include investigating alternative
implementations to improve the experimental capacity over
more complex systems and to measure the limitation of the
proposed methodology. Also, an important effort is needed to
classify the kind of properties and AMS systems that can be
verified using this verification approach.
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Abstract— The relationship between changes in gene expres-
sion and physical characteristics associated with Down syndrome
is not well understood. Chromosome 21 genes interact with non-
chromosome 21 genes to produce Down syndrome characteristics.
This indirect influence, however, is difficult to empirically define
due to the number, size, and complexity of the involved gene
regulatory networks. This work links chromosome 21 genes to
non-chromosome 21 genes known to interact in a Down syndrome
phenotype through a reachability analysis of labeled transi-
tion graphs extracted from published gene regulatory network
databases. The analysis provides new relations in a recently
discovered link between a specific gene and Down syndrome
phenotype. This type of formal analysis helps scientists direct
empirical studies to unravel chromosome 21 gene interactions
with the hope for therapeutic intervention.
I. INTRODUCTION
Researchers currently hypothesize that cancers and other
physical ailments are caused by duplication of genes on
chromosomes [1]. Chromosomes are made up of genes that en-
code information about physical characteristics or phenotypes.
Through empirical analysis, systems biologists determine how
genes are linked to certain phenotypes. Knowing how genes
interact to express specific phenotypes is a critical step for
therapeutic intervention in many diseases. The large number of
genes found in an individual and the possible gene interactions
make it difficult to manually discern how gene regulatory
networks influence phenotypic characteristics.
Patients with Down syndrome (DS) have an extra copy of
chromosome 21 (chr. 21) and have phenotypes like abnor-
mal brain and facial features as well as mental retardation.
DS results from three copies of approximately 350 chr. 21
genes and has many well defined phenotypes that make it
an excellent model to understand gene regulatory networks.
By understanding changes that occur in this model, gene
regulatory networks in other diseases that are not as well-
defined genetically or phenotypically can be better understood.
Phenotypes are generated by interactions between genes
that are described by gene regulatory networks. Each gene
regulatory network is a complex feedback circuit that is con-
structed through large, costly, and time consuming empirical
studies. The regulatory networks once understood, however,
provide a wealth of information. For example, pharmaceutical
researchers use gene regulatory network diagrams to design
compounds that inhibit the expression of certain genes. In
other words, pharmaceutical researchers are designing drugs
to target genes involved in specific medical conditions; the
drugs essentially manipulate the gene regulatory networks to
produce a desired outcome.
DS researchers and systems biologists believe that changes
in expression levels of one or more genes on the extra copy
of chr. 21 lead to specific DS phenotypes. Even though DS
researchers and bioinformaticians have documented elevated
expression levels of chr. 21 genes in DS, they have been
unable, for the most part, to directly link a specific chr. 21
gene to a particular phenotype.
Research in human and mouse models shows that there are
modifier genes, not found on chr. 21, that contribute to DS
phenotypes [2], [3]. For example, the Sonic hedgehog gene
(SHH) in the Hedgehog signaling pathway has been directly
linked to a DS brain phenotype [2]. It is, however, unknown
how the SHH gene is linked to chr. 21 genes. The work in this
paper helps researchers focus on specific modifier and chr. 21
genes for empirical studies.
Researchers often relate chr. 21 genes to modifier genes
by manually examining published gene regulatory network
databases. These databases, [4]–[6], are exceptionally com-
plex and regularly evolve as new data is discovered through
empirical studies. Manual extraction of indirect connections
between chr. 21 and modifier genes is not feasible in such a
large, concurrent, and connected system. An automated formal
analysis is required to assist researchers in understanding gene
regulatory networks important in DS.
We use a formal approach to analyze gene regulatory
networks that are mined from different biological databases.
We build a single labeled transition graph from these databases
by defining a way of connecting the gene regulatory networks.
We perform an exhaustive reachability analysis on the graph
using a randomized breadth-first search (BFS). Randomized
BFS gives a sample of shortest path connections between
modifier genes and chr. 21 genes. The random paths are
tabulated and graphed to show researchers the names and
frequencies of genes found in these paths. We hypothesize that
genes frequently found in paths connecting modifier and chr.
21 genes are more likely to be involved in a specific phenotype.
Our results demonstrate a possible relationship between a non-
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chr. 21 modifier gene and chr. 21 genes. These relationships
help DS researchers to direct resources for future empirical
studies.
The principle contributions of this work are: (1) a biolog-
ically feasible technique connecting different gene regulatory
networks into a single labeled transition graph suitable for
formal analysis; (2) a reachability analysis using randomized
BFS to generate different traces between chr. 21 genes and
modifier genes; and (3) tabulated results showing potential
interactions between specific chr. 21 genes and the SHH
modifier gene.
II. RELATED WORK
Several databases store pictorial representations of empiri-
cally curated gene regulatory networks [4]–[6]. Among all the
databases, KEGG [4], currently has the largest amount of data
in the most comprehensible and accessible format. It provides
175 pathways with over 12,000 genes from the human genome.
Many of its pathways include both a pictorial and XML
representation; although, the XML descriptors often have
fewer defined interactions than those defined in the pictorial
descriptors. Another source of gene interactions is found in a
PubMed abstracts database [7]. PubMed is a premier journal
index for published bio-medical articles. Existing research,
[7], extracts gene relationships from PubMed using natural
language processing algorithms. The work in this paper uses
the KEGG database and the PubMed extraction to build the
labeled transition graph of the gene regulatory networks.
State of the art pathway analyses tools such as
Cytoscape [8], Reactome [9], and Bind [10] visualize
gene regulatory networks. They provide some basic query
mechanisms to probe structure in the regulatory networks. The
queries, however, are simple and do not provide an ability
to derive indirect relationships between modifier and chr. 21
genes in a fully automated manner.
Other formal verification approaches that analyze regulatory
networks consider only a single network or pathway [11]–[14].
A single network is modeled in isolation to predict pathway
behavior based on the gene interaction rates. The work in
this paper abstracts many details of individual regulatory
networks to consider the interactions of the complete system
of regulatory networks. Where existing research, [11]–[14],
tries to understand intra-network interactions, we extend the
analysis to inter-network interactions in expressing a specific
phenotype.
III. GRAPH CONSTRUCTION
We build a labeled transition graph from the KEGG and
PubMed databases. The process follows three steps: first,
we abstract the reactions and compounds in gene regulatory
networks in the KEGG database to create intra-pathway gene
interactions; second, we use gene interactions to create inter-
pathway connections; and third, we add PubMed interactions
to the inter-pathway and intra-pathway connections. Adding
the gene-to-gene connections between individual pathways
essentially flattens the KEGG database in step two. The final
labeled transition graph is an over approximation of the actual
biological system. The process is illustrated in more detail
with a simple example.
Fig. 1(a) shows parts of gene regulatory networks and
metabolic pathways: the Hedgehog signaling pathway (HSP),
Basal cell carcinoma (BCC), and Alzheimer’s disease (AD)
regulatory networks. The rectangle boxes in each pathway
represent the genes in the regulatory networks. For example,
the Hedgehog signaling pathway shown in Fig. 1(a) contains
the genes SHH, PTCH, GLI and WNT1. An edge between
any two genes is a direct or indirect interaction between the
genes. We maintain scalability by abstracting away most of
the details in the actual biological system to focus purely
on gene interactions—direct and indirect. Results suggest that
the abstraction retains enough information to be meaningful.
Fig. 1(b) is the final labeled transition graph for the pathways
and PubMed relations shown in Fig. 1(a).
The abstract pathways form a set of intra-network gene
interactions. Each graph is a separate abstracted regulatory
network. For example, the abstract graph of the Hedgehog
signaling pathway contributes s0, s1, s4, and s5 nodes to the
transition graph in Fig. 1(b). The intra-network connections
between the genes in the Hedgehog signaling pathway are
maintained in the transformation. The next step connects the
abstract networks to form an inter-network graph. The separate
abstract networks are connected by creating a set of nodes
labeled by both the gene and the network owning the gene.
Each node contains the gene label and the owning pathway
label. Once the set of nodes is known, then edges are created
between nodes that contain common gene labels. For example,
Fig. 1(a) shows that both HSP and BCC contain the PTCH
gene. As such, Fig. 1(b) connects state s1 to state s2 showing
a relation between the HSP and BCC pathways through the
common PTCH gene. The two different nodes labeled with
PTCH gene for the HSP and BCC networks enable us to
easily detect that PTCH is the gene which connects the HSP
and BCC networks. Connecting regulatory networks in this
way essentially flattens the KEGG database through gene
interactions.
The final step in building the inter-network graph augments
the XML data in the KEGG database with known interactions
published in the PubMed database using the work in [7]. In
essence, any gene pair related in PubMed is also related in the
inter-network graph. For example, the bottom right member of
Fig. 1(a) shows a relation defined in the PubMed database; it
connects the gene A2M to WNTI. The relation is expressed
in Fig. 1(b) by the edge between states s5 and s6.
IV. ANALYSIS
DS researchers are interested in finding the gene interactions
between modifier genes (e.g., SHH gene) and chr. 21 genes.
We define a randomized BFS to find shortest path traces
between modifier genes and chr. 21 genes.
A regular BFS enumerates all nodes reachable in one-step
from the initial node before enumerating nodes reachable








































Fig. 1. Converting a set of gene regulatory pathways into a labeled transition
graph. (a) KEGG pathways and PubMed Relations. (b) The corresponding
labeled transition graph.
shortest distance between the start node and another node of
interest. The search, however, deterministically generates the
same shortest trace between the two nodes in every single trial.
For example, the shortest distance between nodes s6 and s9 is
two steps in Fig. 1(b). The successors of node s6 are sorted
in some default order. If the successors are lexicographically
sorted where node s7 is inserted in the queue before s8, the
BFS generates the trace s6 → s7 → s9 and does not generate
the trace s6 → s8 → s9.
The labeled transition graph derived from the gene regula-
tory networks database is a highly connected graph. It has
approximately 12,000 nodes and one million edges. About
90% of the connections are a result of the abstraction applied
to the pathways while creating the inter-network connections.
The high degree of connectivity creates a large number of
unique shortest paths between two nodes in the graph. There
are different algorithms to find the k shortest paths between
two nodes in a graph such as the one presented by Eppstein
in [15]; however, to randomly sample different shortest traces
we use a randomized BFS for its algorithmic simplicity and
low complexity. Generating s6 → s7 → s9 is equally likely
as generating s6 → s8 → s9 in any trial of randomized BFS.
A randomized BFS generates a subset of the shortest paths
between modifier and chr. 21 genes. The pseudo-code for a
procedure Random BFS(s0)
1: Visited := {s0}
2: Queue.enqueue(s0)
3: while (Queue) 6= ∅ do
4: s := Queue.dequeue
5: if is chr 21 gene(s) then
6: print “Report Path”
7: Xsucc := get successors(s)
8: s := randomize elements(Xsucc)
9: for each s′ ∈ Xsucc do
10: if s′ 6∈ V isited then
11: V isited := V isited ∪ {s′}
12: Queue.enqueue(s′)
Fig. 2. Pseudo-code for randomized breadth-first search.
randomized BFS, [16], is presented in Fig. 2. The algorithm
is a variant of the regular BFS that randomizes the order of
successors before inserting them into a queue. Randomized
BFS generates shortest traces of all the gene interactions
from the initial state to nodes that represent chr. 21 genes
(is chr 21 gene). During the search, when we encounter a
node, s, labeled with a chr. 21 gene (line 5) we report the path
from the initial state to the node, s (line 6). We then continue
searching for paths connecting the initial state to nodes labeled
with other chr. 21 genes. Note that we maintain a set of visited
nodes and never visit the same node twice (lines 10− 12). If
there is more than one shortest path from the initial state to a
node with a particular chr. 21 gene, each trial of randomized
BFS generates a subset of those traces.
V. RESULTS
The analysis in this paper is designed to answer the fol-
lowing research questions: (a) How many chr. 21 genes are
connected to a modifier gene? (b) What is the length of the
shortest path between a chr. 21 gene and the modifier gene?
and (c) What are the gene interactions between a chr. 21
gene and the modifier gene? We summarize the analysis for
the SHH modifier gene and chr. 21 genes in the following
paragraphs.
To answer the research questions (a) and (b), we run a
single trial of randomized BFS starting from the SHH modifier
gene in the Hedgehog signaling pathway. During the search,
whenever we encounter a chr. 21 gene, we mark the chr. 21
gene as reachable from the SHH modifier gene and note the
length of the trace. Recall that a randomized BFS returns the
length of the shortest trace from the SHH gene to the particular
chr. 21 gene.
Randomized BFS finds 38 chr. 21 genes that are between 3
to 7 steps away from the SHH gene in the labeled transition
graph. Among the reachable chr. 21 genes, there are genes
that play a significant role in Alzheimer’s disease and other
cancers. This result is especially interesting to researchers
because virtually all individuals with DS have indicators of
Alzheimer’s disease by 40 years of age.
We run several trials of randomized BFS to answer research

































































































Fig. 3. Gene occurrences in SSH modifier and chr. 21 genes traces.
between the SHH gene and chr. 21 genes. The traces aid
us in analyzing the different gene interactions that lead from
the SHH gene to chr. 21 genes. For example, consider two
arbitrary traces of gene interactions: a → b → c1 and
a → b → e → c2. Since gene b occurs in both traces it
is more likely to affect a certain phenotype. In essence, to
answer research question (c), we count the number of times a
gene uniquely occurs in multiple traces.
In Fig. 3, for an arbitrary randomized BFS trial, we count
the total occurrences of genes found in traces between the
SHH modifier gene and chr. 21 genes. The results in Fig. 3
are exciting to biologists due to the high occurrence frequency
of LRP2, INS, and MAPK1 genes. These genes have not
been previously considered by biologists in the expression of
DS phenotypes. The results in Fig. 3 open new avenues for
empirical research by providing a list of genes closely related
to SHH modifier and chr. 21 genes.
Interestingly, TP53 (involved in cancer) and APOE genes
have been previously linked to DS phenotypes by researchers.
The fact that our analysis relates TP53 and APOE as frequently
occurring in traces between SHH modifier and chr. 21 genes
provides anecdotal validation to our results. It gives hope that
the other genes, such as LRP2, discovered in this analysis
might affect DS phenotypes. Furthermore, genes like PTCH
and GLI are part of the Hedgehog signaling pathway and
are expected to have a high occurrence in the traces as seen
in Fig. 3. This provides further anecdotal evidence that our
analysis is biologically sound.
VI. THREATS TO VALIDITY
The gene regulatory networks in the databases are not
currently tagged with phenotype or developmental stage infor-
mation. This causes the labeled transition graph built from the
gene regulatory networks to be an over-approximation of the
system. The analysis, however, is aimed to provide biologists
a set of genes possibly involved in DS phenotypes. A small set
of genes makes it feasible to empirically determine whether
the gene affects a DS phenotype. Empirical studies filter any
false positives generated during the analysis.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This work defines a technique to build a labeled transition
graph from different biological databases. On this graph we
perform a reachability analysis using randomized BFS to
find gene interactions between modifier genes and chr. 21
genes. The analysis for the SHH modifier gene and chr. 21
genes gives an interesting set of genes for designing empir-
ical studies. The same analysis can be used for determining
gene interactions in various modifier genes for DS and other
ailments. The representation of the different gene regulatory
pathways as single labeled transition graphs lends itself to a
more refined analysis. As future work, biologically interesting
questions can be posed in temporal logic to find traces that
satisfy the property.
REFERENCES
[1] R. Redon et al., “Global variation in copy number in the human
genome,” Nature, vol. 444, no. 7118, 2006.
[2] R. J. Roper, L. L. Baxter, N. G. Saran, D. K. Klinedinst, P. A. Beachy,
and R. H. Reeves, “Defective cerebellar response to mitogenic Hedgehog
signaling in Down’s syndrome mice,” Proc. Natl Acad Sci, vol. 103,
no. 5, 2006.
[3] J. R. Arron et al., “NFAT dysregulation by increased dosage of DSCR1
and DYRK1A on chromosome 21,” Nature, vol. 441, no. 7093, pp. 595–
600, 2006.
[4] “KEGG database.” [Online]. Available: http://www.genome.jp/kegg
[5] “Biocyc.” [Online]. Available: http://biocyc.org
[6] “Metacyc encyclopedia of metabolic pathways.” [Online]. Available:
http://metacyc.org
[7] R. Bunescu, R. Ge, R. Kate, E. Marcotte, R. Mooney, A. Ramani,
and Y. Wong, “Learning to extract proteins and their interactions from
Medline abstracts,” in ICML-2003 Workshop on Machine Learning in
Bioinformatics, August 2003, pp. 46–53.
[8] P. Shannon et al., “Cytoscape: A software environment for integrated
models of biomolecular interaction networks,” Genome Res., vol. 13,
no. 11, pp. 2498–2504, 2003.
[9] “Reactome - a curated knowledgebase of biological pathways.”
[Online]. Available: http://www.reactome.org/cgi-bin/frontpage
[10] G. Bader, I. Donaldson, C. Wolting, B. Ouellette, T. Pawson, and
C. Hogue, “Bind–the biomolecular interaction network database,” Nu-
cleic Acids Research, vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 242–245, 2001.
[11] J. Heath, M. Kwiatkowska, G. Norman, D. Parker, and O. Tymchyshyn,
“Probabilistic model checking of complex biological pathways,” in Proc.
Computational Methods in Systems Biology (CMSB’06), ser. Lecture
Notes in Bioinformatics, C. Priami, Ed., vol. 4210. Springer Verlag,
2006, pp. 32–47.
[12] H. Kuwahara, C. J. Myers, M. S. Samoilov, N. A. Barker, and A. P.
Arkin, “Automated abstraction methodology for genetic regulatory net-
works,” Transactions on Computational Systems Biology, vol. 4220, pp.
150–175, 2006.
[13] M. Kwiatkowska, G. Norman, D. Parker, O. Tymchyshyn, J. Heath, and
E. Gaffney, “Simulation and verification for computational modelling of
signalling pathways,” in WSC ’06: Proceedings of the 38th conference
on Winter simulation. Winter Simulation Conference, 2006, pp. 1666–
1674.
[14] D. L. Dill, M. A. Knapp, P. Gage, C. Talcott, P. Lincoln, and K. Lader-
oute, “The pathalyzer: a tool for visualization and analysis of signal
transduction pathways,” in First Annual RECOMB Satellite Workshop
on Systems Biology, ser. Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics. Springer,
2005.
[15] D. Eppstein, “Finding the k shortest paths,” in IEEE Symposium
on Foundations of Computer Science, 1994, pp. 154–165. [Online].
Available: citeseer.ist.psu.edu/eppstein97finding.html
[16] M. B. Dwyer, S. Person, and S. Elbaum, “Controlling factors in evalu-
ating path-sensitive error detection techniques,” in SIGSOFT ’06/FSE-
14: Proceedings of the 14th ACM SIGSOFT international symposium
on Foundations of software engineering. New York, NY, USA: ACM
Press, 2006, pp. 92–104.
219
A Formal Model of Clock Domain Crossing and
Automated Verification of Time-Triggered Hardware
Julien Schmaltz1
Institute for Computing and Information Sciences
Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands
Email: julien@cs.ru.nl
Abstract— We develop formal arguments about a bit clock
synchronization mechanism for time-triggered hardware. The
architecture is inspired by the FlexRay standard and described at
the gate-level. The synchronization algorithm relies on a specific
value of a counter. We prove or disprove values proposed in
the literature. Our framework is based on a general and precise
model of clock domain crossing, which considers metastability
and clock imperfections. Our approach combines this model
with the state transition representation of hardware. The result
is a clear separation of analog and digital behaviors. Analog
considerations are formalized in the logic of the Isabelle/HOL
theorem prover. Digital arguments are discharged using the
NuSMV model checker. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first verification effort tackling asynchronous transmissions
at the gate-level.
I. INTRODUCTION
Embedded systems comprise software applications, com-
pilers, real-time operating systems, processors with memory
management units and devices, as well as communication
architectures. These different components form the layers of a
stack. The top layer and the most abstract one is occupied
by software applications. Going down in the abstraction,
software applications together with an operating system are
compiled into machine code and run on top of processing
units and memories. Their gate level description constitutes
the lowest layer of the stack. In the late 80’s, Bevier et
al. [2] demonstrated a first “stack proof”, i.e. a proof of a
simulation theorem between the top layer and the bottom
layer. The application of this approach to realistic embedded
systems remains a challenge [12]. Computer systems are often
distributed. One verified stack is not enough. One needs to
prove correctness of stacks and their communications.
These communications are inherently asynchronous as in
practice clocks of interconnected devices are not constant
over time. This clock distortion induces possible metastable
states of registers. The proof of distributed stacks requires the
analysis of these phenomena at the gate-level. Moreover, in the
context of realistic worst case execution time analysis, it is also
necessary to know the duration of the transmission. Towards
this end, a pencil and paper proof of an entire distributed
systems was developed [1]. From this study, we formalized in
1Part of this work was carried out while the author was affiliated with
the University of Saarland, Saarbrücken, Germany. This work was funded
by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (bmb+f) in the
framework of the Verisoft project under grant 01 IS C38.
the logic of Isabelle/HOL [13] the bit transmission between
independently clocked registers, assuming precise timing pa-
rameters and metastability [15].
The contribution of this paper is an important extension of
these theoretical results and the definition and the applica-
tion of a methodology for the verification of time-triggered
hardware. We extend the Isabelle theory to allow for long-
term jitter. This relieves the previous hypothesis about constant
clock periods. The outcome is a general model of clock
domain crossing. This model is combined with the semantics
of transition systems used to describe hardware designs. This
identifies constraints on the digital design that guarantee
proper transmission assuming analog behaviors. These con-
straints can be solved by decision procedures. We use the
integration in Isabelle of the model checker NuSMV [16]. We
demonstrate this methodology on the verification of a time-
triggered bus interface inspired by the FlexRay standard [5]
and described at the gate-level. The statement of our theorem
also includes the duration of the transmission. Our analysis
identifies precisely the possible values of one crucial parameter
of the bit clock synchronization mechanism. This proves and
disproves values proposed in the literature.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next Section, we
present our general model of clock domain crossing. We show
in Section III how we use this model for hardware design
verification. Section IV describes the time-triggered interface,
which is verified in Section V. Related work is discussed in
Section VI. Section VII concludes the paper.
II. A FORMAL MODEL OF CLOCK DOMAIN CROSSING
A. Signals and Clocks
Time is represented by the nonnegative reals (R≥0). A
signal s is represented by a function s(t) from real time t to
{0, 1,Ω}: 1 and 0 mean “high” and “low” voltages; Ω means
any voltage.
The clock period of unit u is noted τu. Periods are different
from zero. The date of the cth rising edge of clock clku of
unit u is noted eu(c). It equals the product of c with the clock
period: eu(c) = c · τu.
Function e gives the ideal date of edges. In practice, it is
impossible to guarantee constant clock periods. We assume
that all clock periods of any clock deviate at most by a
percentage δ of a reference clock period. This reference clock
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Fig. 1. Behavior of the register w.r.t clock edge c
is named clk ref . Its period is τref . Formally, we assume:
Γu ≡ 1 − δ ≤ τu
τref
≤ 1 + δ (1)
We are not interested in the deviation at each cycle, but
in the number of cycles in which the number of ticks of
two independent clocks may differ by at most one. Let π be
that number. In this interval, the maximum drift between two
clocks is obtained between the slowest and the fastest clocks
allowed by Equation 1. Consequently, the ratio between the
minimum and the maximum clock periods defines the lower
bound of the drift. From Equation 1 and defining π = 1−δ
2·δ ,
we prove the following lemma:
Lemma 1: Bounded Clock Drift.




This property is preserved for any number less than π.
B. Analog Registers
Open intervals are represented using open squared brackets.
Shifting an interval is noted x+[y : z] instead of [x+y : x+z].
Registers consist of one input signal In , one clock signal
clk , one control signal ce and one output signal Out (Fig.
1). A new value (x) is input to the register at cycle c, which
is defined by interval [eu(c) : eu(c + 1)[. During minimum
propagation delay tpmin the output signal equals previous value
y. Because the control signal is high, the output oscillates (i.e.
is Ω) before stabilizing at new value x. If the control signal
is low, the output does not oscillate and keeps its old value y.
If the input or the control signals do not have a constant
value during the setup time (noted ts) before edge c and during
the holding time (noted th) after edge c, the register may
become metastable. This means that its output may still be Ω
after tpmax . When this metastable state is resolved, the register
reaches a defined value. Metastability cannot be avoided [9].
We assume that this resolution time is less than one clock
period. Before giving our formal definition of analog registers,
we define a few concepts.
aRu(c, clku, ceu, Inu,Out0u) 
if c = 0 then λt.Out0u else
if
{
stadep(eu(c) − ts, eu(c) + th, ceu)
∧ stadep(eu(c) − ts, eu(c) + th, Inu) then









aRu(c− 1, . . .)(eu(c)) : t ∈ eu(c)+]0 : tpmin ]
Ω : t ∈ eu(c)+]tpmin : tpmax [
Inu(eu(c)) : t ∈ eu(c) + [tpmax : τu]
Ω : t /∈]eu(c) : eu(c+ 1)]
else ;; keep old value
λt.
{
aRu(c− 1, . . .)(eu(c)) : ∀t ∈]eu(c) : eu(c+ 1)]











aRu(c− 1, . . .)(eu(c)) : t ∈ eu(c)+]0 : tpmin ]
Ω : t ∈ eu(c)+]tpmin : τu[
x ∈ {0, 1} : t = eu(c+ 1)
Ω : t /∈]eu(c) : eu(c+ 1)]
endif
endif
Fig. 2. Definition of Analog Registers
The metastability window w.r.t. edge c of register u (noted
MWcu) is defined by interval eu(c) + [−ts : th].
A signal s is stable during time interval [t1 : t2] if it holds
the value at time t1 until time t2. A signal s has a defined
value during time interval [t1 : t2] if it never equals Ω during
that interval. Formally, this is expressed as follows1:
stadep(t1, t2, s)  ∃b ∈ {0, 1}, ∀t ∈ [t1 : t2], s(t) = b
The formal definition of the analog behavior is given by
function aRu (Fig 2). We are interested in the output value
of a register for all real times during cycle c. Function aRu
takes as arguments a cycle c, a clock signal clku, a clock
enable control signal ceu, an input signal Inu, and the initial
output value Out0u. It generates a signal.
If no setup or holding time violation occurs, the register
behaves normally. If the control signal is low, the register
keeps its old value (at the previous cycle c− 1); if the control
signal is high the output keeps its previous value during tpmin ,
then oscillates (i.e. is Ω) to finally reach its final value at
time eu(c) + tpmax . If input signal Inu or control signal ceu
is not stable and defined during the metastability window, the
register becomes metastable. The output equals the previous
computation until tpmin (included) and Ω afterwards. At the
end of the cycle, metastability has been resolved and the
output equals an arbitrary but defined value. To make the
function total, Ω is output for all times outside the cycle.
To alleviate our notation, we shall write aRcu instead of
aRu(c, clku, ceu, Inu,Out0u).
Formally, all timing parameters (th, ts, tpmin , tpmax ) are per-
centages. We assume that their sum is less than 1. Their value
depends on the local clock period. In the remainder of this




χ ∈ {−1, 0, 1}
τr
es(c+ 8) es(c+ 16)
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cy(ξ + 16 + χ, c)
AWc
cy(ξ, c)
Fig. 3. Relating Receivers and Senders
paper, propagation delays are relative to the sender clock and
setup and holding times are relative to the receiver clock
period.
C. Relating Receivers to Senders
The relation between a sender and a receiver is pictured in
Fig. 3. A sender starts sending three different bits at edge c,
c + 8, and c + 16. If we take a closer look around edge c,
the sender output is not modified before es(c)+ tpmin , when it
moves from y to Ω (see Fig 1 for more details). If a receiver
samples before that date, it will get the old value. In contrast,
sampling strictly after that date will affect the receiver, either
it will get metastable, or it will detect a new value. Let ξ
be the first receiver edge after eu(c) + tpmin . As this edge is
the first one to be affected by the behavior of the sender, we
denote it as “marked with edge c”, noted cy(ξ, c). If there is
no ambiguity, we may drop the first argument. Edge ξ occurs
in time interval es(c) + tpmin +]0 : τr]. This interval defines
the “affected window w.r.t. edge c”, noted AWc. Formally, we
have the following definition:
Definition 1: Affected Cycle. cy(ξ, c) ≡ er(ξ)+th ∈ AWc
Let us suppose that edge ξ is in AWc.If the sender sends
another bit within a number of cycles (α) less than our bound
π, the corresponding affected window may be seen by the
receiver with a potential error of one cycle, i.e. at er(ξ+α±1).
This means that subsequent marks are known with the same
error. Fig 3 shows these marks for α = 8 and α = 16.
Formally, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 1: Regular Affected Windows
Γclkr ∧ Γclks ∧ 0 < α ≤ π ∧ cy(ξ, c)
→ ∨χ∈{−1,0,1} er(ξ + α+ χ) ∈ AWc+α
Proof. We do a case analysis depending on the position of
ξ + α regarding the affected window AWc+α. If er(ξ + α) is
(1) before AWc+α, we prove er(ξ + α + 1) ∈ AWc+α; (2)
within AWc+α, this proves the obvious case where χ = 0; (3)
after AWc+α, we prove er(ξ + α− 1) ∈ AWc+α. 
D. Safe Sampling Window
In case of metastability, we always assume resolution to
the negation of the expected input. Thus, an extra delay may
be introduced. This is represented by the metastability factor
(β). Metastability can only happen if the affected cycle (minus
the setup time) appears while the sender output is undefined,
i.e. before es(c) + tpmax . In this case, the metastability factor
returns 1. It returns 0 otherwise. Formally, the metastability
factor is a function, which takes as arguments cycles ξ and c,
and two clocks.
Definition 2: Metastability Factor.
β(ξ, c, clks, clkr) 
if er(ξ) − ts ≤ es(c) + tpmax then 1 else 0
To alleviate the notation, we shall write βξc instead of
β(ξ, c, clk s, clk r).
To ensure that the receiver will not always sample Ω’s,
the sender keeps its output constant for several cycles (say k
cycles). Consequently, there is only one metastability window
and if k is big enough there exists a “sweet spot” in which
the receiver can sample safely. Formally, the safe sampling
window of length k w.r.t. cycle c (noted SSWck) is denoted by
interval [eu(c) + tpmax : eu(c+ k + 1) + tpmin ].
We prove that under our drift hypothesis, SSWck entails
up to k − 1 receiver cycles (or k edges), even in case of
metastability.
Theorem 2: SSW’s are large enough.
Γclkr ∧ Γclks ∧ cy(ξ, c) ∧ n+ 1 ≤ k ≤ π
→ ∀l ≤ n, cy(ξ + βξc + l) + [−ts : th] ∈ SSWck
E. Clock Domain Crossing Correctness
Our main theorem proves that sampling in a safe sampling
windows is correct. We assume that the sender creates a safe
sampling window of length k, control and input bits must be
stable and defined during all sender metastability windows,
clock drift is bounded. We assume that cycle ξ is in SSWck.
Theorem 3: Correct Transfer.
Γr ∧ Γs ∧ cy(ξ, c) (*bounded drift, affected cycle*)
∧ (* SSWck *)
ces(es(c)) = 1 ∧ ∀l ∈ [1 : k], ces(es(c+ l) = 0
∧ c > 0 ∧ n+ 1 ≤ k ≤ π
∧ ∀l ∈ [0 : k + 1], (*input *)
stadep(es(c+ l) − ts, es(c+ l) + th, Ins)
∧ ∀l ∈ [0 : k + 1], (*control*)
stadep(es(c+ l) − ts, es(c+ l) + th, ces)))
∧ (*analog connection*)
∀c, Inr = aRs(c, clk s, ces, Ins,Out0s) ∧ ∀t, cer(t) = 1
∧ er(ξ) + [−ts : th] ∈ SSWck (* good cycle *)
→ aRξr(er(ξ + 1) = Ins(es(c))
Proof. First, Theorem 2 gives us the position of receiver edges
in the safe sampling window. Then, we case split on the
position of the metastability window around cycle ξ. We set
two reference points: es(c+ 1) and es(c+ 1 + k). We prove
the conclusion for 5 cases depending on the position of the
metastability window regarding these points. 
III. ANALOG TRANSFER IN A DIGITAL WORLD
Our model of clock domain crossing mentions analog
entities only. The semantics is based on functions and a dense
representation of time. Ultimately, we want to use this model
to verify hardware designs described in another semantics,
which is based on a discrete notion of time and transition
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functions. Before describing our approach, we define type
conversion functions and rephrase Theorem 3 to match bits
and not signals.
A. Type Conversions
The conversion from bit lists to signals is done by function
γ. We do not give a particular definition to this function. We
only assume that it produces a signal such that during the
metastability window around cycle i+ 1, it outputs the value
with index i in the bit list. This property is defined by predicate
bv2sp:
bv2sp(γ, lu) ≡ ∀t, i, t ∈ MWi+1u → γ(lu) = lu[i]
The conversion from signals to bits is done by function ζ,
which takes as input a signal and a time. If the value of the
signal at that time is a bit value, then this value is returned.
Otherwise, some bit value is returned.
ζ(s, t)  if s(t) ∈ {0, 1} then s(t) else x ∈ {0, 1}
B. Transfer Correctness in the Digital World
Let lists ces and Ins be the bit lists containing values given
to the analog sender register. If they both satisfy predicate
bv2sp, list element ces[c− 1] or Ins[c− 1] corresponds to the
bit value given to the sender analog register at time es(c).
Theorem 3 is embedded into a digital context in the fol-
lowing statement. We assume that (a) clock drift is bounded;
(b) function γ correctly translates bit lists ces and Ins; (c) the
digital control bits are high once and then low k times. Analog
hypotheses are concerned with the connection of the sender
with the receiver and the clock drift. Obviously, they cannot
be “digitalized”. Under these assumptions, we prove that the
“digitalized” output of the analog receiver register equals the
digital input of the sender at cycle c. In the remainder of this
paper, we will denote the conjunction of the hypotheses of this
theorem by H.
Theorem 4: Back to the Digital World.
Γr ∧ Γs ∧ n+ 1 ≤ k ≤ π ∧ cy(ξ, c)
(*bounded drift, cy(c)*)
∧ ∀c, Inr = aRs(c, clk s, γ(ces), γ(Ins),Out0s)
∧ ∀t, cer(t) = 1 (*analog link*)
∧ bv2sp(γ, ces, clks) ∧ bv2sp(γ, Ins, clks)
(*modeling hypotheses*)
∧ ces[c+ α− 1] = 1 ∧ c > 0
∧ ∀l ∈ [1 : k], ces[c+ l − 1] = 0 (*sender OK*)




r, er(ξ + 1)) = Ins[c− 1]
Proof. By definition of predicate bv2sp, γ(Ins) and γ(ces)
are stadep for the required cycles. Theorem 3 concludes. 
C. Principle and Soundness
Fig. 4 illustrates our integration of our analog results in the
analysis of digital designs. Our clock domain crossing model
(CDC) is shown inside the dashed box. The remainder of the













Fig. 4. Mixing Analog and Digital Signals
to synthesize hardware. These designs are not modified. Our
model is simply inserted as a filter of the receiver inputs.
Digital designs are represented by their transition function,
one application of which represents the computation of one
clock cycle. The sender and the receiver parts are analyzed
separately. The analysis of the sender does not need any analog
arguments. It mainly consists of the proof that sender output
outs follows a specific frame format. The analysis of the
receiver is done assuming correctness of the sender and that
the connection of receiver input inpr is done through our CDC
model. We write that an element su of unit u has bit-value x
at cycle c - i.e. after c applications of the transition function
- as scu = x. Formally, we assume that the value of input bit
inpr at hardware cycle c equals the output value of register
aRr at the date of edge c+ 1:
∀c, inpcr = ζ(aRcr, er(c+ 1)) (2)
The left hand side represents the value that should be in
register Rr at c+ 1. As the analog register is not part of the
transition function of the receiver, one application of the latter
compensates this difference. The right hand side is always
a defined value. This Equation only holds when Rr is not
metastable. As discussed in the next sub-section, it is always
the case when we use Equation 2.
D. Proof Method
Our proof method uses Theorems 2, 1, 4 and Equation 2.
We also need a mark cy(ξ, c) which connects receiver cycle
ξ with the beginning of a safe sampling window started at
sender cycle c. From this mark, we obtain from Theorem 2
that there are n + 1 receiver edges in the safe sampling
window. These edges may be shifted by one cycle depending
on the resolution of metastable states. Then, we obtain from
Theorem 4 that register aRr outputs outcs at the date of these
edges. Because we are outside metastable behaviors, we obtain
from Equation 2 inputs for the receiver. Once these inputs are
known, the analysis is back to the digital world and decision
procedures apply. We obtain subsequent inputs using a similar
reasoning and the marks given by Theorem 1.
IV. TIME-TRIGGERED BUS INTERFACES
We present an implementation of a time-triggered bus
interface inspired by the FlexRay standard [5] for safety-


















Fig. 5. Control Automaton
presented [1]. It can be translated to Verilog [14] and synthe-
sized on FPGA. It will be available at the Verisoft Repository2.
A. Protocol Overview
We consider an arbitrary number of units connected through
a shared bus. Each unit can send and receive messages. Idle
units put one’s on the bus. Let TSS = 0 be the transmission
start sequence, FSS = 01 be the frame start sequence, BSS =
10 be the byte start sequence and FES = 01 be the frame end
sequence. Let 〈a, b〉 be the concatenation of bit vectors a with
b. A message m of l bytes is encapsulated into a frame f(m)
with the following format:
f(m) = 〈TSS,FSS,BSS,m[0], . . . ,BSS,m[l− 1],FES〉
Each bit of a frame is sent 8 times.
B. Sender Module
The sender implements the protocol by the control au-
tomaton in Fig. 5. As specified by the protocol, in each
state the corresponding bit is generated 8 times. The sender
is connected with the shared bus through a register named
Rs with control enable bit ces. This paper focuses on the
verification of message reception. We do not detail the sender
implementation any further.
C. Receiver Implementation: Bit Clock Synchronization
The receiver module implements the same state-automaton
as the sender. In each state, the receiver is expecting to receive
the corresponding bit of the frame. Beside the automaton, the
relevant part of this receiver consists of the input stage pictured
in Fig. 6. The first two registers form a “synchronizer” used
to remedy to metastability. A five majority vote is performed.
Signal sync is used to detect the synchronization sequence
BSS. It is high if and only if the current voted bit does not
equal its previous value and the state automaton is either in
state idle or in state BSS[1]. When sync is high counter cnt is
reset to 000 in the next cycle. The state automaton is clocked
by signal strobe, which is high each time the counter reaches
value 010 and the automaton is not synchronizing, i.e. when
signal sync is low. Each time strobe is high, the voted bit
is stored in shift register BYTE. When the last bit has been
stored (i.e. automaton is in state b[7]) and signal strobe is



















Fig. 6. Input Stage
This implementation uses the synchronization mechanism
described in the FlexRay standard. Synchronization is per-
formed by resetting the counter when receiving the BSS se-
quence. Our implementation differs slightly from the FlexRay
guidelines. The standard suggests to reset the counter to 010
and to strobe when it reaches 101. We reset to 000 and strobe
at 010. So, we strobe one cycle earlier. In [1], the counter is
reset to 000 and strobe is high when cnt is 100.
V. FORMAL VERIFICATION
A. Sender Correctness
The sender is proven to effectively generate each bit 8 times.
This discharges the digital hypotheses of Theorem 4. Formally,
this is defined as follows:
Definition 3: Correctness of ces.
WFce(ces, L, k, c) ≡ ∀i < L, ces[c+ 8 · i] = 0
∧ ∀j ∈ [1 : k], ces[c+ 8 · i+ j] = 0
We prove that the sender generates frames with the specified
format. For the purpose of this paper, we are only concerned
with synchronization bits, i.e. the BSS sequence. This is
expressed by the following predicate:
Definition 4: Partial Correctness of Ins.
WFIn(Ins, L, c) ≡ ∀i < L, ∀y ∈ [0 : 7]
{
Ins[c+ 80 ∗ i+ 16 + y − 1] = 1
∧ Ins[c+ 80 ∗ i+ 24 + y − 1] = 0
B. Receiver Correctness Statement
The correctness of a time-triggered interface is achieved if
for the transmission of any byte of a frame there exists a
hardware cycle from which the interface recovers that byte.
This requires the proof that (1) depending on the position of
the BSS[0]-mark (cy(BSS[0])) the state automaton strobes the
right voted bits, and (2) this happens soon enough to match the
sender output. The first statement expresses that the automaton
indeed synchronizes and the second that this synchronization
is good enough to sample properly. The final proof uses theses
two statements to prove by induction over the number of bytes
that the whole frame is recovered. We assume that the state
automaton is initially is state “idle” and that the first mark
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cy(ξ, c)
1 1 1 0 00 100 0 00 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
TSS FSS BSS[0]





βξc = 0 z = BSS[0] ∧ cnt = 011
βξc = 1 z = FSS ∧ cnt = 010
cy(ξ + 16 + [−1 : 1], c + 16)
Fig. 7. Initial Transmission Phase
is known. The final statement is Theorem 5 below. The first
line of the conclusion states that for all bytes we detect a
mark for BSS[0]. The second lines states that at this cycle the
control automaton could be in different states with different
values of its counter. This different values come from previous
bytes which may have suffered from clock drifts. The last lines
state that under this uncertainty the automaton samples byte i
properly. This theorem also proves lower and upper bounds on
the time at which the last byte is recovered. Using the mark
of the conclusion, these bounds can be expressed as functions
of the reference clock and the time (es(c)) when the first bit
is put on the bus by the sender.
Theorem 5: Transmission Correctness.
H ∧ zξ = idle ∧ cy(ξ, c)
∀c, inpcr = ζ(aRcr, er(c+ 1))(* A/D mix*)
WFce(ces, L, k, c) ∧ WFIn(outs, L, c)
→
∀i < l, ∃ν, cy(ν, c+ 16 + 80 · i) (* mark *)
∧ zν = (FSS ∨ b[7]) ∧ cntν = (001 ∨ 010)
∨ zν = BSS[0] ∧ cntν = (011 ∨ 100)
∧ zν+78+w = BSS[0] ∧ cntν+78+w = 010
∧ BYTEν+79+w = 〈outc+16+80·i+8·(j+2)s 〉
where w ∈ [0 : 3] and j ∈ [7 : 0]
The proof is done by induction over i. For space reason, we
only detail the base case, which is pictured in Fig. 7. The first
two lines show the output of the sender and how it is seen by
the receiver. Black boxes indicate possible metastability.
Because of clock drift, the BSS[0]-mark may appear on the
receiver side 15, 16 or 17 cycles after ξ. There is a potential
metastability at cycle ξ. Depending on the value reached after
resolution – that is depending on the value of βξc – the receiver
automaton reaches different state and counter values when the
BSS[0]-mark is detected. In the figure, we show these values
at βξc +16, where the automaton is either in state BSS[0] with
a counter at 011 or in state FSS with a counter at 010. In the
following sections, we prove that the receiver recovers a byte
for all these possibilities.
C. Traversing Synchronization Edges
Our reasoning is illustrated in Fig. 8. The first two lines
show the output of the sender and how it is seen by the
receiver. Black boxes indicate possible metastability. Question
marks are used to denote unknown values.
We fix the initial step of the lemma to match the date of
the detection of the BSS[0]-mark. We consider the case where
the receiver is in state BSS[0] with a counter value at either
011 or 100.
According to Theorem 1 and assuming that the BSS[0]-
mark is known, the BSS[1]-mark has three possible dates. The
potential metastability around that edge has the same three
dates. We consider bits sampled by the receiver at these dates
unknown. Another source of uncertainty resides in factor β.
It is already represented by metastability. Therefore, at most
three bits are unknown. Depending on the values of these three
bits, the automaton will spend more or less time in the states
of BSS. There is synchronization if the lower and the upper
bound on this number of cycles allow proper sampling. This
bounds are defined by the next lemma which imposes that the
automaton reaches state b[0] with counter value 011 in at least
15, and at most 18 cycles.
Let t be the date of the affected cycle of BSS[0]. If the
three unknown bits are 0 (see line 3 in Fig. 8), signal sync is
high at t + 7 + 4 = t + 11. The counter is reset, and signal
strobe is high at t + 11 + 3 = t + 14. In the next cycle, the
automaton reaches state zt+15 = b[0]. For any lower value of
the counter, the automaton will reach this state earlier.
If the unknown bits are 1, signal sync is high at t+10+4 =
t+14. If the counter was 100 initially, then it has reached value
010 and strobe is high. At the same time, signal sync is high,
the automaton stays in BSS[0] and the counter is reset. At
cycle t + 17, strobe is high and the automaton reaches b[0]
with a correct counter value at t + 18. For any larger value,
the automaton requires more cycles to reach this state.
From Theorem 4 and considering the possible values of βξc ,
we know for sure 6 bits of BSS[0] (from t+ 1 to t+ 6) and
6 bits of BSS[1] (from t + 9 to t + 14). Assuming that only
these input values are known, the rest of the proof is purely
digital. It is expressed by the following lemma, the proof of
which is fully automatic.
Lemma 2: From BSS[0] to BSS[1].
∀u ∈ [0 : 6], inpt+1+u = 1 (* 6 bits of BSS[1]*)
∧ ∀v ∈ [0 : 6], inpt+9+v = 0 (* 6 bits of BSS[0]*)
∧ ((zt = BSS[0] ∧ cnt t = 010 ∨ 011) (* states and *)
∨ (zt = FSS ∧ cnt t = 001 ∨ 010)) (*misalignment*)
→ ∨w∈[0:3] zt+15+w = b[0] ∧ cntt+15+w = 011
Proof. By NuSMV. 
D. Strobing Correct Bits
The next lemma states that whatever happens in the traversal
of “synchronization” edges, strobe points always hit correct
voted bits. We consider hypotheses similar to the previous
lemma. The BSS[0]-mark matches the start point of the lemma.
The automaton could be in state BSS[0] with counter at 011 or
100, or in state FSS with counter at 001 or 010. The reasoning
is illustrated in the right part of Fig. 8, where voted bits are
shown instead of the input.
Formally, we prove that register BYTE contains the correct
frame 79 to 82 cycles following the first bit of the synchro-
nization sequence. The proof shows the exact values of the
counter that allow proper transmission.
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Fig. 8. Earliest and latest possible synchronization points
Lemma 3: Strobing Correct Bits.
H ∧ cy(t, c+ 16) (* BSS[0]-mark is known*)
∧ ∀c, inpcr = ζ(aRcr, er(c+ 1)) (*mixing analog-digital*)
∧ WFce(ces, L, k, c) ∧ WFIn (outs, L, c) (*sender OK*)
∧ ((zt = BSS[0] ∧ cnt t = 011 ∨ 100) (* states and *)




BYTEt+79+w = 〈outc+16+8·(j+2)s 〉, j ∈ [7 : 0]
Proof. From the previous lemma, state b[0] can be reached at
four different dates. Therefore, there are four different dates
for strobe points. Moreover, due to clock drift these strobe
points can be shifted by one cycle. Finally, because of potential
metastability when starting to send b[0], the voted bits have
two different positions. For each one of these, we prove that
strobe points hit good voted values.
Figure 8 illustrates the proof for counter value 010. In the
third line, it considers the shortest traversal of the synchroniza-
tion sequence, i.e. zt+15 = b[0]. The longest traversal is shown
on the next line, i.e. zt+18 = b[0]. In the third line, we assume
no metastability when sampling b[0], or good resolution of it
(β = 0). The last line considers the opposite case and the
voted bits are shifted by one cycle. The “ideal” strobe appears
at t+[15 : 18]+7. This date can shift by one cycle depending
on clock drift. This is represented by the values of χ.
Majority voting delays the input by four or five cycles
depending on metastability resolution. From Theorems 2 and
4 (for k = 7), we know that sending the same bit eight times
implies that the receiver always samples seven times properly.
Using Theorem 1, we extend this result to subsequent bits.
Assuming a mark ξ, we prove the following formula:
∨
χ∈{−1,0,1}
∀x ∈ [4 : 10], vξ+α+χ+βξ+α+χc+α +x = outs[c+α−1]
If the mark is the BSS[0]-mark, this formula gives us when
the bits of a byte are known to be correct. For all possible
traversal durations of the synchronization sequence, we must
find an α and an x such that strobe points match these good
voted bits. This is expressed by the following equality, where
the left hand side corresponds to strobe points and the right
hand side to the cycles at which the voted bit is correct.
cy(c+16)+ [15 : 18]+8 · j+7 = cy(c+16)+α+β+χ+x
We set α = 8 · (j + 2).
The minimum x is required when the right hand side is
maximized and the left hand side of the equality is the earliest
cycle. This means that the receiver is one cycle behind the
sender. Because clock ticks differ at most by one, this implies
that χ cannot take value 1.The right hand side is therefore
maximized with β = 1 and χ = 0. We need to find x such
that:
cy(c+16)+15+8 ·j+7 = cy(c+16)+16+8 ·j+1+0+x
A solution is x = 5. We see here that there is still one
possibility (x = 4). This means that counter value 010 would
also be provable. This value is a limit, i.e. the earliest working
synchronization point.
The maximum x is required when the right hand side is
minimized and the left hand side of the equality is the latest
cycle. This means that the receiver is one cycle ahead of the
sender. Again, because of the bound on clock drift, this implies
that χ = −1. The right hand side is therefore minimized with
β = 0 and χ = 0. Here, we need to find x such that:
cy(c+16)+18+8 ·j+7 = cy(c+16)+16+8 ·j+0+0+x
A solution is x = 9. Counter value 011 would push the x
to the limit 10 and constitute the latest synchronization point.
Note that this value is equivalent to the one proposed by the
FlexRay standard [5]. Value 100 proposed in [1] would be
outside this limit, and is therefore not adequate.
E. Induction Step
The proof of the induction step is very similar. The induction
hypothesis gives the BSS[0]-mark for byte i and the possible
dates when the automaton reaches the end of byte i, i.e. state
b[7] and counter at 010. We extend Lemma 3 to be satisfied
if the automaton is in state b[7]. If the transmission is not
completed (bit done is low), the BSS[0]-mark of byte i+1 has
three possible dates at which the state automaton satisfies the
hypotheses of our extended Lemma 3. We apply this lemma
for all these possible dates.
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VI. RELATED WORK
The first verification effort about physical layer protocols
was carried out by Moore [11]. Moore developed a general
model of asynchronous communications as a function in the
logic of the ACL2 theorem prover [8]. Moore’s model assumes
distortion around sampling edges and do not allow for clock
jitter. Sender and receiver modules are also represented by
two functions. Moore’s correctness criteria states that the
composition of these three functions is an identity. He applied
this approach to the verification of a Biphase-Mark protocol.
Moore’s work inspired many studies around this protocol.
Recently, Vaandrager and de Groot [17] modeled the protocol
and analog behaviors using a network of timed-automata.
Their model is slightly more general than Moore’s and allows
for clock jitter. They can derive tighter bounds for the Biphase-
Mark protocol. Previously, timed-automata have been used to
verify a low level protocol based on Manchester encoding and
developed by Philips [3]. Another recent proof of the Biphase-
Mark protocol has been proposed by Brown and Pike [4]. They
developed a general model of asynchronous communications
in the formalism of the tool SAL [10] developed at SRI.
Their model includes clock jitter and metastability. Using k-
induction, the verificaton of the parameterized specification of
Brown and Pike is largely automatic. All these studies tackle
protocol specification only. They prove functional correctness.
We prove a more precise theorem about a gate-level hardware
implementation and from which bounds on the transmission
duration can be derived.
Regarding hardware verification, Hanna [6], [7] used pred-
icates to approximate analog behaviors at the transistor level.
The predicates can be embedded in digital proofs. His work is
not specifically targeted to communication circuits and does
not consider timing parameters, metastability or clock drift.
We consider only gates and not their structure in terms of
transistors.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Reliable transmission between two independent clocked
devices is performed using bit clock synchronization, which is
achieved by resetting a counter when detecting a synchroniza-
tion sequence. This specific value is a crucial parameter. We
have developed a general and precise model of asynchronous
communications and defined a methodology to use this model
for hardware design verification. We have proven the exact
possible values for this parameter. This proves and disproves
values proposed in the literature.
The model of clock domain crossing is about 2,000 lines
and is available on the web3. The proof presented here was
developed in about one man-year and is about 8,000 lines.
Most of it is dedicated to the deduction of valid digital inputs
from the analog transmission. This technique is independent of
the design under verification. The analysis of similar designs
will mainly amount to re-prove all digital lemmas.
3www.cs.ru.nl/∼julien/, then Research
The case study is extracted from a more complex design
which includes a scheduler implementing a high-level clock
synchronization algorithm. We are currently applying our
approach to the verification of this component, moving towards
a fully verified distributed system.
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Abstract—Time-triggered systems are distributed systems in
which the nodes are independently-clocked but maintain syn-
chrony with one another. Time-triggered protocols depend on
the synchrony assumption the underlying system provides, and
the protocols are often formally verified in an untimed or
synchronous model based on this assumption. An untimed model
is simpler than a real-time model, but it abstracts away timing
assumptions that must hold for the model to be valid. In the first
part of this paper, we extend previous work by Rushby [1] to
prove, using mechanical theorem-proving, that for an arbitrary
time-triggered protocol, its real-time implementation satisfies its
untimed specification. The second part of this paper shows how
the combination of a bounded model-checker and a satisfiability
modulo theories (SMT) solver can be used to prove that the
timing characteristics of a hardware realization of a protocol
satisfy the assumptions of the time-triggered model. The upshot is
a formally-verified connection between the untimed specification
and the hardware realization of a time-triggered protocol with
respect to its timing parameters.
I. INTRODUCTION
Digital control systems are being designed for use in safety-
critical contexts such as automobiles (“drive-by-wire”) and
commercial aircraft (“fly-by-wire”) [2], [3]. Safety-critical
systems embedded in commercial aircraft must have a failure
rate probability no greater than 10−9 per hour of operation [4],
[5]. A design error causing a system to have a higher rate of
failure—say a failure rate of 10−8 per hour—is unacceptable,
yet it is infeasible to determine whether a system has this reli-
ability through testing alone [6]. The inability to demonstrate
correctness through testing motivates us to prove these systems
are correct.
The specific class of control systems considered in this
paper are time-triggered systems. Time-triggered systems are
implemented as distributed systems in which each node in the
system is independently-clocked, and under normal operating
conditions, synchronization mechanisms maintain tight syn-
chronization among the local clocks [5]. When the nodes are
tightly synchronized, the temporal behavior of the system can
be abstracted as if the nodes execute in lock-step. This sort
of abstraction is characterized by the synchronous model or
untimed model. At the level of abstraction that the synchronous
model provides, formal correctness proofs of the protocols are
difficult but feasible [7], [8].
The synchronous abstraction depends on a realization (i.e., a
concrete implementation—hardware and/or software executing
on hardware) satisfying key properties regarding scheduling,
message delays, clock skew, message-reception windows, and
so forth. A more fine-grained model that addresses these
aspects for time-triggered systems is the time-triggered model.
The essential feature of this model, as opposed to an asy-
chronous model, is that while the local clocks of individual
nodes may not be perfectly synchronized, their disharmony is
bounded.
As demonstrated by Rushby, a subset of time-triggered
protocols can be systematically shown to implement their
synchronous specifications, provided certain timing constraints
are met by the underlying system [1]. However, Rushby’s
work suffers two shortcomings. First, despite his formal ver-
ification of the time-triggered model in the PVS mechanical
theorem-prover [9], three of the four system assumptions (or
formally, axioms) he postulates not only fail to model the
actual behavior of time-triggered systems, but are in fact
inconsistent. In a recent note by this author, these axioms
were mended and their consistency proved [10]; we use the
mended axioms herein. Second, the model is too constrained
to model some actual realizations of time-triggered protocols.
Therefore, we generalize the theory to accommodate time-
triggered protocol realizations (and their optimizations) that
fall outside the theory developed. Specifically, the theory is
extended to accommodate (1) event-triggered behavior, (2)
communication delays, (3) reception windows, (4) non-static
clock skew, and (5) pipelined rounds (these generalizations
are explained and justified in Section III). These extensions
are used to model, for example, the time-triggered protocol
implementations of NASA Langley’s SPIDER, an ultra fault-
tolerant fly-by-wire communications bus [11]. This general-
ized time-triggered model, a proof of its consistency, and a
proof that an arbitrary time-triggered protocol implements its
synchronous model have been formulated in PVS (based on
Rushby’s original PVS specifications and proofs), and those
specifications and proofs are available online.1
In the second half of this paper, we demonstrate how to for-
mally verify that a protocol realized in hardware satisfies the
scheduling constraints of the time-triggered model. The veri-
fication is done using SRI’s SAL family of model-checkers,
which combines a bounded model-checker implementing k-
induction with SRI’s satisfiability modulo theories (SMT)
solver, Yices, to prove LTL safety properties over infinite-
1Specification and proof files can be found at http://www.cs.indiana.edu/
∼lepike/pub pages/fmcad.html. To improve the presentation in this paper,
slight syntactic modifications are made from the PVS specifications (e.g.,
some functions are uncurried).
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state systems (our proofs essentially depend on the theory
of linear arithmetic and uninterpreted functions) [12]. These
specifications and proofs can also be found on-line.1 Besides
being a novel application of formal verification in general, the
approach showcases a particularly successful application of
















Fig. 1. Time-Triggered Protocol Verification Strategy
Taken together, we have a methodology for proving that a
hardware realization of a time-triggered protocol implements
its synchronous specification, with respect to its timing param-
eters, as illustrated in Figure 1.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. The
synchronous model’s syntax and semantics is provided in
Section II. In Section III, the syntax and semantics of a
generalized time-triggered model are given, and a simulation
theorem is stated. In Section IV, we demonstrate how to
prove the schedule for a protocol realization satisfies the
scheduling constraints of the time-triggered model using as a
case-study the SPIDER Distributed Diagnosis Protocol (proofs
for the SPIDER Clock Synchronization Protocol and schedule
optimizations are provided on-line1). Concluding remarks are
given in Section V.
II. THE SYNCHRONOUS MODEL
The synchronous model presented is a variant of Lynch’s
formulation [13] subsequently adapted by Rushby for the
purposes of formulating it in a mechanical theorem-prover [1].
Here, we make some slight modifications to the language and
also introduce a round-independence relation, to be described
shortly. In the synchronous model, distributed protocols are
specified as if the nodes in the distributed system execute in
lock-step. A synchronous protocol proceeds in rounds. In a
round, nodes synchronously and instantaneously update their
outbound channels (in the communication phase) and then
their local state (in the computation phase), based on the
incoming messages received on their inbound channels [13].
A. Syntax
We begin by fixing a set of messages, mess . A distinguished
element null represents the absence of a message (it can also
represent a “do not care” message). Let P be a nonempty set
of node identifiers. For each p ∈ P , the following sets and
total functions are defined:
• A set of node identifiers, out nbrsp, identifying the
outbound neighbors; i.e., the nodes to which p is con-
nected by outbound channels. A set of node identifiers,
in nbrsp, identifying the inbound neighbors, can be
defined from the outbound neighbors:
in nbrsp
df= {q ∈ P | p ∈ out nbrsq}
• A set of states, statesp. A distinguished component of
the state, r, keeps track of the current round. The state
init sp is the initial state.
• A message-generation function msgp : statesp ×
out nbrsp → mess that returns the message p sends
to each node to which it is connected by an outbound
channel; null is returned if no message is sent.
• A higher-order state-transition function transp :
statesp × (in nbrsp → mess) → statesp that returns
the new state of p based on the current state and inputs
generated by its inbound neighbors.
Sometimes we omit the node-identifier subscript from a set
or function to denote a global representation of the system.
For example, we define the global state to be the function
states df= λp. statesp.
Finally, we introduce a round-independence relation
independent over rounds that holds if messages to be sent
in r + 1 do not depend on the computation that occurs during
round r. This relation is used to determine whether a messages
for the subsequent round can be sent before computation in the
current round is complete. We call this round-based pipelining.
B. Semantics
The semantics of a synchronous specification can be given
by a transition system expressed as a recursive function. The
communication phase is modeled by each node applying its
msg function, and the computation phase is modeled by each
node applying its trans function. The function run takes the
number of rounds of execution and the global initial state
and returns the final global state (runp is p’s component of
the global state returned by run). Thus, for the initial round
init rnd and the initial state init s of a protocol, its behavior
can be defined as run(init rnd , init s), where
run(r, s) df=
if r = 0 then s
else λp. transp(runp(r − 1, s),
λq. msgq(runq(r − 1, s), p)),
where q ∈ in nbrsp
The protocols we model execute for only a finite number of
rounds. However, a protocol may be scheduled to execute an
infinite number of times.
The meaning of the round-independence relation is cap-
tured by Axiom 1, which describes the behavior of pipelined
communication and computation phases by stating that if the
relation holds at round r, then the messages generated from the
states in rounds r and r−1 are equivalent. The intuition is that
if the computation phase of r does not depend on the messages
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sent in the communication phase of r, then the computation
phase may begin before the computation phase ends. We
motivate the use of the relation in pipelining optimizations
in Section III-0e.
Semantic Axiom 1 (Pipelining):
¬independent(0)
and ( independent(r)
implies (∀q ∈ out nbrsp :
msgp(runp(r, init s), q)
= msgp(runp(r − 1, init s), q)))
III. THE GENERALIZED TIME-TRIGGERED MODEL
We extend the synchronous model presented in the pre-
vious section to take into account the real-time behavior of
the protocols’ execution. Some of the syntax comes directly
from the original model Rushby developed [1]; the syntactic
extensions we introduce for the time-triggered model are noted
specifically. After the extensions, we describe the semantics
of the model and then present a simulation theorem between
an arbitrary protocol in the synchronous and time-triggered
models.
Here, we take a moment to motivate informally the gener-
alizations to Rushby’s original time-triggered model. We use
these generalizations to model the NASA SPIDER protocols
and their realizations. We do not know to what extent these
generalizations support current realizations of similar time-
triggered systems, such as SAFEbus, TTA, and FlexRay [4],
but the generalizations can be used to explore more aggressive
timing characteristics for any time-triggered system satisfying
the model.
Recall the generalizations for which we make provisions:
(1) event-triggered behavior, (2) communication delays, (3) re-
ception windows, (4) non-static clock skew, and (5) pipelined
rounds; we motivate them in the same order.
a) Event-Triggered Behavior: Some protocols, while
mostly time-triggered, occasionally manifest event-triggered
behavior—actions driven by the observance of some event
rather than reaching some pre-scheduled clock-time. A typical
example is a clock synchronization protocol such as Davies
and Wakerly’s protocol [14] or Srikanth and Toueg’s proto-
col [15]. Some of the messages sent in the protocols may
be determined by the global schedule, but others are event-
triggered: when a node receives some number of messages
over its inbound channels, it sends a synchronization (or echo)
message.
b) Communication Delays: Communication is not in-
stantaneous; latency depends on both the distance a message
travels and the medium through which it travels. Latency must
be accounted for in tightly synchronized systems with large
differences in latency between nodes. Furthermore, for a given
distance and medium, there is a nominal latency, and error
bounds are also introduced to bound the greatest deviation
from the nominal latency that is not regarded as a faulty
communication.
c) Reception Windows: Based on the anticipated send
time, the expected latency, and the local clock-time, a receiving
node will open a reception window, which is the set of clock
ticks during which the node allows incoming messages in
a given round. Messages received outside the window are
marked as being faulty. We introduce reception windows into
the model to ensure that the windows in a realization do not
violate the synchrony assumption.
d) Non-Static Clock Skew: Provisions for reasoning
about non-static clock skew have two benefits. First, they allow
protocols that satisfy the assumptions of the time-triggered
model but nevertheless directly affect the system’s timing
characteristics (e.g. clock synchronization, self-stabilization,
and startup protocols [11]) to be specified in a time-triggered
model rather than a more general asynchronous model. Sec-
ond, they allow for formal reasoning about schedule optimiza-
tions. Time-triggered system schedules (also known as task-
descriptor lists [5]) are usually designed with respect to the
maximum possible clock skew during the normal operation of
the system. When clocks are not resynchronized, the maximum
possible clock skew increases as a linear function of time. If
the difference between the possible clock skew at different
points in the system’s execution is significant, then a schedule
can be tightened at those points that the clock skew is small.
e) Pipelining Rounds: Embedded control systems often
have hard real-time deadlines that may require aggressive
schedules. It may be possible to pipeline the communication
and computation rounds of a single protocol or of multiple
protocols for better throughput; we call pipelining of this sort
round-based pipelining. For rounds of the schedule satisfying
Axiom 1, the computation phase can begin before the com-
munication phase has completed. Section IV-6 mentions how
to exploit this in schedules that interleave distinct protocols.
A. Syntax
We define real-time to be the set of real numbers R and
clock-time to be the set of integers Z. Real-time is measured
in some arbitrary unit of time (e.g. milliseconds), and clock-
time is measured in ticks. By convention, real-time variables
and constants are lower-case and clock-time variables and
constants are upper-case.
A time-triggered specification extends the syntax for a
synchronous specification as follows. (The syntax deals with
both the protocol specification and its time-triggered imple-
mentation.)
Let P be a nonempty set of node identifiers. For each p ∈ P ,
the following total functions are defined:
• An inverse clock function Cp : R → Z that takes a real-
time as an input and returns a clock-time.
• A schedule function schedp : N → Z from rounds
to clock-times. It parameterizes the communication and
computation phase schedules, defined as offsets from the
beginning of the round. To accommodate event-triggered
behavior, we take a more general view of the schedule
function than Rushby does: the schedule function may
determine the time at which some event occurs, for a
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time-triggered action, or it may simply denote the clock-
time at which an event occurs, for an event-triggered
action.
• A relation sentp ⊆ out nbrsp ×mess ×R, the tuples of
which consist of a node q (that is an outbound neighbor
of p), a message m, and a real-time t and holds if p sent
message m to q at real-time t.
• A relation recvp ⊆ in nbrsp × mess × R, the tuples of
which consist of a node q (that is an inbound neighbor of
p), a message m, and a real-time t and holds if p received
message m from q at real-time t.
In addition, the following functions and constants, not param-
eterized by node identifiers, are also defined:
• A schedule discrepancy function Λ : N → Z from
rounds to clock-times denoting the maximum clock-
time discrepancy between the schedule functions for that
round. This function is added to Rushby’s model since
nodes may not share the same schedule (due to event-
triggered behavior).
• A communication offset function D : N → Z from
rounds to a clock-time offset. It determines the clock-
time at which nodes send messages in each round.
• A communication delay δnom > 0 is a real-time con-
stant that denotes the expected nominal delay between
when a message is sent and when it is received. The
small real-time constants el > 0 and eu > 0 denote
the maximum offsets from δnom at which a message
is received sooner (δnom − el ) or later (δnom + eu)
than expected, respectively. We require el < δnom and
eu < δnom . These constants, added to Rushby’s model,
provide finer-grained reasoning on the real-time bounds
of latency-sensitive time-triggered protocols (e.g., clock
synchronization protocols).
• A computation offset function P : N → Z from rounds to
a clock-time offset. It determines the clock-time at which
nodes begin computation in each round.
• A maximum drift rate ρ ∈ R such that 0 < ρ < 1. This
is the maximum rate at which a clock may drift.
• A dynamic clock skew Σ(r) ≥ 0 function is introduced
to Rushby’s model, which denotes the greatest clock-time
skew occurring between a sender and receiver during the
duration of round r.
• A reception window function R : N → Z from rounds to
a reception window offset is also introduced to Rushby’s
model. It marks the clock-time at which a node accepts
inbound messages. In round r, the reception window
closes at P (r).
B. System Assumptions and Schedule Constraints
We constrain the interpretations that can be given to the
syntax when defining a time-triggered system with the fol-
lowing system assumptions and schedule constraints. The
system assumptions describe the assumed behavior of the
underlying system—most notably, the behavior of the local
clocks. The schedule constraints ensure the schedule of time-
triggered events, given the system assumptions, gives rise to
synchronous behavior.
1) System Assumptions: As in Rushby’s original model,
we present four system assumptions [1]; recalling that three
of Rushby’s formulations were inconsistent [10], we present
mended and generalized assumptions here. As usual, free
variables are implicitly universally-quantified.
Assumption 1 bounds the maximum drift of a clock in terms
of the maximum drift rate, ρ.
System Assumption 1 (Clock Drift Rate): Let t1 ≥ t2.
Then b(1−ρ) · (t1− t2)c ≤ Cp(t1)−Cp(t2) ≤ d(1+ρ) · (t1−
t2)e.
Lemma 1 shows that the clocks are monotonic.
Lemma 1: t1 < t2 implies Cp(t1) ≤ Cp(t2).
Proof: By System Assumption 1, Cp(t2) ≥ Cp(t1) +
b(1− ρ)(t2 − t1)c.
Assumption 2 ensures the skew between clocks is no greater
than the maximum clock skew so that if any clock is in
the communication phase of round r, then all of the clocks
are synchronized within the skew of that round. Clock-time
schedp(r) + D(r) is the clock-time at which p sends its
messages in round r, and schedp(r) + P (r) is the clock-time
at which it begins the computation phase of round r.
System Assumption 2 (Clock Synchronization):
( max(Cp(t), Cq(t))
≥ min(schedp(r), schedq(r)) + D(r)
and min(Cp(t), Cq(t))
≤ max(schedp(r), schedq(r)) + P (r))
implies |Cq(t)− Cp(t)| ≤ Σ(r)
Assumption 3 ensures that messages are received within the
communication delay of when they are sent, modulo error, and
that messages received were not “spontaneously generated.”
System Assumption 3 (Maximum Communication Delay):
There exists some real-time d, where δnom − el ≤
d ≤ δnom + eu , such that sentp(q, m, t) if and only if
recvq(p, m, t + d), and there exists some real-time d′, where
δnom − el ≤ d′ ≤ δnom + eu , such that recvq(p, m, t) if and
only if sentp(q, m, t− d′).
Assumption 4 constrains the maximum discrepancy per-
mitted between the schedule functions of two nodes for a
given round. For a particular implementation, whether this
constraint is met depends on the constraints for the event-
triggered behavior of the individual nodes.
System Assumption 4: 0 ≤ |schedp(r)− schedq(r)| ≤
Λ(r).
2) Schedule Constraints: We present six schedule con-
straints to ensure the time-triggered schedule implements a
synchronous system. Constraints 1 - 3 generalize Rushby’s
original constraints [1], and constraints 4 - 6 are new con-
straints necessary to constrain pipelining and the scheduling
of receivers’ reception windows. The schedule constraints are
what we later prove hold of the time-triggered schedules in
Section IV.
Constraint 1 ensures that the computation offset of round r
falls within round r.
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Schedule Constraint 1 (Offset Constraint): 0 < P (r) <
sched(r + 1)− sched(r).
Schedule constraint 2 gives the minimum communication
offset. Note that if the nominal delay is substantially larger
than the clock skew (as is the case in tightly-synchronized
systems), the skew has little bearing on when messages can
be sent.
Schedule Constraint 2 (Communication Constraint):
D(r) ≥ Σ(r) + Λ(r)− b(1− ρ) · (δnom − el)c.
Similarly, constraint 3 gives the minimum computation
offset. The offset must be greater than the latest time at which
a non-faulty message may arive, which is the sum of the
communication offset, the clock skew, the maximum schedule
discrepancy, and the maximum delay.
Schedule Constraint 3 (Computation Offset Constraint):
P (r) > D(r) + Σ(r) + Λ(r) + d(1 + ρ) · (δnom + eu)e.
clock-time
P (r) P (r + 1)D(r + 1) schedp(r + 1)
communication phase (r + 1)
computation phase (r)
Fig. 2. Pipelined Communication Phase (Constraint 5)
Constraint 4 ensures that pipelining only occurs when the
messages to be sent do not depend on the computations from
the previous round, and constraint 5 restricts pipelining to
consecutive rounds. The effect of pipelining is illustrated in
Figure 2.
Schedule Constraint 4: ¬independent(r) implies
D(r) ≥ 0.
Schedule Constraint 5: r > 0 implies D(r) ≥ P (r − 1) −
sched(r) + sched(r − 1).
clock-time
schedp(r) P (r)− 1D(r) R(r)− 1 R(r)
≤ b(1− ρ) · (δnom − el)c − Σ(r)− Λ(r) + 1
reception window
Fig. 3. Reception Window (Schedule Constraint 6)
The final schedule constraint, Constraint 6, restricts when
the reception window is opened. The constraint is illustrated in
Figure 3. The reception window must be opened soon enough
so that non-faulty messages are received within the window.
The formula b(1−ρ) ·(δnom−el)c gives a lower bound on the
minimum message delay. We add D(r) to take into account
the clock-time offset at which the message is sent. The skew
for the round, Σ(r), is subtracted to account for the case where
the receiver’s clock is maximally faster than the sender’s. A
one-tick constant is added to the upper bound on R(r) because
the reception window is opened on a clock edge, but messages
arrive asynchronously. A message that arrives strictly less than
one clock tick before the reception window is opened will be
latched on the clock edge when the window is opened.
Schedule Constraint 6 (Reception Window Constraint):
0 ≤ R(r) ≤ D(r)+ b(1−ρ) · (δnom −el)c−Σ(r)−Λ(r)+1.
C. Semantics
The semantics for the time-triggered model is a transition
system in which states are pairs of the form 〈s, t〉, where s
is a global state of the system together with the current real-
time, t. The transitions between states are constrained by the
axioms given in this section as well as Axiom 1, from the
synchronous model.
The axioms are defined over the following uninterpreted
functions. We give the type signatures of the functions, as
well as their intended interpretations:
• A function sendtimep : N → R from rounds to real-
times denoting the real-time that p broadcasts messages
in each round.
• A time-triggered system state function ttssp : states ×
Z → statesp that takes a global state s, a clock-time
T , and returns p’s state after executing for T clock ticks
from s.
• A time-triggered inbound messages function ttinp : Z×
in nbrsp → mess that maps a clock-time T and an
inbound neighbor q to the message p receives from q
at T .
• A time-slice function gs : N → R from rounds to real-
times. Its purpose is to provide real-times at which the
system state of the time-triggered model of a protocol is
the same as the untimed model of the protocol, for each
round.
Axiom 2 constrains the sendtimep function by ensuring that
at the real-time that p broadcasts its message in round r, its
clock-time is at the communication offset into that round.
Semantic Axiom 2: Cp(sendtimep(r)) = schedp(r) +
D(r).
Axioms 3 and 4 constrain the behavior of the sentp function
by first stating the sufficient conditions for it to hold and
then the necessary conditions for it to hold. Axiom 3 ensures
that the message p sends to q at the real-time sendtimep(r)
is the message generated by its message-generation function
using its time-triggered state at the beginning of round r.
Axiom 4 ensures that if the sendtimep relation is satisfied,
then it is satisfied by a message generated by the message-
generation function in some round and by the real-time at the
communication delay into the round.
Semantic Axiom 3: sentp(q, msgp(ttssp(s, schedp(r) +
D(r)), q), sendtimep(r)), where q ∈ out nbrsp.
Semantic Axiom 4: sentp(q, m, t) implies there exists a
round r such that t = sendtimep(r) and m =
msgp(ttssp(s, schedp(r) + D(r)), q), where q ∈ out nbrsp.
Before stating the next axiom, we define the relation
recv win openp, which takes a real-time t and a round r and
is true if the real-time falls within p’s reception window for
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round r. Messages may arrive strictly less than one clock tick
before R(r) is reached, but these messags are latched at R(r).
Therefore, recv win openp(t, r) holds for any real-time t
that is mapped to a clock-time strictly greater than Rp(r)− 1
(and strictly less than the beginning of the computation phase).
Definition 1 (Reception Window Open):
recv win openp(t, r)
df=
schedp(r) + Rp(r)− 1 ≤ Cp(t) < schedp(r) + P (r)
Axiom 5 constrains the behavior of the ttinp function by
ensuring that for any clock-time T in the computation phase
of round r, ttinp(T, q) is the message p receives from q in the
reception window of round r (ε is Hilbert’s choice operator).
Semantic Axiom 5: schedp(r)+P (r) ≤ T < schedp(r+1)
implies ttinp(T, q) =
ε
({
m ∈ mess | ∃t ∈ R. recv win openp(t, r)
and recvp(q, m, t)
})
Axioms 6 and 7 constrain the ttssp function. Axiom 6
determines p’s time-triggered state at the clock-time sched(r),
for each round r, to be the current state if r = 0, or the state
computed in the computation phase of the previous round.
Semantic Axiom 6:
ttssp(s, schedp(r)) =
if r = 0 then sp
else transp(ttssp(s, T ), λq. ttinp(T, q))
where q ∈ in nbrsp and
T = schedp(r − 1) + P (r − 1)
Axiom 7 ensures that outside of the computation phase, p’s
time-triggered state does not spontaneously change.
Semantic Axiom 7: For all clock-times T ,
schedp(r) ≤ T ≤ schedp(r) + P (r) implies
ttssp(s, T ) = ttssp(s, schedp(r)).
Finally, Axiom 8 constrains the real-time gs(r) to be the
real-time at which the process with the slowest clock has
reached sched(r).
Semantic Axiom 8: For all nodes l,
∀q : Cq(gs(r)) ≥ sched l(r))
and ∃p : Cp(gs(r)) = sched l(r))
Finally, Axiom 9 ensures that while a node is in its compu-
tation phase, its state is either the state it has before applying
its state-transition function in that round or the updated state
resulting from its application (in this model, the state is
updated at some nondeterministic time during the computation
phase, but the entire state is updated instantaneously).
Semantic Axiom 9: For all clock-times T , schedp(r) +
P (r) ≤ T < schedp(r + 1) implies either ttssp(s, T ) =
ttssp(s, schedp(r)), or ttss(s, T ) = ttss(s, schedp(r + 1)).
An interpreted transition relation is one that satisfies axioms 1
through 9. The axiomatization ensures a simulation relation
exists between a synchronous protocol and its time-triggered
implementation, as stated in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1: ttssp(s, Cp(gs(r))) = runp(r, init s).
Proof: By induction on the rounds of the protocol;
see [16] for a proof sketch of the proof formulated in PVS.1
IV. SCHEDULE VERIFICATION
The schedule of a time-triggered protocol’s realization are
the clock-times at which events are scheduled to occur. As-
suming that an architecture is fixed and satisfies the system
assumptions, we wish to prove the schedule developed for
a protocol’s realization satisfies the six schedule constraints,
Constraint 1 through Constraint 6, from Section III-B2.
This verification is carried out in SRI’s SAL family of
model-checkers, which contains an infinite-state bounded
model checker that combines the Yices SMT solver with
the k-induction model-checking algorithm to make bounded
model-checking complete for safety properties [12]. Because
the languages of PVS and SAL are similar, the schedule
constraints have nearly identical formulations in the respective
languages.
The verification technique is demonstrated by verifying
the schedule constraints for two SPIDER time-triggered pro-
tocols. The schedules verified are taken from the VHDL
coded by Wilfredo Torres-Pomales and Mahyar Malekpour
of the NASA Langley Research Center, the implementors
of the latest prototype [11]. The schedules were generated
using Matlab R© according to the by-hand analysis of the
timing requirements [11]. The verification technique provides
a formal mapping from the synchronous specification of these
protocols to the time-triggered implementation. Below, we
overview the verification of the SPIDER Distributed Diagnosis
Protocol (SPIDER DD Protocol) schedule. The verification
of the constraints for a more complex protocol, the SPIDER
Clock-Synchronization Protocol, as well as a demonstration
of how to use this technique to optimize the throughput of
SPIDER protocols, are available on-line.1
Briefly, the SPIDER DD Protocol ensures nodes maintain a
consistent assignment of the faultiness of the other nodes [11].
Nodes may individually accuse one another of being faulty,
based on accumulated evidence. During the protocol, if enough
nodes accuse a node, the accusations are promoted to an
agreed-upon conviction. When a node has been convicted,
the other non-faulty nodes ignore the convicted node until it
proves itself to be non-faulty. (The mechanism for doing so
involves executing the SPIDER Reintegration Protocol [17].)
The verification of this protocol’s schedule is straightfor-
ward. The protocol has four rounds. The schedule offsets D,
P , and R do not vary from round to round. We verify the
protocol with respect to the maximum possible skew for the
duration of the protocol. Furthermore, none of the rounds are
pipelined, and there are no event-triggered actions.
1) Type and Constant Declarations: The type and constant
declarations are straightforward in SAL. All system constants
are interpreted to be concrete values taken from the system
parameters for the targeted prototype. The SAL specification
of the declarations are given in Figure 4. The schedule
constraints require taking the floor and ceiling of the minimum
and maximum communication delay, respectively; we do this
by hand (The Yices SMT solver cannot handle non-linear
arithmetic) and set them equal to constants.
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REALTIME : TYPE = REAL;
CLOCKTIME : TYPE = INTEGER;
OFFSET : TYPE = {T: CLOCKTIME | T >= 0};
RND : TYPE = NATURAL;
rho : REALTIME = 1/10000;
d_nom : {t: REALTIME | t >= 0} = 5;
ERROR : TYPE = {t: REALTIME |
t >= 0 AND t < d_nom};
e_l : ERROR = 5/10000;
e_u : ERROR = 5/10000;
% floor((1 - rho) * (d_nom - e_l))
fl_d_min : CLOCKTIME = 4;
% ceiling((1 + rho) * (d_nom + e_u))
cd_d_max : CLOCKTIME = 6;
Fig. 4. Type and Constant Declarations
2) Variables: In SAL, we build a state-machine to model-
check. The state-machine transitions follow the order of the
schedule’s rounds and update state variables accordingly.
Therefore, in the SAL model, we replace some of the math-
ematical functions from the time-triggered system model pre-
sented in Section III with corresponding state variables ranging
over rounds. Thus, the set of state variables include sched , D,
P , R, Λ, Σ, independent , and R. The state variables may be
nondeterministically updated in the state-machine transitions
depending on the specifics of the schedule being verified.
In the schedule verified for the SPIDER DD Protocol, the
values of D, P , R, and Σ are constant over the rounds for
this protocol’s schedule; only sched is updated from round
to round. The other protocol schedule verifications are more
complex; see IV-6.
3) Schedule Constraint Specification: The schedule con-
straints stated in Section III-B2 are stated in SAL as shown
in Figure 5. Some of these constraints compare the schedule
between successive rounds (e.g., Constraint 1). Because we
have transcribed the functions over the rounds to variables
that are updated in the state machine at each round, these
relations may take as arguments the values of these variables in
a round and compare them to the values in the next round (e.g.,
constraint1 takes pre_sched and sched as arguments,
denoting the values for sched(r − 1) and sched(r), respec-
tively). The SPIDER DD Protocol contains no event-triggered
behaviors; therefore, for all rounds, the schedule skew Λ is
zero. We therefore omit it from the constraints.
4) Specifying a Round-Based Schedule: We create a state-
machine representation of how the schedule constraints evolve
through the rounds of execution. In addition to schedule vari-
ables, for each constraint, a boolean variable is declared. The
value of the variable is determined by whether its associated
schedule constraint is satisfied in the present round. The state
machine includes a counter r that records the current round
in the synchronous abstraction of the protocol. In each initial
state, this counter is set to 0. Each transition from a state in
round r is to a state in round r + 1. In general, we check the
schedule constraints for the next-state values of the variables.
For constraints that compare the values between rounds, the
current-state variable values and the next-state variable values
constraint1(P: OFFSET, pre_sched: CLOCKTIME,
sched: CLOCKTIME): BOOLEAN =
0 < P AND P < sched - pre_sched;
constraint2(D: CLOCKTIME, S: OFFSET): BOOLEAN =
D >= S - fl_d_min;
constraint3(P: OFFSET, D: CLOCKTIME, S: OFFSET):
BOOLEAN = P > D + S + cd_d_max;
constraint4(r: RND, D: CLOCKTIME): BOOLEAN =
(NOT independent?(r)) => D >= 0;
constraint5(pre_P: OFFSET, D: CLOCKTIME,
pre_sched: CLOCKTIME, sched: CLOCKTIME):
BOOLEAN = D >= pre_P - sched + pre_sched;
constraint6(D: CLOCKTIME, R: CLOCKTIME, S: OFFSET):
BOOLEAN = R - 1 <= D + fl_d_min - S;
Fig. 5. SAL Specification of the Generalized System Assumptions
are compared in the constraint. Because there are no previous
state assignments in round 0, those state variables associated
with constraints that compare values between rounds are
declared to be true upon initialization.
Not every state variable needs to be updated in each
transition. If a state variable is not reassigned in a guarded
transition, its value remains the same in the next state.
5) Verification: The property stating that in all reachable
states, each constraint holds can then be specified by the
following LTL state invariant.
constraints: LEMMA SYSTEM |-
G(c1 AND c2 AND c3 AND c4 AND c5 AND c6);
The property is verified by executing SAL’s infinite-state
bounded model checker. The lemma constraints is
verified by the k-induction solver, for k = 2. The proof is
fully automatic and requires no supporting invariants.
6) Other Verifications: We have also used this proof tech-
nique to verify the SPIDER Clock Synchronization Protocol
schedule. The purpose of the clock synchronization protocol
is to resynchronize the local clocks, in the presence of faults,
after they have possibly drifted apart [11]. Consequently,
the schedule of the clock synchronization protocol is more
complex, as the skew is a function of the round of the protocol.
Similarly, we have also verified a schedule interleaving
distinct SPIDER protocols. In these schedules, we can take
advantage of the round-based pipelining optimizations. Both
of these verifications are available on-line.1
V. DISCUSSION
Faults are not dealt with explicitly in the models presented;
we discuss them below. Concluding remarks follow.
A. Faults
Neither the synchronous nor time-triggered model presented
explicitly model faulty behavior. Nevertheless, because many
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time-triggered protocols are fault-tolerant, we ultimately wish
to prove that the protocols behave correctly in the presence
of faults. Before discussing faults specifically, recall that the
state-transition function trans and the message-generation
function msg are left uninterpreted, and the same functions
appear in both the synchronous and time-triggered models.
Thus, the simulation theorem holds regardless of their instan-
tiations; in particular, the functions can be partially-interpreted
and under-specify a protocol, and the theorem still holds.
Keeping this in mind, faults can be modeled, as Rushby
notes, by partially-interpreting trans and msg , allowing them
to return arbitrary values, nondeterministically, if a node or
channel is faulty [1]. In fact, all faulty behavior can be
modeled, with no loss of fidelity, by partially-interpreting the
message-generation function only [18].
In the synchronous model, the correctness of a protocol can
be verified under a maximum fault assumption (MFA), which
constrains the kinds of faults, and the number of each kind, un-
der which the protocol is hypothesized to behave correctly [1].
If the effects of faults are captured by the message-generation
function msg , then the MFA can be thought of as a constraint
on the function’s nondeterminism. Thus, one purpose of the
time-triggered model is to define the timing behaviors that are
non-faulty. That is, if the timing characteristics of the system
satisfy the system assumptions and schedule constraints of
the time-triggered model, then no faults will result if these
characteristics hold in a realization (timing and value faults
may still arise from environment factors).
B. Concluding Remarks
The approach presented herein and illustrated in Figure 1
is one portion of an end-to-end verification methodology—
from the distributed protocols to the hardware implementations
of the nodes—in a time-triggered system. As an anonymous
reviewer notes, the results presented herein can be combined
with recent work in physical-layer protocol verification [19]
and gate-level I/O device verification [20] to further the goal
of an end-to-end verification of time-triggered systems.
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A Mechanized Refinement Framework for Analysis
of Custom Memories
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Abstract— We present a framework for formal verification of
embedded custom memories. Memory verification is complicated
by the difficulty in abstracting design parameters induced by the
inherently analog nature of transistor-level designs. We develop
behavioral formal models that specify a memory as a system of in-
teracting state machines, and relate such models with an abstract
read/write view of the memory via refinements. The operating
constraints on the individual state machines can be validated by
readily available data from analog simulations. The framework
handles both static RAM (SRAM) and flash memories, and we
show initial results demonstrating its applicability.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper describes an approach to verify embedded cus-
tom memories. Memory verification entails showing that a
transistor implementation conforms to the high-level view of
a state machine that stores and retrieves data at addressed
locations. Memories are complex analog artifacts, optimized
for performance, area, power, etc., and account for about half
the real estate and more than 50% of the transistor count
of a microprocessor. This makes their verification a critical
component of the overall design validation. However, given the
size and complexity of a custom memory core, it is impossible
to validate the entire core by analog simulation. Thus, a key
challenge is to derive an effective abstraction which can be
formally compared against the high-level specification.
The common approach to abstract a traditional SRAM is to
extract a switch-level model [1] that represents the memory
netlist as a set of nodes connected by transistor switches.
Each node has state 0, 1, or X; each switch has state “open”,
“closed”, or “indeterminate”; state transitions are specified
by switch equations. These models capture many aspects of
transistor circuits, namely bidirectionality, signal strengths,
etc. The common analyzers for constructing such models are
the ANAMOS [2] and its variants; they partition a netlist into
channel connected subcomponents (CCSs) and analyze each
component separately to construct the switch equations.
However, in spite of their sophistication, switch-level ana-
lyzers ignore many analog effects. For instance, the strength
assignment procedure in ANAMOS produces a significant mis-
match with detailed analog simulations for netlists containing
transistors of closely matching but different strengths [3].
While these discrepancies can be ameliorated by designing
more and more accurate analyzers [4], such an approach does
not solve the fundamental problem of effectively represent-
ing inherently analog behaviors with equations in a discrete
algebra. The problem is exacerbated with the advent of flash
memories that contain both regular and Floating Gate (FG)
transistors; FG transistors “break” the view of netlists as a
collection of switches, making switch-level analysis untenable.
In this paper, we present a new approach to abstracting
memory implementations. Instead of extracting a switch-level
model by structural analysis of a transistor netlist implement-
ing a memory core, we formalize its behavior as a system of
interacting state machines. The viability of the method is based
on the observation that in an industrial design flow, custom
memories are designed not as an ad-hoc transistor network but
by interconnecting small, cohesive units such as bitcells, sense
amplifiers, etc., with well-understood electrical properties in
their range of operation. For instance, in Motorola’s design
flow, the units are carefully architected to operate over a lim-
ited sequence of certified stimulus patterns, each of which is
validated by extensive analog SPICE simulation across various
process corners and operating conditions [3]. Thus, it is natural
to formalize the behavior of each unit as a state machine using
guarded transitions that encode its operating constraints. This
enables us to reduce a memory implementation to a formal
behavioral model specifying an interacting composition of
state machine components, with each component representing
the behavioral model for a pre-computed unit. Note that by
focusing on the behavior of the units, our approach is agnostic
to the nature of the transistors (standard, FG, etc.) used in
the implementation, making it applicable to both SRAM and
flash designs. Finally, we show how to prove a refinement
theorem relating such compositions with high-level memory
specifications using an assume-guarantee technique.
Our approach is mechanized in the ACL2 theorem
prover [5]. We show how the use of the expressive language
of a general-purpose theorem prover enables effective compo-
sitional reasoning about the interacting state machines.
II. MODELING CUSTOM SRAM
We illustrate our approach with the bitcell implementation
shown in Fig. 1. From an electrical perspective, reading from
the bitcell can be explained by the following operations.
• Initially, the precharge (pch) signal turns 1 in order to
precharge the bitline (bl) and bitline-bar (blb) to 1s.
• Next, the wordline (wl) turns 1 indicating that the decoded
address matches that of the bitcell. Thus the data stored
in the bitcell (say 0) and its complement (1) are gated to
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Fig. 1. A Standard SRAM Bitcell and Associated Timing Diagram
bl and blb respectively. Due to the large load on bl, the
bitcell cannot pull it down from 1 to 0; bl is pulled down
to an indeterminate value (1 − δ) (where 0 < δ < 1),
while blb retains a 1. Furthermore, since the isolate (iso)
signal is 0, the sense-line (sl) is pulled down to (1 − δ).
• Finally, the sense (se) signal, followed by iso, turn 1
resulting in (i) an electrical disconnection between bl and
sl, and (ii) converting the bottom 5-transistor pack into a
latch that pulls the value of sl from (1 − δ) to a solid 0.
The value is then inverted and is obtained at dout.
Note that reading a bitcell is a complex analog problem —
how to drive a large load (a bitline) with a bitcell that is
quite small in strength. Furthermore, the circuit functionality
depends on the constraints on the relative times within which
successive signals change value. For example, wl must be 1 for
a pre-determined bounded interval in order for the bitcell value
to drive bl from 1 to (1 − δ). Nevertheless, the behavior of
the signal pattern can be viewed as discrete state transitions:
if the data stored in the bitcell is 0, then under appropriate
conditions bl transits from state 1, through (1 − δ) and so on
until finally the circuit produces 1 at dout.
Our approach works on the bitcell design as follows. We
identify the design as a composition of state machines that
correspond to the following two components:
1) the bitcell (from the shaded region together with the
structure of the pch and iso), with the wl, pch, and iso
signals as input and bl and blb as output, and
2) the sense amplifier (from the 5-transistor pack together
with the transistors gated by iso), with bl and blb as
inputs and dout as the output.
Each state machine is pre-computed into a “library”. To make
the library generic, the state machines are parameterized to
work over a range of operating constraints. For instance, to
model the time delay between pch and iso signals, the bitcell
component contains parameters n0, n1, and n2 (among others),
with constraints that on a read, (i) pch is 1 and iso is 0 for
at least n0 units, (ii) both pch and iso are 0 for at least n1
units thereafter and wl becomes 1 in this interval, and (iii) iso
is 1 for at least n2 units subsequently. For the reader familiar
with ACL2, the parameters are modeled using encapsulation
(with constraints specifying operating conditions) and can be
functionally instantiated [6] for concrete models.
We have used our library to model the transistor implemen-
tation of a simple but complete SRAM core consisting of an
array of memory words, each word composed of a row of
the bitcells in Fig. 1 (the sense amplifier being shared along
a bitcell column), together with a decoder implementation.
This example demonstrates scalability of the approach. A
strength of the approach is compositionality: the extracted
formal model of the memory core is merely a hierarchical
composition of those of the individual bitcells, with interme-
diate state machines specifying the behavior of the glue logic.
III. MODELING FLASH MEMORY
Although we can abstract custom SRAMs, our principal
goal is to develop a framework for handling flash memories.
The additional complexity in flash arises from FG transistors,
which have, in addition to the conventional drain (D), gate (G)
and source (S) terminals, a floating gate (F) — a polysilicon
layer inserted in the oxide between the gate and the substrate
that is physically disconnected from both S and D. A detailed
treatment of flash memories is provided by Cappelletti et
al [7]. The key electrical effect is the capacitive coupling
between G, F, and the substrate. The capacitance is exploited
to design a bitcell with a single FG transistor as follows.
Controlling the stored charge in the capacitive coupling allows
dynamic regulation of the threshold voltage Vth (the minimum
voltage to turn on the device); a low threshold voltage (V Lth)
represents logic 1 and high threshold voltage (V Hth ) represents
logic 0. Additionally, some flash designs make use of multiple
Vth levels to store 2 or 3 bits in one FG transistor; we do not
consider multi-level flash in this paper.
Unfortunately, the capacitive coupling mentioned above
breaks the simple view of a transistor as an on/off switch, as
taken by ANAMOS-like analyzers, and makes it infeasible to
extract precise switch-level abstractions. Consequently, current
industry practice on flash validation amounts to (i) simulating
the high-level model along with the encompassing SoC, and
(ii) simulating individual FG bitcells through SPICE simula-
tions. In particular, no formal correspondence is guaranteed
between the transistor netlist and high-level specification.
Before describing our behavioral models, we discuss the
electrical effects of flash operations. Below we summarize the
three main operations of an FG bitcell: read, program (writing
0), and erase (writing 1). The operations involve both the
bitcell and the surrounding control logic.
• Read: For the selected bitcell, one applies a voltage v
(V Lth < v < V
H
th ) at G which is driven by the selected
wordline, while keeping other wordlines at ground. If the
cell has logic 0, the transistor does not turn on and no
current flows to the associated sense amplifier; otherwise
the bitcell turns on and current is detected, reading a 1.
• Program: The so-called Channel Hot-Electron Injection
procedure is performed to inject negative charge into the
FG, raising its Vth to V Hth . Then there is a verification
phase to ensure that Vth has been appreciably raised;
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this is done by “reading” the cell with a gate voltage
v (> V Hth ). A result of 0 for the read indicates successful
programming; otherwise programming is iterated until it
succeeds or a specified number of attempts have been
made, signalling failure in the latter case.
• Erase: Erasing is performed for an entire memory sector
rather than one bitcell, and is based on removal of stored
charge by a procedure called Fowler-Nordheim tunneling.
The operation involves (i) raising the Vths of the bitcells
in the sector to V Hth by programming, (ii) charge removal
to lower all the Vths to V Lth, and finally, (iii) normaliza-
tion, which employs soft programming to increase the Vth
of the cells that have fallen below V Lth.
The description underlines the complexity of the analog op-
erations in a flash memory, and points to the difficulty of
designing switch-level analyzers. Other factors to account for
in abstracting flash memories include (i) multiple voltage
levels, (ii) charge injection and removal, and (iii) complex
sense amplifier activity to compare various current values.
However, the behaviors of the individual components are still
tractable (albeit more complex than SRAMs). For instance, the
response of the state machine for the FG bitcell component
to the electron injection phase of a program sequence is
formalized as a non-deterministic transition raising the Vth
by a bounded constant. Our library contains behavioral state
machine models for the different components of flash memory,
such as bitcell, sense amplifier, etc. Note that a few of the
generic components are reused from the SRAM library.
We used behavioral abstractions to formalize a standard
implementation of a NOR flash core:1 bitcells are arranged
in a two-dimensional array with a row decoder and a column
decoder; a read of a bitcell causes a row to be activated by the
row decoder, while the column decoder causes the appropriate
column to be connected to the sense amplifier resulting in the
loading of the data from the addressed bitcell to the output
buffer. The extracted model is a composition of the behavioral
models corresponding to the bitcells, the (row and column)
decoders, the sense amplifiers, and the output buffers.
IV. SPECIFICATION AND VERIFICATION
We relate the executions of the memory core with a high-
level specification. The specifications are abstract state ma-
chines representing the core’s interface to an SoC during
functional verification. The SRAM specification supports read,
write, and reset operations; the flash specification supports
read, program, and erase, together with core enable that
controls operations on the entire core, and write protect that
regulates programming bitcells in the core.
We prove that the implementation is a simulation refine-
ment [8], [9] of the specification up to stuttering, with respect
to a refinement map. A refinement map enables us to appropri-
ately view implementation states as specification states [10],
and in our case, maps the bitcell states in the memory core
1Flash memories have two common organizations: NOR and NAND. A
NOR flash is used as a nonvolatile memory with fast random access. A NAND
flash can be used as a disc storage. We do not consider NAND flash.
to an association list that models the core at the specification
level. We require the notion of correspondence to be stutter-
insensitive to account for the timing mismatch between the
implementation and specification models.
We now discuss the proof obligations. Let rep be a refine-
ment map. We then define predicates inv and commit, and a
function pick such that (i) inv is an implementation invariant
and (ii) the following formulas are provable:
1. ∀s, i : inv(s) ∧ ¬commit(s, i) ⇒
rep(impl(s, i)) = rep(s)
2. ∀s, i : inv(s) ∧ commit(s, i) ⇒
rep(impl(s, i)) = spec(rep(s), pick(s, i))
Here impl and spec are the (non-deterministic) state transition
functions of the implementation and specification respectively;
commit governs for an implementation transition if the spec-
ification transits or stutters; pick provides the specification
stimulus in case of a matching transition. The formulas above
thus state that for each transition of the implementation, the
specification either has a matching transition or stutters.2
These proof rules, of course, can be used to compare two
systems modeled at different abstraction levels; they have been
adapted from Manolios’ rules for stuttering simulations [11]
with the restriction that stuttering is one-sided. The restriction
is justified since one step of the specification corresponds to
several steps of the implementation, but not vice versa.
Using the ACL2 theorem prover we have verified the SRAM
and flash models of the preceding sections. Note that each
implementation is a complex composition of a large number
of state machines, which normally poses a challenge to formal
verification. However, the problem is ameliorated in our case
by a synergy of several factors. First, the implementation cor-
rectness is independent of the size of the core: we replace the
core size with a symbolic constant, and use symbolic rewriting
of the transition relations (an area of strength of theorem
provers, in particular ACL2) rather than detailed reachability
analysis. A second, subtle reason arises from the nature of the
models and proof obligations. The expensive verification step
involves the definition and proof of the appropriate invariant
inv. However, this step is substantially automated by using
the constraints attached to the component state machines.
Since the implementation is merely an interactive, hierarchical
composition, the assumed input constraints associated with a
component C must be implied by the invariants (guarantees)
associated with the state machines for their environmental
components. Furthermore, in a theorem prover we can define
invariants with generic, expressive predicates. Since ACL2
supports full first order logic, we define a predicate to express
(by quantification) that each state s is reached by transitions in
which the input sequences satisfy the associated constraints.
Invariance proof for this predicate reduces to the above
assume-guarantee reasoning.
2We also prove that stuttering is finite, by exhibiting a well-founded ranking
function that decreases along stuttering steps; this proof is trivial since timing
constraints upper-bound the completion of the state transition sequence by a
natural number, namely the number of delay units in system-clock cycle.
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Fig. 2. A SPICE Simulation trace showing a failed write of 0 due to
insufficient Setup Time
Finally, we note that one key feature of our framework is
the direct behavioral correspondence between the components
used for analog simulation and the formal models in our li-
brary. This facilitates corroboration of the models with readily
available simulation data. Furthermore, this correspondence
together with our assume-guarantee approach, can potentially
identify corner cases missed in analog simulation. In one
illustrative experiment, we inserted a bug in the SRAM li-
brary. During a write, the constraints on the state machines
responsible for generating signals bl and wl (Fig. 1) did not
guarantee that bl has been 0 for a sufficient time (setup time),
before wl becomes 0. The bug was promptly discovered while
attempting to prove the assumptions on the bitcell, and the
scenario specified by the failure corresponds directly to the
actual SPICE simulation pattern for the bitcell (Fig. 2).
V. RELATED WORK AND CONCLUSION
Formalization of transistor circuits has chiefly focused on
developing switch-level analyzers such as SLS [12], MOSSIM-
II [1], and ANAMOS [2]. Switch-level models have found
extensive applications in academia and industry [2], [13].
In addition, there has been work on equivalence verifica-
tion and conservative reachability analysis of small ana-
log circuits [14], [15], [16], [17]. Finally, the PROSYD
project (http://www.prosyd.org) aims to provide an
assertion-based run-time monitoring tool supporting STL or
PSL properties in analog circuits. This tool has been applied
on simulation traces from a flash memory [18].
Our framework has been inspired by recent efforts of Bhadra
et al [3] on behaviorally formalizing transistor implementa-
tions of custom memories. They show how to abstract SRAM
designs using parameterized regular expressions, and compare
those abstractions with a high-level memory specification
using STE. However, a limitation of that work is the difficulty
to correspond the abstract models with analog simulations; our
approach overcomes this by carefully constructing our library
of state machine models to formalize behaviors of design units
that have direct correspondence with SPICE simulations.
Our key insight is that although custom memories consist of
complex analog components, the behavioral characteristics of
the components are well-understood, at least within the limited
range of operating conditions. By focusing on the behavior
rather than the structure of components, we circumvent the
complex problem of abstracting analog operations with a
discrete algebra, and formalize memory implementations as
interactive compositions of relatively simple state machines.
To our knowledge, ours is the first platform that permits formal
analysis of both SRAM and flash memories. Note, however,
that our approach can only be applied to memory designs
constructed by interconnection of well-defined components;
in particular, we cannot abstract an arbitrary transistor netlist.
In future work, we plan to explore if the approach scales to
industrial memory designs. We also plan to extend our library
of models to handle multi-level flash designs.
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